ORDER 1. They are heard. Perused the case-diary. 2. This petition has been filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the First Information Report (FIR) registered at Crime No.47 of 2020, under sections 376, 294 and 506 of IPC at Police Station Mahila Thana, Palasia, Indore on 21.07.2020, as also the subsequent charge-sheet filed in the case, which is pending before the VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Indore as S.T. No.95 of 2021. 3. In brief, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that on 21.7.2020, an FIR has been lodged by the prosecutrix against the present petitioner under sections 376, 294 and 506 of IPC, stating that she is a resident of Indore and is a divorcee having a four years' old son, residing with her mother, brother and sister-in-law. Further, her case is that she wanted to settle in life once again, and with this purpose to remarry, she uploaded her bio data on a matrimonial site for marriage and subsequently the present petitioner Sachin Jain showed his interest in her, and spoke to her on telephone and after satisfying that she is a divorcee started talking to her from 30.8.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner left for China and came back in the month of January, 2020, however, he spoke to her from his Chinese number and they also Chatted on his web Chat I.D. sachin32jain. Soon he proposed her and also told her that he would adopt her son and as he wanted to meet her, they met for the first time on 21.2.2020 where he took her to a Hotel and reiterated that he wants to marry her and also wants to adopt her son. Thereafter on 22.2.2020, he went to Dubai and after coming from Dubai on 29.2.2020, he met her in Indore and took her to some Hotel at Tukoganj, Indore, there he tried to get intimate with her, but as she protested, he consoled her that he would marry her, however, he did not do anything on that day and left her back to Tower Chauraha (Square). He also introduced her to his sister, brother-in-law and mother and when they also consented to their marriage, their relation became cordial and her son also started addressing the petitioner as his dad. He also introduced her to his sister, brother-in-law and mother and when they also consented to their marriage, their relation became cordial and her son also started addressing the petitioner as his dad. On 26.6.2020, petitioner came to her house along with her mother, sister and brother-in-law to which the prosecutrix thought that he has come to fulfill his promise and take her to the upper floor to talk to her privately and took advantage of her. Thereafter, they left for Bhopal and from there the petitioner also called her to come to Bhopal where they would enjoy to which the prosecutrix refused as she said that as she has still not married to him, her family members would not allow her to go on her own, to which the petitioner got angry and started abusing her and also told her that he has already made contacts with many such women from the matrimonial site and threatened her with dire consequences and also blocked her and when she tried to call the petitioner's mother, sister and brother-in-law, they also blocked her phone number. Thus, the prosecutrix got scared and lodged the report alleging that the petitioner had sexually exploited her and she wants legal action against him. 4. Shri Vinay Saraf, learned senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated by the prosecutrix as it is a absurd allegation that a person would rape a woman on the day when he would go to her house with a marriage proposal and introduced her to his family members, who were also sitting downstairs. In support of his contention, Senior Counsel has relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 para 102 to submit that where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the FIR deserves to be quashed. 5. 