ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in letter no. 1732/2021 dated 21.09.2021 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) issued by the Director, Jharkhand Renewable Energy Development Agency (JREDA) whereby the petitioner has been blacklisted and debarred for 2 years with immediate effect from participating in any tender process invited by JREDA. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in letter no. 1196/2021 dated 23.07.2021 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the Director, JREDA whereby Work Order No. 43 dated 26.04.2021 awarded to the petitioner has been terminated and earnest money of Rs. 7,76,000/- deposited by it has been forfeited. 2. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent published e-procurement Notice dated 25.11.2020 relating to a tender being Tender Reference No. 10/JREDA/LED/SSLS/20-21 inviting online bids for supply, installation, testing and commissioning including 5 years’ Comprehensive Maintenance Contract (CMC) of Solar Street Lighting Systems (SSLS) with 12w LED light, 75 WP Module and Lithium Ferro Phosphate Battery under Solar Photovoltaic Programme on Turnkey basis across the State of Jharkhand. Pursuant to the said tender, the petitioner submitted its bid and being the L-1 bidder, it was issued Work Order No. 43/2021-22 dated 26.04.2021 for supply, installation, testing and commissioning including 5 years’ Comprehensive Maintenance Contract (CMC) for 2000 nos. of 12W white LED based Solar Street Lighting Systems (SSLS) with Lithium Ferro Phosphate Battery under Solar Photovoltaic Programme on Turnkey basis across the State of Jharkhand. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to submit security deposit @ 10% of the allotted work order value in the form of Demand Draft/ Bank Guarantee valid for one year and performance guarantee @ 5% of the allotted work order value in the form of Demand Draft/Bank Guarantee valid for five years. Subsequently, an ‘Addendum’ was incorporated on 27.04.2021 by the respondent in the said work order demanding from the petitioner an Additional Performance Security deposit of Rs. 23,91,000/- in the form of demand draft/bank guarantee valid for one year on or before 15 days from the date of issuing work order. It is further submitted that due to difficult situation arising out of Covid-19 pandemic, the petitioner requested the respondent to reduce security deposit to 3% of the allotted work order value instead of 10%. 23,91,000/- in the form of demand draft/bank guarantee valid for one year on or before 15 days from the date of issuing work order. It is further submitted that due to difficult situation arising out of Covid-19 pandemic, the petitioner requested the respondent to reduce security deposit to 3% of the allotted work order value instead of 10%. The petitioner also requested for waiving off the additional performance security deposit and vide email dated 13.05.2021, also invoked Force Majeure Condition as mentioned in clause no. 13 of the Work Order due to Covid-19 pandemic. However, the respondent compelled the petitioner to fulfill the terms of deposit with respect to the said work order till 31.05.2021 by granting 20 additional days from the last date to deposit the security deposit, performance guarantee and additional performance security. The petitioner, vide reference no. TIPL/2021-22/JREDA/06-30 dated 30.06.2021, requested the Director, JREDA, for time extension by 30-60 days as well as for waiving off the additional performance security and reducing the security deposit to 3% of the allotted work order value so as to complete the process of agreement considering the gravity of situation owing to Covid-19 pandemic, however instead of considering the petitioner’s request, the respondent, vide letter No. 1196/2021 dated 23.07.2021, arbitrarily terminated the work order issued to it due to non-payment of security deposit @ 10% of the allotted work order value and additional performance security deposit of Rs. 23,91,000/-. Further, the respondent, vide letter no. 1732/2021 dated 21.09.2021, debarred and blacklisted the petitioner for two years from participating in any tender process invited by JREDA with immediate effect due to non-compliance of Clause-3 and Clause-4 of the work order as also forfeited the earnest money of Rs. 7,76,000/- deposited by it. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order of blacklisting has been passed without issuance of specific show-cause notice to the petitioner for the proposed punishment and as such in view of the settled position of law, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The Department of Expenditure Procurement Policy Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, vide office memorandum as contained in reference no. F.9/4/2020-PPD dated 12.11.2020, had decided to reduce performance security from existing 5-10% to 3% of the value of the contract for all existing contracts, however the respondent did not consider the said aspect and passed the impugned order. 4. The Department of Expenditure Procurement Policy Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, vide office memorandum as contained in reference no. F.9/4/2020-PPD dated 12.11.2020, had decided to reduce performance security from existing 5-10% to 3% of the value of the contract for all existing contracts, however the respondent did not consider the said aspect and passed the impugned order. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner had not deposited the security deposit and performance guarantee and kept on requesting for reduction of the percentage of security deposit from 10% to 3% of the allotted work order value on the ground of surge of Covid-19 pandemic. The petitioner also requested to waive off the additional performance security deposit. The terms and conditions for blacklisting and forfeiture of the security deposit and/or performance guarantee have specifically been mentioned in Clause 18 of Section-5 (General Terms & Conditions) of the Tender Document as well as in clause-3 of the work order itself and therefore the petitioner cannot take a plea that it was unaware of the consequence of not fulfilling the aforesaid requirements. The additional performance security was also asked to be deposited by the petitioner as per guidelines of Ministry of Renewable Energy, Government of India only to ensure that the petitioner executes the work completely. Though the petitioner was informed on various occasions through e-mails and letters to execute the agreement failing which the work order would be terminated, yet it did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the tender document as well as the work order, resultantly the impugned order of blacklisting and forfeiting the earnest money has been passed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The main argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of blacklisting has been passed without serving any show cause notice to the petitioner specifying the allegation and the proposed punishment and thus the same is liable to be set aside being in violation of the principles of natural justice. