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2022 DIGILAW 94 (TS)

T. S. Anand v. State of Telangana

2022-02-22

A.ABHISHEK REDDY

body2022
ORDER : A. Abhishek Reddy, J. 1. Seeking to call for the records pertaining to proceedings in case No. F1/74/2019 dated 06.06.2020 of respondent No. 2 and to quash the same as illegal and arbitrary, the present Writ Petition is filed. With the consent of both the parties, the present writ petition is being taken up and disposed of on merits. 2. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that land in survey No. 145 totally admeasuring Acs. 7-29 guntas situated at Manchirevula Village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, is an Inam Dastagardan land. That one Syed Mohd. Hyder Hassan was the inamdar of the said land, whereas one Lankala Mallaiah @ Malta Reddy was in physical possession of the said land. Accordingly, the names of the above persons were recorded as inamdar and possessor of the subject land respectively in the pahames including the pahani for the year 1973-74. It is the case of the petitioners that one Mohammed Hussain filed a suit in O.S. No. 57/1 of 1950-51 before the Munsif Magistrate, West Hyderabad, seeking eviction of the possessor Sri Lankala Mallaiah @ Malla Reddy from the land in survey Nos. 145, 146, 156, 157 and 158 of Manchirevula Village and for recovery of lease amount from him on the ground that he failed to pay the lease amount. The said suit was partly decreed directing payment of kaul and rejecting the relief seeking eviction of Sri Lankala Mallaiah @ Malla Reddy. Thereafter, the names of respective legal representatives of Inamdar and Lankala Mallaiah were recorded in the revenue records. While so, Lankala Narayana Reddy S/o. Lankala Mallaiah @ Malla Reddy filed an application dated 04.12.1997 in Form-1 under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1995 (sic 1955) (for short 'the Inam Abolition Act'), and the Rules made thereunder, for grant of Occupancy Rights Certificate (ORC). After issuing notices to all the interested parties and calling for a report from the Mandal Revenue Officer, ORC has been granted by the Revenue Divisional Officer vide file No. L/795/98 dated 03.11.2001. Thereafter, said Lankala Narayana Reddy has sold the land admeasuring Acs. 7-29 guntas in survey No. 145 for a valuable consideration vide registered document Nos. 694 of 2003 and 695 of 2003 and the petitioners were put in physical and lawful possession of the same. Thereafter, said Lankala Narayana Reddy has sold the land admeasuring Acs. 7-29 guntas in survey No. 145 for a valuable consideration vide registered document Nos. 694 of 2003 and 695 of 2003 and the petitioners were put in physical and lawful possession of the same. Subsequently, the petitioners along with adjoining land have developed the land into an integrated layout of residential plots and sold to third parties through registered sale deeds. Later, the said plots were regularized under LRS Scheme by HMDA. It is further stated that respondent No. 5 suppressing all these material facts including granting of ORC in favour of Lankala Narayana Reddy, had submitted an application dated 20.02.2015 in Form VI-A before the Tahsildar, Rajendranagar-respondent No. 4, in respect of land admeasuring Acs. 4-25 guntas in survey No. 145 (subject land) seeking mutation of his name in the revenue records basing on the certificate purported to have been issued under Section 38-E of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short the Tenancy Act'), dated 15.05.1975 issued by the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad. That without considering the inordinate delay in filing the application seeking mutation, the respondent No. 4 had numbered the case vide No. D/135/2015 and allowed the prayer of the respondent No. 5 vide order dated 04.05.2017. Petitioners have challenged the same before respondent No. 3, who vide proceedings No. C/1502/2017 dated 25.08.2018 has allowed the appeal. It is further stated that the order dated 25.08.2018 in file No. C/1602/2017, passed by the respondent No. 3 was not challenged and the same has become final. Thereafter, the respondent No. 5 filed an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act before respondent No. 2 challenging the grant of ORC in favour of Lankala Narayana reddy vide file No. L/795/1998 dated 03.11.2001. The respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 06.06.2020, has partly allowed the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 setting the aside the ORC granted on 03.11.2001 in favour of Lankala Narayana Reddy to the extent of the land claimed by respondent No. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 3. On 10.07.2020, this Court has granted interim order in favour of the petitioners herein 4. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 3. On 10.07.2020, this Court has granted interim order in favour of the petitioners herein 4. Seeking to vacate the said interim order, respondent No. 5 has filed the vacate stay petition along with a counter affidavit mainly contending that the land in survey No. 145 admeasuring Acs. 7-29 guntas is admittedly a patta land held by Syed Mohd Ismail and Syed Mohd Hussain. In the counter filed before respondent No. 3 in file No. 1/795/1998, it was clearly stated that the lands were held by one Smt. Raja Begum, who sold the same to Syed Abdul Rajak. Thereafter, in the public auction conducted by the Hon'ble High Court and Sri Syed Mohd Ismail and Syed Mohd Hussain have purchased the said land. On the application made by the pattadars, the wrong entry of nature of land from 'Inam Dastagardan land' was changed to 'Patta land' in the year 1986 and the same continued till date. It is further held that the land in question was held by one Syed Mohd Ismail and Syed Mohd Hussain as pattadars and Talladi Balaiah was the protected tenant of the land as reflected in the tenancy records. Thereafter, based on the application made by the respondent No. 5 and after conducting due enquiry, the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, has granted certificate in File