ORDER : Petitioner, in present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’), has assailed order dated 5.9.2020, passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.5, Shimla, in case No.57-3/2020, titled as Tikmi Devi v. Bhim Singh, whereby learned Magistrate has proceeded against him for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) and issued summons for his service. 2. It is case of the complainant-respondent that she, on request of accused-petitioner to enable him purchase land at Ner- Chowk Mandi, had paid amounts to him on different dates and for discharge of his liability to return the same, petitioner had issued two cheques dated 25.3.2020 and 20.3.2020, for Rs.3,30,000/- and Rs.4,50,000/- respectively. The said cheques, on presentation by the respondent-complainant for collection, on 25.6.2020, were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, on 18.7.2020, Legal Demand Notice was issued to the accused-petitioner by the complainant-respondent, through her counsel, requesting him to pay Rs.7,80,000/- within 15 days of receipt of the notice. On failing to pay the amount of cheques, within 15 days of receipt of the Demand Notice, complaint was preferred in the Court. 3. Case of the accused-petitioner is that he was not having any social or any other relation with the complainant-respondent or her family members, but he was an authorized Marketing Agent of Financial Institutions/Banks, on commission basis, for promoting Mutual Funds and Bonds of the Institutions/Banks and in such course he came in contact of respondent and she had invested in Mutual Funds of ICICI Prudential, State Bank of India and SAMRUDDHA Jeevan Foods India Ltd., and from Mutual Funds of ICICI Prudential and State Bank of India, respondent is getting returns ranging from 15% to 18% per annum, however, with respect to amount of Rs.4,00,000/-, invested in the Bonds of SAMRUDDHA Jeevan Foods India Ltd., some problem has arisen as the Company has been restricted from Investment Trading and criminal actions, under law, have also been initiated against the said Company for aforesaid irregularity which are pending in the Courts. In this regard, petitioner has placed on record Newspaper cutting as Annexure P-6. 4. In this regard, petitioner has placed on record Newspaper cutting as Annexure P-6. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that during aforesaid business interaction, respondent had taken blank cheques from petitioner, bearing only signatures of the petitioner, as security to ensure that the amount is actually invested, with understanding that the cheques would be torn after issuance of Certificates/Bonds of investment to the respondent. As such, petitioner has claimed that there is no enforceable debt for which cheques, in reference, would have been issued. According to petitioner, he was assured that the cheques had been torn, but he was shocked and astonished on receiving notice/warrant from the Court in the complaint, preferred by the respondent against him, under Section 138 of NI Act. As per petitioner, after service in the said complaint, he had asked the husband of respondent, who is an Advocate, reasons for filing the complaint, whereupon it was informed that as amount invested in SAMRUDDHA Jeevan Foods India Ltd. was under dispute, the respondent had no other option to recover the said amount, except by filing the complaint. 5. Defence of the petitioner is that story in complaint is fabricated and concocted, and in order to frame the petitioner in false case, notice, which was issued by Mr. K.R. Thakur, Advocate, who is husband of respondent, was posted at the wrong address of the petitioner, giving incorrect description of the Post Office, by avoiding to send the same on the present address of the petitioner, who is residing in Shimla, despite having knowledge of the said address. Further that, petitioner as well as respondent and her husband are residing in Shimla, but the notice, as per postal receipt placed on record, has been posted from a Post Office at Karsog, which is neither Post Office of the respondent and her family members nor the Post Office of the petitioner and, according to petitioner, notice was sent on wrong address, i.e. village address of the petitioner where he does not reside, to avoid delivery thereof. 6. Petitioner has also placed on record E-mail, dated 2.3.2021, whereby he had sought information from Indian Postal Department for verifying status of service of notice stated to be sent through Registered Post, in response whereto, Indian Postal Department has informed that the said Registered Letter was not delivered to the addressee and was returned to the sender on 24.7.2021. 6. Petitioner has also placed on record E-mail, dated 2.3.2021, whereby he had sought information from Indian Postal Department for verifying status of service of notice stated to be sent through Registered Post, in response whereto, Indian Postal Department has informed that the said Registered Letter was not delivered to the addressee and was returned to the sender on 24.7.2021. Communication received from Indian Postal Department, through E-mail, has been placed on record as Annexure P-10. 7. It has been contended that not even a single line has been mentioned in the complaint to disclose return of the notice to the sender, which fact has now surfaced after receiving information from the Indian Postal Department by the petitioner. 8. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that notice, in present case, has not been sent on proper address, has not been served upon the petitioner and the same stands returned to the sender, and the sender/respondent has failed to place on record the said envelope, which is a relevant piece of evidence to adjudicate claim of the parties and, as a matter of fact, notice was never delivered to the petitioner and, therefore, no cause of action arises for the respondent to file complaint under Section 138 of NI Act and as all three essential ingredients, entitling to file a complaint under Section 138 of NI Act are not in existence, therefore, petition deserves to be allowed by quashing the criminal complaint. 9. Relying upon judgment of Delhi High Court in Amit Kumar Mishra v. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr), Crl. M.C. 1189/2018 and Crl.M.A. 4326/2918, decided on 30.1.2020, wherein pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another, (2014) 2 SCC 424 ; Shivakumar v. Natarajan, (2009) 13 SCC 623 ; and Harnam Electronics Private Limited and another v. National Panasonic India Private Limited, (2009) 1 SCC 720 , have been referred, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that an offence under Section 138 of NI Act would constitute only if ingredients thereof are proved by the complainant and one such ingredient, i.e. receipt of notice by the accused-petitioner, is missing and, therefore, no cause of action is available to file complaint under Section 138 of NI Act. 10. 