ORDER : 1. Since the issue involved in all the Criminal Petitions is one and the same, they are being taken up together for disposal by way of this common order. 2. Criminal Petition No. 5499 of 2020 is filed seeking to quash the proceedings in crime No. 303 of 2020 of Mudigubba police station, Anantapur district, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467, 471, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and 206 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Criminal Petition No. 5465 of 2020 is filed seeking to quash the proceedings in Crime No. 245 of 2020 of Peddapappur police station, Anantapur district, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467, 471, 120B IPC. Criminal Petition No. 5520 of 2020 is filed seeking to quash the proceedings in crime No. 706 of 2020 of Tadipatri Town police station, Anantapur district, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467, 471, 120B IPC and 206 of the MV Act. Criminal Petition No. 5524 of 2020 is filed seeking to quash the proceedings in crime No. 615 of 2020 of Tadipatri Rural police station, Anantapur district, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467, 471, 120B IPC and 206 of the MV Act. 3. The allegations, in brief, are that six vehicles registered in Karnataka State were brought into Andhra Pradesh State without No Objection Certificate. The accusation as against the petitioners is that the registered numbers of the vehicles were changed through online of RTA portal as if they were registered in Andhra Pradesh State by mentioning Andhra Pradesh State Registration numbers. It is alleged that the engine and chassis numbers were also tampered by altering two or three digits and online applications were submitted for transfer of the said vehicles, and without verification of the original R.C. transfers were effected in the RTA Office, Anantapur. Later, on coming to know about it, the said vehicles were seized and cases were registered. The petitioners are alleged to have evaded to pay life tax to the State of Andhra Pradesh by uploading fabricated documents into the data of existing Andhra Pradesh based vehicle illegally with the help of A.2 to A.5, and thereby A.1 to A.5 cheated the government officials as well as the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioners are alleged to have evaded to pay life tax to the State of Andhra Pradesh by uploading fabricated documents into the data of existing Andhra Pradesh based vehicle illegally with the help of A.2 to A.5, and thereby A.1 to A.5 cheated the government officials as well as the Government of Andhra Pradesh. In connection with that, 2nd respondent herein made complaints to different police stations in respect of different vehicles, and basing on the same, the aforesaid crimes came to be registered. 4. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there cannot be any second First Information Report for each and every subsequent complaint. It is his contention that in the complaints pertaining to the same nature of offence and since the allegations in all the complaints are one and the same, one First Information Report is sufficient for conducting investigation and any complaints filed thereafter are liable to be quashed. The learned counsel relied on a decision in Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, (2013) 6 SCC 348 and T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 . 5. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for State opposed the same on the ground that every complaint that has been filed pertains to a different vehicle, and there are number of other vehicles wherein the accused cheated the Government of Andhra Pradesh in respect of the said vehicles, and there is no sameness in the complaints for the reason that the vehicle numbers are different from one complaint to the other and the chassis and engine numbers are also different in each and every complaint. He contends that for every vehicle, different complaint has to be filed. 6. In Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (supra), it is held thus: “58.2. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, the investigating officer has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. 58.5. The first information report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.” 7. In J.C. Uma Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh in W.P. No. 11709 of 2020 dated 08.02.2021 a learned single Judge of this Court held thus: (paragraphs 34 and 35) “The documents that are being relied upon are also different in each case and each act of alleged forgery is a separate offence. Different offences are alleged against different people and the role played by all the persons is different according to the prosecution. According to the learned Advocate General, what is forged is not the same as in other. Different offences are alleged against different people and the role played by all the persons is different according to the prosecution. According to the learned Advocate General, what is forged is not the same as in other. The modus operandi and the beneficiaries are also different, vehicle is different, registration of the vehicles is also made under different jurisdictions of the transport authorities. The vehicles are also re-registered in favour of different persons. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, petitioner is not entitled for any relief and the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.” 8. In Prem Chand Singh vs. State of U.P. (2020) 3 SCC 54 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in pursuance of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs is common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging of general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.” 9. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.” 