JUDGMENT (Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, made in S.C.No.173 of 2017 dated 12.02.2020.) R. Subramanian, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant / sole accused as against the conviction and sentence, dated 12.02.2020, made in S.C.No.464 of 2015, by the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni. 2. The appellant / sole accused stood convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment as detailed hereunder: Conviction U/s. Sentence Fine amount 294(b) IPC To undergo three months rigorous imprisonment To pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo 10 days rigorous imprisonment. 498(A) IPC To undergo three months rigorous imprisonment To pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment. 302 IPC To undergo life imprisonment To pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment. (All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.) 3. The brief facts of the prosecution is as follows: (i) The accused is the husband of the deceased. P.W.1 is the mother of the deceased. P.W.2 is the grand mother of the deceased. P.W.4 is the father of the deceased. The deceased married the accused 10 years back. Out of the wedlock two children were born. They were residing in the house of P.W.1. The accused demanded to set up a saloon shop for him. On the date of occurrence, when P.W.1, P.W.2 and others were sitting outside the house, on hearing the cries of the deceased, P.W.1 to P.W.3 rushed to the house of the deceased and found that the deceased was burning and the deceased informed P.W.1 and P.W.2 that the accused set her ablaze. P.W.5 is the brother of P.W.1. He has also rushed to the spot and when enquired, the deceased told him that the accused demanding saloon shop to be set up for him, hit the deceased's head against the wall and set her ablaze. On 27.03.2017, P.W.1 brought the deceased to the hospital. P.W.14-Medical Officer attached to the Government Medical College Hospital, Theni, examined the deceased. She was conscious and she has stated that she has tried to commit suicide by self immolation. P.W.14 noted 45% burn injuries in the body and issued Ex.P9-AR copy. On 27.03.2017, P.W.1 brought the deceased to the hospital. P.W.14-Medical Officer attached to the Government Medical College Hospital, Theni, examined the deceased. She was conscious and she has stated that she has tried to commit suicide by self immolation. P.W.14 noted 45% burn injuries in the body and issued Ex.P9-AR copy. (ii) P.W.12-Sub Inspector of Police after receipt of intimation from the hospital went to the hospital and examined the deceased and recorded her statement under Ex.P5. Thereafter, registered a case in Crime No.76 of 2017 under Sections 294(b), 498(A) and 307 IPC at 22.30 hours under Ex.P6-FIR and forwarded the FIR to the Court and copy to the Superior Officers. (iii) P.W.15, the Medical Officer was present when the learned Judicial Magistrate recorded her statement at 10.05 p.m, and at that time, she was conscious and thereafter, the deceased succumbed to injuries on 29.05.2017. P.W.15 has sent a death intimation to P.W.12 under Ex.P10. (iv) P.W.16-Inspector of Police after receipt of FIR in Crime No.76 of 2017 altered the crime into Sections 294(b), 498(A) and 302 IPC after death of the deceased under Ex.P11, conducted inquest over the dead body, prepared inquest report under Ex.P.12 and gave a requisition to the medical officer to conduct autopsy over the dead body. (v) P.W.7-the Medical Officer conducted autopsy and found the following injuries: “Extensive superficial partly healed and infected burns involving face, front, side and back of neck, front of chest and abdomen, both right and left upper limbs, whole of right and left thigh regions. The base of the burnt area is dark brown in colour. Singeing of hairs all over the body noted. The infected areas are covered with foul smelling pus material in a patchy manner. Peeling and blackening of the skin noted all over the burnt areas in a patchy manner. I.V.drip wound noted in the inner aspect of left ankle. I.V.drip wound noted in the inner aspect of right ankle.” He issued Ex.P4-Postmortem certificate opining that the deceased would appear to have died of effects of extensive superficial burns of about 50%. (vi) P.W.17-the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 10.05 p.m. on 27.03.2017 and the dying declaration was marked as Ex.P13. I.V.drip wound noted in the inner aspect of right ankle.” He issued Ex.P4-Postmortem certificate opining that the deceased would appear to have died of effects of extensive superficial burns of about 50%. (vi) P.W.17-the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 10.05 p.m. on 27.03.2017 and the dying declaration was marked as Ex.P13. (vii) P.W.18-Investigating Officer prepared observation mahazar under-Ex.P13 in the presence of witnesses and drew a rough sketch under Ex.P14 and also collected material objects and recorded the statement and finally laid the final report as against the accused. (viii) The prosecution, in order to bring home the guilt of the accused examined as many as 18 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.18, marked 15 documents as Ex.P1 to Ex.P15 and 9 material objects as M.O.1 to M.O.9. After analyzing the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court has found the accused guilty under Sections 294(b), 498(A) and 302 IPC. Assailing the same, the present appeal is filed. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the evidence of the relatives does not show the nature of the crime said to have been caused by the accused. In fact, the deceased has committed suicide and the accused has made an attempt to douse the fire. In the said incident, the accused had also sustained injuries and admitted in the hospital which has been suppressed by the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.1 that the accused ran away from the place of occurrence is also highly doubtful. P.W.2's evidence clearly indicates that the accused in fact raised an alarm to save his wife. P.W.3's evidence also affirms the above fact. Therefore, the statement of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that the deceased gave a oral dying declaration to them is highly unbelievable. Admittedly P.W.1 took the deceased to the hospital at the earliest point of time. If really, such an oral dying declaration was given by the deceased, the same should have been reflected before P.W.14-Medical Officer. 