ORDER : A.Muhamed Mustaque, J. The landlord secured an eviction order from the Rent Controller under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, the 'Act'). In an appeal filed by the tenant, the appellate authority reversed the order of eviction under Section 11(3) and converted it into an eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. In this revision, the tenant questions the proceedings of eviction on the ground that the landlord's claim under Section 11(3) having been dismissed and, without maintaining a separate challenge, the landlord cannot claim the benefit of an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. 2. The landlord approached the Rent Controller under Section 11(3) projecting bona fide need to start a stitching unit. In the upstairs, the landlord is conducting a textile business. The Rent Controller allowed eviction under Section 11(3). The tenant is found not entitled for protection from eviction under the proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act as she failed to prove that the income from the building is her main source of income. Admittedly, the tenanted premises is being used as a godown for the business of her husband. In appeal, the rent control appellate authority, noting the fact that the tenanted premises is a part of the building owned by the landlord, upheld the claim of the landlord under Section 11(8) and ordered eviction accordingly. 3. Perhaps, it is necessary to distinguish the features of eviction that can be sought under Sections 11(3) and 11(8). Section 11(3) allows eviction if the building is required for own occupation of the landlord or a dependant family member. This is subject to further rigour under the first and second provisos of Section 11(3). The first proviso states that if the landlord has another building of his own, in his possession, in the same town or locality, the Rent Controller shall not order eviction on proof of bona fide need except for special reasons to be recorded. The second proviso also states that even if the landlord is able to establish his bona fide need, the tenant shall not be evicted if the tenant is depending, for his livelihood, mainly on the income derived from the trade or business carried out in such building and there are no suitable buildings to shift such business. The second proviso also states that even if the landlord is able to establish his bona fide need, the tenant shall not be evicted if the tenant is depending, for his livelihood, mainly on the income derived from the trade or business carried out in such building and there are no suitable buildings to shift such business. Section 11(8) would come into play if the tenanted premises is part of the larger building in possession of the landlord and the landlord requires the building for an additional accommodation for his personal use. The Rent Controller can reject the application for additional accommodation if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. 4. The landlord is the master of the petition for eviction. A need for occupation of the building may arise in different context. The need projected under Section 11(3) can also be claimed under Section 11(8). It is for the landlord to choose his ground for eviction either under Section 11(3) or Section 11(8) of the Act. The need that can be claimed under Section 11(8) for additional accommodation for his personal use, can also be projected under Section 11(3). The Rent Controller in such circumstances is required to consider whether the need projected would come under either Section 11(3) or 11(8), as the case may be, as projected by the landlord in the petition for eviction. The requirement being in both the cases related to the personal choice of the landlord, it will not change the character of such choice exercised under Section 11(3), merely for the reason that the choice so exercised was in respect of a part of the building, to attract the same, under Section 11(8). The Full Bench of this Court in Smitha and Another v. V.Krishnan [ 2017 (1) KHC 81 (FB)], Kunhammi v. Abdullakutty [ 2015 (1) KLT 795 (FB)] and of the Division Bench of this Court in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy [ 2006 (3) KLT 129 ] have held that Sections 11(3) and 11(8) are mutually exclusive and independent. In the light of the above, the appellate authority went wrong in identifying the need as though it is coming under Section 11(8). In the light of the above, the appellate authority went wrong in identifying the need as though it is coming under Section 11(8). The appellate authority went on to hold that mere misquoting of the statutory provision will not have an impact on the eviction sought in as much as that no prejudice has been caused to the tenant. It is to be noted that the protection accorded to the tenant and the nature of the evidence to be adduced as envisaged for protection are dependant upon varying factors under both the provisions. If the landlord is not certain as to the provision he invoked for eviction, the tenant is likely to be prejudiced in defending the petition for eviction. The appellate authority could not have lightly approached the issue, though in this case it may not have had much impact for the reason that the building is being used as a godown for the business of the husband of the tenant. We are certain that the claim for eviction of the landlord falls under Section 11(3) and not under Section 11(8). 