9. In State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav, (2017) 8 SCC 1 relied upon by the learned Advocate General, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “It was submitted by Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General appearing for CBI that as the offences relate to different treasuries for different financial years, for different amounts running into several crores with the help of different fake allotment letters, supply orders, different falsification of books of accounts, different suppliers, Article 20(2) of Constitution of India is not attracted as the offences cannot be said to be the same. Similarly the provisions of Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted. They are different offences and transactions. Reliance has been placed upon Section 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to contend that the period of charge for offence of misappropriation shall not exceed one year. There has to be different trials for different periods. Reference has also been made to Sections 219, 220 and 221 of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is difference between the same kind and the same offence. In different treasuries, distinct offences have been committed though of same kind by different sets of Accused persons. There have to be separate charges for distinct offences and, therefore separate trials are required to be held. Principle of issue estoppel would not arise as parties are different, duties were different for different times.” “It was contended by Shri Surendra Singh, learned senior Counsel on behalf of Lalu Prasad Yadav that the charge for conspiracy against Lalu Prasad Yadav with respect to cases at Chaibasa, Patna, Ranchi, Bhagalpur and other places of Bihar, Calcutta and Delhi, was not specific to the period of defalcation. The charges were general for the period from 1988 to 1996. Thus, it was submitted that evidence has been adduced with respect to the general conspiracy between 1988 and 1996 which included the Treasuries in question in the cases where prosecution has been quashed. It was not the case put up Under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that there was separate conspiracy for the period 1.4.1994 to 30.1.1995. Thus, it was submitted that evidence has been adduced with respect to the general conspiracy between 1988 and 1996 which included the Treasuries in question in the cases where prosecution has been quashed. It was not the case put up Under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that there was separate conspiracy for the period 1.4.1994 to 30.1.1995. In RC No. 64(A)/96 similar charges for conspiracy for the years 1988 to 1996 at Deoghar, Dumka, Ranchi, Patna and other places had been framed. In pursuance thereof an amount of Rs. 89,27,164.15/- has been withdrawn from Deogarh Treasury. As the conspiracy for Chaibasa and Deogarh is the same the evidence has already been adduced in the case relating to Chaibasa treasury. Thus for one and the same conspiracy Respondent Lalu Prasad Yadav cannot be tried over again in view of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure.” “The main question for consideration is whether in view of Article 20(2) of Constitution of India and Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure, it is a case of prosecution and punishment for the “same offence” more than once. No doubt about it that the general conspiracy had been hatched as alleged for the period 1988 to 1996 but defalcations are from different treasuries for different financial years by exceeding the amount of each year which was allocated for Animal Husbandry Department for each of the district for the purpose of animal husbandry. The amount involved is different, fake vouchers, fake allotment letters, fake supply orders had been prepared with the help of different sets of Accused persons. Though there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for different periods. Question arises whether there is one general conspiracy pursuant to which various defalcations of different amounts have been made running into several years from different treasuries, by different sets of Accused persons. Whether there could have been only one trial or more than one. Whether legal requirement is for one trial or more than one in such cases. Article 20(2) of the Constitution is extracted hereunder: 20.(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” “We are unable to accept the submissions raised by learned senior Counsel. Whether legal requirement is for one trial or more than one in such cases. Article 20(2) of the Constitution is extracted hereunder: 20.(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” “We are unable to accept the submissions raised by learned senior Counsel. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, which was allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a particular treasury in particular time period. The charge has to be taken in substance for the purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding the allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry on the basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. The sanctions made in Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation and joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law and various provisions discussed above, we are of the opinion that separate trials which are being made are in accordance with provisions of law otherwise it would have prejudiced the Accused persons considering the different defalcations from different treasuries at different times with different documents. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Each defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be held to be in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure. Separate trials in such cases are the very intendment of law. There is no room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of general conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same time offences are different at different places, by different Accused persons. As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes punishable and the substantive charge which has to be taken is that of the offence under the P.C. Act etc. There was conspiracy hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different Accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in Section 212(2), obviously, there have to be separate trials. There was conspiracy hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different Accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in Section 212(2), obviously, there have to be separate trials. Thus it cannot be said to be a case of double jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for the same offence the Accused persons are being tried again.” 