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in support of his argument, puts reliance on a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Quess Corp. Limited vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2021 SCC Online Jhar. 1086 wherein while dealing with the matter of blacklisting, it has been held as under: “12. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in support of his argument, puts reliance on a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Quess Corp. Limited vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2021 SCC Online Jhar. 1086 wherein while dealing with the matter of blacklisting, it has been held as under: “12. In the aforesaid cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that blacklisting involves civil consequences. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties, but any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any its instrumentalities not only on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. It has also been held that a show-cause notice should contain the grounds of contemplated action as well as the penalty/action proposed to be imposed/taken.” 7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further puts reliance on a recent judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Lava International Limited, Noida, vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2022 (2) JLJR 583 wherein after referring to several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court on the issue of blacklisting/debarment, it has been held as under: “15. In the case of UMC Technologies Private Limited vs. Food Corporation of India and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 551 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “13. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or interests are being affected should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can defend himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. This Court in [Nasir Ahmad vs. Custodian General, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1 ] has held that it is essential for the notice to specify the particular grounds on the basis of which an action is proposed to be taken so as to enable the noticee to answer the case against him. If these conditions are not satisfied, the person cannot be said to have been granted any reasonable opportunity of being heard. 14. Specifically, in the context of blacklisting of a person or an entity by the State or a State Corporation, the requirement of a valid, particularised and unambiguous show-cause notice is particularly crucial due to the severe consequences of blacklisting and the stigmatisation that accrues to the person/entity being blacklisted. Here, it may be gainful to describe the concept of blacklisting and the graveness of the consequences occasioned by it. Blacklisting has the effect of denying a person or an entity the privileged opportunity of entering into government contracts. This privilege arises because it is the State who is the counterparty in government contracts and as such, every eligible person is to be afforded an equal opportunity to participate in such contracts, without arbitrariness and discrimination. Not only does blacklisting take away this privilege, it also tarnishes the blacklisted person's reputation and brings the person's character into question. Blacklisting also has long-lasting civil consequences for the future business prospects of the blacklisted person.” 16. In the case of Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2021) 1 SCC 804 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “8. There is no dispute that the injection was not supplied to the respondents by the appellant. Yet the show-cause notice dated 21-10-2008 referred to further action in terms of the tender for supplying misbranded medicine to the appellant. Furthermore, the show-cause notice did not state that action by blacklisting was to be taken, or was under contemplation. It only mentioned appropriate action in accordance with the rules of the tender. The fact that the terms of the tender may have provided for blacklisting is irrelevant in the facts of the case. Furthermore, the show-cause notice did not state that action by blacklisting was to be taken, or was under contemplation. It only mentioned appropriate action in accordance with the rules of the tender. The fact that the terms of the tender may have provided for blacklisting is irrelevant in the facts of the case. In the absence of any supply by the appellant, the order of blacklisting dated 8-9-2009 invoking Clauses 8.12 and 8.23 of the tender is a fundamental flaw, vitiating the impugned order on the face of it reflecting non-application of mind to the issues involved. Even after the appellant brought this fact to the attention of the respondents, they refused to pay any heed to it. Further, it specifies no duration for the same. 11. If the respondents had expressed their mind in the show-cause notice to blacklist, the appellant could have filed an appropriate response to the same. The insistence of the respondents to support the impugned order [Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of U.P. 2019 SCC Online All. 6734] by reference to the terms of the tender cannot cure the illegality in the absence of the appellant being a successful tenderer and supplier. We therefore hold that the order of blacklisting dated 8-9-2009 stands vitiated from the very inception on more than one ground and merits interference.” 17. In the case of Kulja Industries Limited vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “17. That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor whether the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court. 18. The legal position on the subject is settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court starting with Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70 , where this Court declared that blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains and that the authority passing any such order was required to give a fair hearing before passing an order blacklisting a certain entity. This Court observed: (SCC p. 75, Para 20) “20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” Subsequent decisions of this Court in Southern Painters vs. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 699, Patel Engg. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 257 , B.S.N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 , Joseph Vilangandan vs. Executive Engineer (PWD), (1978) 3 SCC 36 among others have followed the ratio of that decision and applied the principle of audi alteram partem to the process that may eventually culminate in the blacklisting of a contractor. 19. 19. Even the second facet of the scrutiny which the blacklisting order must suffer is no longer res integra. The decisions of this Court in Radhakrishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457 , E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 , Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 , Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 and Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons vs. Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 , have ruled against arbitrariness and discrimination in every matter that is subject to judicial review before a writ court exercising powers under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. 20. It is also well settled that even though the right of the writ petitioner is in the nature of a contractual right, the manner, the method and the motive behind the decision of the authority whether or not to enter into a contract is subject to judicial review on the touchstone of fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination, equality and proportionality. All these considerations that go to determine whether the action is sustainable in law have been sanctified by judicial pronouncements of this Court and are of seminal importance in a system that is committed to the rule of law. We do not consider it necessary to burden this judgment by a copious reference to the decisions on the subject. A reference to the following passage from the decision of this Court in Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752 , should, in our view, suffice: (SCC pp. 760-761, Para 12) “12. It is well settled that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this Court in Radhakrishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457 ..........In case any right conferred on the citizens which is sought to be interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in State action of this type of entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14 springs up and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable.......It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.” 18. In the case of Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (1975) 1 SCC 70 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “17. The Government is a Government of laws and not of men. It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. This privilege arises because it is the Government which is trading with the public and the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions. Hohfeld treats privileges as a form of liberty as opposed to a duty. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with any one but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Reputation is a part of a person's character and personality. Blacklisting tarnishes one's reputation. 18. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with any one but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Reputation is a part of a person's character and personality. Blacklisting tarnishes one's reputation. 18. Exclusion of a member of the public from dealing with a State in sales transactions has the effect of preventing him from purchasing and doing a lawful trade in the goods in discriminating against him in favour of other people. The State can impose reasonable conditions regarding rejection and acceptance of bids or qualifications of bidders. Just as exclusion of the lowest tender will be arbitrary, similarly exclusion of a person who offers the highest price from participating at a public auction would also have the same aspect of arbitrariness. 20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 19. In the case of Gorkha Security Services vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 105 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be preceded by a show-cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded and does not even demand much amplification. The necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts. 22. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts. 22. The High Court has simply stated that the purpose of show-cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural justice, a show-cause notice should meet the following two requirements viz. (i) The material/grounds to be stated which according to the department necessitates an action; (ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second requirement which the High Court has failed to omit. We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice but it can clearly and safely be discerned from the reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement.” 20. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also put reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Ankush Agrawal vs. Food Corporation of India and Others [W.P. (C) No. 2254 of 2018] wherein after having gone through the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the law of blacklisting has been summarized in the following manner: “24. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when a contract is entered between two private parties, in case of any breach of contract by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. However, in a situation where an order of blacklisting has been passed by the State or its instrumentalities, such order is within the realm of power of judicial review of the Writ Court and the same has to be tested in the touchstone of the principle of natural justice, doctrine of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. However, in a situation where an order of blacklisting has been passed by the State or its instrumentalities, such order is within the realm of power of judicial review of the Writ Court and the same has to be tested in the touchstone of the principle of natural justice, doctrine of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the government/government agencies for the purposes of gains. Thus, prior to taking such a harsh decision, the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. The show cause must not be a mere formality, rather the same should specifically mention the grounds which necessitates the action and also the proposed action by the department so that the person aggrieved may explain the circumstances properly. 