10. Referring pronouncement of Supreme Court in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani v. State of Kerala and another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 , learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that standard of proof in a case under Section 138 of NI Act has to satisfy preponderance of probability and onus, upon the accused-petitioner, to rebut the same is lesser than the complainant and as the petitioner has proved that notice was never delivered upon him, he has discharged the onus to establish that chain of ingredients, mandatory for filing complaint under Section 138 NI Act, is missing. 11. Relying upon pronouncement of Supreme Court in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan and another, (2013) 1 SCC 177 , it has been contended that all three conditions, including receipt of notice by accused, are mandatory for cause of action to file complaint, and for non-compliance, of mandatory condition of receipt of notice by accused, is fatal to the complaint and, therefore, complaint deserves to be quashed. 12. Reliance has also been placed on Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 , wherein it is stated that though there is presumption, as mandated by Section 139 of NI Act, but regarding existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, such presumption is rebuttable presumption by granting liberty to the accused to raise defence, wherein existence of legally enforceable liability can be contested, and, in case, accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubt about claim of complainant, the prosecution can fail. It has been contended that the respondent has not said anything with respect to service of notice or return thereof to the sender and there being no evidence of service of notice upon/receipt of notice by the accused-petitioner, the petitioner is not required to adduce evidence, as for absence of any pleading in this regard, there is no question of rebutting the same. 13. Pronouncement of Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah and another, (2008) 13 SCC 689 , has also been referred by the petitioner to demonstrate the ingredients, which must exist for commission of offence under Section 138 of NI Act, which include service of notice on the accused, in terms of Section 138 of NI Act, and non-payment of amount by the accused, despite service of notice. It has been contended that in present case notice was not served and, therefore, there was no question of payment after service of notice and, as such, mandatory ingredients are missing disabling the respondent from filing the complaint. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that none of the judgments referred on behalf of the accused-petitioner deals with the issue regarding issuance of notice by the Magistrate, but are judgments based on conclusion of trial, whereas for issuance of process, the Magistrate has to see whether prima facie case is made out for issuance of notice or not and all issues raised in this petition are required to be adjudicated by the trial Court on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties. It has been argued that whether notice has been served or not, whether there is liability or not, are the issues which are to be decided by the trial Court on the basis of evidence but not by this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in view of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, there is presumption with respect to delivery of notice to the accused-petitioner. To substantiate his plea, he has relied upon pronouncement of Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and another, (2007) 6 SCC 555 , by referring to the following paragraphs: “13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the Court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the Court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the G.C. Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of G.C. Act is extracted below: 27. Meaning of service by post. - Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression 'serve' or either of the expressions 'give' or 'send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre- paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement 'refused' or 'not available in the house or house locked or shop closed or addressee not in station, due service has to be presumed. {Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 ] ; State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal & Ors. {Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 ] ; State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal & Ors. [ (1996) 7 SCC 523 ] and V.Raja Kumari Vs. P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr. [(2004) 8 SCC 774]}. It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved. 15. Insofar as the question of disclosure of necessary particulars with regard to the issue of notice in terms of proviso (b) of Section 138 of the Act, in order to enable the Court to draw presumption or inference either under Section 27 of the G.C. Act or Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is concerned, there is no material difference between the two provisions. In our opinion, therefore, when the notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing the drawer of the cheque, the mandatory requirement of issue of notice in terms of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act stands complied with. It is needless to emphasise that the complaint must contain basic facts regarding the mode and manner of the issuance of notice to the drawer of the cheque. It is well settled that at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, the Court is required to be prima facie satisfied that a case under the said Section is made out and the aforenoted mandatory statutory procedural requirements have been complied with. It is then for the drawer to rebut the presumption about the service of notice and show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address or that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the letter was never tendered or that the report of the postman was incorrect. In our opinion, this interpretation of the provision would effectuate the object and purpose for which proviso to Section 138 was enacted, namely, to avoid unnecessary hardship to an honest drawer of a cheque and to provide him an opportunity to make amends. 