5. Senior Counsel has further submitted that the prosecutrix, prior to the lodging of the FIR, had also made a complaint to the Indore Police on 8.7.2020, wherein she had also levelled the same allegation of forcefully physical relationship by the petitioner on the pretext of marriage in a Hotel at South Tukoganj, Indore. However, the aforesaid compliant was inquired into by the police and it was found to be without any substance. A copy of the report dated 16.9.2020 is also placed on record prepared by C.S.P., South Tukoganj, Indore in which the petitioner has been given clean chit. It is further submitted that the FIR itself has been lodged after inordinate delay and there is no explanation provided by the prosecutrix regarding the same. Shri Saraf has also relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another reported as (2019) 9 SCC 608 as also in the case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.11218 of 2019 (Criminal Appeal No.233 of 2021) dated 1.3.2021 wherein the FIR lodged against the petitioner/accused on the promise of marriage has been quashed. 6. Senior Counsel has also submitted that the proposed marriage of the petitioner and the prosecutrix could not take place on account of certain unacceptable conditions sought to be imposed by the prosecutrix that they would not have any issue after their marriage and her son would be their only son and that he would also make F.D.s in the name of her son to the tune of Rs.5 to 10 lacs and as the petitioner was not ready to accept such conditions, he refused to marry the prosecutrix. 7. None has appeared for the respondent No.2/complainant, despite service of notice. 8. Counsel for the respondent No.1/State, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and it is submitted that no case for interference is made out as enough material has been seized during the course of investigation including WhatsApp Chats and other record. Thus, it is submitted that the application be dismissed. 9. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. Thus, it is submitted that the application be dismissed. 9. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. So far as the allegation of rape on the pretext of marriage is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), has held as under :-- “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant’s promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant’s statements are accepted in totality, no offence under section 375 of the IPC has occurred.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Similarly, in the case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar (supra), while relying upon the same preposition in the case of Pramod Surybhan Pawar (supra), it is held as under :-- “9. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant’s statements are accepted in totality, no offence under section 375 of the IPC has occurred.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Similarly, in the case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar (supra), while relying upon the same preposition in the case of Pramod Surybhan Pawar (supra), it is held as under :-- “9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), while dealing with a similar situation, the principles of law which must govern a situation like the present were enunciated in the following observations : “Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it...” 10. Further, the Court has observed : “To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” 11. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the above decision, we are of the view that even assuming that all the allegations in the FIR are correct for the purposes of considering the application for quashing under section 482 of CrPC, no offence has been established. There is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. There is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. On the contrary, it would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave rise to the registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under section 482 of CrPC on the basis that it was only the evidence attrial which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was established. 12. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 26 September 2019. In view of the reasons which have been adduced earlier, the charge sheet dated 25 April 2018, which has been filed in pursuance of the investigation which took place, shall stand quashed. The order of the trial Court dated 3 October 2018 taking cognizance shall accordingly stand quashed and set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. Thus, it is apparent that as held by the Supreme Court, a person would not fall under the definition of rape if it can be demonstrated that the promise to marry given to the prosecutrix was not false at the inception when they indulged in sexual act, but subsequently he failed to honour his promise to marry the prosecutrix. Thus, it is apparent that as held by the Supreme Court, a person would not fall under the definition of rape if it can be demonstrated that the promise to marry given to the prosecutrix was not false at the inception when they indulged in sexual act, but subsequently he failed to honour his promise to marry the prosecutrix. On the anvil of the aforesaid dictum when the case of the petitioner is considered , it is found that in the FIR the following allegations have been levelled by the prosecutrix :-- ß;g fd eSa fMokWlhZ esVªkseksuh lkbV ij viuk ck;ksMkVk 'kknh ds fy, viyksM fd;k Fkk mDr ck;ksMkVk esa eSusa viuh iwjh foLr`r tkudkjh vafdr dh Fkh fd eSa fMokWlhZ efgyk gksdj ,d iq= 04 dk gS fd ek¡ gw¡ ,oa eSa vius ekrk ,oa HkkbZ HkkHkh ds lkFk fuokl djrh gw¡ rFkk eSa ukSdjh dj viuk Lo;a dk ,oa vius cPpksa dk [kpZ pykrh gw¡ ,oa eSaus viuh iwjh tkudkjh ,oa QksVks Hkh viyksM fd;k FkkA fnukad 27-8-2019 ,oa 28-8-2019 dks eq>s izksQkbZy 'kkVZ fyLV dj lfpu tSu esVªheksfu;y vkbZMh Mh-ch-,e- 2188321 us bLVªsLV Hkstk Fkk ,oa bUVªsLV fn[kkus ds i'pkr 30-8-2019 dks lfpu firk Lo- jktdqekj tSu fuoklh vfjgar fogkj lkxj ds }kjk eq>ls VsyhQksfud ppkZ dh xbZ vkSj ,d nwljs dks le>us ds fy, viuh iwoZ 'kknh 'kqnk ,oa rykd ds laca/k esa lEiw.kZ ppkZ gksus ds mijkar rc ls ysdj tqykbZ 2020 rd esjh lfpu tSu ls yxkrkj ckrphr pyrh jgh esjh 'kq:vkrh ppkZ ds nkSjku fnukad 8-9-2019 dks lfpu tSu vius O;olkf;d dk;Z gsrq phu pyk x;k Fkk ogk¡ ls iqu% tuojh 2020 esa Hkkjr ykSVus ds nkSjku Hkh lfpu tSu ls pkbZuk ds uEcj 8615067517901 ij ckrphr gksrh jgh rFkk osc pSV vkbZMh sachin32jain ij ppkZ gksrh jghA Hkkjr ykSVus ds i'pkr esjh lfpu tSu ls OgkV~lvi vkSj VsyhQksu ij ppkZ gksus yxh blh nkSjku lfpu us eq>ls 'kknh dh ppkZ dh vkSj esjs }kjk gk¡ dgus ij eq>ls 'kknh dk oknk fd;k vkSj esjs CksVs dks Hkh vMksIV djus dh ckr djh vkSj eq>ls eqykdkr djus dh ckr djhA esjs gk¡ dgus ij fnukad 21-2-2020 dks ge izFke ckj feys vkSj og eq>s viuh gksVy esa ysdj x;k tgka lfpu tSu ls eq>ls dgk fd eSa vkils 'kknh djus dks rS;kj gw¡ vkSj rqEgkjs cPps dks Hkh xksn ysus dks rS;kj gw¡A vkSj vxys fnu fnukad 22-2-2020 dks nqcbZ pyk x;k djhc ,d grs vFkkZr fnukad 29-2-2019 dks nqcbZ ls okil ykSVus ij lfpu us eq>s Qksu fd;k vkSj eq>ls feyus dh bPNk tkfgj dh vkSj blds lkFk gh bUnkSj esa lfpu eq>s VkWoj pkSjkgs ij ysus vk;k vkSj VkWoj pkSjkgs ls eq>s rqdksxat ds fdlh gksVy esa ys x;k jkf= gksus ds dkj.k eSa gksVy dk uke ugha ns[k ik;h FkhA mDr gksVy esa tc lfpu ls ckrphr dj jgh Fkh fd lfpu us esjs lkFk ckrphr ds nkSjku esjs vaxksa dks Li'kZ dj eq>ls 'kkjhfjd laca/k LFkkfir djus dk iz;kl fd;k esjs }kjk ;g crk, tkus ij fd esjh vHkh rqels 'kknh ugha gq;h gSa rks lfpu tSu dgus yxk fd viuh 'kknh rks gks gh tk,xh vc rqe esjh gks pqdh gksA bl izdkj esjs }kjk fojksèk fd, tkus ij ml le; lfpu us esjh ckr eku yh vkSj eq>s okil VkWoj pkSjkgs ij NksM+ fn;kA mlds dqN fnu i'pkr lfpu tSu us eq>ls viuh cgu] thtkth ,oa ekrkth ls Hkh ckrphr djk;h lHkh yksxks us eq>s ilan fd;k vkSj 'kknh ds fy, gk¡ dgk fQj lfpu ls esjh ykWdMkmu ij Hkh ckrphr gksrh jgh ,oa esjs iq= ds lkFk Hkh lfpu tSu mls