Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 954 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Jagatsinh Kantubhai Chaudhari

2022-08-10

ASHOKKUMAR C.JOSHI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. The present Appeal is preferred by the Appellant - State of Gujarat under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973, against the impugned judgment and order passed in N.D.P.S. Case Nos. 6 of 2010 [By Respondent Nos. 1 to 3], N.D.P.S. Case No. 12 of 2010 [By Respondent No.4] and N.D.P.S. Case No. 14 of 2010 [By Respondent No.5] by the learned Special Judge, Surat dated 30.9.2011, recording the acquittal of the Respondents/Original Accused Persons for the charges under Sections 8(C), 20(B) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case is that on the day of incident i.e. on 26.2.2010, the complainant viz. Rameshbhai Madhubhai, who was discharging his duty as Unarmed Head Constable with S.O.G. Branch, Surat (Rural), was on patrolling along with other Police Personnel on Mangarol-Sankhavav. At that time, they found three persons coming from Mangarol in Hero Honda Motorcycle in suspicious condition and, hence, they were interrupted, however, out of them, one fled away from the place of offence. Upon making search, they found Ganja from their possession. Therefore, they made a secret report informing the superior officer about the said incident and for securing the presence of the panch witnesses. After following the due procedure as required and after securing the presence of panch witnesses, they inquired about the accused persons and asked their name, and in turn, they replied that they are Jagatsinh Kantubhai Chaudhary and Nareshbhai Mohanlal Chaudhary. They also inquired about the persons who fled away from the place of offence, they replied that he was Maheshbhai Vitthalbhai Chaudhary. Thereafter, they were asked as to whether they wanted to have the presence of the Gazetted Officer or Magistrate during the course of their search and seizure. At that time, the accused persons stated that they did not want the presence of the Gazetted Officer. In the presence of the panch witnesses, upon making search, the complainant found stock of Ganja from his bag, which was examined by the complainant as well as well as the Experts of the Forensic Science Laboratory at the spot and the substance was found to be a Ganja - a prohibited drug 4.182 Kg. Upon asking the pass permit, the accused did not have any such documents. Thereafter, 100 gm samples from each parcel were taken in the presence of panch witnesses. Upon asking the pass permit, the accused did not have any such documents. Thereafter, 100 gm samples from each parcel were taken in the presence of panch witnesses. The contraband article and samples were sealed in the presence of the panch witnesses and after having registered the regular case, the samples were sent to FSL for examination. The substance sent to FSL by the Investigating Agency is identified as Ganja. Thereby the accused have committed the alleged offences under the N.D.P.S. Act. 3. Upon such, FIR being C.R.No.II-7/2010 came to be registered with Mangrol Police Station, Surat under Sections 8(C), 20(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act. On the basis of the complaint, the investigation started and the accused were arrested by the police at different points of time, and therefore, the charge-sheet against the Respondent - Accused Nos. 1 & 3 was submitted in the Court of Learned Special Court, Surat, which came to be numbered as N.D.P.S. Case No.6 of 2010. While the other accused persons were shown absconding. Thereafter the second phase of charge-sheet was submitted by the police against the Respondent - Accused No.4 before the Court of learned Special Court, Surat, which came to be registered as N.D.P.S. Case No.12 of 2010 and thereafter the third phase of charge sheet was submitted by the Police against the Respondent - Accused No.5 before the Court of learned Special Court, Surat, which came to be numbered as N.D.P.S. Case No. 14 of 2010. 4. Since all the aforesaid three N.D.P.S. Cases have arisen from the same Crime Register number, all cases were consolidated and were tried under the N.D.P.S. Case No. 6 of 2010. Thereafter the case was transferred and placed for trial before the learned Special Judge, Surat, who had initially framed charge for the offence punishable under Section 8(C), 20(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act vide Exh.6. The charge was read over and explained to them. However, the Respondents - Accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home the charge levelled against the accused persons, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and relied upon their oral testimony, the details of which have been given in paragraph No.4 of the impugned judgment and order. 5. In order to bring home the charge levelled against the accused persons, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and relied upon their oral testimony, the details of which have been given in paragraph No.4 of the impugned judgment and order. The prosecution has also produced several documents and relied upon the contents of the same, the details of which have been given in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment and order. 