JUDGMENT: M.S. Sonak, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Rule in each of these petitions. The Rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 3. In each of these petitions, the petitioners were engaged as Patient Care-taker (PCT) on a contractual basis in December 2013 at the Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, Government of Goa (IPHB). By instituting these petitions, they complain about the non-regularization of their services. They also challenge the Government of Goa, Institute of Psychiatry & Human Behaviour, Group 'C', Non-Gazetted, Non-Ministerial Post, Recruitment Rules, 2021 (said Rules) to the extent they prescribe eligibility criteria which the petitioners in the first nine petitions of this batch, do not possess. 4. In the first nine petitions of this batch, this Court, by order dated 08.12.2021, directed IPHB to refrain from filling nine vacancies for the post of Psychiatric Patient Care-taker (PPC) by way of interim relief. However, in the balance of 16 petitions, the petitioners who claimed to possess the qualifications prescribed in the said Rules were permitted to participate in the selection process without prejudice to their rights and contentions seeking regularization of their services. 5. Mr. Palekar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that none of the petitioners who participated in the selection process were ultimately selected. He pointed out that one of the petitioners from the batch of the first nine petitions and another from the balance 16 petitions have instituted Writ Petition No.304/2022 (Filing) questioning the selections and appointments to the posts of PPC. He pointed out that this petition was instituted without prejudice to the rights and contentions urged in the present petitions. He pointed out that Rule was issued in this petition on 21.02.2022. He pointed out that if the current batch of petitions is allowed, there will be no necessity to even decide Writ Petition No.304/2022 (Filing) on merits since the selections and appointments questioned therein will be deemed to have been set aside. 6. Though the petitioners have challenged the said Rules in these petitions, the appointees based on the said Rules have not been impleaded. Mr. Palekar pointed out that since further appointments were made subject to the result of these petitions, there was no necessity of impleadment. 6. Though the petitioners have challenged the said Rules in these petitions, the appointees based on the said Rules have not been impleaded. Mr. Palekar pointed out that since further appointments were made subject to the result of these petitions, there was no necessity of impleadment. Ordinarily, such nonimpleadment might have precluded us from granting any relief that would have the effect of setting aside the appointments of parties who have not even been impleaded. However, since the petitioners have not even otherwise made any case for the grant of any reliefs in these petitions, we do not wish to base our decision on this aspect of non-impleadment of necessary parties. 7. Mr. Palekar has pointed out that the facts involved in all these petitions are quite peculiar. The petitioners do not claim regularization merely because they were contractual employees, but the petitioners claim this relief because they were Covid Warriors who have taken significant risks during the pandemic to serve the State. He submitted that the petitioners were not claiming any regularization based on the window left open by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 53 of Secretary, State Of Karnataka And Ors. Vs Uma Devi And Others, 2006 (4) SCC 1 but based on the observations in paragraph 43, in which it was held that in extraordinary situations, the High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be precluded from granting relief of regularization. 8. Mr. Palekar placed extensive reliance on the proposal of regularization forwarded by the Director/Dean of IPHB on 04.10.2016 to the Government, recommending the regularization of the services of all the petitioners. He pointed out how the note had detailed the circumstances in which the petitioners came to be contractually engaged and how further, there was nothing illegal or even irregular in the contractual engagement of the petitioners. He pointed out that for the last almost eight years or thereabouts, the petitioners had served the IPHB and how, at this stage, it would be arbitrary not to regularize the services of the petitioners and go for any other selection process. He pointed out that if the petitioners' contracts are terminated, and some fresh recruits are introduced, then the special experience acquired by the petitioners in the last eight years will remain unutilized or underutilized. He pointed out that if the petitioners' contracts are terminated, and some fresh recruits are introduced, then the special experience acquired by the petitioners in the last eight years will remain unutilized or underutilized. He pointed out that all these aspects have been highlighted by the Director/Dean in the proposal dated 04.10.2016. He submitted that the State was not justified in rejecting this proposal, enacting the said Rules, and proceeding with the regular selection by issuing a public advertisement. He submitted that all this would amount to exploitation. He relied on Nihal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, 2013 (3) SCR 1 to submit that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra) is not a license for exploitation. He relied on Gajanan Rajeshwar Debadwar vs. Secretary APMC UDGIR & Anr., 2019 (0) Supreme (Bom) 671, Municipal Corporation of Gr. Mumbai vs. Kachara Vahtuk Shramik Sangh, 2016 (0) Supreme (Bom) 1803, Netram Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., 2018 (5) SCC 430 , Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. Etc., 2018 (8) SCC 238 and Dhananjay Malik & Ors. vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors., 2008 (4) SCC 171 in support of the petitioners' pleas for regularization. 