5. Further, it is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the Medical Officer-P.W.14, who admitted the deceased in the hospital, has stated that at the time of admitting the deceased, she was conscious and stated that she has self immolated and in the process, she sustained burn injuries. 5. Further, it is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the Medical Officer-P.W.14, who admitted the deceased in the hospital, has stated that at the time of admitting the deceased, she was conscious and stated that she has self immolated and in the process, she sustained burn injuries. Therefore, the alleged oral dying declaration spoken by the witnesses is an after thought and pressed into service at latter point of time. It is further contended that Ex.P1, the so called statement of the deceased came at later point of time and not as alleged by the prosecution. If really, the statement was recorded, as alleged by the prosecution, by the Sub-Inspector of Police at 19.00 hours, the FIR ought to have registered immediately, whereas the FIR has been registered at 22.30 hrs and the same has reached the Court on the next day. This delay itself clearly proves that Ex.P1 has been recorded in conformity with the dying declaration given before the learned Judicial Magistrate at 10.05 p.m. Though the deceased has given dying declaration to the Judicial Magistrate at 10.05 p.m. implicating the accused, such dying declaration was a result of tutoring which has happened latter. P.W.1 and others were in the hospital from the time of admission till the dying declaration was recorded. Therefore, possibility of them tutoring the deceased to implicate the accused at latter point of time also cannot be ruled out. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.4 that the accused hit the deceased against the wall is highly improbable. The Medical Officer- P.W.14 has not found any injury on the head. Therefore, there is inconsistency in the dying declaration. The first statement which was given with the presence of P.W.1-mother of the deceased in fact falsified the other dying declarations. Hence, submitted that the accused is certainly entitled to the benefit of doubt and prays for allowing of the appeal. 7. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would submit that Ex.P1 and Ex.P3 clearly shows that the accused only poured the kerosene on the deceased and set fire. Merely because there is different statement before the Doctor , the same is not a ground to reject the dying declarations. 7. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would submit that Ex.P1 and Ex.P3 clearly shows that the accused only poured the kerosene on the deceased and set fire. Merely because there is different statement before the Doctor , the same is not a ground to reject the dying declarations. The evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 also clearly shows that immediately after the occurrence, they rushed to the spot and the deceased has informed them about the nature of the incident. The evidence of witnesses coupled with the dying declaration clearly proves the guilt of the accused. It is also the contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the accused has not explained the circumstances under which his wife got injured, which would also go against him. Therefore, merely because the accused has sustained injury that cannot be a ground to disbelieve the entire prosecution. Hence, prays for dismissal of this appeal. 8. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials. 9. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused demanded for setting up of the saloon shop and was involved a frequent quarrels with his wife. On the date of occurrence, on 27.03.2017 at about 12.30 p.m., the accused quarrelled with his wife and with the intention to do away with her, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. P.W.1 is the none other than the mother of the deceased. The accused and deceased were residing along with P.W.1 It is the evidence of P.W.1 that on the date of occurrence, while P.W.1 and his mother-P.W.2 was sitting outside the house, on hearing the sound of the deceased, went to the house and found that the deceased has sustained burn injuries and the deceased informed them that the accused set fire on her. P.W.1 has also stated that the accused ran away from the place of occurrence. P.W.2 in her evidence has stated that accused dashed the deceased against the wall and set fire. The statement that the accused dashed the deceased against the wall is not supported by P.W.1 and P.W.3. Be that as it may, P.W.1 in her evidence has stated that the accused also sustained burn injury. Her evidence also indicates that after setting the deceased ablaze, the accused ran away from the place of occurrence. The statement that the accused dashed the deceased against the wall is not supported by P.W.1 and P.W.3. Be that as it may, P.W.1 in her evidence has stated that the accused also sustained burn injury. Her evidence also indicates that after setting the deceased ablaze, the accused ran away from the place of occurrence. But the cross examination of P.W.1 clearly indicates that the accused also sustained burn injuries and he was also taken treatment in the same hospital. The cross examination of P.W.2 clearly indicates that the accused in fact raised alarm to save his wife. The evidence of P.W.3 also proves that the accused raised alarm to save his wife. 10. Further, P.W.5 in his chief examination stated that the accused dashed the head of the deceased on the wall and set her ablaze. The evidence of the witnesses that the accused dashed the head of the deceased on the wall is falsified by the Medical Officer-P.W.14. The Medical Officer has admitted the deceased in the hospital at about 2.30 p.m. and she has not noted any injury on the