6. After recording of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was over, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted closing pursis vide Exh.72. Thereafter the Court below explained to the Respondents - Accused persons the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In their further statement, they denied the case of the prosecution in its entirety. According to them, they have been roped in a false case. However, they have neither lead any evidence nor did they examine any witnesses in support of their defence. 7. At the end of trial, on appreciation, evaluation, analysis and scrutiny of the evidence on record, the learned Special Judge, Surat vide judgment and order dated 30.9.2011 was pleased to acquit the Respondents - Accused persons for the offence under Section 8(C), 20(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act holding inter alia that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.9.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge in N.D.P.S. Case Nos. 6, 12 and 14 of 2010 for the offence under Section 8(C), 20(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act, the State has preferred the present Appeal under Section 378(1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 9. Heard, learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant - State and learned Advocate Ms. Yogini H. Upadhyay for the Respondents/Original Accused. 10. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Jirga Jhaveri has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned APP submitted that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences, and thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. Jirga Jhaveri has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned APP submitted that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences, and thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. The learned APP further submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has erred in recording the acquittal of the respondents - original accused. 11. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri referred to the judgment and order as well as the testimony of number of witnesses and also the documentary evidence. Learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of natural justice, hence the same deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. It is further contended that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Court of learned Judge is based on inference not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption not permitted by law and that the learned Judge ought to have seen that there are direct and indirect evidence connecting Respondent with crime produced in this case. In spite of the fact, learned Judge without appreciating oral as well as documentary evidence on record of the case, straight way arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt for the alleged offence under the N.D.P.S. Act. 12. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has failed to appreciate that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order dated 30.9.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge, Surat in N.D.P.S. Case Nos. 6, 12 and 14 of 2010 is contrary to law and evidence on record. The learned Special Judge ought to have appreciated the version of the prosecution witness No.5 - Chetan Chhibabhai Patel, who has been examined at Exh.18 and has supported the case of the prosecution to prove the offence committed by the accused persons. However, the learned Judge without properly appreciating the evidence of this witness has committed grave error in disbelieving and discarding the evidence of this witness. However, the learned Judge without properly appreciating the evidence of this witness has committed grave error in disbelieving and discarding the evidence of this witness. The learned Judge ought to have appreciated the version of prosecution. 14. Learned APP has therefore submitted that the learned Judge has committed error in giving undue weightage to minor omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and therefore the reasons given by the learned Judge while appreciating the evidence as well as while acquitting the accused are improper, perverse and bad in law. Learned APP has submitted that as per the settled principles of law, there are all chances of minor omissions or contradictions which may not result into fatal the case of the prosecution. The learned APP has also drawn the attention of this Court to the FSL report which supports the case of the prosecution and the contraband goods is seized from the Respondents/Accused persons. Therefore, it is submitted that the present Appeal may be allowed. 15. Per contra, learned Advocate Ms. Yogini H. Upadhyay for the Respondents/Original Accused has heavily contended that in the present case, the material placed is not examined. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay has heavily and fervently contended that in the present case the provisions have been complied with, especially the Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were arrested and Accused No.3 was escaped. Not only that, the prosecution has failed to prove its case for the conscious possession of the contraband goods as alleged in the complaint as well as in the charge sheet and therefore also the learned Special Judge has rightly arrived at the acquittal of the accused persons. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay has further contended that there are so many contradictions and omissions including the version of prosecution if we compare with the complaint as well as the contents of the charge sheet and therefore also when the prosecution is failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, this Hon'ble Court may not interfere in the acquittal order passed by the learned Special Judge. 16. In view of the rival submissions made by the learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the Appellant - State of Gujarat and learned Advocate Ms. Yogini H. Upadhyay for the Respondents/Original Accused, it is required to be considered whether the impugned judgment and order can be sustained or not. 17. 16. In view of the rival submissions made by the learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the Appellant - State of Gujarat and learned Advocate Ms. Yogini H. Upadhyay for the Respondents/Original Accused, it is required to be considered whether the impugned judgment and order can be sustained or not. 17. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the Appellant - State and learned Advocate Ms. Yogini Upadhyay for the Respondents/Original Accused, before we advert to the merits of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of this Appeal. 17.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 17.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 17.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 18. In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that: "The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court". 19. Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under: "9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused." 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636 )." 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: "31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) "10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case." 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) "8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this noncompliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case." 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809- 10) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."" 20. To substantiate the charges levelled against the Accused Persons, the prosecution has testified PW-1 - Mohammad Hanif Gulamnabi Patel at Exh.12. He appears to be panch witness who turned hostile and therefore has not supported the case of the prosecution. The prosecution has testified PW-2 - Imrankhan Gulammuhammadkhan Pathan at Exh.14. He appears to be panch witness, not supported the prosecution case and turned hostile. The prosecution has testified PW-3 Amarsinh Nania Vasawa at Exh.16. He also appears to be the panch witnsess. He has also not supported the prosecution case and turned hostile. The prosecution has testified PW-4 Safi Mohammad Ahmedbhai at Exh. 17. He appears to be the Head Constable at the respective time on 26.2.2010. He has deposed in accordance with his official duty, but in the cross-examination, he has admitted that it is true that the so-called Accused ran away who came on the Bike. Further, it is also admitted that it is true that since the police party approached the place of occurrence, at that time, the Accused Persons have thrown the muddamal and tried to ran away. It is also admitted that every proceedings were carried out in the Jeep, where the Accused persons were ordered to sit and thereafter the proceedings were started. It is also admitted that after arresting the Accused persons, they were ordered to sit in the Jeep. It is admitted that he has not given any name of the panchas, and therefore, it appears that the learned Special Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. The prosecution has testified PW-18 Chetan Chinabhai Patel at Exh.18. He appears to be the Scientific Officer. He tried to depose in accordance with his official duty but in the cross-examination he has stated that he has not given the name of the Accused person from whom the muddamal was seized. Further, it is admitted that he has received the names but he has not mentioned the said names in the report. It is admitted that the same is not mentioned in the rough note. It is also admitted that there is no mention about the weight of muddamal in the report. It is also admitted that except primary investigation, he has not done any other investigation. 20.1 The prosecution has testified PW-6 Janmohammad Fakirbhai Mansuri at Exh. 20. It is admitted that the same is not mentioned in the rough note. It is also admitted that there is no mention about the weight of muddamal in the report. It is also admitted that except primary investigation, he has not done any other investigation. 20.1 The prosecution has testified PW-6 Janmohammad Fakirbhai Mansuri at Exh. 20. He appears to be the Scientific Officer in the FSL at Gandhinagar. He tried to depose in accordance with his official duty. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that he has mentioned about the position of seal at Exh.22. It is also admitted that when the sample is to be taken from the contraband goods at that time, the quantity of the main sample would be reduced but the same is not observed in the report. Further, the name of the officer is also not mentioned in the slip. 20.2 The prosecution has testified PW-7 Ajay Ramlal Patil at Exh.23. He appears to be the Police Constable at Kamrej Police Station in July 2020. He has deposed in accordance with his official capacity. In the cross-examination he has admitted that it is not stated in the statement, which is taken before him, so longer as the location of muddamal coupled with bags on motorcycle. Further, it is also admitted that there were so many persons who were residing near the place of occurrence. It is also admitted that he has no knowledge that which co-accused has tried to escape from the place. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the learned Special Judge has rightly observed so longer as the strict proof of conscious possession and the contraband good, and therefore, the learned Special Judge has rightly arrived at the benefit of doubt by holding acquittal of the accused persons. 20.3 The prosecution has testified PW-8 Manharbhai Patel at Exh.24. He appears to be Head Constable. He tried to depose in accordance with his official duties but in cross-examination he has stated that he has not noted the timings of taking the samples. Simultaneously, he has admitted that it is mandatory to mention the date and time at the time of such procedure. Further, when the receipt of muddamal was issued at the time also date is mentioned but the time is not mentioned. 20.4 The Prosecution has also testified PW-8A Chandubhai Bhimsinhbhai at Exh.26. Simultaneously, he has admitted that it is mandatory to mention the date and time at the time of such procedure. Further, when the receipt of muddamal was issued at the time also date is mentioned but the time is not mentioned. 20.4 The Prosecution has also testified PW-8A Chandubhai Bhimsinhbhai at Exh.26. He appears to be ASI at Mangrol Police Station. He has admitted that his statement was recorded after the registration of the FIR and also after receiving the muddamal. It is also admitted that the captioned two mobiles as well as seal is not mentioned in the statement . 20.4 The prosecution has also testified PW-9 Devilal Ukaji Gurjar at Exh.29. He appears to have witnessed the persons at Mangrol Shop Center. He has admitted that it is not true that he has not gone for weighing the muddamal at Mangrol Police Station. 20.5 The Prosecution has also testified PW-10 Lalsinh Jeetsinh Solanki at Exh.31. He appears to be Head Constable on 26.2.2010. He tried to depose in accordance with his official duty. But in the cross-examination he has admitted that prior to any raid, it is mandatory to have the search of the person concerned for the so-called proceedings. Further, he has admitted that out of three accused persons one has escaped. Further, it is admitted that there is nothing on record so longer as checking of other vehicle is concerned. 20.6 The Prosecution has testified PW-11 Babulal Amthalal Sharma at Exh.37. He appears to be Police Inspector at Surat LCB on 26.2.2010. He tried to depose in accordance with his official duty and also tendered different documents including Exh.38 for search, Exh.39 for panchnama, Exh.40 for Panchnama, Exh.25 for availing the sample of FSL Gandhinagar, Exh.42. This witness was also duly cross-examined. He has also admitted that he has not availed the names of other persons who were near to the surrounding place of occurrence. 20.7 The Prosecution has also testified PW-13 Sahelkumar Rameshchandra Tandel at Exh.54. He appears to be Police Inspector at Surat LCB. He tried to depose as per his official duty and also produced different documents. He has admitted that the mobile print out is not examined. 20.8 The Prosecution has also examined PW-14 Devyesh Kanchanlal Patel at Exh. 69. He appears to be Lok Rakshak Police constable at Surat Rural SOG. He appears to be Police Inspector at Surat LCB. He tried to depose as per his official duty and also produced different documents. He has admitted that the mobile print out is not examined. 20.8 The Prosecution has also examined PW-14 Devyesh Kanchanlal Patel at Exh. 69. He appears to be Lok Rakshak Police constable at Surat Rural SOG. He has tried to depose in accordance with his official duty. In cross-examination he has admitted that he has no knowledge about the third person who has escaped from the place. He has also admitted that the place of occurrence is the public place. He has no knowledge about Accused No.3. 21. Thus, on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, as referred to herein above, it transpires that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The learned trial Judge has observed that on considering the evidence on record there appears no trustworthy evidence on record to prove the charge levelled against the accused persons and the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges levelled against the accused persons inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. This Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned Special Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned Special Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 30.9.2011, passed in N.D.P.S. Case Nos. 6, 12 and 14 of 2010 by the learned Special Judge, Surat recording the acquittal of the Respondents/Accused Persons is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P, if received, be transmitted back forthwith.