9. Mr. Palekar submitted that the petitioners had made oral and written representations from time to time. Based upon the same, the Chief Minister of the State of Goa had publicly assured the petitioners that they would be confirmed in service or that their services would be regularized. Mr. Palekar referred to Annexure A3 Colly containing press reports incorporating such promises made by the Chief Minister, State of Goa. He submitted that such promises are binding upon the State Government. He relied on Shishir Realty Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. the State of Maharashtra, 2021 (0) Supreme (SC) 755 to submit that the State can be compelled to honor its promises. 10. Mr. Palekar submitted that the State had regularized services of contractual employees similarly placed. He offered that such regularization was both legal and proper. However, he submitted that such a lawful and appropriate course was not being taken in case of the present petitioners. This would amount to discrimination and violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Palekar submitted that the State had regularized services of contractual employees similarly placed. He offered that such regularization was both legal and proper. However, he submitted that such a lawful and appropriate course was not being taken in case of the present petitioners. This would amount to discrimination and violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He relied on the pleadings in paragraph 62 of the Writ Petition No.2206/2021 (Filing) and an order dated 02.12.2013 creating posts for regularization of contractual employees of Class IV inter aliaat the IPHB. 11. Mr. Palekar, without prejudice to those mentioned above, submitted that the petitioners have at least made out a case for direction to the State to formulate a scheme for regularization of petitioners' services and consider, after that, the claims of the petitioners for regularization under such scheme. He relied on University of Delhi vs. Delhi University Contract Employees Union & Ors., 2021 (3) Supreme 134 to support this contention. 12. Mr. Palekar, without prejudice to those above, finally submitted that the said Rules are illegal, unconstitutional, and ultra vires because the qualifications set out therein, have no nexus whatsoever with the job profile of PPC. He submitted that in terms of the interim recruitment rules based on which the petitioners were contractually engaged, the essential qualification was only VIIIth standard pass and knowledge of Konkani, which all the petitioners fulfilled. He pointed out that even having a good physique was only a desirable qualification, which the petitioners fulfilled. He submitted that the petitioners discharged the duties as PCT for almost eight years based upon these qualifications. He submitted that the requirement of SSCE or completion of ITI course in the said Rules has no reasonable nexus with the job profile of PPC. He submitted that based upon such needs, the petitioners ought not to be declared ineligible even to be considered for PPC after they have rendered service of almost eight years on a contractual basis. He submitted that the promises given by the Chief Minister, State of Goa, in July 2021 had created a vested right in the petitioners. The State could not have taken away this vested right by enacting the said Rules in September 2021. He, therefore, submitted that the said Rules are liable to be declared illegal, unconstitutional, ultravires, null and void. He relies on P.U. Joshi & Ors. The State could not have taken away this vested right by enacting the said Rules in September 2021. He, therefore, submitted that the said Rules are liable to be declared illegal, unconstitutional, ultravires, null and void. He relies on P.U. Joshi & Ors. vs. The Accountant General, Ahmedabad & Ors., 2003 (1) SCC 632 and Chandigarh Administration through the Director Public Instructions (Colleges) Chandigarh vs. Usha Kheterpal Waie & Ors., 2011 (9) SCC 645 in support of these propositions. 13. For all the reasons above, Mr. Palekar submits that these petitions may be allowed and Rule therein be made absolute. 14. Mr. Bhobe, the Special Counsel for the State, pointed out that most of the contentions now raised by the petitioners stand answered against them by common Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2022 in a batch of writ petitions, including Writ Petition No.135/2022 (Filing) (Rupin Gangaram Naik vs. State of Goa). He submitted that the Dean's note dated 04.10.2016 creates no rights for the petitioners. In any case, the State, upon due consideration of such note, did not agree to regularization of the petitioners' services primarily because any such attempt at regularization would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi(supra). He submitted that the proposals put forth by the Dean were contrary to the legal position explained in Uma Devi(supra),and even the State did not have the power to order regularizations contrary to the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as explained in Uma Devi(supra). 15. Mr. Bhobe also took us through the affidavit of Dr. Shivanand Bandekar, Director/Dean of IPHB. He pointed out the circumstances and how the petitioners were engaged on a contractual basis. He pointed out that the orders of contractual appointments had made it very clear that such engagement would not entitle any petitioners to claim regularization. He pointed out that the contractual terms were extended from time to time, making this position clear. Finally, he pointed out that the petitioners had never protested and had accepted the contractual engagement with full knowledge that the same would not entitle them to claim any regularization. 16. Mr. Bhobe also pointed out how hardly five days were given to the candidates to respond to the advertisement for contractual engagement. Almost 286 persons were interviewed on a single day by a single panel. 