No. LRW/44/75, dated 15.05.1975, under Section 38E of the Tenancy Act by granting ownership rights in respect of Acs. 4-25 guntas out of the total kind admeasuring Acs. 7-25 guntas duly considering the possession of the respondent No. 5, as the owner of the land w.e.f. 01.01.1973. And as such, this respondent by virtue of the 38-E Certificate has become the absolute owner and possessor of the said property, that the proceedings dated 15.05.1975 have become final and no challenge was made thereto till date. Thereafter, pursuant to the application dated 29.07.1980 made by this respondent, the District Collector addressed letter dated 05.09.1980 for conducting enquiry. But, inadvertently the name of this respondent was not recorded and taking advantage of the same, the writ petitioners have made an application for grant of occupancy rights claiming themselves to be the protected tenants. Basing on the same. Thereafter, pursuant to the application dated 29.07.1980 made by this respondent, the District Collector addressed letter dated 05.09.1980 for conducting enquiry. But, inadvertently the name of this respondent was not recorded and taking advantage of the same, the writ petitioners have made an application for grant of occupancy rights claiming themselves to be the protected tenants. Basing on the same. Respondent No. 3-RDO vide proceedings dated 03.11.2001 has erroneously granted occupancy rights in favour of the writ petitioners, It is the specific case of respondent No. 5 that he conceded for a compromise only in respect of survey No. 147 but not in respect of survey No. 145 and that he was granted ownership certificate in respect of survey No. 145 in the year 1975 itself. Hence, it is averred that the order dated 03.11.2001 passed by the respondent No. 3 in file No. L795/98 granting ORC in respect of land in survey No. 145 in favour of the writ petitioners is without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the Inams Abolition Act. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. A reply has been filed by the petitioners mainly stating that the order of granting ORC by the RDO in respect of the land, which includes survey No. 145, was a consent order and therefore no appeal is maintainable against the said consent order. It is further specifically averred that, as on the date of enactment of Tenancy Act. 1950, Lankala Mallaiah was cultivating the land and thereafter his son was in continuous possession and therefore the RDO has granted ORC in their favour. It is specifically denied that respondent No. 5 was the protected tenant of the said land. Respondent No. 5 having allowed the proceedings of the RDO to become final, cannot file an appeal before the Joint Collector after a lapse of 18 years and the same is only an afterthought. The filing of 6-A application before the Tahsildar by respondent No. 5 is only for the purpose of creating a cause of action for filing of appeal against the ORC. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for the official respondents and Sri E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned senior counsel, for the unofficial respondent No. 5. 7. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for the official respondents and Sri E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned senior counsel, for the unofficial respondent No. 5. 7. The present writ petition is filed questioning the order, dated 06.06.2020, in file No. F1/74/2019, passed by the Joint Collector, and the subject matter of the present writ petition is confined to only Acs. 4.25 gts., of land out of the total extent of Ac. 7.25 gts., in Sy. No. 145 situated at Manchirevula village, Rajendra Nagar Mandai, Ranga Reddy District. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has stated that the respondent No. 5 herein has filed an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, before the Joint Collector questioning the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer passed in file No. L/795/98, dated 03.11.2001. Learned counsel has stated that by virtue of the impugned order, the appeal of respondent No. 5 was partly allowed. Further, it is stated that without there being any application to condone the delay of 18 years, the Joint Collector, in a mechanical manner, has passed the impugned order after lapse of more than 18 years. That as per Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, the time prescribed for filing an appeal against the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer under the provisions of Telangana Area Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, is only 30 days. But the Joint Collector without there being any application or explanation from respondent No. 5 regarding the inordinate delay of 18 years in preferring the appeal has allowed the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 and set aside the order of by the Revenue Divisional Officer in file No. L/795/98, dated 03.11.2001. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, dated 03.11.2001, wherein the respondent No. 5 herein was also made a party-respondent and in the said proceedings, the respondent No. 5 had not filed any objections for grant of ORC to the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest i.e., Lankala Narayana Reddy, S/o. Lankala Mallaiah @ Malla Reddy in respect of Sy. No. 145. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to show that respondent No. 5 along with others filed objections in respect of Sy. No. 147, admeasuring Acs. No. 145. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to show that respondent No. 5 along with others filed objections in respect of Sy. No. 147, admeasuring Acs. 5.18 gts., and not in respect of the other survey numbers, which were subject matter of the application under Section 7 of the Telangana Area Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. That the respondent No. 5 did not have any objection for grant of ORG in respect of other survey numbers and as a matter of fact, the parties thereto have compromised and stated that they do not have any objection for grant of ORC in favour of Sri L. Narayana Reddy, the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners herein. That respondent No. 5 was aware of the grant of ORC way back in the year 2001, and having participated in the proceedings, cannot turn around after a lapse of 18 years and file an appeal challenging the said orders, more so, without filing any condonation petition or explaining the abnormal and inordinate delay in approaching the appellate authority after a lapse of 18 years. Learned counsel has also stated that even if the contention of respondent No. 5 that he has been granted 38-E certificate under the provisions of the Tenancy Act is also taken to be true, the said 38-E certificate was granted in the year 1975 but the respondent No. 5 never brought the same to the notice of the R.D.O. in proceedings No. L/795/98. The respondent No. 5 having failed to get his name mutated in the revenue records on the basis of the purported 38E certificate has again approached the Joint Collector for setting aside the orders of granting O.R.C. in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners after a lapse of 18 years. That the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer granting O.R.C. has become final as no appeal was filed by any person much less the respondent No. 5 for more than 18 years. That respondent No. 5 approached the Joint Collector after a lapse of 18 years, which cannot be condoned by any stretch of imagination and the same is contrary to the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act and the law laid down by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That respondent No. 5 approached the Joint Collector after a lapse of 18 years, which cannot be condoned by any stretch of imagination and the same is contrary to the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act and the law laid down by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That the Joint Collector has exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the application, without examining as to whether the appeal filed by the respondent No. 5 is within the prescribed period of 30 days or not, and without there being any application for condonation of delay, has passed the impugned order and therefore sought to set aside the order of the Joint Collector in file No. Fl/74/2019, dated 06.06.2020, impugned in the present writ petition. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 has vehemently argued that respondent No. 5 was issued 38-E certificate under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. That as per the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the Tenancy Act has an overriding effect over the Inams Abolition Act by virtue of the savings clause in Section 33 of the Inams Abolition Act and therefore the Joint Collector has rightly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No. 5 and set aside the order, dated 03.11.2001, passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer for an extent of Acs. 4.25 gts., in Sy. No. 145. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer in File No. L/795/98, dated 03.11.2001, and has stated that the respondent No. 5 has never agreed for any compromise or gave up his right in Sy. No. 145 at any point of time. That the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer are contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and therefore liable to be set aside. That under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the rights of the protected tenant cannot be trampled with nor interfered with, once 38-E certificate is issued to respondent No. 5, the protected tenant becomes the absolute owner and without there being any challenge to the said 38-E certificate, the petitioners cannot agitate their rights under the Telangana Area Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. That the Joint Collector has rightly passed the impugned order and the said order is strictly in consonance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act and therefore prayed this Court to dismiss the writ petition filed by the petitioners herein and relied on the decision reported in (1) GADDE KRISHNA MURTHY v. MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER 2015 (2) ALT 534 and (2) An unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 575 of 1981 and CRP No. 1947 of 1982 (common order) in A. Balaiah & Others v. The District Collector, Hyderabad District & Others. 10. Perused the record. 11. A perusal of the record shows that the Revenue Divisional Officer vide order, dated 03.11.2001, has granted ORC to the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners i.e., Lankala Narayana Reddy in respect of Sy. No. 145, 146, 147, 156, 157 and 158 for extents of Acs. 7.29, 4.26, 5.18, 1.14, 1.09 and 1.30 respectively situated at Manchirevula village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, vide order, dated 03.11.2001. The only dispute in the present writ petition and before the Joint Collector is with regard to Sy. No. 145 for an extent of Acs. 4.25 gts. Respondent No. 5 herein has filed an appeal before the Joint Collector contending that he has been issued 38-E certificate way back in the year 1975 for an extent of Ac. 4.25 gts., in Sy. No. 145 and the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer insofar as Acs. 4.25 gts., in Sy. No. 145 is concerned, the same is contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act as well as the Inams Abolition Act. It is pertinent to note that respondent No. 5 herein was a party to the proceedings in file No. L/795/98 before the Revenue Divisional Officer and was arrayed as respondent No. 3 therein. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the respondent No. 5 has not objected for issuance of ORG in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners herein i.e., Lankala Narayana Reddy at any point of time. But, as a matter of fact, as seen from the memo filed by the respondent No. 5 and others in File No. L/795/98 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, they have stated as under:- (i) It is submitted that the petitioner herein filed the above case for issue of occupancy rights certificate in his favour in respect of lands in Sy. Nos. Nos. 145, 146, 147, 156, 157 and 158 situated at Manchi Revula village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. (ii) It is further submitted that the respondents 3 to 15 are concerned with the land in Sy. No. 147 admeasuring Ac. 5.18 gts., as such they have opposed for issue of occupancy rights certificate in favour of the petitioner herein. (iii) As the things stood thus, at the intervention of the well-wishers of the parties herein, they settled the disputes out of the Court. In view of the settlement arrived between the parties, the respondents 3 to 15 herein have no claim over the land in Sy. No. 147 and further they have no objection for issue of occupancy Rights Certificate in respect of land in Sy. No. 147 admeasuring Ac. 5.18 gts., in favour of the petitioner herein. (iv) It is further submitted that all disputes have been settled between the petitioner and these respondents 3 to 15 and they have no claim against each other. The respondents 3 to 15 received consideration from the agreement holders of the petitioner. The said memo has been signed by all the respondents in that case including the respondent No. 5 herein. Further the Revenue Divisional Officer has passed the order in File No. L/795/98, dated 03.11.2001 based on the memo of compromise arrived by the parties to which compromise the respondent No. 5 was also a party. The relevant portions of the said order is extracted below: "The respondents 3 to 15 are concerned with the land Sy. No. 147 admeasuring Acs.,5.18 gts as such they have opposed for issue of Occupancy Rights Certificate in favour of the petitioner herein. As the things stood thus, at the intervention of the well-wishers of the parties herein, they settled the dispute out of the Court. In view of the settlement arrived between the parties, the respondents 3 to 15 herein have no claim over the land in Sy. No. 1-17 and further they have no objection for issue of Occupancy Rights Certificate in respect of Sy. No. 147 admeasuring Acs. 5.18 gts.. in favour of the petitioner herein. They further stated that all the disputes have been settled between the petitioner and these respondents 3 to 15 and they have no claim against each other. The respondents 3 to 15 received consideration from the agreement holders of the petitioner. No. 147 admeasuring Acs. 5.18 gts.. in favour of the petitioner herein. They further stated that all the disputes have been settled between the petitioner and these respondents 3 to 15 and they have no claim against each other. The respondents 3 to 15 received consideration from the agreement holders of the petitioner. On 23.10.2001, the respondents 1 and 2 through their counsel filed a memo of compromise. In the said memorandum they have stated that the applicant herein has filed a petition for grant of Occupancy Rights Certificate in respect of Sy. Nos. 145, 146, 147, 156, 157 and 158 of Manchirevula village of Rajendranagar Mandal. During the enquiry of the above matter notices were issued to the respondents herein and on receipt of the said notices, the respondents have filed their objections while the matter stood thus, at the intervention of the elders and well wishers of the parties herein have amicably settled matter out of the Court in the following mutual agreed terms: 1) The respondents herein declare that the land in Sy. Nos. 145, 146, 147, 156, 157 and 158, total admeasuring Acs. 22.06 gts.. of Manchirevula village, Rajendranagar Mandal, is the Inam land. The respondents have no claim or objections over the above mentioned land. 2) That the respondent herein relinquishing all the rights title if any over the above lands in favour of the applicants. The respondents no objection for grant of Occupancy Rights Certificate in favour of the applicant. 3) In consideration of the above amicable settlement the applicant has paid a sum of Rs. 9,00,000.00 (Rupees nine lakhs only) to the respondents towards full and final settlement of this compromise and the respondents have admit the acknowledge the receipt of the same, that the terms of this compromise shall final and conclusive and bind on either side to effect the compromise............It is___________the certified copies of pahani 1960-61, 1965-66, 1970-71, the lands in Sy. Nos. 145, 146, 156, 157 and 158 shown Dasthagardan Maqtha Lands. The names of Syed Mohd. Hyder Hussain and Syed Mohd. Hassan shown as Maqthadar (land holder) and Sy. No. 147, Acs. is shown in the name of Naganna S/o. Rajanna, In the Occupation Col. The names of Lankala Pedda Mallaiah is shown. As per Memo issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Khasra Pahani and Pahani 1972-73 is not available. The names of Syed Mohd. Hyder Hussain and Syed Mohd. Hassan shown as Maqthadar (land holder) and Sy. No. 147, Acs. is shown in the name of Naganna S/o. Rajanna, In the Occupation Col. The names of Lankala Pedda Mallaiah is shown. As per Memo issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Khasra Pahani and Pahani 1972-73 is not available. As seen from the pahani 1981-82, 1994-95 and 1996-97 the name of the petitioner Sri Lankala Narayan Reddy is shown as occupant over the above said lands. The various land revenue receipts produced reveals that Lankala Mallaiah and his son Lankala Narayana Reddy were in occupation of the lands for the last several years including on the date of vesting i.e., 01.11.1973. That as per the will deed, dated 13.07.1977, that Sri Lankala Mallaiah. S/o. Venkat Reddy executed a will in favour of Sri Lankala Narayana Reddy in respect of the suit lands. ....... In respect of the claim of the petitioner Lankala Narayan Reddy, S/o. Malla Reddy, it is proved that the suit lands are Maqutha Dastagardan Inam lands. The said lands were in possession and enjoyment of Sri Lankala Pedda Malla Reddy. After his demise, the claimant continued his possession over the suit lands in the capacity of L.R. of protected tenant late Sri Lankala Pedda Mallaiah. The claimant father was in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands since long including on the dale of vesting i.e.. 01.11.1973 and subsequently. The respondents who objected the claim later compromised and settled the dispute out of the Court and filed compromise memo withdrawing their no objection in granting Occupancy Rights Certificate in favour of the petitioner over the suit lands. In view of the above facts it. is ordered to grant Occupancy Rights Certificate in favour of the following individuals under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, as detailed below: 1. Sri Lankala Narayan Reddy S/o Pedda Malla Reddy Sy. No. 145 Acs.7.29 146 4.26 147 3.08 156 0.14 157 1.09 158 1.30 Acs.18.36 Further, in the Preliminary Enquiry Report submitted by the Tahasildar, at page 2, it is stated as under. 