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Gujarat High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 991 (GUJ)

Ashok Hiralal Parikh v. Senior Divn Manager

2022-08-26

A.J.SHASTRI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- "18.(a) quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 26-07-93 (Annexure 'I'); (b) quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25-04-95 (Annexure 'L'); (c)granting such other and further reliefs, and passing such other and further orders, as the circumstances of the case may require; (d) awarding the costs of this petition. 19. During the pendency and final disposal of this Special Civil Application, Your Lordships may be pleased to make an order: (e) Directing the respondent - Corporation to consider with regard to the quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner and to modify suitably the penalty to a lesser penalty and further direct the respondent-Corporation to reinstate the petitioner in service as Development Officer." 2. The background of facts, which has given rise to filing of present petition is that petitioner was appointed as an agent of respondent-Cooperation at Career Agent Branch in Ahmedabad way back in 1983. He was working at that Branch up to the year 1989 and in the said year, the petitioner was then appointed as Development Officer and was posted at Kadi. Last 3 years performance of the petitioner as development officer was satisfactory and he was quite successful in achieving targets and securing the business for respondent-Corporation. He has also earned three increments and incentives in cash for achieving such targets for securing business for respondent - Corporation. 2.1 The petitioner was then served with the charge-sheet on 20.12.1991 and such imputations of charges summarized as under:- "1. That on 08.03.1991 you collected a blank cheque No.552373 dated 08.03.91 drawn on the Saranpur Co.Op.Bank, Ltd., Maskati Market, Ahmedabad from Shri Rajesh Lekhraj Chawla, B-13, Nirankar Society, Bhairavnath Road, Maninagar, Ahmedabad towards yearly premium due on 28.12.90 under Policy No.69157058 on the life of his son Kumar Honey. You were to a write the amount in the cheque and after calculating the interest for late payment. You collected the cheque though you are not authorized to collect renewal premium; 2. You were to a write the amount in the cheque and after calculating the interest for late payment. You collected the cheque though you are not authorized to collect renewal premium; 2. That you wrote the amount of Rs.2725/- on the cheque and struck off the Policy No.69157058 written by Shri R.L. Chawla on the reverse of above cheque and wrote another Policy No.830818495 and tendered the same to Kadi B.O. on 13.03.91 in payment yearly premium of Rs.2725/- due 15th March, 1991 under Policy No.830818495 on the life of Shri H.A. Panchal; 3. You also collected unauthorisedly cheque No.298 dtd. 04.02.90 for Rs.2725/- drawn on Bank of Baroda, Rakhial Branch from Shri Hasmukh A. Panchal, Life Assured under Policy No.830818495 in payment of yearly premium of Rs.2725/- due 15.03.91 thereunder. Instead of tendering this cheque in payment of the above referred premium you tendered it to Kadi Branch Office on 06.02.91 in payment of First Deposits under four proposals as per particulars stated below; Sr. No. Propl. No. Policy No. BOC No. Date Amt. Name of Policy Holder 1 8407 850412300 426260 06/02/91 311 MH Parmar 2 8454 850412333 426261 06/02/91 694 NG Makwana 3 8409 850445419 426259 06/02/91 874 MN Chauhan 4 8441 850412328 426258 06/02/91 846 BD Rajput That You have misused the Cheque No.298 dated 04.02.90 drawn on Bank of Baroda and Cheque No.552373 dated 08.03.91 drawn on the Sarangpur Co. Op. Bank Ltd. You have thus indulged in temporary misappropriation of moneys belonging to L.I.C. By your aforesaid acts, you failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, failed to serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully, acted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and prejudicial to good conduct and thereby committed breach of Regulation 21 and 24 read with Regulations 39(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, for which any one or more of the penalties specified under Regulation 39(1) (1) to (g) of the aforesaid (staff) Regulations, 1960 can be imposed upon you." 2.2 The said charges for which an explanation was sought, petitioner offered the same by way of a reply dated 13.01.1992. Subsequent to it, having not satisfied with the explanation, the respondent authority decided to conduct a departmental inquiry as a result of which, an inquiry officer came to be appointed to inquire with respect to the charges levelled against the petitioner. Subsequent to it, having not satisfied with the explanation, the respondent authority decided to conduct a departmental inquiry as a result of which, an inquiry officer came to be appointed to inquire with respect to the charges levelled against the petitioner. After due inquiry conducted, it appears that a report is submitted on 24.08.1992 indicating that charges levelled against the petitioner are proved and established. As a result of it, a second show cause notice came to be issued on 09.02.1993. Later on, after considering the said reply and upon overall consideration, it was decided by disciplinary authority to impose a penalty. Hence, an order of removal came to be passed on 26.07.1993. 2.3 It is the case of petitioner that the said original order of removal came to be challenged by way of filing Special Civil Application No.1451 of 1994 which was later on withdrawn with a view to make an appropriate representation before respondent No.2 authority accordingly, petition was disposed of vide order dated 28.12.1994. It is thereafter, a representation was made by the petitioner to zonal office but the same came to be rejected vide order dated 25.04.1994. It is in this background, the petitioner has moved to this Court by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for assailing such orders i.e. order dated 26.07.1993 as well as 25.04.1995 respectively. 