16. Mr. Bhobe also pointed out how hardly five days were given to the candidates to respond to the advertisement for contractual engagement. Almost 286 persons were interviewed on a single day by a single panel. He pointed out how the contractual engagements were based only on the marks allotted at the oral interviews, i.e., the selection was based on 100% marks for oral interviews. He pointed out how records do not even reveal the marks awarded to any of the candidates since the remarks columns are empty. He pointed out that selecting Group' D' posts based entirely on the marks in an oral interview would be illegal and violate the constitutional mandate. Based upon all this, Mr. Bhobe submitted that the petitioners would not even be entitled to any benefits of the directions in paragraph 53 of Uma Devi(supra),which benefits, the petitioners were rightly not even claiming. 17. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that the allegations of discrimination in paragraph 62 of the petition are entirely vague. No case of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution is made out based upon the same. He submitted that it is well settled that the petitioners cannot claim any equality of illegalities even otherwise. 18. Mr. Bhobe submitted that no promise was even given by the Chief Minister, State of Goa, to regularize the petitioners' services. He offered that even otherwise, such assurances cannot be given having regard to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi(supra),or in any case, such alleged promises can never be enforced before a Court of law. 19. Mr. Bhobe submitted that the qualifications prescribed in the said Rules have every nexus with the job profile of PPC. He submitted that the Central Government, based on the recommendations of the 6th Pay Commission, had abolished Group 'D’ post and further provided that the minimum qualification for Group ‘C’ post must be SSCE passed or ITI equivalent. He submits that the State was entirely justified in providing SSCE passed or ITI equivalent as one of the essential qualifications. He presents that the job profile of PPC involves attending to patients who are prone to get aggressive or even violent. He, therefore, submits that there was nothing wrong in prescribing minimum physical standards. Finally, he submits that the said Rules are legislative and cannot be assailed on the grounds now urged by the petitioners. 20. He presents that the job profile of PPC involves attending to patients who are prone to get aggressive or even violent. He, therefore, submits that there was nothing wrong in prescribing minimum physical standards. Finally, he submits that the said Rules are legislative and cannot be assailed on the grounds now urged by the petitioners. 20. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that most of the decisions now relied upon by Mr. Palekar were already considered and distinguished in Rupin Gangaram Naik(supra). Therefore, Mr. Bhobe submitted that these petitions may be dismissed based on all of this. 21. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 22. In all these petitions, the records bear out that by advertisement dated 15.11.2013, the IPHB invited applications for filling up 30 posts of Patient Care-Takers (PCT) on a contractual basis. The candidates possessing the minimum VIIIth standard pass qualification and having knowledge of Konkani were eligible to attend the walk-in interview scheduled after five days, i.e., 20.11.2013 at 9.30 a.m. The advertisement provided “having good physique” as desirable qualification. 23. The petitioners said the advertisement was based on some “interim recruitment rules.” However, in his affidavit, the Director/Dean has denied the existence of any such rules. Moreover, there is no dispute that such rules, whether interim or otherwise, were never framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 24. However, the return filed by the Director/Dean of IPHB bears out that in pursuance to the advertisement, almost 286 candidates applied, and a single panel interviewed all these 286 candidates on a single day. This panel comprised Director/Dean, Deputy Director (Administration), and Head Clerk (Administration). There is some controversy about whether the committee was competently constituted in the absence of the Joint Secretary/Secretary (Health), who was replaced by the Head Clerk (Administration). However, there is no dispute that the entire selection was based with cent-percent emphasis only on the marks obtained in the oral interview, even though there is no dispute that the post of PCT was a Group ‘D’ post. The return filed by the Director/Dean also discloses that there is no record of entry of any marks against the names of the candidates. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the marks that the petitioners secured at the interview. Mr. The return filed by the Director/Dean also discloses that there is no record of entry of any marks against the names of the candidates. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the marks that the petitioners secured at the interview. Mr. Palekar submitted that the circumstance that most of the petitioners, i.e., the selected contractual appointees, were from the constituency of Pernem was only a matter of coincidence. He pointed out that in the regular selection process, almost 80 to 85% of the candidates were from the constituency of Sattari or Valpoi. In this petition, we do not propose to go into this last aspect. 25. However, suffice to record that the advertisement had made it clear that the State intended to resort only to a contractual engagement. There was no promise held out in the advertisement about regularization or confirmation. Further, the selection was entirely based upon or at least allegedly based upon the marks obtained by the petitioners at the oral interview. In Rupin Gangaram Naik(supra), a co-ordinate bench of this Court has upheld the contention of the learned Advocate General that recruitment to Group ‘D’ posts in Government service based only upon the marks obtained in an oral interview cannot be styled as legal recruitment in the context of specific observations in paragraph 53 of Uma Devi(supra). 