10. In the judgment of the Division Bench of High Court of AP (erstwhile combined High Court for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh) in Jakir Hussain Kosangi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2018 (4) ALD 180 it is held thus: “A careful look at all the observations of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony would show that the bar to the registration of a second FIR was read into the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the second or subsequent information related to “the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or same incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.” The emphasis laid by the Supreme Court was on the sameness of the truth and substance of the gravamen of the charges. As we have pointed out earlier, an important aspect to be noted in the decision of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony is that the Supreme Court did not quash the two FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 registered at two different places on the very date of the occurrence, but quashed only the FIR filed after 3 years pursuant to the recommendation of the commission of inquiry. Therefore, it follows that the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court was not applied to the second FIR filed on the same date.” 11. In Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. Government of A.P. Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department and Others, 2013 (6) ALT 101 (S.B.) it is held thus: “Every crime is considered an offence against the Society as a whole and not only against an individual even though it is an individual who is the ultimate sufferer. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropriate steps when an offence has been committed. [State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar]. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropriate steps when an offence has been committed. [State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar]. A criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance, but is a proceeding initiated to punish the offender in the interests of society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in Society that certain acts are constituted as offences, and a right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. Punishment of the offender in the interests of society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for the larger good of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus-standi. The locus-standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. [Sheo Nandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar, R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay] Registration of a complaint, under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is not victim-specific but is informationcentric. Emphasis thereunder is on the information in the complaint and not on the complainant. Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. stresses on the requirement of reducing every “information” relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, into writing i.e. registration of the “information” otherwise called an F.I.R. No matter who the informant is, as long as the information received relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. mandates the officer, in charge of a Police Station, to reduce the information into writing and enter the substance thereof in a book kept by such an officer. While the victim would, undoubtedly, be aggrieved on a congnizable offence having been committed against him, it is not only he but anyone else, in the know of such an offence having been committed, who can also convey such information to the officer in-charge of a police station. This can be better explained by way of an illustration. If one offence is committed against several persons each of them would be a “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. whereunder a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission, for which an accused person is charged, is a “victim” including his or her guardian or legal heir. If one offence is committed against several persons each of them would be a “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. whereunder a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission, for which an accused person is charged, is a “victim” including his or her guardian or legal heir. Any one of such victims can inform the police officer of a cognizable offence having been committed and such information is required to be reduced into writing (i.e. an FIR). Once an FIR is registered the investigation thereinto would include all victims and not merely the victim who has provided information to the police. The necessity of the other “victims” giving complaints becomes superfluous as the information, relating thereto, has already been recorded as an FIR. There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which confers a right on each of the victims to make a complaint, or a corresponding obligation on the police officer to register each of them as an FIR, when an FIR has already been registered in the police station with respect to the said occurrence/incident. Registration of a complaint, under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is not victim-specific but is information-centric. Emphasis thereunder is on the information in the complaint and not on the complainant. Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. stresses on the requirement of reducing every “information” relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, into writing i.e. registration of the “information” otherwise called an F.I.R. No matter who the informant is, as long as the information received relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. mandates the officer, in charge of a Police Station, to reduce the information into writing and enter the substance thereof in a book kept by such an officer. While the victim would, undoubtedly, be aggrieved on a congnizable offence having been committed against him, it is not only he but anyone else, in the know of such an offence having been committed, who can also convey such information to the officer in-charge of a police station. This can be better explained by way of an illustration. While the victim would, undoubtedly, be aggrieved on a congnizable offence having been committed against him, it is not only he but anyone else, in the know of such an offence having been committed, who can also convey such information to the officer in-charge of a police station. This can be better explained by way of an illustration. If one offence is committed against several persons each of them would be a “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. whereunder a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission, for which an accused person is charged, is a “victim” including his or her guardian or legal heir. Any one of such victims can inform the police officer of a cognizable offence having been committed and such information is required to be reduced into writing (i.e. an FIR). Once an FIR is registered the investigation thereinto would include all victims and not merely the victim who has provided information to the police. The necessity of the other “victims” giving complaints becomes superfluous as the information, relating thereto, has already been recorded as an FIR. There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which confers a right on each of the victims to make a complaint, or a corresponding obligation on the police officer to register each of them as an FIR, when an FIR has already been registered in the police station with respect to the said occurrence/incident. Wherever the Code requires only the victim, or the person aggrieved, to make a complaint and for the Magistrate to take cognizance thereof, it has so provided as in Sections 198 and 199 Cr.P.C. Unlike Sections 198 and 199 Cr.P.C. which enable the Court to take cognizance of an offence only upon a complaint made by a person aggrieved by the offence, Section 190(1)(a) does not place any such restriction and enables the Court to take cognizance on receipt of a complaint of facts from any person as long as the complaint alleges commission of a cognizable offence. The right conferred on the victim, except where the Cr.P.C. has expressly provided otherwise, is only to have the offence investigated, and the offender tried and convicted. Investigation into the commission of a cognizable offence is, necessarily, preceded by information being received and recorded by an officer in charge of the police station. The right conferred on the victim, except where the Cr.P.C. has expressly provided otherwise, is only to have the offence investigated, and the offender tried and convicted. Investigation into the commission of a cognizable offence is, necessarily, preceded by information being received and recorded by an officer in charge of the police station. It is wholly unnecessary for the officer, in charge of a Police Station, to receive and record the complaint given by each “victim” of the very same offence, and it would suffice if information of the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded and is investigated from whatever source the information may have been received. The statutory right conferred on a victim or the statutory obligation cast on a police officer is only to have the information, relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, recorded and to have an investigation caused therein to. No right is conferred under the Cr.P.C. for each victim to insist that his complaint be registered under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. even if the information, relating to the commission of the very same cognizable offence, has already been received by the officer in charge of the police station, has been reduced into writing, and its substance has been entered in the book kept by the said police officer. Once information is given to a police station and an FIR is registered, there is no further right given to any other complainant/victim/aggrieved person to have his complaint registered as another FIR provided, of course, that the complaint which he seeks registration of relates to the very same incident/event/occurrence (other than a counter-complaint) which has already been registered.” 12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court comes to the conclusion that vehicle numbers are different, and on perusal of the First Information Reports goes to show that there is absolutely no sameness in respect of the subject First Information Reports. The modus operandi of the accused may be one and the same and the vehicles that are brought from the State of Karnataka to the Andhra Pradesh State are of different registration numbers and the chassis and engine numbers are also different. The beneficiaries are also different. The modus operandi of the accused may be one and the same and the vehicles that are brought from the State of Karnataka to the Andhra Pradesh State are of different registration numbers and the chassis and engine numbers are also different. The beneficiaries are also different. Since all the transactions have taken place at R.T.A. Office which is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of I Town police station, Anantapur, I am of the opinion that all the cases are transferred to I Town police station, Anantapur, which is competent enough to conduct investigation in respect of all the vehicles. Since the modus operandi in all the cases is one and the same, though the vehicles are of different registration numbers and the chassis and engine numbers are also different, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the opinion that all the cases be transferred to I Town police station, Anantapur for conducting investigation. 13. Accordingly, the Criminal Petitions are disposed of. Crime No. 303 of 2020 of Mudigubba police station, Anantapur district, Crime No. 245 of 2020 of Peddapappur police station, Anantapur district, Crime No. 706 of 2020 of Tadipatri Town police station, Anantapur district and Crime No. 615 of 2020 of Tadipatri Rural police station, Anantapur district, are transferred to Anantapur I town police station, Anantapur for investigation. The Station House Officer concerned is directed to complete the investigation as expeditiously as possible. 14. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in the Criminal Petitions shall stand closed.