JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:- "It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that by appropriate writ, order or direction: (i) The declaration of the petitioner's account as Non Performing Assets (NPA) by the respondent No.1 may kindly be declared illegal and while quashing and setting aside the same the consequential relief be also granted. (ii) The order dated 16.07.2019 (Annex.12) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur Metropolitan in C.M. No.44/2019 may kindly be quashed and set aside. (iii) Any further proceedings initiated in pursuance to the order 16.07.2019 may also be declared as null and void. (iv) The respondent No.1 be directed to adhere to the regulatory norms of RBI while applying the EMI and rate of interest in the loan account of the petitioner and to ensure appropriation of remittance in a lawful manner. (v) Any other appropriate order or direction as may be deemed just and proper by the Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. (vi) Costs of this writ petition may be awarded in favour of the petitioner. " 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent No.1 sanctioned a housing loan of Rs.19,00,063/- in favour of the petitioner on 04.04.2016 and in lieu of the loan, the petitioner mortgaged his residential house and as per the terms and conditions of the loan, the same was to be repaid in Equated Monthly Installment (EMI) of Rs.19,172/-. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he maintained his loan account with all financial discipline and was discharging his financial liabilities in proper manner, however, on account of some losses in his business, he has failed to repay the installments as per the fixed schedule. Petitioner's loan account was declared as Non-Performing Asset on 1.9.2018 and a demand of Rs.19,58,746/- was raised and pursuant to that, two notices under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act were issued to the petitioner on 01.09.2018 and 11.10.2018. Thereafter, another notice under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act was also issued to the petitioner as some cheques deposited by him were dishonored. Thereafter, proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act were initiated against the petitioner and possession notice was issued to him. 4. Thereafter, another notice under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act was also issued to the petitioner as some cheques deposited by him were dishonored. Thereafter, proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act were initiated against the petitioner and possession notice was issued to him. 4. As per the petitioner, after the proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, he approached the bank authorities and entered into a compromise and an amount of Rs.6,53,068/- was deposited with the respondent No.1 on 16.11.2019 and, thereafter, the petitioner's loan account was regularized with the understanding that the EMI up to March, 2021 has been paid by the petitioner. 5. It is averred in the petition that despite the compromise arrived at between the parties, the respondent No.1 - Bank has again sent notices to the petitioner through emails on 18.01.2021 and thereafter on 22.03.2021 while asking the petitioner to pay the due EMIs. It is alleged by the petitioner that in the said notices, the respondent No.1 has failed to give details regarding his loan account as also the EMI has been increased without notice to him. The petitioner has further alleged that he contacted the respondent No.1 at its local office, Jodhpur and thereafter at Jaipur, but the respondent No.1 has failed to redress his grievances. It is further stated by the petitioner that after obtaining the certified copies, he came to know that the respondent No.1 has applied under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the CJM, Jodhpur Metropolitan, who has passed the order dated 16.07.2019 and directed to provide police assistance to take possession of the mortgaged property of the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that once the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act came to an end on account of compromise arrived at between the parties, the action of the respondent No.1 seeking police assistance as per the order dated 16.7.2019 passed by the CJM, Jodhpur is illegal and without jurisdiction. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 - Mr. Vijay Purohit has vehemently opposed the writ petition and raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the same on account of availability of alternate statutory remedy to the petitioner under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 8. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 - Mr. Vijay Purohit has vehemently opposed the writ petition and raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the same on account of availability of alternate statutory remedy to the petitioner under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 8. The respondent No.1, in its reply, has contradicted the contention of the petitioner that compromise has already been arrived at between the parties and the loan account of the petitioner has been regularized. 9. It is stated on behalf of the respondent No.1 that the loan account of the petitioner was never regularized and no such compromise as alleged by the petitioner ever took place between the petitioner and the respondent No.1. It is also averred in the reply that on account of some mistake on the part of customer care, the actual status of the petitioner's loan account could not be mentioned in the e-mail. It is also stated that the EMI of the loan amount was enhanced due to increase of rate of interest as per the contract entered into between the parties. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has frankly admitted that the petitioner is having an alternative statutory remedy of filing appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAISI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Anr. v. Mathew K.C., reported in (2018) 3 Supreme Court Cases 85 has held as under:- "10. In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings Under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved Under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy Under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding: 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this Rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction Under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection. 11. In Union Bank of India and Anr. v. Panchanan Subudhi, MANU/SC/1229/2009 : 2010 (15) SCC 552 , further proceedings Under Section 13(4) were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- leading this Court to observe as follows: 7 . In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the Respondent failed to abide by the terms of one-time settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the Respondent Under Section 17 of the Act. 12 . The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing: 23. 12 . The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing: 23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the Appellants Under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.) 13. In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank Under Section 13(4) of the 'SARFAESI Act' available to challenge by the aggrieved Under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly Under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing: 27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition Under Article 226. On misplacedconsiderations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. *** 28.......In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him Under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge. 14. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and Anr. v. Imperial Gift House and Ors., reported in (2013) 14 SCC 622 , observing: 3. Upon receipt of notice, the Respondents filed representation Under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken Under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 4. v. Imperial Gift House and Ors., reported in (2013) 14 SCC 622 , observing: 3. Upon receipt of notice, the Respondents filed representation Under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken Under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued Under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank. 15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex- parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payersexpense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: 46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. of course, if the Petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order. 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Anr., reported in 1997 (6) SCC 450 , observing: 32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops. 18. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court Under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. 19. It is time that this tendency stops. 18. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court Under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. 19. All questions of law and fact remain open for consideration in any application by the aggrieved before the statutory forum under the SARFAESI Act." Having gone through the pleadings, I am of the opinion that certain disputed questions of fact are involved in this writ petition, which certainly cannot be decided while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. Moreover, when the petitioner is having statutory remedy of filing an appeal against the action of the respondent No.1, I am not inclined to interfere in this writ petition in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore (supra). 14. Hence, without going into the merits of the case, this writ petition is dismissed solely on the ground of availability of alternate statutory remedy to the petitioner.