5. The landlord has not chosen to file a revision as against the order of the appellate authority. In view of the fact that we have to set aside the order of eviction granted under Section 11(8) and to restore the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the question remains whether the revisional authority can sustain the order of eviction, without there being a challenge to an order under section 11(8) by the landlord. 6. The Rent Control legislation contemplates eviction of the tenant only on enumerated grounds as referred in Section 11. These grounds are to be satisfied with a pre-condition, to order eviction. The ultimate outcome of the proceedings in a rent control petition for eviction is the order of eviction and the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, can be said to be an aggrieved qua the final outcome of the proceedings of an order of eviction. The aggrieved under the statutory provision as contemplated under Section 11 is related to the order of eviction though the order is based on the grounds of eviction. The aggrieved under the statutory provision as contemplated under Section 11 is related to the order of eviction though the order is based on the grounds of eviction. A Division Bench of this Court in Smitha v. Krishnan [ 2011 (4) KLT 697 ] doubted the proposition of whether a Court is bound to consider the challenge raised against rejection of a claim without there being a specific challenge, while considering the order of eviction challenged in other grounds and referred the question to the larger bench. The Division Bench observed at para.40 as follows: 40. According to us, the obiter in Santha (supra) which is followed as dictum in Ganesh (supra) deserves reconsideration. This is because there is an underlying assumption in both that in law there can be an "order of eviction simplicitor" which can be supported on any ground available under S.11 of the Act. That assumption according to us, we say with respect, is legally erroneous. No such order of eviction simplicitor can in law exist. There can be an order of eviction on any one of the nine grounds (i.e. 11(2), 11(3), 11(4)(i) to (v), 11(7) or 11(8)). Each such order is separate and distinct. The grounds to be proved are different. The pre requisites and preconditions are different. The consequences flowing from each order of eviction is different. The rights and obligations post eviction are also different. In these circumstances, we opine respectfully, that the assumption that there exists "an order of eviction simplicitor" which can be supported on any grounds under S.11 is legally impermissible. In law there can be only an order of eviction under S.11(2), 11(3), 11(4) (i) to (v), 11(7), 11(8) and there cannot be an unspecified "order of eviction" without reference to any sub-section. In Santha (supra) and Ganesh (supra) such an incorrect assumption in law was made and that we say with respect led to incorrect conclusions. That joinder of causes of action is permissible and eviction can be claimed by the landlord under different sub-sections of S.11 in one petition filed by him does not and cannot militate against the separate and distinct nature and identity of the claim (and order) for eviction under the respective sub-sections. Pursuant to the reference, the Full Bench of this Court in Smitha and Another v. V.Krishnan [ 2017 (1) KHC 81 (FB)] at para.33 answered the reference as follows: 33. Pursuant to the reference, the Full Bench of this Court in Smitha and Another v. V.Krishnan [ 2017 (1) KHC 81 (FB)] at para.33 answered the reference as follows: 33. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that a party in a Rent Control Petition is not entitled to challenge the order/judgment of the Court below against him on a distinct and separate ground of eviction, in an appeal or revision filed by the opposite party challenging the order/judgment against him on another ground of eviction. In other words, though the respondent in an appeal/revision can support the ultimate conclusion on a distinct ground by even opposing the finding in respect of that ground, he cannot challenge an order on a distinct and different ground which was decided against him by the Court below, while opposing the appeal/revision filed by the opposite party. Order XLI Rule 22 or the principles thereunder can be invoked by the respondent in an appeal/revision only to support the ultimate conclusion in his favour granted by the lower authority in respect of a ground of eviction which is the subject-matter of the Appeal/Revision. A respondent cannot invoke Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC in an appeal/revision filed by the opposite party, for the purpose of getting an order in favour of the respondent on a distinct and different ground of eviction which was denied to him by the lower authority. 