viuk ikik crkdj ikik dh gSfl;r ls ckr djus yxk blds i'pkr fnukad 26-6-2020 dks lfpu tSu viuh ekrkth] cgu o thtkth dks lkFk ysdj esjs ?kj ij vk;k ftlls dh eq>s iw.kZ fo'okl gks x;k fd lfpu eq>ls 'kknh djus dk oknk fuHkkus vk;k gSa mlh fnukad dks lfpu us ekSdk ikdj eq>ls vdsys esa ckr djus dk gokyk nsrs gq, esjs ?kj esa mij eafty ds dejs esa ysdj x;k ,oa ogka ij esjs lkFk 'kkjhfjd laca/k LFkkfir fd, blds ckn lfpu o mlds ifjokjtu okys 'kknh dks fj'rk iDdk cksyrs gq, Hkksiky pys x, Hkksiky ls lfpu us Qksu djds eq>s Hkksiky cqyok;k vkSj dgk fd rqe vdsys Hkksiky vk tkvks viu ;gka batk; djsaxsA eSusa dgk fd esjs ?kj okys vdsys fudyus dh ijeh'ku ugha ns jgs gSa blfy, eSa 'kknh fd, cxSj vkids lkFk 'kgj bUnkSj ls ckgj ugha tk ldrh bl ij lfpu fpM+ x;k rFkk Qksu ij eka cgu dh uaxh uaxh xkyh;ka nh ,oa dgus yxk fd esVªkseksfu;y lkbZV ij eSusa rsjs tSlh dbZ yM+fd;ksa ls dkUVsDV djds lacaèk cuk, ;k ढq+ढ+us dh dksf'k'k dh rks eSa rq>s o rsjs csVs dks tku ls fuiVk nw¡xk blds lkFk gh mlus vius uEcj ij esjk uEcj CykWd dj fn;k blds ckn eSaus lfpu dh ekrkth] cgu ,oa thtk th dks Qksu yxk;k rks mUgksaus Hkh esjk uEcj CykWd dj fn;k ftlls eSa dkQh Hk;Hkhr gks x;h gw¡ vkSj esjs lkFk esa dHkh Hkh fdlh Hkh izdkj dh vugksuh ?kVuk bu yksxksa }kjk dkfjr dh tk ldrh gSA Jhekuth pwafd eSa rykd'kqnk efgyk gw¡ fdUrq lfpu }kjk eq>s fookg djus dk fo'okl fnyk;k tkrk jgk gS ftlls eSa mldks le>dj fookg djuk pkgrh Fkh ftldk eSusa cgqr iz;kl fd;k eq>s vc le> vk x;k gS fd mDr O;fDr lfpu }kjk esjk 'kkjhfjd 'kks"k.k fd;k x;k gSa vr% eSa blds fo:) dk;Zokgh pkgrh g¡wA lfpu tSu ds fo:) mfpr dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djus dh d`ik djsaA gLrk{kj ¼vaxzsth esa vLi"V gSa½^^ 13. Considering the aforesaid FIR on its face value, it is apparent that even according to the prosecutrix when the petitioner called her to some Hotel at Tukoganj area, he tried to take advantage of her, but when she said that she has not yet married to him, he has accepted this fact and again dropped her to Tower Chauraha and thereafter after some days, he allowed her to talk to his mother, sister and brother-inlaw and thereafter on 26.6.2020, he came to her house along with his mother, sister and brother-in-law on which date it is alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of marriage on the upper floor. She has also stated that thereafter the petitioner and his family members also told her that marriage between them is acceptable to them. They went to Bhopal and thereafter the petitioner also called her to Bhopal and a dispute arose between them. 14. Thus, it is apparent that even assuming that the prosecutrix had physical relationship with the petitioner at her home, his immediate conduct as also the conduct of his family members clearly reveal that all of them had agreed that the prosecutrix should marry the petitioner. Thus, it cannot be said that what transpired on 26.6.2020 in the house of the prosecutrix was a rape as it was not against her will, or not without her consent, and there was no false promise which can suggest that it was a rape. 15. Also, it is rather difficult to believe that a man who has gone to the house of a woman along with his mother, sister and brother-in-law with a marriage proposal, would commit rape on her on the upper floor. The story of the prosecutrix appears rather preposterous. In view of the same, this Court finds force with the contentions raised by the senior counsel for the petitioner that it is not a case of rape but of consensual relationship, if at all. 16. Resultantly, the petition stands allowed and the FIR registered at Crime No.47/2020 under sections 376, 294 and 506 of IPC registered against the petitioner at Police Station—Mahila Thana, Palasia, Indore as also the subsequent charge-sheet are hereby quashed. The petitioner is discharged from the aforementioned charges. All the subsequent proceedings relating to aforementioned crime number registered against the petitioner are also quashed. Petition stands disposed of.