8. Entries as per Pahanies 1973-74 Name of the village Sy.No. Extent Ac.Gts. Cot No.11 Col. No.16 Manchirevula 145 7.20 Syed Vikarul Hasan 1, Hyder Hassan Lankala Mallaiah 146 3.36 -do- 1 Lankala Mallaiah 2. 8. Entries as per Pahanies 1973-74 Name of the village Sy.No. Extent Ac.Gts. Cot No.11 Col. No.16 Manchirevula 145 7.20 Syed Vikarul Hasan 1, Hyder Hassan Lankala Mallaiah 146 3.36 -do- 1 Lankala Mallaiah 2. L. Narayana Reddy 146/1 0.30 Lankala Mallaiah -do- 147 5.18 Baganna Rajhanna -do- 156 1.14 Syed Vikarul Hasan Syed Hyder Hasen -do- 157 1.09 -do- -do- 158 1.30 -do- -do- ........................ 12. As seen from the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer in File No. L/795/98 and the record, the respondent No. 5 was not only fully aware of passing of the orders by the Revenue Divisional Officer in the year 2001 itself but also participated in the proceedings and filed a memo of compromise and never claimed any right in Sy. No. 145. The petitioner, for the reasons best known to him, kept quiet for more than 18 years and has filed the appeal before the Joint Collector only in the year 2020. Along with the appeal, the respondent No. 5 has not filed any application for condoning the inordinate delay of 18 years and the only explanation stated in the grounds of appeal for approaching the appellate authority after a lapse of more than 18 years is that the orders were obtained by fraud and therefore no limitation applies. The proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer are for grant of ORG in respect of Sy. Nos. 145, 146, 147, 156, 157 and 158 and even in the compromise memo, the respondent No. 5 along with other respondents therein have clearly stated that they have claim in respect of Sy. No. 147 only and not the other survey numbers. Therefore, the contention that they never gave up their claim or compromised in respect of Sy. No. 145 is not only false but and the same is contrary to the record and appears to be an afterthought. 13. Moreover, as seen from the record, the respondent No. 5 at no point of time before the Revenue Divisional Officer has taken the plea that 38E certificate was issued in his favour way back in the year 1975. No. 145 is not only false but and the same is contrary to the record and appears to be an afterthought. 13. Moreover, as seen from the record, the respondent No. 5 at no point of time before the Revenue Divisional Officer has taken the plea that 38E certificate was issued in his favour way back in the year 1975. The proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer were initiated by Lankala Narayana Reddy, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein in the year 1997, which culminated in the order, dated 03.11.2001, in File No. L/795/98, But the respondent No. 5 has kept quiet and thereafter, it appears that he tried to get his name mutated in the revenue records. Though mutation orders were passed but subsequently, the said orders were also set aside by the Joint Collector and the order of the Joint Collector has become final. A perusal of the 38E certificate filed by respondent No. 5 shows that it is in the name of one Sudarshan and others, sons of Tallavaddi Balaiah (late) whereas the respondent No. 5 in the proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer was arrayed as respondent No. 3 and his name was shown as A. Sudeshwar, S/o. Balaiah. The contention of the petitioners that the respondent No. 5, taking advantage of the similarity in the name of the father, is trying to project himself as Sudarshan, S/o. Tallavaddi Balaiah appears to be true. Even if the contention of the respondent No. 5 that the 38E certificate is issued in the name of Sudarshan and others, and that the said Sudarshan and Sudeshwar i.e., the respondent No. 5 are one and the same person is also taken to be true, as seen the 38E certificate is not issued exclusively in favour of Sudarshan but there are others too. The respondent No. 5 has to explain as to how he has become the exclusive owner of Sy. No. 145 for an extent of Ac. 4.25 gts., and when his name is changed to Sudarshan @ Sudeshwar, son of Tallavaddi Balaiah when the proceedings before the RDO his name is mentioned simply as A. Sudarshan, S/o. Balaiah. 14. Admittedly, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 5 is beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Section 24 of the Inam Abolition Act. 4.25 gts., and when his name is changed to Sudarshan @ Sudeshwar, son of Tallavaddi Balaiah when the proceedings before the RDO his name is mentioned simply as A. Sudarshan, S/o. Balaiah. 14. Admittedly, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 5 is beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Section 24 of the Inam Abolition Act. Even though the respondent No. 5 has not filed any application for condonation of delay and has simply stated that the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer were obtained by fraud. The said factum of fraud has to be not only pleaded in clear terms but the same has to be proved by evidence. Simply making a bland assertion that fraud has been played while obtaining the order, without giving the details as to how and in what manner fraud is played, will not vitiate the proceedings, more so, when the respondent No. 5 has participated in the said proceedings and filed a compromise memo. The Courts have held that mere assertion that orders are obtained by fraud will not vitiate the said proceedings, but the same has to be pleaded in empathetic terms and proved by the party asserting and by leading evidence. What was the fraud played by L. Narayan Reddy i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners has not been stated by the respondent No. 5 anywhere in the grounds of appeal before the Joint Collector or in the counter filed by the respondent No. 5 before this Court and why respondent No. 5 has kept quiet for 18 years before challenging the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer when the fraud was discovered, are all matters which the respondent No. 5 is obligated to plead. 