3. The present petition was initially entertained by calling upon the respondent authority and the same appears to have been extensively heard on previous occasion and after a detailed order on 14.07.2016 the petition came to be dismissed. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said order, it appears that Letters Patent Appeal is filed being Letters Patent Appeal No.2153 of 2017 and simultaneously a review application also came to be filed being Misc. Civil Application No.2765 of 2016. The same was also disposed of which led to the filing of an appeal and accordingly, both the said appeals were heard together and vide common judgment and order dated 30.11.2017, the Division Bench was pleased to allow the Appeal No.2154 of 2017 in part and the order passed in review application, as stated above, was quashed and the matter remitted back to decide Misc. Civil Application a fresh in the light of observations made by the Division Bench of this Court. Civil Application a fresh in the light of observations made by the Division Bench of this Court. It is in this view of the matter, the record indicates that by an order dated 07.09.2018 the original order dated 14.07.2016 passed in main Special Civil Application No.5665 of 1995 is recalled and the petition was ordered to be restored to its original position and directed the same to be placed before the appropriate bench. It is with this background, the petition was enlisted before this Court after obtaining proper orders on administrative side and accordingly, the petition is heard. During pendency of this petition, few orders have been passed, which will be referred to in case of necessity at a later point in present order. With the consent and request of both the learned advocates, since pleadings were completed, the Court heard the matter. 4. Mr. Bhaskar Tanna, learned senior counsel appearing with Mr. Hardeep L. Mahida, learned advocate for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the order of removal passed by the authority is grossly disproportionate to the charges which have been levelled against the petitioner and as such the same being disproportionate deserves to be corrected. It has been submitted that even if the imputation of charge to be taken in as it is manner then also it was merely a temporary misappropriation of paltry sum of Rs.2,725/- and for which gross penalty has been imposed. On the contrary, the inquiry which has been initiated is a camouflage inasmuch as the charges levelled against him are bald not justified and it is merely a lapse or irregularity at the best on the part of petitioner which cannot be treated to be a misappropriation and as such in this context, the penalty of removal is too harsh, practically an economic death of the petitioner. 4.1 Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has further submitted that even on perusal of charge-sheet, it appears that there is no misappropriation charge levelled in fact against the petitioner and inquiry has been conducted in a slipshod manner and there is no iota of evidence which can sustain a charge said to have been proved against the petitioner. 4.1 Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has further submitted that even on perusal of charge-sheet, it appears that there is no misappropriation charge levelled in fact against the petitioner and inquiry has been conducted in a slipshod manner and there is no iota of evidence which can sustain a charge said to have been proved against the petitioner. In fact, the person at whose instance the inquiry came to be initiated, has not been examined and during the passage of time, it was also specifically addressed to the respondent by those very persons have no grievance and they agitated on account of misunderstanding which now having been clarified, they have nothing more to say. As such when that be the situation, there is hardly any justifiable reason for authority to proceed ahead and pass an impugned order which apparently is arbitrary, disproportionate and it is settled position of law that punishment must commensurate with gravity of charge and as such the said principle having not been appreciated by the authority, Hon'ble Court may kindly interfered with it. 4.2 Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has further submitted that it is the complaints which were relied upon were withdrawn by the relevant person and there was no further material in the inquiry and at that moment only the inquiry could have been stopped. The star witness Mr.N.G.Shah who on the contrary supported the case of the petitioner by indicating that he has collected third party cheque of Mr. H.A.Panchal for all three proposals amounting to Rs.2725/- and as such the question of unauthorized collection of cheque dated 04.02.1994 of Rs.2725/- would not arise and as such petitioner cannot be held to be guilty of misappropriation. It has further been submitted that at the best, there was a mistake or lapse for which the petitioner is made a scapegoat and rather trapped and instead of showing a lenient view or taking a sympathetic view as expected by the Court on initial round of litigation, the authority has not passed an order in consonance with the spirit in which the petitioner was permitted to file representation. According to Mr. According to Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel, the authority initially was of the view that the stop increment may be a proportionate penalty but it appears that under dictation of higher authority this extreme penalty of removal was imposed upon and as such, this being an apparent arbitrariness, the order in question deserves to be quashed. 