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2022 DIGILAW 980 (JHR)

Awadhesh Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2022-08-04

S.N.PATHAK

body2022
JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents for shifting the date of joining from 28.04.1988 to 29.01.1988. 3. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. Vide Notification No. 1-A-10-17/87-320 dated 24.12.1987, petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer on the pay-scale of Rs. 785-25-1135-EB-25-1210 and accordingly, he gave his joining on 29.01.1988 before the Advance Planning Division, Bihar, Patna. Thereafter, the petitioner was sent on deputation at Hazaribagh Mining Department and accordingly, he gave his joining there on 28.04.1988. The aforesaid facts finds support from the service book of the petitioner. It is the specific case of the petitioner that though the date of joining of the petitioner was 29.01.1988, the custodian of the service book while making note, changed the date of appointment to 28.04.1988. By making cutting in the column of the date of appointment, the date 28.04.1988 was entered and that was accepted as the date of joining of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that cutting was not done by him as he was neither the custodian of his service book nor his signature finds place on the same. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the petitioner represented before the respondent-authorities but no consideration was shown and hence, he was constrained to knock the door of this Court. 4. Mr. H.K. Shikarwar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that admittedly the date of joining of the petitioner was 29.01.1988 which finds place in the service excerpts itself. Learned counsel submits that from perusal of page-18 of the writ petition it appears that cutting was done by the custodian of the service book and not by the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that petitioner has retired on 31.05.2021 and thereafter, has accepted the retiral benefits but from the service excerpts it is clear that date of joining of the petitioner is 29.01.1988 and as such, on legal advice, he approached this Court to get the date changed to its original date of joining as 29.01.1988 instead of 28.04.1988. Learned counsel further argues that merely because the petitioner has accepted the retiral benefits, the same may not come in the way of the Court in directing the respondents to shift the date of joining of the petitioner from 28.04.1988 to 29.01.1988. 5. Learned counsel further argues that merely because the petitioner has accepted the retiral benefits, the same may not come in the way of the Court in directing the respondents to shift the date of joining of the petitioner from 28.04.1988 to 29.01.1988. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Jharkhand submits that from the service excerpts it is clear that date of joining of the petitioner is 28.04.1988 and the petitioner himself has endorsed the same by putting his signature. Learned counsel further argues that even the service of the petitioner was approved and it has been clearly mentioned that date of joining of the petitioner is 28.04.1988 and petitioner was fully aware of the same and now, it cannot be said that he was not aware of his date of joining. It was open for the petitioner to represent before the respondents and merely because once he has made representation before the respondents, it cannot be construed that now onus lies upon respondent-authorities to correct the date of joining of the petitioner and the petitioner has nothing to do with the same. Further, petitioner has approached this Court after 18 long years and the delay in approaching the Court has not at all been explained and on that ground itself, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed in limine. 6. Mr. Sudarshan Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-AG submits that petitioner has received all pensionary benefits and the same has already been authorized in terms of the departmental sanction order as contained in Letter No. 1527 dated 29.10.2021 considering the date of joining of the petitioner as 28.04.1988, which was mentioned in online pension papers forwarded by the concerned Department. Learned counsel further argues that it is not open for the petitioner to seek relief after accepting the date of joining as 28.04.1988 for shifting the same to 29.01.1988. 7. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar adopts the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Jharkhand and submits that the State of Bihar has no role to play as the entire retiral benefits has to be paid by the State of Jharkhand. 8. 7. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar adopts the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Jharkhand and submits that the State of Bihar has no role to play as the entire retiral benefits has to be paid by the State of Jharkhand. 8. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition. Admittedly, the petitioner has accepted his date of joining as 28.04.1988 and has not bothered to approach this Court or before the concerned Authorities for correction of his date of joining for 18 long years and now has approached this Court for direction upon the respondents for shifting his date of joining from 28.04.1988 to 29.01.1988. The petitioner has not explained the reasons for such delay. 9. This issue has already been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass vs. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1979 , in which while dismissing the writ petition, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily.” 10. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has held as under: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle.” In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 11. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal proposition and judicial pronouncement, no other view can be taken as to what has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 12. Resultantly, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed.