ORDER : 1. This revision petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter will be referred as Cr.P.C. for convenience) and the revision petitioner herein is the sole accused in S.T. No. 3548 of 2016 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Taliparamba. The respondents herein are the original complainant as well as the State of Kerala. 2. The revision petitioner impugns judgment dated 31.08.2019 in the above case and thereby, he was convicted and sentenced for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter will be referred as NI Act for convenience). He also impugns judgment in Crl.Appeal No. 278 of 2019 dated 05.07.2022 on the file of the Sessions Court, Thalassery by which, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. Notice to the first respondent/the original complainant stands dispensed with. 4. I shall refer the parties in this Revision Petition as ‘complainant’ and ‘accused’ for convenience. 5. The case put up by the complainant before the trial court was that in repayment of Rs.2 lakh entitled to by the complainant, the accused issued cheque dated 10.11.2013 for Rs.2 lakh drawn on State bank of Travancore, Blathur Branch with assurance of encashment. But when the cheque was presented for collection, the same was dishonoured for want of funds. Though notice of demand was issued, no amount repaid. Accordingly, prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act was initiated. 6. The court below took cognizance of the matter and secured the presence of the accused for trial. During trial, PW1 to PW3 examined and Exts.P1 to P7 were marked on the side of the complainant. 7. After questioning the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, though opportunity was provided to the accused to adduce defence evidence, no defence evidence was adduced. 8. On appreciation of the evidence, the trial court imposed simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/-and the fine was ordered to be paid as compensation to the complainant. On failure of pay the fine amount, default imprisonment for a period of two months also was imposed. Crl.Appeal No. 278 of 2019 arising therefrom also was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. On failure of pay the fine amount, default imprisonment for a period of two months also was imposed. Crl.Appeal No. 278 of 2019 arising therefrom also was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. Now the concurrent verdicts of the trial court as well as the appellate court are under challenge before this Court. While arguing the case, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that Ext.P2 dishonour memo was not in relation to Ext.P1 cheque and therefore, dishonour of Ext.P1 cheque for want of funds not proved by the complainant. Similarly, it is argued that the lower court ignored the fact that the entries in the cheque were not written by the accused. Further, it is contended that the complainant miserably failed to prove his initial burden in this matter. 10. In fact, the challenge except in respect of Ext.P2 are matters which would require appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence and the same cannot be done, while exercising the power of revision. However, in this matter, as could be read out from the judgments, it is to be noted that Ext.P2 is the dishonour memo which was issued by the Bank, when Ext.P1 was presented for collection. This contention was raised before the trial court on the submission that Ext.P2 did not contain the cheque number shown in Ext.P1. However, in order to prove Ext.P2, dishonour memo was pertaining to Ext.P1, complainant examined PW2, the Branch Manager of Syndicate Bank, Sreekandapuram Branch, through which Ext.P1 cheque was sent for collection. PW2 given evidence that Ext.P1 cheque bearing No. 160626 was sent for collection to the State bank of Travancore, Blathur Branch and Ext.P5 letter was received therefrom. PW3, Manager of State bank of Travancore, Blathur Branch also was examined and he had produced Ext.P7, the relevant page of the Cheque return register and the trial court found that on reading Ext.P2 along with Exts.P5 and P7, the complainant successfully established that Ext.P2 dishonor memo was pertaining to Ext.P1 cheque and therefore, the said contention was found against the accused. 11. The appellate court also re-appreciated the evidence and concurred the finding of the trial court. Thus, it appears that the challenge raised by the accused to the effect that Ext.P2 dishonour memo was not pertaining to Ext.P1 cheque could not be accepted for any reason. Therefore, this challenge stands repelled. 11. The appellate court also re-appreciated the evidence and concurred the finding of the trial court. Thus, it appears that the challenge raised by the accused to the effect that Ext.P2 dishonour memo was not pertaining to Ext.P1 cheque could not be accepted for any reason. Therefore, this challenge stands repelled. In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court given emphasis to the evidence of PW1 to PW3 and Exts.P1 to P7 to hold that the complainant discharged his initial burden in the matter of transaction led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque. Thereby, the courts below given benefit of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act in favour of the complainant. Law regarding presumption is also settled as well. 12. In this connection, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in Rangappa vs. Sri. Mohan, 2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC). In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and held as under: “The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat, 2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC) may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.” 13. In the decision reported in Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, 2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 Cri. L.J. 3227 the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: “A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.” 14. In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in M/s. Kalamani Tex. and Another vs. P. Balasubramanian, 2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC Online 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT Online 1132 the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under: “Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. …................ 18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, ( 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 Cri. It is useful to cite Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, ( 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 Cri. L.J. 3227, P.36., where this Court held that: “Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.” 15. Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharged the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities. 16. It is the well settled legal position that power of revision is not akin to power of appeal. 17. It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 454-455, Para 5): “5.…...In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the oral evidence....” 18. In another decision reported in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19 the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in Para-14 (SCC p.135): “14.…...Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 19. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kishan Rao vs. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 20. Thus, it appears that the concurrent verdicts of conviction imposed by the trial court as well as the appellate court do not require any interference. 21. However, it appears that sentence requires modification to effect payment of the cheque amount within the statutory limit. Therefore, the sentence is modified. 22. In this result, this revision petition is allowed in part. Conviction imposed by the trial court as well as the appellate court stands confirmed. 21. However, it appears that sentence requires modification to effect payment of the cheque amount within the statutory limit. Therefore, the sentence is modified. 22. In this result, this revision petition is allowed in part. Conviction imposed by the trial court as well as the appellate court stands confirmed. Sentence is modified as under: The accused/the revision petitioner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a day till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/-for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Fine shall be paid as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and on failure to pay the amount, the accused/the revision petitioner shall undergo default imprisonment for a period of three months. 23. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the accused sought for three months time to pay the amount. Considering the fine amount as Rs.2,00,000/-and taking note of the fact that the transaction was in the year 2013, I am inclined to grant one month time from today to pay the compensation. 24. Accordingly, the revision petitioner/the accused is given one month time from today to pay the compensation and to undergo the sentence. Therefore, the revision petitioner/the accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 04.12.2022 to pay the compensation and to undergo the sentence. The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 03.12.2022. 25. On failure to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. 26. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the courts below concerned for information and compliance.