4.3 Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has further submitted that on the contrary, there appears to be noting with respect to imposition of penalty and the same were indicating that this penalty of removal was not even suggested and as such the authority was expected to impose proportionate penalty looking to the record on the noting in file having not done so an arbitrariness is shown by the authority which violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India and as such by taking same lenient view the petitioner may be at the best vested with proportionate penalty and not the penalty like economic death i.e. removal from the services. 4.4 To strengthen his submission, Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has relied upon following decisions:- (i) 2006 (5) SCC 88 . (ii) 1991 (3) SCC 219 . (iii) AIR 2022 SC 2002 . (iv) 2022 (4) SCC 385 . (v) 2022 (4) SCC 358 . (vi) 2011 (4) SCC 584 . After contending this, a request is made that in view of this passage of time and in view of the fact that the age of superannuation was already crossed in the year 2018, the quantum of penalty be directed to be examined once again by the authority, by issuing suitable direction. Hence, a request is made to grant the relief, as prayed for in the petition. 4.5 Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel has also submitted that the notings were called for and were expected to be produced on record, but somehow the authority had chosen not to disclose it before the Court by just indicting that the record is not available, but for this very purpose, the petitioner may not be allowed to suffer. Hence, he has requested to pass suitable order in the interest of justice, by granting relief as prayed for in the petition. No other submissions have been made. 5. As against this, Mr. Hence, he has requested to pass suitable order in the interest of justice, by granting relief as prayed for in the petition. No other submissions have been made. 5. As against this, Mr. Yogi K. Gadhia, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent authority has submitted that present petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be put to quietus after a long lapse of time now. In fact, during the course of inquiry and proceeding against the petitioner, there has been no procedural lapse nor any violation of principles of natural justice in any manner and inquiry is conducted in a transparent, fair and in consonance with the relevant rules and as such there seems to be no violation of principles of natural justice. According to Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate, more than adequate opportunities are given for cross examining the witness, even for examination his own witness, but it has been chosen conveniently not to examine a few witness and now, coming out with a case that witnesses have not been examined. In fact, if the entire chronology of departmental inquiry is to be looked into, at every stage, the petitioner had been given an opportunity and he has vehemently contended that there has been no violation of principles of natural justice in any way. In fact, the entire decision making process is in conformity with the relevant rules and hence, it cannot be said in any manner that any unfair approach has been made by the authority while proving the charge against the petitioner. 5.1 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that the petitioner appears to have over simplified the charge. In fact, the charge is indicating a loss of confidence and element of trust is breached, which is the essence of business of respondent corporation. If this is missing, then irrespective of any amount, it is open for the authority to take an appropriate stand as expected by petitioner. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that the petitioner went on making efforts to somehow tried to drag on the issue by filing one petition on the other on multiple counts. In fact, on earlier occasion, when the petition was filed in the year 1994, the Hon'ble Court was not with the petitioner as a result of this, was permitted to make a representation and the petition was disposed of on 28.12.1994. In fact, on earlier occasion, when the petition was filed in the year 1994, the Hon'ble Court was not with the petitioner as a result of this, was permitted to make a representation and the petition was disposed of on 28.12.1994. After the said order, the authority has in its true spirit, considered the representation of the petitioner, but then the authority found by looking at the conduct and charge which has been proved that there is hardly any scope for reconsideration the request of the petitioner and therefore, by a detailed order the request was rejected and as such, while decision making process, the authority has applied its mind and hence in the absence of any irregularity, mala fides or any perversity, it is not open for the petitioner to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, in view of settled position of law. In fact, by a detailed order, even in the month of July, 2016, after final hearing, a second round of litigation was concluded but then the judgments which were reflecting in the order, were not stated to have been put to the notice, but an additional opportunity was given by recalling the order and as such when this be the situation, according to learned advocate now, it is just and proper not to allow the petitioner to further precipitate the issue which has already been examined by the competent authority more than once. 5.2 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has submitted that a case is tried to be made out, to divert the attention from core issue, by suggesting that, as per the internal communications, the penalty of stop increment was suggested but instead of that the disciplinary authority has passed an order of removal and as such a contention is raised by the petitioner that appellate authority has not examined the said issue. But then the learned advocate has vehemently contended that, in fact it is not