26. In these matters, Mr. Palekar was quite clear that the petitioners are not claiming any benefits in terms of paragraph 53 of Uma Devi (supra). He conceded that the petitioners were engaged on a contractual basis after the decision of the constitution bench in Uma Devi (supra).Further, none of the petitioners had even completed ten years as PCTs when the State issued its advertisement on 15.10.2021 inviting applications for regular selections to the posts of PPC in terms of the said Rules. 27. The appointment orders issued to the petitioners had made it clear that their engagement was only on a contractual basis, and such engagement will not entitle them to seek any regularization. These contractual engagements were extended from time to time, and even the extension orders make this position quite clear. Although Mr. Palekar referred to oral and written representations, no written representations have been placed on record. All that is pleaded is that the petitioners made oral representations on 15.12.2015 and then in October 2021, urging the regularization of their services. These contractual engagements were extended from time to time, and even the extension orders make this position quite clear. Although Mr. Palekar referred to oral and written representations, no written representations have been placed on record. All that is pleaded is that the petitioners made oral representations on 15.12.2015 and then in October 2021, urging the regularization of their services. The petitioners instituted these petitions sometime in October 2021 and even after the IPHB published an advertisement dated 15.10.2021 inviting applications for the post of PPC in terms of the said Rules. 28. Except for the press reports at Annexure A3 Colly to be found on pages 97 and 98 of the paper-book in Writ Petition No.2206/2021 (Filing), the petitioners have not placed any material on record about the so-called promises made to them by the Chief Minister, State of Goa about the regularization of their services. Even the press notes speak about some priority to the persons who worked during the pandemic whenever job vacancies arise in the Health Department. 29. The Director/Dean, IPHB has, by filing an affidavit, denied that any such promises were ever given and further pleaded that it is a settled legal position that even if the Government wants to regularize persons like the petitioners, the same cannot be done since the Constitution does not permit such an exercise. The return also states that the Government does not operate or work on such oral assurances. 30. On perusing the record, we also do not find any promises or assurances about regularization, even assuming that such promises could have been legitimately made. We rejected an identical contention in Rupin Gangaram Naik (supra) by referring to paragraph 47 of Uma Devi (supra), in which the Constitutional Bench has observed as under:- “47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature, Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees, It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” 31. Shishir Realty (supra) was a case dealing with the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. Even paragraph 60, relied upon by Mr. Palekar, refers to the decision in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors., 1979 (2) SCC 409 . This decision deals with the principle of Promissory Estoppel. These decisions are not an authority for the purpose now relied upon by Mr. Palekar. Based upon these decisions, there is no question of enforcing the so-called promises of the Chief Minister, State of Goa. Even otherwise, there are no pleadings about Promissory Estoppel in any of the petitions. Therefore, the petitioners cannot benefit from the decision in either Shishir Realty(supra)or Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills(supra). 32. In the precise context of regularization of services, the contention based on legitimate expectation was considered in great detail in official Liquidator vs. Dayanand & Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 1 in the precise context of regularization of services. But such an argument was ultimately rejected after relying upon Uma Devi (supra) and some other decisions. The discussion on the subject of legitimate expectation is to be found in paragraphs 101 to 114 of the SCC report. All this is sufficient to turn down the petitioners' plea based on legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel doctrine. 33. We agree with Mr. Bhobe that there are no pleadings whatsoever in the petition to sustain any foundation for a cause based on discrimination. Paragraph 62 in Writ Petition No.2206/2021 (Filing) relied upon by Mr. Palekar reads as follows:- “62. The petitioner states that the respondents has approved, considered and regularized the services of the contract workers employed in various other departments/sections. The petitioner with a legitimate expectation continued to work with the hope that he would also one day experience the good days. To that extent the petitioner is a victim of discrimination.” 34. The pleadings mentioned above are hardly sufficient to sustain a plea of discrimination. The petitioner with a legitimate expectation continued to work with the hope that he would also one day experience the good days. To that extent the petitioner is a victim of discrimination.” 