head. P.W.14 in her evidence stated that the deceased was conscious at the time of admission and informed her that she attempted self immolation by pouring kerosene. The statement of the deceased was recorded by P.W.14 under Ex.P.9. If really the deceased has given oral dying declaration before P.W.1 to P.W.4 that the accused has set fire on her, there was no reason as to why the same was not reflected in the statement given before the Medical Officer-P.W.14. This aspect creating serious doubt about the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 about the so called oral dying declaration. AR copy-Ex.P9 clearly indicates that the deceased gave a statement that she attempted to commit suicide. The burns involved in neck and throat. The evidence of P.W.14 also indicates the burn injuries started from the neck, chest, front side of the abdomen and back. These injuries by self immolation is also possible. Therefore, we are of the view that the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 about the oral dying declaration is highly doubtful. 11. P.W.1's evidence that the accused ran away from the place of occurrence is also doubtful. In fact, the accused has also sustained burn injuries, as per cross examination of P.W.1, he was admitted in the same hospital. Therefore, we are of the view that the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 about the oral dying declaration is highly doubtful. 11. P.W.1's evidence that the accused ran away from the place of occurrence is also doubtful. In fact, the accused has also sustained burn injuries, as per cross examination of P.W.1, he was admitted in the same hospital. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 clearly show that the accused in fact raised alarm to save his wife. The conduct of the accused making such an attempt to save his wife also cannot be ignored all together and it assumes significance. Therefore, the oral dying declaration spoken by P.W.1 to P.W.5, in our view, is highly doubtful. If really such dying declaration was given by the deceased immediately after the occurrence, the same should have been reflected in the statement given before P.W.14-the Doctor, who admitted the deceased in the hospital at the first instance. In fact P.W.1 accompanied the deceased to hospital at first instance. The prosecution has also relied upon the statement said to have been recorded by P.W.12 at 19.00 hrs i.e., 7.00 p.m. on the same day. P.W.12-Sub Inspector of Police is said to have been recorded the statement of the deceased under Ex.P5. Though the statement recorded by P.W.12 indicates that as if the accused has set her ablaze for not setting up a saloon to him, it is relevant to note that while recording the statement of the deceased, P.W.1 and one Jeeva has signed as witnesses in the said statement. Though the statement said to have been recorded at 7.00 p.m., FIR has been registered at 22.30 hrs. The same has reached the Court in the next day early morning at 6.00 a.m. There was no explanation by the prosecution for such delay in despatching the statement. P.W.1 in her cross examination has stated that the police has obtained a signature and thumb impression in three blank papers. In her cross examination she did not speak anything about the statement given by the deceased to the police. This fact coupled with the despatching delay makes the very statement doubtful. Such delay in fact probabilises the argument of the appellant's counsel that the statement has been prepared in tune with the dying declaration recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate at later point of time. 12. This fact coupled with the despatching delay makes the very statement doubtful. Such delay in fact probabilises the argument of the appellant's counsel that the statement has been prepared in tune with the dying declaration recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate at later point of time. 12. In the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, the deceased has stated that the accused poured the kerosene and set her ablaze. It is relevant to note that the dying declaration was recorded at 10.05 p.m. after long delay, till such time, P.W.1 and other relatives were very much present in the hospital. When the learned Judicial Magistrate recorded the statement of the deceased, the doctor had certified her mental condition and at the time of recording the statement, others were not allowed inside the room. The fact remains that till the Judicial Magistrate arrived at 10.05 p.m., P.W.1 and other relatives were very much present in the hospital from 2.30 p.m. onwards. Therefore, we are of the view that the possibility of tutoring the deceased also cannot be ruled out. The delay in sending Ex.P1 to the Court in the next day morning in fact, probabilises the claim that Ex.P1 came in later i.e., after the dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. It is also relevant to note that the deceased died due to burn injuries and its complication much later. Only after the death of the deceased, the Investigating Officer has arrested the accused. 13. The fact that the accused also sustained injuries and he was admitted in the hospital is also spoken by the witnesses. It is argued that since the accused has not explained as to what has transpired in his house, the circumstances would go against him. No doubt that the accused has not explained as to what has transpired in the house, where he and his wife were residing, and how his wife sustained injuries, but the fact remains that except relative witnesses, the prosecution has not produced any evidence to prove as to how the injuries were sustained by the accused. The prosecution proceeded as if the accused has not sustained any injury. The prosecution proceeded as if the accused has not sustained any injury. In fact P.W.1's evidence indicates that as if the accused ran away from the place of occurrence, whereas in the cross examination it came to light that he had sustained burn injuries and had taken treatment in the same hospital which has been suppressed by the prosecution. Therefore, when the foundation facts itself has not been established and the real fact has been suppressed, merely the accused has not explained certain circumstances, the Court cannot come to the conclusion that the prosecution theory is true and established beyond all reasonable doubt. 