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2022 DIGILAW 942 (AP)

Chatta Chinna Pullamma v. Chatta Pullaiah

2022-09-26

SUBBA REDDY SATTI

body2022
JUDGMENT: The appellant, being plaintiff in the suit filed the above second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.08.2014 in A.S.No.49 of 2011 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Kadapa, confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.07.2011 in O.S.No.218 of 2001 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa. 2. Suit O.S.No.218 of 2001 was filed by the plaintiff against the defendants 1 and 2 for partition of plaint schedule property into three shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiff. Pending the suit, 3rd defendant was added. Trial Court decreed the suit and preliminary decree was passed in respect of item Nos.1 and 2 of suit schedule properties and in respect of item No.3, suit was dismissed. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, plaintiff filed appeal A.S.No.49 of 2011 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Kadapa. Lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 27.08.2014. 4. Against the said judgment and decree, the above second appeal was filed by the plaintiff with a delay of 2631 days. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone delay, the appellant pleaded at Paragraph-8 as follows: “8. I humbly submit that in view of the pecuniary facts and circumstances stated above the delay in filing the present appeal is neither willful nor wanton but for the reasons stated above. I humbly submit that if the delay is not condoned I will suffer irreparable los and hardship and the same cannot be compensated. It is further submitted that my substantial right of immovable property is involved in the appeal, if the appeal is not heard and adjudicated my legal and substantial rights in the schedule property being coparcener will be defeated. It is not out of place to submit that I am having good chances of succeeding in the appeal, unless this Hon’ble Court suspends the decree and judgment of trial Court, I will be put to irreparable loss.” 5. Since the appeal is filed with an inordinate delay, this Court ordered notices to respondents. 6. 3rd Respondent filed counter and opposed the application. 7. Pending the second appeal, 2nd respondent died and I.A.No.5 of 2022 was filed to bring the legal representatives of 2nd respondent as respondents 4 and 5. Since the appeal is filed with an inordinate delay, this Court ordered notices to respondents. 6. 3rd Respondent filed counter and opposed the application. 7. Pending the second appeal, 2nd respondent died and I.A.No.5 of 2022 was filed to bring the legal representatives of 2nd respondent as respondents 4 and 5. Notice was ordered in the said petition and Sri S.Ganesh Babu, learned counsel filed vakalat on behalf of proposed respondents 4 and 5. 8. Heard Sri M.Delhi Babu, learned counsel for appellant and Sri B.S.Venkata Ramesh, learned counsel for 3rd respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant relied in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst.Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 . 10. Learned counsel for 3rd respondent relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Anr. Vs. Gopi Chand Atreja, AIR 2019 SC 1423 . 11. In Katiji’s case, the matter arises under Land Acquisition Act and the appeal was dismissed, since it was filed with a delay of four days. Considering the facts and circumstances of the said case, the Apex Court condoned the delay. 12. While considering the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to see whether the delay is inordinate or delay is few days and that reasons assigned are valid and cogent. Party seeking condonation of delay needs to explain the delay properly, the grounds which are reasonable and plausible. 13. In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685 after referring to earlier case law, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraphs 24 and 25 as under; “We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 14. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 , the two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.” 15. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy5, the Hon’ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following principles: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 16. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed:- “17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [( 1962 2 SCR 762 ] (supra), it is observed and held as under:— In construing sec. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.” 18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [ (1997) 7 SCC 556 ] (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 ] (supra), it is observed as under:— “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.” 17. A conspectus of above the judgments referred to supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Hon’ble Apex Court also cautioned that if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. Litigant should be vigilant. The explanation should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and should deal with such application with utmost care. 18. In the affidavit filed in support of petition to condone delay, except stating that ‘in view of the pecuniary facts and circumstances stated, the delay in filing the present appeal is neither willful nor wanton’, no sufficient reason was stated. The second appeal was filed with an inordinate delay of 2631 days. If the appellant is vigilant in prosecuting the appeal, Court will definitely come to rescue of the appellant. Vigilantibus non dormentibus jura subveninet, means that Court protect those who are vigilant about their rights. The long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them. 19. The second appeal was filed with an inordinate delay of 2631 days. If the appellant is vigilant in prosecuting the appeal, Court will definitely come to rescue of the appellant. Vigilantibus non dormentibus jura subveninet, means that Court protect those who are vigilant about their rights. The long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them. 19. In V.Subba Rao and others Vs. Secretary to Government Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Government of A.P. and others, (1996) 7 SCC 626 , it was observed that: “Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time”. 20. The affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone delay does not indicate valid reason. The appellant is also not vigilant in prosecution the litigation. As per the expressions of Hon’ble Apex Court, while condoning the delay, the Court must see whether the deponent explained sufficient cause. Involving substantial rights of parities alone is not the criteria. Unless, sufficient cause is shown, that in case of inordinate delay, condoning the delay does not arise. Since the appellants failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay of 2631 days, this Court does not find any ground to condone delay. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2022 is dismissed. 21. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.