34. The pleadings mentioned above are hardly sufficient to sustain a plea of discrimination. The petitioner has not bothered to furnish any particulars or details. The petitioner has also not bothered to demonstrate how the cases of those regularized were similar to the petitioners. By way of rejoinder, the petitioner has undoubtedly produced an order dated 02.12.2013 on pages 105 to 112 of the paper book in Writ Petition No.2206/2021 (Filing). However, this order only speaks about creating additional posts to regularize contractual employees of Class IV in the respective institutions. Again, there are no details about actual regularization, if at all, or the circumstances in which such regularizations were made. Based upon such pleadings, no discrimination case can be said to have been made out by any of the petitioners. Besides, it is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not promote any negative equality and certainly does not encourage any equality of illegalities. As noted earlier, an identical challenge was rejected by us in Rupin Gangaram Naik(supra). 35. Since the petitioners placed reliance on paragraph 43 of Uma Devi (supra), its contents are transcribed below for the convenience of reference: “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker 1s continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts: acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not 'ordinarily’ issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the Court, which we have described as “litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.” 36. Now we find nothing in paragraph 43 of Uma Devi (supra) that supports the petitioners' case. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.” 36. Now we find nothing in paragraph 43 of Uma Devi (supra) that supports the petitioners' case. The Constitution Bench has ruled that it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution, and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court, while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same will not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract; if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would end when it is discontinued. The Constitution Bench also held that a temporary employee or a person engaged on daily wages on a casual basis is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be, entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. The Constitution Bench also held that it is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose employment has come to an end or of adhoc-employees who do not acquire any right by the very nature of their appointment. The Constitution Bench also held that it is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose employment has come to an end or of adhoc-employees who do not acquire any right by the very nature of their appointment. Merely because the Constitution Bench in paragraph 43 used the phrase “ordinarily” while stating that the High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme, the petitioners, cannot claim that their case is “extraordinary” and not “ordinary.” This, according to us, would not be the correct manner of reading or construing law laid down in paragraph 43 of Uma Devi(supra). 37. The petitioners may have rendered good service to the State during the Covid Pandemic. However, by itself does not entitle the petitioners to claim that their case is different from the case of other contractually engaged employees who may also have rendered equally good service during the pandemic. Therefore, while we commend the good service the petitioners may have rendered during Covid Pandemic, that circumstance will not entitle the petitioners to claim that their case is not on par with the cases discussed by the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra). Therefore, based upon this alleged distinction, the petitioners cannot claim or even attempt to wriggle out of the legal position explained by the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra). 38. Nihal Singh (supra) undoubtedly holds that Uma Devi (supra)is not a license for exploitation. However, this observation was made entirely in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtained in the said matter. Such facts and circumstances are not even remotely present in the petitioners' cases. Therefore, based on the observations in Nihal Singh (supra),the petitioners cannot claim any relief in these petitions. 39. In Nihal Singh(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the initial appointments were not irregular. Instead, the selection process was designed under which the District Senior Superintendent of Police was required to choose suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons for being appointed as Special Police Officers (SPOs) in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. 39. In Nihal Singh(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the initial appointments were not irregular. Instead, the selection process was designed under which the District Senior Superintendent of Police was required to choose suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons for being appointed as Special Police Officers (SPOs) in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. Accordingly, a requisition was made by the Police Department, and options were called from ex-servicemen who were willing to be enrolled as SPOs under Section 17 of the Police Act. Such a procedure of making recruitments was consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in Union of India vs. N. Hargopal, (1987) 3 SCC 308 . 40. Based on these distinguishing factors, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there was nothing irregular in the appointments of the SPOs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also noted that at that time there was large-scale unrest in the State of Punjab and there was a dire necessity to appoint the SPOs. 41. Regarding all such distinguishing features, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ordered the absorption of such SPOs in service. Consequently, such factors do not obtain in the present Petitions and, therefore, the decision in Nihal Singh(supra)can be of no assistance to the Petitioners. Incidentally, Nihal Singh(supra)was also distinguished by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent Delhi University Contract Employees Union (supra) decision. 