14. Further, to show that the accused was in the habit of demanding dowry and treating the injured with cruel manner, the prosecution for the reasons best known to them, has not examined the children of the accused and the deceased. They were also residing in the same house. P.W.5 is the brother of P.W.1. He was also present when the deceased was admitted in the hospital at the first instance of 02.34 hours. According to him, he has also heard the dying declaration made by the deceased immediately after the occurrence. But in the statement made before the Medical Officer, the deceased herself has stated that she has made an attempt to commit suicide. If really P.W.1 and P.W.5 heard the dying declaration, there was no reason as to why they have not given any statement to the Doctor at the first instance. This aspect also cannot be ignored all together. 15. Ex.P1, stated to be the statement of the deceased recorded with minute details, there was no reason as to why it was not recorded in the presence of the Medical Officer. This also creates doubt about Ex.P1- statement. Though the sanctity is normally attached to the dying declaration, because it comes from the mouth of dying person, when the Court finds that the possibility of tutoring, prompting her imagination cannot be ruled out, it is unsafe to rely upon such statement. We are of the view that as the earlier version was different from the later version, which came after quit some time, particularly when the entire family members of the deceased were all along with the deceased till the dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, it is very unsafe to rely upon only the dying declaration without any corroborative evidence. It is well settled that in cases of multiple dying declarations, the Court has to scrutinize the evidence and documents and to verify whether there is any inconsistency between the particulars and materials therein. In a case, where the statement of the deceased at the earliest point of time appears to be uninfluenced, it is unsafe to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded later, particularly, when there was no circumstance that would justify two different versions at the first instance when the deceased was conscious. Therefore, we are of the view that as there was possibility of tutoring, it is unsafe to rely upon the dying declaration recorded after some period of time. It is highly unsafe to rely upon the statement of the deceased, which was marked as Ex.P1 and Ex.P3, to base the conviction. Hence, we are of the view that the accused is certainly entitled to the benefit of doubt. 16. Further, we also noted that though P.W.2 has stated in her evidence that the accused has caused injury on the head of the deceased, the Medical Officer, who admitted the deceased has not seen any injury on the head of the deceased. Postmortem Doctor also has not seen any injury on the head. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.5 is highly doubtful in this regard. Accordingly, we hold that the accused is certainly entitled to the benefit of doubt. 17. We also record our displeasure over the manner in which the trial has been conducted by the Sessions Judges. It is relevant to note that originally P.W.1 to P.W.12 were examined on 28.06.2018 but the cross examination was conducted only on 06.08.2019. Thereafter, the judgment was pronounced only on 12.02.2020. Despite the repeated directions by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, to conduct a trial on day-to-day basis in tune with Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the trial Judges seem to have forgotten the mandatory provisions contained in the Code and are casually allowing the adjournments as sought for by the counsel for both sides. As per Section 309 Cr.P.C., the trial shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. 18. Section 309 of Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: “309. As per Section 309 Cr.P.C., the trial shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. 18. Section 309 of Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: “309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. (1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be record: (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing: [Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him.] Explanation 1. If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2.- The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused.” Explanation 2 of Section 309 Cr.P.C. makes it very clear that in the event of seeking any adjournment for reasonable ground, such adjournment can be granted in appropriate cases on the payment of cost payable either by the prosecution or the accused. 19. We have never seen in our experience any Trial Judge imposing costs for adjournments. 19. We have never seen in our experience any Trial Judge imposing costs for adjournments. If the cost is imposed for such adjournment as per the mandate, the whims and fancies of the counsel and the accused would be curtailed to the maximum level, but the Trial Court has failed to follow the procedure. 20. In State of U.P. Vs. Shambu Nath Singh and Other, reported in 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 798, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when the witnesses are in Court, they will have to be examined except for “special reasons” which are to be recorded in the order of adjournment. Inconvenience of the advocate is not a “special reason” for bypassing the mandate of Section 309 of the Code. Further, it has held that if any Court finds that the day-to-day examination of the witnesses mandated by the legislature cannot be complied with due to the non-cooperation of the accused or his counsel the Court can adopt any of the measures indicated in the sub-section i.e., remanding the accused to custody or imposing cost on the party who wants such adjournments (the cost must be commensurate with the loss suffered by the witnesses including the expenses to attend the Court). Another option is, when the accused is absent and the witness is present to be examined, the Court can cancel his bail, if he is on bail (unless an application is made on his behalf seeking permission for his counsel to proceed to examine the witnesses present even in his absence provided the accused gives an undertaking in writing that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case). 