15. In Union of India v. M/s. Chaturbhai M. Patel & Co. 1976 AIR 712 the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 2 held as under: "Fraud, like any other charge of criminal offence, whether made in civil or criminal proceedings must be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, suspicious may be the circumstances, however strange the coincidences and however grave the doubts, suspicion alone can never take the place of proof." 16. 1976 AIR 712 the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 2 held as under: "Fraud, like any other charge of criminal offence, whether made in civil or criminal proceedings must be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, suspicious may be the circumstances, however strange the coincidences and however grave the doubts, suspicion alone can never take the place of proof." 16. In State of Kerala vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (1996) 1 SCC 435 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla vs. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 443 , M. Meenakshi vs. Metadin Agarwal (2006) 7 SCC 470 and Sneha Gupta vs. Devi Sarup (2009) 6 SCC 194 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. 17. In State of Punjab vs. Gurdeve Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a party aggrieved by the invalidity of an order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and therefore, not binding upon him. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Smith vs. East Elloe RDC 1956 AC 736 wherein Lord Radeliffe observed as under: ".... An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity [on] its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders." 18. In KRISHNADEVI MALCHAND KAMATHIA vs. BOMBAY ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION GROUP, (2011) 3 SCC 363 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion that order is void. .................. In view of the above, it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it, He has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. .................. In view of the above, it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it, He has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the Court in a given circumstance, the Court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person." 19. It is beyond the comprehension of this Court as to how the respondent No. 5 can allege that the orders of the RDO passed in File No. L/795/98 dated 03.11.2001, are obtained by fraud when the fact remains that respondent No. 5 was a party respondent in that proceedings, he along with others have not only filed their counter therein but subsequently the matter was compromised between the parties by filing a Memorandum of Compromise and thereafter the RDO passed an order which was inconsonance with the Memorandum of Compromise. Even for the sake of arguments, if the contention of respondent No. 5 that fraud was played and order was obtained is taken to be true and correct, still the respondent No. 5 is obligated to substantiate the same by pleadings and by leading evidence in a Court of law as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred judgments. But, the respondent No. 5 cannot get away by making bald assertions of fraud after a period of 18 years. 20. Further, as seen from the record, there is absolutely no evidence placed before the Joint Collector for believing the version of the respondent No. 5 and without, adverting as to how the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 is well within the period of limitation or that the explanation given by the respondent No. 5 is sufficient to condone the delay of 18 years has not at all been adverted to by the Joint Collector in his order. 21. 21. This Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases have held that where a Statute prescribes a particular period for preferring an appeal/revision, as the case may be, the aggrieved party has to file such appeal/revision within the prescribed period of limitation. If there is any delay in approaching the appellate/revisional authority, the party is obligated to file an application seeking condonation of the delay by duly explaining the reasons and also showing sufficient cause. In the absence of the same, the appeal has to be thrown out at the threshold by the appellate authority on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the case. Even otherwise, if the contention of respondent No. 5 that a separate application seeking condonation of delay is not required to be filed before the quasi judicial authorities is taken to be true, still the respondent No. 5 is supposed to give a proper explanation or sufficient cause for filing the appeal with an inordinate and abnormal delay of 18 years. 22. This Court in BARLA PRABHAKAR REDDY v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District AND OTHERS at para 10 held as under: "In the instant case, the 1st respondent did not advert to, either the grounds urged for condonation of delay, or those, urged by the petitioner, against the same. The record does not disclose that there existed any separate order, condoning the delay. Therefore, there is a serious infirmity in the order passed by the 1st respondent. With the expiry of limitation, valuable rights accrue to the persons, in whose favour an order is passed by a Court or Authority. The delay in presenting the appeal or revision, as the case may be. can be condoned only after taking into account the objection raised by the aggrieved party, and by assigning reasons." 