16. In our opinion, this interpretation of the provision would effectuate the object and purpose for which proviso to Section 138 was enacted, namely, to avoid unnecessary hardship to an honest drawer of a cheque and to provide him an opportunity to make amends. 16. As noticed above, the entire purpose of requiring a notice is to give an opportunity to the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days of service of notice and thereby free himself from the penal consequences of Section 138. In D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa { (2006) 6 SCC 456 }, this Court observed: One can also conceive of cases where a well intentioned drawer may have inadvertently missed to make necessary arrangements for reasons beyond his control, even though he genuinely intended to honour the cheque drawn by him. The law treats such lapses induced by inadvertence or negligence to be pardonable, provided the drawer after notice makes amends and pays the amount within the prescribed period. It is for this reason that Clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 provides that the section shall not apply unless the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. To repeat, the proviso is meant to protect honest drawers whose cheques may have been dishonoured for the fault of others, or who may have genuinely wanted to fulfil their promise but on account of inadvertence or negligence failed to make necessary arrangements for the payment of the cheque. The proviso is not meant to protect unscrupulous drawers who never intended to honour the cheques issued by them, it being a part of their modus operandi to cheat unsuspecting persons. 17. It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. 17. It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran's case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the 'receipt of notice' a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” 16. Referring pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ajeet Seeds Limited v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685 , it has been canvassed on behalf of the respondent that it is not necessary to aver in the complaint that notice was served upon the accused, as presumption, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee when it is sent to the correct address by Registered Post and unless or until contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. 17. 17. Referring observations of the Supreme Court in its pronouncement in HMT Watches Limited v. M.A. Abida and another, (2015) 11 SCC 776 , it has been contended that the High Court should not express its view on the disputed question of fact in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to come to a conclusion that offence is not made out. On this count, judgment of the Supreme Court, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1325 of 2019, titled as Kishore Sharma v. Sachin Dubey, decided on 3.9.2019 has also been relied upon. 18. Pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta and others, (2015) 3 SCC 424 , has been relied upon on behalf of the respondent to substantiate that at the stage of cognizance and summoning, the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused person or not and the Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or material or arguments nor is he required to evaluate the merits of the material or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the material will lead to conviction or not, as the cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender, and an accused may seek discharge at the stage of framing of charge if he or she can show that materials are absolutely insufficient for framing of charge against the said accused, but such exercise will be required only at a later stage not at the state of taking cognizance for summoning the accused on the basis of prima facie case. 19. Judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another, (2020) 3 SCC 794 , has been relied upon to refer that once the issuance of cheque is established, presumption would arise under Section 139 of NI Act in favour of holder of cheque and the presumptions under Section 139 of NI Act and Section 118(a) of the Evidence Act are rebuttable and burden lies on the accused to rebut the presumption by leading evidence and until the accused discharges the burden, presumption under Section 139 of NI Act will continue to remain. Therefore, apart from raising defence that there is no legally enforceable debt and other disputed questions of fact, accused has to adduce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption and prove the disputed questions of fact and, therefore, complaint under Section 138 of NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C., though the Court has the power to quash such Criminal Complaint on the legal issues like limitation, etc. 20. Reliance has also been placed on pronouncement of the Supreme Court on Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, 2019(1) CCC 580 (SC), wherein it has been held that a meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability, and it is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer, and that if the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. 21. Issues raised on behalf of accused-petitioner that notice was not given on proper address, it was not served properly, it has never been delivered to the petitioner, it has been returned to the sender leading to adverse inference, it was sent on the wrong address, there was no legally enforceable debt for discharge of which cheques in question were issued and the cheques were issued as a security, which was valid till issuance of certificates/ bonds by the concerned companies/financial institutions, are the disputed facts which, as also held by the Apex Court in pronouncements referred supra, are to be adjudicated and decided by the trial Court after adducing of evidence by the parties. 22. 22. In view of pronouncement in Ajeet Seeds Limited v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685 , it is not necessary for the complainant to aver in the complaint that notice was served upon the accused, however, this issue is to be determined by the trial Court on the basis of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, but subject to rebuttal thereof by the petitioner by leading evidence and this issue cannot be decided in present petition. Though petitioner has placed on record information received from Postal Authorities that notice was never served upon the addressee but was returned to the sender and delivered to sender on 24.7.2020, however, the said information is incomplete as it does not disclose the reasons for returning the notice to the sender. 