7. The above position is further fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the circumstances of facts involved in this revision in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman [ (2002) 6 SCC 1 ] wherein at paras.14 and 15, the Court had held as follows: 14. It was also held in Gangabai v. Vijay Kumar [ (1974) 2 SCC 393 ] that "no appeal can lie against a mere finding" and, if filed, shall be liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. In Seetaram v. Ramabai [ AIR 1958 MP 221 ] the Division Bench consisting of M.Hidayatullah, C.J. and P.K. Tare, J., (as Their Lordships were then), considered clause (21) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, which provides for an appeal being preferred by "any person aggrieved by an order" of the Controller to the Deputy Commissioner who shall decide the appeal. Eviction was sought for on three grounds but was allowed by the Controller only on one ground. In an appeal preferred by the tenant, the landlord was not permitted by the Deputy Commissioner to establish that the other two grounds on which permission was asked for were wrongly decided. The Deputy Commissioner formed an opinion that the order of the Controller could not be allowed to be supported by the respondent landlord before him on any ground which had been decided against him by the Controller unless an appeal was filed by the respondent landlord. The Division Bench held that "a person aggrieved" must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced, which has wrongfully refused him something which he had a right to demand. In spite of a ground for an order having been decided against the landlord, if the operative part of the order is in his favour, the landlord though a "person aggrieved" is not a "person aggrieved by an order of the Controller". The landlord could have felt satisfied therewith and there is no reason why he should have appealed. Even if a person has a grievance against the finding, he cannot come by way of appeal unless he challenges the order itself and wants to get it interfered with. Such an interpretation of the provision is warranted otherwise even if the order is in favour of a party he would be required to file an appeal against a finding. The Division Bench held that, in an appeal, the party who has an order in its favour is entitled to show that the order is justified on some ground which was decided against it in the court below and this position of law is supportable on general principles without having recourse to Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. in his opinion, in Gaddem Chinna Venkata Rao v. Koralla Satyanarayanamurthy [ AIR 1943 Mad 698 ] which is a Full Bench decision, held, interpreting Order 41 Rule 22 CPC, that a party who has succeeded in the result of a decision in spite of one or more of several grounds urged by him having been negated, he cannot and need not appeal as regards the latter grounds, however erroneous the decision because there is no right of appeal to a party who has succeeded. The distinction lies in supporting or sustaining the decree in one's favour and in obtaining an alteration which would give him a further advantage. The latter can be secured only by an appeal or cross- objection. 8. The line of the decisions as above clearly show that the landlord can support the order of eviction on any adverse findings against him. The principles emanating from Order XLI Rule 22 CPC enables him to support the order of eviction. It is to be noted that the grounds of eviction are supported by the findings of the authority. If the order of eviction stands in the favour of the landlord on any specified ground, he cannot maintain a separate appeal or revision to the findings in the order of eviction. No doubt if eviction is declined on any other ground,he cannot enlarge the appeal or revision without there being a separate challenge to it. 9. The Nalakath's case (supra) directly relate to the point involved in this case. The Apex Court therein held that no revision would lie against the findings when the ultimate decision in the impugned order is in favour of the person aggrieved by the finding. In the above case, the landlord projected his case under Sections 11(8) and 11(3). His claim under Section 11(3) was rejected and allowed under Section 11(8). In the revision filed by the tenant challenging the order of eviction under Section 11(8), the High Court reversed the finding and sustained it under Section 11(3). The question that was considered by the Apex Court was whether the High Court was justified in allowing the claim under Section 11(3) as the landlord had not challenged the finding in revision. It is in that context the Apex Court held that a revision will not lie against the finding alone unless the ultimate impugned order is against the person aggrieved by the finding. It is further clarified that if a person is entitled to a greater or more beneficial relief, a separate revision has to be filed. 10. In the light of the discussions as above, sustaining the order of the Rent Controller under Section 11(3), we dismiss this revision. It is further clarified that if a person is entitled to a greater or more beneficial relief, a separate revision has to be filed. 10. In the light of the discussions as above, sustaining the order of the Rent Controller under Section 11(3), we dismiss this revision. However, the revision petitioner is granted three months time to vacate the building on the following conditions: i. The tenant shall file an undertaking that she will vacate the building on or before 14/2/2023, before the Rent Control Court within three weeks from today. ii. The tenant shall clear the entire arrears of rent and continue to pay the rent till 14/2/2023. If there are arrears, it shall be cleared within one month from today. No order as to costs.