JUDGMENT : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. Brief facts of the case are as under: In the year 2007 applications were invited by the respondent-Department for appointment on the post of Sub- Inspector (AP). The petitioner being eligible, applied for the same and was declared successful in the written examination. After clearing the medical test also he was called for interview and when the result was declared on 09.02.2009, the petitioner was assigned 28th rank in merit. The list of the selected candidates was published on 18.12.2009 wherein name of the petitioner did not find place. Although no response in writing on the inquiry being made by the petitioner was furnished to him by the Department but it was orally informed to him that as the information regarding his conviction by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhunjhunu in Case No. 45/2003 for offence under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949 was not filled up in column No. 12 of the application form as required, he was not afforded appointment. Being aggrieved by the said action of the respondent-Department in not affording the appointment to the petitioner, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. Vide interim order dated 19.01.2010, direction to keep one seat vacant had been issued by this Court. 3. It has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that: (i) On the date of alleged offence i.e. 08.10.2002, the petitioner was 16 years and 4 months of age and on the date of passing of the order by the Magistrate on 17.01.2003, petitioner was 16 years 7 months and 9 days of age. Therefore, at the relevant time the petitioner was a juvenile and as per the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2000’) the said conviction would not be an impediment in his future employment. (ii) The petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 13 of the Gambling Act which by all means is a trivial offence in nature. The said offence can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to be a heinous offence so as to deprive the petitioner from employment. (ii) The petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 13 of the Gambling Act which by all means is a trivial offence in nature. The said offence can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to be a heinous offence so as to deprive the petitioner from employment. (iii) At the time of the commission of the said offence the petitioner was not mature enough to understand the consequences of the same and conviction too was based on a compromise arrived at between the parties which concluded into imposition of fine of Rs. 200/-. The said punishment was also in the spirit of Lok Adalat and passed by the Lok Adalat. (iv) Leaving of column No. 12 blank would not amount to concealment as concluded by the respondents. The fact is that the petitioner did not even remember the incident having taken place in the year 2002 and the order of the conviction having been passed by the Lok Adalat as the petitioner was a minor at the relevant time. Therefore, there was no intentional concealment on behalf of petitioner. (v) The offence for which the petitioner was convicted did not involve any moral turpitude and in terms of the note appended to Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1989’) the case of the petitioner does not fall within the parameters so as to deny him appointment on the post of Sub-Inspector. (vi) The petitioner stood at rank No. 28 in the overall merit which fact in itself is sufficient to prove that he is a meritorious student and cannot be denied appointment on the basis of a trivial offence committed by him in the past when he was a minor and was not mature enough. The action of the respondent-Department is completely in contravention to the spirit of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. (vii) The persons lower in merit had been afforded appointment whereas the petitioner being higher in merit had been denied the same only on the ground which would not be tenable in terms of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions, relied upon the following judgments: 1. Commissioner of Police and Others vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644 2. Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2021 (4) Crimes 475 (SC) 3. Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions, relied upon the following judgments: 1. Commissioner of Police and Others vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644 2. Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2021 (4) Crimes 475 (SC) 3. Ashok vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 (1) OLR 74 [Special Leave to Appeal (Cr.) No. 643/2020 decided on 29.11.2021] 4. Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471 5. Babu Lal Meena vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2073/2016 decided on 13.02.2017 4. Reply to the petition has been filed on behalf of the respondents and it has been averred that Clause No. 10 of the advertisement specifically provided that if any information furnished by the candidate is later on found to be incorrect, then the candidature of the candidate would be cancelled. The petitioner intentionally and knowingly left column No. 12 of the application form blank which clearly amounts to concealment of the fact of his conviction. So far as the petitioner being a juvenile on the date of incident is concerned, counsel for the respondents argued that the order of conviction was passed by the judicial court and not by the Juvenile Justice Board under the Act of 2000. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits as available under the Juvenile Justice Act. Further, the date of birth as mentioned by the petitioner has also been disputed by the respondents. Counsel further argued that Note 1 and 2 appended to Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 would not apply in the case of the petitioner as the offence for which he was convicted did fall within the purview of moral turpitude. Counsel also argued that in terms of Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code a fine is also a conviction and therefore, in view of the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 a person who has previously been convicted is not entitled for any employment particularly in the police force. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. So far as the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was a juvenile on the date of the alleged offence and therefore is entitled to the protection as granted under the Act of 2000 is concerned, the same cannot be held to be tenable. 7. Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2000 reads as under: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.” 8. A bare perusal of the above provision makes it clear that it would apply only in the cases wherein a juvenile has been tried under the provisions of this Act. It is an admitted position that the petitioner was not tried under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, the protection available under the Act of 2000 to a juvenile cannot be held to be available to the petitioner. 9. The question which would now deserve consideration is whether the offence as committed by the petitioner involves any semblance of moral turpitude or crime of violence. 10. Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 reads as under: “13. Character: The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was educated and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of application, from two responsible persons not connected with his school or College or University and not related to him. Notes: (1) A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completed reformed on the production of report to that effect from the Superintendent. After-care Home or if there are no such homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After-care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable from employment as they proved to completely reformed by their disciplined life while in Prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After-care Home.” 11. A bare perusal of the above mentioned provision makes it clear that mere conviction cannot be regarded as a disqualification for employment. It specifically provides that sole conviction cannot be a ground to conclude that the candidate is not of a good character. The provision provides that the circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association of crime with violence or with the movement, the same conviction cannot be regarded as a disqualification. So far as the conviction of the petitioner under Section 13 of the Gambling Act is concerned, it can safely be concluded that the same is not an offence heinous in nature neither the same comprises of semblance of moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with the movement. 12. In the case of Commissioner of Police and Others vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. 12. In the case of Commissioner of Police and Others vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.” 13. In the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while referring to a decision in Morris vs. Crown Office, (1970) 2 QB 114 observed as under: “11. As already observed above, youth often commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Sections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.” The Hon’ble Apex Court further held as under: “This Court has observed that suppression related to a case when the age of Sandeep Kumar was about 20 years. He was young and at such age people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions may often be condoned. The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him a criminal all his life. .................................... .................................... 23. Coming to the question whether an employee on probation can be discharged/refused appointment though he has been acquitted of the charges, if his case was not pending when form was filled, in such matters, employer is bound to consider grounds of acquittal and various other aspects, overall conduct of employee including the accusations which have been levelled. If on verification, the antecedents are otherwise also not found good, and in number of cases incumbent is involved then notwithstanding acquittals in a case/cases, it would be open to the employer to form opinion as to fitness on the basis of material on record. If on verification, the antecedents are otherwise also not found good, and in number of cases incumbent is involved then notwithstanding acquittals in a case/cases, it would be open to the employer to form opinion as to fitness on the basis of material on record. In case offence is petty in nature committed at young age, such as stealing a bread, shouting of slogans or is such which does not involve moral turpitude, cheating, misappropriation etc. or otherwise not a serious or heinous offence and accused has been acquitted in such a case when verification form is filled, employer may ignore lapse of suppression or submitting false information in appropriate cases on due consideration of various aspects. (4) In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted: (a) In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.” 14. The ratio as laid down in the above mentioned judgments may be summarized as to mean that: Firstly, there cannot be any straight jacket formula to decide each case of concealment of criminal antecedent by a candidate. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances and the impact of suppression of facts and concealment of information. Secondly, if a conviction has been recorded for the offences of a trivial nature and the candidate was of a young age at the time of commission of that petty offence, even if it has not been disclosed, the same would not render him unfit in terms of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. Thirdly, the circumstances of conviction should be taken into account and if they involved no moral turpitude or association with the crimes of violence or with a movement, the mere conviction would not amount to a disqualification. 15. Thirdly, the circumstances of conviction should be taken into account and if they involved no moral turpitude or association with the crimes of violence or with a movement, the mere conviction would not amount to a disqualification. 15. In the present matter, it is clear on record that the offence under Section 13 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 for which the petitioner had been convicted involves no association with crimes of violence or a movement. In any event, the offence was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape and hence as observed in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra), a more lenient view ought to have been taken by the respondent authorities in the matter. The offence at the most can be termed to be an indiscretion committed by a young boy and as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, such indiscretion deserves to be condoned. 16. The present one is also a case where the Appointing Authority ought to have considered the nature of the criminal case and not acted mechanically. Sub-Clause 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 acquires more importance in this regard. The same provides for consideration even of the ex-prisoners for the purposes of employment in the service. The intention of the legislation is clear from the above provision. The intent of the legislation is not to completely bar the entry of the persons with criminal antecedents into service. The purport of the above provision seems to be of affording a reasonable opportunity even to the ex-prisoners who have completely reformed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that any person against whom an F.I.R. has been lodged even once in his life or has been convicted for offence howsoever trivial in nature would not be entitled to an employment ever in whole of his life. 17. So far as the argument of the counsel for the respondent regarding Rule 4 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 is concerned, the same is a provision providing for disciplinary action against the government servant being convicted. The said provision cannot be held to be applicable to the present petitioner who is not a “government servant” as of date. 18. In view of the ratio as laid down in the above discussed judgments and in view of the observations made above, the present writ petition is allowed. 19. The said provision cannot be held to be applicable to the present petitioner who is not a “government servant” as of date. 18. In view of the ratio as laid down in the above discussed judgments and in view of the observations made above, the present writ petition is allowed. 19. Impugned communication dated 22.12.2009 (Annexure-7) is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to issue appointment order in favour of the petitioner for the post as per his order of merit within a period of six weeks of placing a certified copy of the order instant. 20. All the pending applications also stand disposed of.