42. In Gajanan Debadwar (supra), decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court was a matter arising under the Unfair Labour Practises Act. There, certain concessions were made on behalf of the employer. However, prima facie, the Court found that the employer was attempting to exploit its wrongs by irregularly recruiting daily wagers and continuing them for several years. The Court also prima facie found that the benefit of regularization was being dolled out arbitrarily. No such facts are involved in the present case, and therefore, based upon Gajanan Debadwar (supra), the petitioners cannot claim any reliefs in these petitions. 43. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (supra) also entirely turns on facts peculiar to the said matter. There, the Court found that the Corporation was taking advantage of its dominant position and exploiting the members belonging to the lowest strata of the society. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that even this decision was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by instituting Civil Appeal No.4929/2017. There, the Court found that the Corporation was taking advantage of its dominant position and exploiting the members belonging to the lowest strata of the society. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that even this decision was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by instituting Civil Appeal No.4929/2017. This appeal was disposed of based upon the consensus arrived at between the parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that its order shall not be treated as a precedent as, by and large, the same was based upon consensus. 44. In Netram Sahu(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the State is satisfied that the case of a citizen is a just one, the State should normally not seek to defeat such a case of a citizen through some legal or technical defenses. In the present matters, we do not think that the State is either satisfied that the petitioners' case deserves consideration or is this a case where the State is raising mere technical defenses. The State is relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi(supra)and pointing out that it is not open to the State to regularize the services of contractual employees in the teeth of the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as explained in Uma Devi(supra). 45. Narendra Kumar Tiwari(supra) also turns on its facts, and the observations therein cannot be read out of the context. This decision depends upon how the cut-off date for computing ten years of service in terms of paragraph 53 of Uma Devi(supra) should be construed in the context of the State of Jharkhand when the State of Jharkhand had come into existence only in November 2000. But, again, such an issue is not even remotely involved in the present petitions, and therefore, based upon some observations therein, the petitioners cannot claim any relief in these petitions. 46. Dhananjay Malik(supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present case. This decision is an authority for the petitioners, having participated in the selection process without any demur or estoppel from challenging the selection criteria after they were adjudged by the same criteria but were found unsuccessful. Again, such an issue does not arise, at least in the present petitions, and therefore, the decision in Dhananjay Malik(supra) is of no assistance to the petitioners. 47. Again, such an issue does not arise, at least in the present petitions, and therefore, the decision in Dhananjay Malik(supra) is of no assistance to the petitioners. 47. The issue is not whether the contractual engagement of the petitioners was illegal or tainted. Possibly, as a contractual engagement, this was not. But the real problem is whether, based upon such contractual arrangement, the petitioners acquire some right to now seek regularization of their services, bypassing the constitutional scheme of Articles 14 and 16 concerning public employment. This issue is squarely answered against the petitioners in Uma Devi(supra) by the constitution bench. The window kept open in paragraph 53 is not wide enough to permit entry to the present petitioners because their engagement was in the teeth of the observations in Uma Devi(supra),and they have not even completed ten years of the term referred in the said paragraph. Mr. Palekar also clarified that the petitioners were not basing their claim on paragraph 53 of Uma Devi(supra). 48. In Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court has explained that where the initial advertisement under which the petitioners were engaged held out no prospects of regularization, it would be presumed that all eligibles desirous of securing firm public employment with the State might not even apply for consideration. The Supreme Court explained this idea in the following words: “52. In this context, we may also mention that though the Official Liquidators appear to have issued advertisements for appointing the company-paid staff and made some sort of selection, more qualified and meritorious persons must have shunned from applying because they knew that the employment will be for a fixed term on fixed salary and their engagement will come to an end with the conclusion of liquidation proceedings. As a result of this, only mediocres must have responded to the advertisements and joined as company-paid staff. In this scenario a direction for absorption of all the company-paid staff has to be treated as violative of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution 75. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgment of the Constitution Ben’ in Uma Devi (supra) is binding on all the courts including this Court till the same is overruled by a larger Bench. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgment of the Constitution Ben’ in Uma Devi (supra) is binding on all the courts including this Court till the same is overruled by a larger Bench. The ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment has been followed by different two-Judge Benches for declining to entertain the claim of regularisation of service made by ad hoc/temporary/daily wage/casual employees or for reversing the orders of the High Court granting relief to such employees - Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen - (2007) 1 SCC 408 , Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 933, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. L.V. Subramanyeswara (2007) 5 SCC 326 , Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh - (2007) 6 SCC 207 . However, in U.P SFB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey (2007) 11 SCC 92 , on which reliance has been placed by Shri Gupta, a two Judge Bench has attempted to dilute the Constitution Bench judgment by suggesting that the said decision cannot be applied to a case where regularisation has been sought for in pursuance of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the same is in conflict with the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India - (1978) 1 SCC 248 .” 49. The contractual scheme eschews any backdoor entries when it comes to public employment. Therefore, based upon the advertisement that only assured a contractual engagement, based upon a spot selection process comprising only of walk-in interviews, the petitioners cannot claim some indefeasible right to seek regularization of their services simply because their contractual engagement continued for almost eight years or simply because together with several similarly placed employees, the petitioners may have served the IPHB well during the pandemic. Howsoever laudable, these considerations are not sufficient to bypass the constitutional scheme and the constitutional mandate. 50. Therefore, even assuming that Mr. Palekar is justified in over-emphasizing the expression “ordinarily” in paragraph 43 of Uma Devi (supra), we do not think that the circumstances highlighted by him render the case of the petitioners “extraordinary” enough to bypass the constitutional scheme and the constitutional mandate. This is again assuming that this Court could at all embark upon such a venture even in the absence of all-encompassing powers that Article 142 of the Constitution has reserved only to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 51. This is again assuming that this Court could at all embark upon such a venture even in the absence of all-encompassing powers that Article 142 of the Constitution has reserved only to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 51. Now finally, we come to the challenge to the said Rules. Mr. Palekar has contended that the said Rules are illegal, ultra vires, and unconstitutional simply because the qualifications prescribed therein have no nexus to the job profile of PPC. We are afraid we cannot accept such a challenge in the present petitions. 52. Admittedly, in this case, we are concerned with the recruitment to the post of Psychiatric Patient Care-taker (PPC). In the note/proposal dated 04.10.2016 relied upon by the petitioners themselves, the Dean has explained how the IPHB functions as a special purpose facility for mentally ill patients. He has demonstrated that such patients unexpectedly get aggressive/violent and are prone to commit homicides or suicides. He has explained how it becomes difficult for the Jr. Residents, staff nurses, wards attendant and sweeper on duty in the concerned wards of IPHB to control such patients in such cases. He has explained how the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has issued directives not to physically restrain and keep such patients in cells as coercive actions against mentally ill patients may violate their human rights. The note explains how it is necessary to deploy caretakers having a good physique to deal with such situations. Besides, the Director/Dean of IPHB, in his return, has referred to the recommendations of the 6th Pay Commission abolishing Group 'D' posts and providing that the minimum qualifications for Group 'C' posts should be SSC pass or ITI equivalent. 53. The said Rules, which the petitioners challenge as being ultravires prescribe the following essential qualifications for the post of PPC: “Essential: (1) Passed Secondary School Certificate Examination from a recognised Board/Institution. Or Successfully completed the course conducted by a recognised Industrial Training Institute (2) Must possess following minimum physical standards: (I) For male candidate: (i) Minimum height – 157 cms. (ii) Chest Unexpanded 80 cms. and expanded 85 cms.” 54. Considering the job profile of PPCs, about which there is no serious dispute, we do not think that the qualifications prescribed have no nexus or are otherwise arbitrary or absurd, as contended by Mr. Palekar. (ii) Chest Unexpanded 80 cms. and expanded 85 cms.” 54. Considering the job profile of PPCs, about which there is no serious dispute, we do not think that the qualifications prescribed have no nexus or are otherwise arbitrary or absurd, as contended by Mr. Palekar. Merely because the petitioners may have discharged services as Patient Care-takers (PCT) on a contractual basis with qualification of VIIIth pass or some other undefined good physique, that does not render the qualifications prescribed in the said Rules bereft of nexus or otherwise arbitrary or absurd. 55. In P. U. Joshi (supra), relied upon by the petitioners themselves, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the questions relating to the Constitution, pattern, the nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/substruction the qualifications, eligibility criteria, and other conditions of service, including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State, by appropriate rules, is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation, or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. Likewise, the State, by appropriate rules, is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation, or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired, or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service. 