23. It is apt to quote the maxim "Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt" - Law aids the vigilant not those who sleep over their rights." The respondent No. 5 having slept over his rights, if any, for a period of more than 18 years cannot file the appeal without explaining the delay in cogent and convincing manner showing sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 18 years. 24. 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as various High Courts have in catena of cases as held as under: In Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2014) 11 SCC 351 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 10 held as under: "The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of" bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone." In Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 15 held as under: "The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court, could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 16 held as under: "Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant. - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis" In Manavalan v. LG. Srinivasan and Another, the Madras High Court, at paras 3 to 8, held as under: "3. Uncondonable delay cannot be condoned. In respect of huge delay, the reasons must be acceptable. Courts are exercised its discretionary power only on exceptional circumstances where the reasons stated for such a huge delay are candid or convincing and not otherwise. In the absence of any reasons, huge delay cannot be condoned. Law of limitation is to be respected in all circumstances and exercise of discretionary power to condone the delay is an exception to be followed. Thus, the reasons stated for condoning the huge delay of 1100 days in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is unacceptable. 4. Perusal of the affidavit shows that there is absolutely no acceptable reason for the purpose of condoning the enormous delay of 1100 days in filing the appeal. The reasons stated in the affidavit must be convincing, enabling this Court to consider the condonation of delay, Huge delay cannot be condoned in a routine manner. Law of Limitation is substantive. Condonation of delay is an exception. Only on genuine reasons, delay can be condoned by exercising the power of discretion. 5. Mechanical way of condoning delay is undoubtedly impermissible. Law of Limitation is substantive. Condonation of delay is an exception. Only on genuine reasons, delay can be condoned by exercising the power of discretion. 5. Mechanical way of condoning delay is undoubtedly impermissible. The condonation of delay can never be a mechanical affair and the High Court cannot condone the delay in a routine manner. Courts are bound to ensure that the reasons for condoning such delays are recorded, so as to set out a precedent and to avoid mechanical way of condonation of delay. When the law provides limitation for preferring an appeal and the proviso clause as contemplates the power of discretion to the Court to condone the delay, then such discretionary powers are to be exercised judiciously and by recording reasons. It is not as if, the High Courts can condone the delay in a routine manner, so as to dilute the law of limitation as contemplated under the Statutes. Thus, in all cases, where there is an enormous delay in filing an appeal, the Courts are bound to ascertain the reasons and its genuinity and the acceptability of such reasons. Every litigant is expected to prefer an appeal within the period of limitation stipulated in the statute. On account of certain unavoidable reasons, if the appeal is filed with some delay, then the Courts are vested with the discretionary power to condone such a delay. Rule is to file an appeal in time and condonation is an exception, which is to be exercised discreetly and by recording reasons. Recording of reasons are of paramount importance in order to maintain consistency in the matter of condonation of delay. 6. Discretionary powers are expected to be exercised by the Courts judiciously. Any reasonable delay or the reasons, which all are valid and acceptable alone can form an opinion for exercising the power of discretion in the matter of condonation of delay. Thus, uncondonable delay cannot be condoned and what all are the condonable delay and the reasons stated and its validity, which all are important, so as to exercise the power of discretion. The very purpose and object of providing discretionary powers to the Courts are to ensure that the justice is done in an appropriate manner. Because of some genuine delay, the rights of the litigants cannot be neutralized and they should not be deprived of remedy from the Court of law. The very purpose and object of providing discretionary powers to the Courts are to ensure that the justice is done in an appropriate manner. Because of some genuine delay, the rights of the litigants cannot be neutralized and they should not be deprived of remedy from the Court of law. Therefore, the power of discretion, which is provided with genuine intention, cannot be diluted nor be neutralized by condoning the delay in a casual manner. Thus, while exercising the power of discretion, Courts are expected to be cautious and the reasons for condonation must be recorded and in the absence of recording any reasons, the Courts are not considering the substantive law of limitation. Therefore, the law must prevail in all circumstances and discretion must be exercised discreetly and with caution. 7. Uncondonable delay cannot be condoned. Law expects that every such delay is to be explained. Unexplained delay cannot be condoned. Such unexplained delay is to be construed as uncondonable. Thus, delay under what circumstances, would be condonable is the relevant point to be considered by the Courts, while condoning such enormous delay. 