Research › Search › Judgment

Manipur High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 95 (MAN)

Veijalhing v. State of Manipur

2022-06-03

AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, Mr. R.K. Umakanta, learned GA appearing for the respondents No. 1 & 2, Mr. Ashish Deep Verma, learned counsel assisted by Mr. M. Tapan Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 and Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned ASG appearing for the respondents No. 4 & 5. The present application had been filed with a prayer for allowing the applicant to be impleaded as private respondent No. 5/intervener in the connected L.A. Appeal No. 2 of 2018. 2. The case of the applicant is that the Chief of Songpi Village namely Shri Thienkholet Haokip gifted some portion of Songpi Village reserved unsurvey hill land measuring an area of about 120 hectares to the applicant, the present respondent No. 3 and another person in the year 1992 vide gift deed bearing Registered No. G/Deed 85/92 dated 17.07.1992. Thereafter, the portion of the Songpi Village reserved unservey hill land measuring about 120 hectares which was gifted to the applicant, the said respondent No. 3 and another person were partitioned and an area of about 103 acres out of the said 120 hectares of the said land was partitioned as absolute share of the said respondent No. 3 and the remaining area of the said land was partitioned as the share of the present applicant and another person. 3. It is the case of the present applicant that the land acquired by the Assam Rifles falls within the share portion of the applicant, however, the applicant recently came to know that the respondent No. 3 had withdrawn the compensation amount without any authority and had filed the connected Original (Land Acquisition) Case No. 1 of 2018 before the learned District Judge, Churachandpur and that the respondent No. 3, while filing the above preferred case, did not implead the applicant as one of the parties in the said case even though the present applicant is very much a necessary party. 4. Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the respondent No. 3 did not dispute that the applicant is the rightful owner of the land acquired by the Assam Rifles, however, the respondent No. 3 did not implead the present applicant as one of the parties while filing the aforesaid Original (Land Acquisition) Case No. 1 of 2018 before the learned District Judge, Churachandpur. The learned senior counsel submitted that if the present Land Acquisition Appeal No. 2 of 2018 is decided without giving an opportunity of being heard to the present applicant, the applicant will suffer an irreparable loss and injury. The learned counsel accordingly submitted that the applicant is very much interested to assist the Hon'ble Court during the proceedings of the connected appeal so as to enable her to protect her right and interest and accordingly, the learned senior counsel made a prayer for allowing the impleadment of the present applicant as private respondent No. 5/intervener in the connected appeal. 5. Mr. Ashish Deep Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 submitted that on 10.05.2017, the Government of Manipur issued a notification under Section 11 (1) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act' for short) for acquiring one hundred acres of land urgently for public purpose and that except for the respondent No. 3, no one including the present applicant submitted any claim to the authorities in connection with the proposed land acquisition. Subsequently, after taking into consideration the claim of the respondent No. 3, the Collector calculated the market value of the acquired land under Section 15 (2) of the said Act by issuing notification dated 21.08.2017. The learned counsel further submitted that after calculating the market value of the acquired land, the Collector issued a notice dated 11.05.2018 under Section 21 of the said Act inviting any interested person to claim their compensation and raised any objection, however, at that point of time except the respondent No. 3, no person including the present applicant claimed any interest and accordingly, the Collector finally passed the award of compensation dated 11.06.2018. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 also submitted that several opportunities were given at different point of time during the proceedings of the land acquisition process and passing of the award, however, the applicant remained silent for the last about four years and after all the process of the land acquisition proceedings had been completed, the applicant is now suddenly claiming to be an interested person in the land acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel submitted that as the applicant remained silent throughout the land acquisition proceedings, she had waived her right and that as the period of limitation had already expired, the applicant cannot be allowed to be joined as a party in the connected appeal at this juncture and that the application is liable to be dismissed. 7 The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 strenuously submitted that under Section 15 (1) and Section 21 of the said Act, time limitations are prescribed for making objection to the land acquisition proceedings as well as to the amount of compensation and persons entitled to the compensation amount. It has been submitted that in the present case except for the respondent No. 3, no person including the applicant submitted any objection or made any claim whatsoever and almost four years after all the land acquisition proceedings have been completed and when the connected appeal is at the final stage of hearing, the applicant cannot claim to have any interest in the acquisition proceedings and such claims deserves to be rejected outright. Mr. R.K. Umakanta, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents No. 1 & 2 and Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned CGSC appearing for the respondents No. 4 & 5 endorsed the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3. 8. After hearing the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and on careful examination of the records of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that there is no dispute among the parties in the present case with regard to the fact that the present applicant never made a claim or raised any objection before the Collector during the whole process of the land acquisition proceedings. It is also an undisputed fact and found on record that the respondent No. 3 filed an application dated 15.06.2018 before the Deputy Commissioner/Collector (L.A.), Churachandpur District, raising objection to the amount of compensation as provided under Section 64 of the said Act and that on receiving the said application, the Deputy Commissioner/Collector (L.A.) issued an Office Memorandum dated 13.07.2018 referring the claim of the respondent No. 3 as to the amount of compensation for the acquired land to the District Judge, Churachandpur for deciding the matter as provided under Section 64 of the said Act. 9.It may be pointed out that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is a self-contained code and it not only provides for mode and manner in which acquisition proceedings are initiated but also the mode and manner in which the proceedings for making an award as also the mode and manner in which an application for reference by a person dissatisfied therewith is to be made. Under Section 64 of the said Act, it is provided that a reference may be prayed for by a person interested in the proceedings and ordinarily, he should be a party to the proceedings and he is required to file an application for making a reference before the Collector within the time specified therein and the reference to the Civil Court should be with regard to the objection raised in the application, which may be in respect of the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the apportionment of the compensation amongst the person interested, etc. 10. In the present case, the reference was made only in respect of the amount of compensation and no reference has been made in regard to the right of persons to whom it was payable or apportionment of compensation amongst the persons interested. Accordingly, the lis between the party to the reference, i.e., the respondent No. 3 and the State, is with regard to only the quantum of compensation and no other question can be raised therein since a Reference Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction and it derives its jurisdiction from the terms of reference and exercises a limited jurisdiction. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that if this Court allowed the impleadment of the present applicant, who is a third party in the lis pending before this Court and who was not a party before the Collector, the nature of the dispute in the present case will be substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of the applicant will be raised, inasmuch as, the claim of the applicant is that she is entitled to the compensation amount for the acquired land. Since the applicant did not made any such claim before the Collector and since such claim/objection had not been included in the reference made by the Collector, consideration of such claim by this Court in the present appeal is not permissible under law and accordingly, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present application. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Muthavalli of Sha Madhari Diwan Wakf v. Syed Zindasha' reported in (2009) 12 SCC 280 wherein, it has been held that:- '11. The Act is a self-contained code. It not only provides for the mode and manner in which the acquisition proceedings are initiated but also the mode and manner in which the proceedings for making an award as also the mode and manner in which an application for reference by a person dissatisfied therewith is to be made. A reference may be prayed for by a person interested in the proceeding. Ordinarily, he should be a party to the proceedings for making an award. He has to file an application for making a reference before the Collector of the district within the time specified thereunder. Such an application must be in writing and the reference to the civil court which may be prayed for before the Collector would be in regard to his objection as regards measurement of land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested. '12. The reference was made only in respect of the amount of compensation. No reference has been made in regard to the right of persons to whom it was payable or apportionment of compensation amongst the persons interested. The claim of the first respondent has been noticed by us. He has laid his claim on the title of the property. He has prayed for proper and effective implementation of the decree passed by a civil court. He alleged mismanagement of the wakf property by the first appellant. '13. A Reference Court is not a court of original jurisdiction. It derives jurisdiction only in terms of the order of reference. The Act being a self-contained code, the manner in which the reference is to be made and the statement required to be made by the Collector has been specified in Section 19 of the Act. '13. A Reference Court is not a court of original jurisdiction. It derives jurisdiction only in terms of the order of reference. The Act being a self-contained code, the manner in which the reference is to be made and the statement required to be made by the Collector has been specified in Section 19 of the Act. The lis between the parties to the reference meaning thereby a person interested and the State is with regard to the quantum of compensation. No other question can be raised therein. The Reference Court exercises a limited jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction from the terms of reference. '14. Even otherwise a civil court can direct impleadment of a third party in a suit only in a case where it is a proper or necessary party and otherwise has an interest in the subject-manner of the suit. Even the civil court ordinarily would not entertain a petition for impleadment of a third party in a lis pending before it which would enlarge the scope and ambit of the dispute between the parties. A civil court would also not ordinarily implead a third party as a result whereof fresh dispute(s) either amongst the plaintiffs inter se claiming under the same title or inter se between the defendants would be required to be determined.' 11. On careful examination of the present application, this Court also found that the applicant did not give any reason for her failure to appear or made any claim or objection before the Collector during the land acquisition proceedings and also the delay in approaching this Court. In the absence of any reason or explanation given by the applicant for such delay, this Court is also not inclined to entertain the present application at this point of time. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors.' reported in (2010) 14 SCC 309 wherein, it has been held that:- '13. ...................... It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. ...................... It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. If there is such negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner to assert his right which, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party, the High Court must refuse to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner. '14. In Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports this Court had held that it is well settled that the relief under Article 226 is discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that the petitioner has filed the petition after a delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. It was noted that: '4. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar, observed: 'It is well settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably.'' '15. In Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India a Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with the same issue in relation to Article 32 of the constitution, had observed that: (SCC pp. 96-97, para 32) '32. ....... We are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.' '16. Though the afore-extracted observations in Rabindranath Bose relate to Article 32 of the Constitution, a fortiori, they would apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution as well. [See Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar.] '17. Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [to which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a party], this Court had observed as under: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-57) '56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. '57. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. '57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime.' '18. Moreover, in relation to the land acquisition proceedings, the Court should be loathe to encourage stale litigation as the same might hinder projects of public importance. The Courts are expected to be very cautious and circumspect about exercising their discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution if there has been inordinate unexplained delay in questioning the validity of acquisition of land. In this regard, it will be useful to advert to the observations made in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P. where in this Court had observed thus: (SCC p. 494, para 11) '11. .... In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good.' '21. In the present case, as already stated, the respondents did not furnish any explanation as to why it took them 16 years to challenge the acquisition of their lands, when admittedly they were aware of the acquisition of their lands and had in fact participated in these proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector. We have no hesitation in holding that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition of the respondents after 16 years of the passing of the award. We have no hesitation in holding that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition of the respondents after 16 years of the passing of the award. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches on the part of Respondents 1 to 17, notwithstanding its earlier decision in WP No. 2244 of 1991, which decision, according to the appellant, was otherwise distinguishable.' 12. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case narrated hereinabove and for the foregoing reasons, this Court did not find any merit in the present application and the same is accordingly dismissed, however, without any costs.