21. In Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 1 MLJ (Crl) 288, the Hon'ble Apex Court taken up the practice of adjournments in criminal trials and held as follows: “Adjournments sought on drop of hat by counsel, though witness present in Court, same contrary to principles of holding trial. Law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but same not taken note of. Facts on record show that after examination-in-chief of witness over, adjournment sought for cross-examination and Trial Courts grant time. Also, show that cross-examination took place after year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize witness and to gain over him by adopting tactics. Facts on record show that after examination-in-chief of witness over, adjournment sought for cross-examination and Trial Courts grant time. Also, show that cross-examination took place after year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize witness and to gain over him by adopting tactics. If accused for his benefit takes trial on path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. Court has sacred duty to see that trial conducted as per law. If adjournments granted with so much time, same would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to farce. If examination-inchief over, cross-examination should be completed on same day and if examination of witness continues till later hours, trial can be adjourned to next day for cross-examination and crossexamination should not be deferred for such long time.” 22. In State of Haryana Vs Ram Mehar and others reported in (2016) 3 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 577 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that concept of fair trial cannot be limitlessly stretched to permit recall of witnesses endlessly on ground of magnanimity etc. and further held that a criminal trial does not singularly centre around accused. In it, there is involvement of prosecution, victim and victim represents the collective. Cry of collective may not be uttered in decibels which are physically audible in Court premises, but Court has to remain sensitive to such silent cries and agonies, for the society seeks justice. Therefore, a balance has to be struck. 23. In Palanivel @ Velusamy Vs. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, Natham Police Station, Dindigul District reported in (2018) 4 MLJ (Crl) 1, a Division Bench of this Court [in which one of us, N.Sathish Kumar, J was a party] held that the conduct of the accused clearly indicates that he has deliberately failed to cross-examine the eye witnesses and therefore, he cannot contend that the entire trial is vitiated on the ground of fair concept. 24. In State of Kerala Vs. Rasheed reported in (2019) 13 SCC 297 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 23has held as follows: “23. While deciding an Application under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C., a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. 24. In State of Kerala Vs. Rasheed reported in (2019) 13 SCC 297 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 23has held as follows: “23. While deciding an Application under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C., a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. The following factors must be kept in consideration: (i) possibility of undue influence on witness(es); (ii) possibility of threats to witness(es); (iii) possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy; (iv) possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination-in-chief has been completed; (v) occurrence of delay in the trial, and the nonavailability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) Cr.P.C. These factors are illustrative for guiding the exercise of discretion by a Judge under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C.” 25. In Doongar Singh and others Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 410 has also held that trial Court must carry out mandate of Section 309 Cr.P.C. as reiterated in the judgments in V.Shambu Nath Singh case (cited supra), Mohd. Kalid Vs. State of W.B. reported in (2202) 7 CC 334 and Vinod Kumar case (cited supra). 26. Despite repeated pronouncements by the Apex Court and this Court still we feel that adjournments are granted causally without adhering to the mandatory provisions. Therefore, we are of the view that in every Sessions Case, day-to-day trial should be conducted, adjournments should not be granted for the mere asking and the reasons for adjournments should be recorded. We hope that the trial Courts, at least hereafter, do follow the mandatory procedure. We direct all the trial Judges to follow the mandatory provisions in conducting the trial particularly in sessions cases and warrant cases. 27. As the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is certainly entitled to acquittal. In fine, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant / sole accused, by Judgment dated 12.02.2020, made in S.C.No. 173 of 2017, on the file of the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni are set aside and the appellant /sole accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. In fine, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant / sole accused, by Judgment dated 12.02.2020, made in S.C.No. 173 of 2017, on the file of the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni are set aside and the appellant /sole accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is confined in Central Prison, Madurai, in view of the judgment of acquittal, he is directed to be released forthwith, unless his custody is required in connection with any other case.