25. On perusal of the impugned order dated 26.04.2018, it appears that the order of termination of contract coupled with the debarment of the petitioner has been passed without describing any cogent or strong reason for the same. The order cancelling the awarded work is one aspect while the order of blacklisting is another. The order of termination of contract is passed merely for violation of any mandatory terms and conditions of the contract, however, the order of blacklisting debars any person from dealing with the government instrumentality within the time frame mentioned in the order. Thus, before passing the order of blacklisting, it is a sine-qua-non to hear the alleged delinquent to make sure so as to satisfy as to whether the default is intentional or has been caused under the situation beyond one's control. In the present case, the respondent-FCI has not called upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances under which the delay was caused before passing the order of debarment. The impugned order has been passed merely on the ground that in case of default, the respondent-FCI has the discretion to pass any such order. It is a settled position of law that the State or its instrumentality while dealing with any private individual has to exercise the said discretion in a fair and equitable manner. 26. The impugned order has been passed merely on the ground that in case of default, the respondent-FCI has the discretion to pass any such order. It is a settled position of law that the State or its instrumentality while dealing with any private individual has to exercise the said discretion in a fair and equitable manner. 26. For the aforesaid reason, I am of the view that the decision making process of the respondent-FCI in blacklisting the petitioner is vitiated as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to explain the reasons of alleged default.” 21. Law laid down in the aforesaid cases is summarized as under: “(i) The power to blacklist is inherent in the party allotting the contract which is unqualified. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by the statute or reserved by contractor because the blacklisting is merely a business decision not to enter into contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. However, such decision is open to scrutiny on the touchstone of fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination, equality, reasonableness and proportionality. (ii) A person has no right to enter into a contract but is entitled to equal treatment. The Government which is trading with the public and the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions. (iii) Blacklisting has long-lasting civil consequences for the future business prospects of the blacklisted person. It also tarnishes the blacklisted person's reputation and brings the person's character into question. In the matter of blacklisting a valid, particularised and unambiguous show-cause notice should be served stating the grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken as well as the proposed action so as to enable the notice to answer the case. (iv) In order to fulfil the requirement of principle of natural justice, a show cause notice should meet two requirements i.e. the materials/grounds to be stated which according to the department necessitates an action and particular penalty which is proposed to be taken.” 8. In the case in hand, on perusal of record, I find substance in the argument of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that no specific show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner before passing the order of blacklisting. 9. In the case in hand, on perusal of record, I find substance in the argument of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that no specific show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner before passing the order of blacklisting. 9. The stand of learned counsel for the respondent is that in view of Clause 18 of General Terms and Conditions of the Tender Document as well as the work order, the JREDA was at liberty to blacklist the petitioner in case of its default and accordingly, the impugned order has been passed blacklisting the petitioner invoking the said clause which needs no interference of this court. I am of the considered view that though there was stipulation in the tender document and the work order with respect to passing an order of blacklisting for non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the same, still the respondent was obliged to issue show cause notice to the petitioner mentioning the allegation as well as the proposed punishment and thereafter to pass final order providing sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in view of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments as the order of blacklisting has severe civil consequences. Moreover, the period of blacklisting has neither been mentioned in the Tender Document nor in the Work Order. Any specific reason for fixing the period of punishment of blacklisting has also not been mentioned in the impugned order. The respondent was duty bound to determine the period of punishment looking to the nature of allegation levelled against the petitioner and its past performance. Clause 18 of the General Terms and Conditions also speaks about serving of fifteen days’ prior notice for passing any order under the said clause which has not been followed by the respondent. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order as contained in letter no. 1732/2021 dated 21.09.2021 issued by the Director, JREDA is hereby quashed. Since, the petitioner has already suffered the consequence of blacklisting for about 10 months out of two years, this Court is not inclined to remand the matter to the respondent to pass fresh order on the said issue. 11. So far as the claim of the petitioner for refund of earnest money is concerned, this Court does not feel appropriate to entertain the same on merit. 11. So far as the claim of the petitioner for refund of earnest money is concerned, this Court does not feel appropriate to entertain the same on merit. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to move before the Director, JREDA raising the said claim which shall be dealt with by the said authority in accordance with law. 12. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in part.