corrected and the said notings are not available and it is only with a view to divert the attention such contention is raised. Except the said bald assertion, no other proof of the same is produced which would clearly indicate that in fact it was available on record. Except the said bald assertion, no other proof of the same is produced which would clearly indicate that in fact it was available on record. Such kind of assertion, which has been made in present proceeding, was also attempted in the first round of litigation, in the year 1994, in a petition being Special Civil Application No.1451 of 1994. Such suggestion in the form of submission was made but an affidavit was filed by disciplinary authority in the said petition wherein it has been clearly stated on oath that no such assurance has been given and the disciplinary authority was firmed in its opinion to impose penalty of removal and as such the point which was tried to be canvassed is of no assistance to the petitioner. 5.3 It has further been contended that during the course of inquiry, enough opportunity has been given and was also provided with an assistance of co-employee and simply because the inquiry has been conducted smoothly in a time schedule, it is not open for the petitioner to contend that the same is conducted in a slipshod manner. In fact, on the first date, the presenting officer produced the documents on record with a list of witnesses and the petitioner was asked to examine any witness. At that juncture, the petitioner produced two letters, one dated 20.03.1992 written by Mr.R.L.Chawla and another dated 19.03.992 written by Mr.H.A.Panchal. The petitioner was represented by one Mr. C.P.Patel and during the course of inquiry, the presenting officer firstly examined Mr. L.M.Mehta to substantiate the charges and when petitioner was asked to examine the said witness, he did not do that. Similarly the presenting officer then examined one Mr. N.G.Shah and again when put for cross-examination, the petitioner chose not to cross-examine. So far as, the two persons named by him, Mr. Chawla and Mr. Panchal as defense witnesses, they did not remain present in the inquiry and at that stage, the petitioner was specifically asked as to whether he wanted to produce any witness or evidence, on which he replied in negative and it is only thereafter that the inquiry was concluded. As such, having participated in the said inquiry and chosen conveniently not to examine the witness, now it is not open for the petitioner to raise any grievance. Before concluding the inquiry, petitioner was very much given an appropriate opportunity. 5.4 Mr. As such, having participated in the said inquiry and chosen conveniently not to examine the witness, now it is not open for the petitioner to raise any grievance. Before concluding the inquiry, petitioner was very much given an appropriate opportunity. 5.4 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that on the contrary, when show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 09.02.1993, as to why his services should not be put to an end by passing an order of removal, the petitioner replied the same on 20.04.1993 inter alia indicating that he was extremely sorry for the mistake committed by him and asked for mercy and since the charges were proved and established, such mode is adopted by the petitioner and as such now, the petitioner cannot raise any grievance as if the authority has unfairly treated him. In fact, fullest opportunity was given to him during the course of inquiry and there is no procedural lapse of any nature in inquiry nor the same has been conducted in violation of any principles of natural justice and as such, the entire decision making process is in consonance with the proper procedure and is not irregular. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has then referred to a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2019 (8) SCC 134 and thereby contended about the scope of interference in departmental proceedings. 5.5 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has then contended that petitioner was faced with a serious charge and it is not a question of amount but question of integrity of an employee. The petitioner was working on a sensitive post in the public sector undertaking and in discharge of his duties he took a cheque of Mr. Chawla, struck off the policy number written on the reverse side of cheque and presented it for payment of premium of Mr. Panchal. He then took the cheque of Mr. Panchal and used it for four proposals. The glaring illegalities have been surfaced when a complain was received by Mr. Chawla on 08.05.1991 as well as by letter of Mr. Panchal dated 06.10.1991 and as such, this is a fraudulent act on the part of petitioner. Panchal. He then took the cheque of Mr. Panchal and used it for four proposals. The glaring illegalities have been surfaced when a complain was received by Mr. Chawla on 08.05.1991 as well as by letter of Mr. Panchal dated 06.10.1991 and as such, this is a fraudulent act on the part of petitioner. It cannot be said that it was merely a mistake committed by him and therefore, simply because the said complainants have withdrawn their respective grievance, the conduct cannot be evaporated and as such after relying upon the decision delivered by the Court reported in 2005 (3) GLR 2000 , a request is made not to interfere with a decision taken by authority. In fact, according to him, the petitioner has miserably failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion and also failed to serve the public sector undertaking with honesty and faithfulness and it is in that context, the authority found that petitioner does not deserve to be continued and hence, the order is passed. Proportionality of penalty issue depends upon individual facts of the case and therefore, in this peculiar background of facts, specially when the petitioner being an employee has acted quite contrary to the