23. The Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 ; State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 523 ; and V.Raja Kumari Vs. P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 774, has held that when notice is sent by Registered Post and is returned with a postal endorsement 'refused' or 'not available in the house’ or ‘house locked’ or ‘shop closed’ or ‘addressee not in station’, due service has to be presumed. 24. In present case, it is not clear on what count registered letter was returned. It is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence led by the parties. Definitely, when notice has been returned to the sender, it would be duty of the sender, i.e. complainant, to place it on record to establish the reason for returning the notice, amounting to deemed service of the notice. Petitioner would also be entitled to rebut the presumption of service by leading appropriate evidence to establish that notice was not returned on those counts which may lead to presumption of deemed service. In case returned envelope is not placed on record and it is duly proved that it was returned to the sender, an adverse inference may also be drawn against the respondent-complainant. But, all these issues are to be considered and decided by the trial Court on conclusion of trial. Therefore, this ground is not available for the petitioner for quashing the proceedings at this stage, i.e. stage of issuance of process by the Magistrate. 25. But, all these issues are to be considered and decided by the trial Court on conclusion of trial. Therefore, this ground is not available for the petitioner for quashing the proceedings at this stage, i.e. stage of issuance of process by the Magistrate. 25. So far as question raised about Post Office from where notice was sent, in my considered opinion, it is an irrelevant issue, as there is no bar or impediment to post a registered notice from the Post Office not having jurisdiction of the area where the party or Advocate is residing. Notice can be posted from anywhere for more than one reason. There is possibility that after preparing the notice and putting it in envelope, the sender may have to travel somewhere else before posting the same from the same station and in such eventuality, notice can be posted from a place other than the place of Advocate or sender. 26. As to whether address of the petitioner was correct or not is also again a matter of disputed fact required to be adjudicated by the trial Court. 27. Before parting, in view of ratio laid down in Rajiv Thapar and others Vs. 26. As to whether address of the petitioner was correct or not is also again a matter of disputed fact required to be adjudicated by the trial Court. 27. Before parting, in view of ratio laid down in Rajiv Thapar and others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , it is clarified that in pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this High Court, it is not the ratio that in complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act, the High Court is precluded or inhibited from quashing the complaint, exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In appropriate cases, absence of necessary ingredients, enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process, under Section 138 of NI Act or for production of sound, reasonable and indubitable material of sterling and impeccable quality on record which is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, leading to persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false and the said material is of such nature that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the complainant and, thus, clearly depicting that proceedings with the trial would result in an abuse of process of Court, running contrary to purpose of serving the ends of justice, exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the High Court can proceed to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused, as such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial as well as proceedings arising therefrom, especially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in conviction of the accused. The parameters, considering which the High Court is supposed to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, would definitely be available to the trial Court for taking a decision as to whether initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings is justifiable or not. There cannot be a case that on considering certain factors it is permissible to the High Court to quash the proceedings, but impermissible to the trial Court to do so on the basis of the same material at the time of taking cognizance or at the stage of framing of charges. There cannot be a case that on considering certain factors it is permissible to the High Court to quash the proceedings, but impermissible to the trial Court to do so on the basis of the same material at the time of taking cognizance or at the stage of framing of charges. It would not be prudent and justifiable to hold that those, who can afford to approach High Court, would enjoy privilege of quashing of criminal proceedings but not those who cannot afford to reach High court for any reason. Therefore, the parameters culled out in Rajiv Thapar’s case, are equally applicable to the criminal proceedings before the trial Court. 29. There is a difference between an ‘ordinary criminal case’ and a ‘complaint under Section 138 of NI Act’. In ordinary criminal case, presumption of innocence is in favour of accused, whereas in a case in complaint under NI Act, presumption is in favour of complainant with reverse onus upon the accused. 30. In case ingredients for filing complaint under Section 138 of NI Act are in existence, then presumption is there, as provided under law, and to rebut the same, definitely, evidence would be required, which would be possible only in the trial Court, but in case essential ingredients are lacking, then the trial Court, at the time of framing of charge/putting notice of accusation, can quash the criminal proceedings as also explained by this Court in CRMMO No.165 of 2018, titled as Siemens Enterprise Communications Ptv. Ltd. Now known as Progility Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, decided on 30.8.2019, reported in 2019(4) Him L.R.(HC) 2491. 31. Stay stands vacated and the parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 21.3.2022. 32. In view of aforesaid discussion, and in the light of ratio laid down by the aforesaid judgments, I find no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.