8. Parties are expected to file their respective appeals within the period of limitation stipulated in the statute. Undoubtedly, certain unforeseen circumstances may be the reason for delay. However, such unforeseen circumstances or reasons, which all are genuine, must be clearly and truthful explained in the affidavit filed in support of the miscellaneous petition. In the present case, reading of the affidavit reveals that there is no valid and acceptable reason for the purpose of condoning the enormous delay of 1100 days in filing an appeal. In the event of condoning such a long delay, undoubtedly, the same will set a wrong precedent and every such delay is to be condoned in other circumstances. Therefore, in the absence of any valid reasons, the Courts would not condone such an enormous delay, Undoubtedly, meager delay can be condoned by taking a lenient view. Even to condone such a small delay, Court has to find out, whether there is any sensible reason for such delay. Therefore, the Courts have to adopt a liberal approach only in smelt delays and certainly not in the cases of enormous delay. Even to condone such a small delay, Court has to find out, whether there is any sensible reason for such delay. Therefore, the Courts have to adopt a liberal approach only in smelt delays and certainly not in the cases of enormous delay. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in arriving a conclusion that the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the miscellaneous petition are neither candid nor convincing and therefore, the delay is to be construed as uncondonable." 25. Admittedly, the lands are Inam lands and the said factum is not disputed by either of the parties. Even if the contention of respondent No. 5 that he is having 38E certificate is taken to be true, he is still obligated under the provisions of the Inam Abolition Act to show that he was in physical possession as on the date of vesting i.e. 01.11.1973 and that he is entitled to ORC under the provisions of the Act. The respondent No. 5 should fit into the persons envisaged under Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition Act for grant of ORC, but not otherwise. Even otherwise, if the respondent No. 5 contends that Sy. No. 145 is a private patta land and not Inam land, the fact remains that, he is not in physical possession of the same since last more than 45 years, therefore, he has to necessarily seek out his remedies before an appropriate Civil Court for getting back possession. Moreover, as seen from the documents filed by the petitioners, the pahanies reflect the name of the predecessor - indenters of the petitioner, the registered sale deeds are executed in favour of the petitioners by the original pattadars and the entire land has been converted into plots and sold to various individual persons. These individual plot owners, in turn, have applied for LRS to the HMDA and separate orders regularizing the plots have also been issued in their favour. Some of the owners have constructed buildings and are paying property tax to the concerned Departments and also obtained electricity connections. A perusal of the photos filed by the petitioners show that buildings, roads, sewerage lines and electricity poles are in existence. Some of the plot owners have raised compound walls for their individual plots and the entire layout is encompassed with a compound wall. A perusal of the photos filed by the petitioners show that buildings, roads, sewerage lines and electricity poles are in existence. Some of the plot owners have raised compound walls for their individual plots and the entire layout is encompassed with a compound wall. When such is the case, the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 before the Joint Collector without making these individual plot owners as party respondents is not only bad but contrary to the well established principles of law. The citations submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 are distinguishable on the facts of the case and therefore not applicable to the present case. 26. In view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector is liable to be set aside both on the ground of laches as well as on facts and the law laid down by various High Courts. The respondent No. 5 was fully aware of the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in the year 2001 itself having participated in the same and at no point of time he has objected for granting of ORC in respect of Sy. No. 145, nor did he plead in the said proceedings that he was issued 38-E certificate for an extent of Acs. 4.25 gts., in Sy. No. 145. The respondent No. 5 having slept over his rights for a period of more than 18 years, cannot file an appeal after a lapse of more than 18 years, more so without filing an application for condonation of delay nor giving a proper explanation or showing sufficient cause for the said inordinate delay of 18 years. The contention that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer was obtained by fraud and therefore no limitation applies is also without any legal basis as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector is nothing but improper exercise of power. The contention that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer was obtained by fraud and therefore no limitation applies is also without any legal basis as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector is nothing but improper exercise of power. The Joint Collector has exceeded his jurisdiction by setting aside the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer after a lapse of 18 years and without adverting to the delay or verifying the fact that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is based on the compromise memo signed by respondent No. 5 and others, which is nothing but a consent order, and therefore the impugned order has to be necessarily set aside. 27. For the afore-stated reasons, the proceedings of respondent No. 2 in case No. Fl/74/2019 dated 06.06.2020 are hereby set aside insofar as it relates to Acs. 4.25 gts., of land in Sy. No. 145 situated at Manchirevula village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. 28. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed. Miscellaneous petitions pending in this writ petition, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.