56. Similarly, in Chandigarh Administration (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal and the High Court committed an error in holding that the Chandigarh Administration could not prescribe qualification of Ph.D. degree for the post of Principal merely because when the said qualification is not unrelated to the duties and functions of the post of Principal and is reasonably relevant to maintain the high standards of education, there is absolutely no reason to interfere with the provision of the said requirement as an eligibility requirement. 57. It is now well settled that it is for the rule-making authority or the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for any recruitment. Courts and tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications nor entrench upon the power of the concerned authority so long as the qualifications prescribed by the employer are reasonably relevant and has a rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post, and are not violative of any provision of Constitution, statute, and Rules. [See J. Rangaswamy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 (1) SCC 288 and P.U. Joshi vs. Accountant General, 2003(2) SCC 632] In the absence of any rules, under Article 309 or Statute, the appellant had the power to appoint under its general power of administration and prescribe such eligibility criteria as it is considered to be necessary and reasonable. 58. Both the decisions mentioned above provide a clear answer to Mr. 58. Both the decisions mentioned above provide a clear answer to Mr. Palekar's contention about the said Rules being ultravires or unconstitutional on account of the qualifications prescribed allegedly having no nexus with the job profile of PPC. This is also not a case where some vested rights of the petitioners have been taken away. No right was ever conferred upon the petitioners to insist upon any regularization. The so-called promise or assurance by the Chief Minister, State of Goa, is neither established on facts nor can such alleged promise, described in Uma Devi(supra)as a constitutionally impermissible promise, create any rights, much less vested rights in the petitioners. 59. Mr. Palekar even admitted that except in 9 petitions out of the 25 petitions being considered today, all other petitioners possess the qualifications prescribed in the said Rules. The qualifications so prescribed can by no means be styled as some absurd qualifications having no nexus whatsoever with the job profile of PPC. This is a case of a challenge to recruitment rules that have been made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. This proviso's rule-making function is legislative (see B.S. Yadav vs. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp.SCC 524). For this reason, such rules can be struck down only on the grounds that may invalidate a legislative measure and not on improper motive as was vaguely urged on behalf of the petitioners. (see R.L. Bansal vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp.(02) SCC 318 & V. K. Sood vs. Secretary, Civil Aviation, 1993 Sup.(3) SCC 9). We see no merit in the challenge to the said Rules for all the reasons mentioned above. 60. Delhi University Contract Employees Union (supra) can also be of no assistance to the petitioners' cause. Incidentally, even that decision distinguishes Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra). It holds that the contract employees cannot claim benefit of regularization even in terms of paragraph 53 of Uma Devi (supra), and the rejection of their petition by the Single Judge of the High Court was quite correct. Hence, the division bench did not have to interfere in the matter. 61. The Court, however, took cognizance of the benefits of age relaxation and awarded some extra marks during the selection process proportionate to the number of years of contractual service rendered by the employees and issued certain directions. Hence, the division bench did not have to interfere in the matter. 61. The Court, however, took cognizance of the benefits of age relaxation and awarded some extra marks during the selection process proportionate to the number of years of contractual service rendered by the employees and issued certain directions. However, the Court also made it clear that the directions were premised on the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the University itself that all the contract employees were otherwise entitled and eligible to participate in the selection process. Based on such directions, which were quite peculiar to the facts before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are afraid we will not be in a position to issue any orders for framing a scheme of regularization and directing the State to consider the case of the petitioners for such regularization. 62. We are constrained to dismiss these petitions for all the reasons mentioned above, including the reasons set out by us in Rupin Gangaram Naik (supra). 63. The Rule in each of these petitions is therefore discharged. Accordingly, the interim orders in these petitions are vacated. Nothing in this Judgment and Order is intended to affect the hearing of Writ Petition No.304/2022 (Filing) challenging the selection and appointments made to the posts of PPC pursuance of the advertisement dated 15.10.2021 on grounds other than those now raised in these petitions. The said Writ Petition will undoubtedly be considered on its own merits and accord with the law. 64. Miscellaneous applications, if any, do not survive, and the same are also disposed of. There shall be no order for costs.