interest of organization, which reflects a loss of faith and integrity. The learned advocate by referring to a decision delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2011 (7) SCC 325 has requested not to interfere with. 5.6 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that the petitioner in fact did not examine witnesses in the matter and not even cross-examined the witnesses put up by the management and he only has chosen to produce two letters, one dated 19.03.1992 and another dated 20.03.1992, written by the said two persons. But the said letters if to be perused, it would clearly indicate that the same are not only after the chargesheet was issued and not an appropriate stage and these two persons, during the course of inquiry, have not been examined to prove the contents of said letters. The affidavit of Mr. But the said letters if to be perused, it would clearly indicate that the same are not only after the chargesheet was issued and not an appropriate stage and these two persons, during the course of inquiry, have not been examined to prove the contents of said letters. The affidavit of Mr. Panchal is attempted to be produced on 23.01.1994 whereas the order was passed by the disciplinary authority on 26.07.1993 and therefore, with a view to persuade the said persons to save the skeen of the petitioner is nothing but a concoction which has rightly not been encouraged by the authority and therefore, when such is the conduct, extraordinary equitable jurisdiction may not be exercised. In fact, at the fag end, an attempt is made to indicate that on account of inexperience, a mistake has been committed but then the petitioner cannot forget that he worked as an agent from 1983 to 1989 and then got appointed as a Development Officer and therefore, inexperience part is nothing but an eyewash which has rightly not been considered by the authority. It has further been contended that the amount is insignificant when the charge is that of lack of devotion and integrity and for that purpose, the learned advocate has made a reference to a decision reported in 2015 (2) SCC 341 . 5.7 Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has then reiterated that an attempt which has been made that once upon a time there was an indication of penalty of stop increment to be imposed upon but then, as against this, the respondent had produced on record a letter dated 10.12.1992 written by disciplinary authority which indicates a proposal to impose a punishment of removal. Further, in the earlier petition, as stated above, no such assurance was given to the petitioner in any form and as such at this stage, the learned advocate has made a reference to a decision reported in GJT 2022 (4) SC in case of IOC versus Rajendra D. Hamalkar and reference is made to paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2 and thereby contended that no interference deserves in the present case. 5.8 Additionally Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that the defense witnesses as indicated in his list, one Mr. Chawla and another Mr. 5.8 Additionally Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has further submitted that the defense witnesses as indicated in his list, one Mr. Chawla and another Mr. Panchal but it was his duty to examine his witnesses and as such the contention that the star witness has not been examined is out of place. It was the duty on the part of petitioner to place them as witnesses to prove the contents of letters in defense, specially when those two persons were there in the list enlisted as defense witnesses by him only and therefore, simply because the inquiry has been conducted in 4 to 5 hearings, it is no ground to call in question the decision making process. In fact, if the evidence whatever is collected is to be examined, the charges levelled against the petitioner stand proved. As a result of this, proportionality of penalty is not an issue permitted to be agitated by the petitioner. 5.9 Lastly Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate has submitted that here in the case, now the grievance of the petitioner is tried to be put to its quietus in view of the fact that the service tenure of the petitioner was only of two years and almost 30 years have been passed in litigating and way back in 2018 has already crossed the age of superannuation and therefore, when the petitioner has lost the confidence of management, there is hardly any reason to grant any equitable relief to the petitioner and for this purpose a reference is made to a decision reported in 2020 (12) SCC 656 and has submitted that the present background of fact, deserves no interference. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material on record in the context of submission which has been made by respective sides, it appears clearly that petitioner has been extended an adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material on record in the context of submission which has been made by respective sides, it appears clearly that petitioner has been extended an adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry. The inquiry also appears to have been conducted in consonance with the relevant rules and in close conformity with the principles of natural justice since enough opportunity was given to examine and cross-examine the witnesses as well and as such after the relevant record where the disciplinary authority has arrived at a conclusion in respect of penalty than it is not possible for this Court to hold otherwise since no irregularity has been committed in decision making process nor any perversity is reflecting and the material placed before it has been considered. That being the situation, the process of inquiry cannot be said to be ill-founded in any form. It further appears that the inquiry officer has conducted an inquiry in consonance with the relevant regulation and the procedure set up therein and has arrived at a conclusion that charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved. A perusal of inquiry report at Annexure-D clearly indicates that not only the petitioner misused the cheque No.298 dated 04.12.1990 but also indulged in temporary misappropriation of monies belonging to LIC and in the said context, an explanation has also been considered and then on the basis of such overall material, a detailed report is submitted before the authority that charges have been established against the petitioner. A perusal of such report of inquiry officer appears to have been taken into consideration at length by the authority who passed an order originally on 26.07.1993. 7. As such, it is not possible for this Court to hold that any non-application of mind is reflecting or any perversity is emerging. Since, the decision making process is on the basis of relevant material put on record and in close perusal thereof it cannot be said that decision is perverse in any form. 7. As such, it is not possible for this Court to hold that any non-application of mind is reflecting or any perversity is emerging. Since, the decision making process is on the basis of relevant material put on record and in close perusal thereof it cannot be said that decision is perverse in any form. Later on, from the record, it appears that the said original order was the subject matter of Special Civil Application No.1451 of 1994 and the same was disposed of vide order dated 28.12.1994 whereby a permission was granted to make a representation and the authority was directed to consider sympathetically within a stipulated period but then it appears that the said representation of the petitioner has been considered by proper application of mind and same appears to have not been accepted vide order dated 25.04.1995. The said direction to relook the grievance is observed by the authority by passing an order and as such gist thereof is required to be reproduced hereunder:- "a) In so far as the contentions of Shri Parikh that the enquiry conducted was an eye-wash as the same was over within 4 hearings, that he was not given sufficient opportunity to defend his case, that the complainants at whose behest action was taken against him were not examined by the corporation to establish the case against him, that the evidence produced by him in the shape of two letters obtained by him from the complainants shri Panchal and Shri Chawla stating interalia that they now have no complaint were not taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer, that he was given to understand that if he did not contest the case and accepted the charges a lenient view would be taken, that the Disciplinary Authority was of the view to impose a lighter penalty. I find that the enquiry proceedings were held on four occasions, that the Enquiry Officer had given sufficient opportunity to Shri Parikh to represent his case inasmuch as he was allowed to take the assistance of Shri C.P. Patel, Co-employee to present his case in the above matter and that he was also asked to lead documentary evidence as well as present his witnesses. I further observe that he was given opportunities to cross examine the prosecution witnesses to refute the depositions made by them but on every occasion Shri Parikh and his assisting employee did not cross examine the prosecution witnesses, that Shri Parikh also failed to present Shri Panchal and Shri Chawla to depose as defence witnesses though he had given their names as his witnesses to the Enquiry Officer, that Shri Parikh did not present any documentary evidence except the two letters from the complainants stating that they had no complaint against Shri Parikh. I find that I n the original letter of complaint Shri Chawla in addition to requesting for investigation into his complaint had also stated that he was contemplating taking legal action against Shri Parikh. (b) In respect of Shri Parikh's argument that the two letters produced by him were not taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer, I observe that this point has been adequately dealt with by the Enquiry Officer in his Report. As these letters were produced by Shri Parikh from these complainants, it is for him to prove the same before the Enquiry Officer so that the Presenting Officer would have had an opportunity of confronting them with their earlier letters of complaint, based on which the proceedings ere instituted. Further I observe that Shri Parikh in his reply dated 13.01.1992 to the charge sheet has described Shri Panchal as one of his best friends. If that was so he could have easily produced him as his witness before the Enquiry Officer. The charges were held proved against Shri Parikh on the basis of documentary evidence and the depositions of the three witnesses. (c) The main plant of the defence of shri Parikh is the deposition made by Shri N.G. Shah, Agent, as a witness of the Management during the enquiry proceedings held on 24.08.1992. I find that in reply to a pointed question from the Presenting Officer viz. "how you have collected the deposit amount towards first premium under the above proposals?", Shri Shah replied " I have collected third partly cheque of Shri H.A. Panchal for all three proposals amounting to Rs.2,725/-. I find that in reply to a pointed question from the Presenting Officer viz. "how you have collected the deposit amount towards first premium under the above proposals?", Shri Shah replied " I have collected third partly cheque of Shri H.A. Panchal for all three proposals amounting to Rs.2,725/-. Although neither Shri Parikh nor his assisting employee cross-examined the said witness when he was asked to do so by the Enquiry Officer, now in his representation on hereof Shri Parikh has contended that if the aforesaid statement of the witness is to be believed and accepted then the charge relating to the so called unauthorised collection of Rs.2,725/- from Shri H.A. Panchal is baseless or the testimony of the witness is rong. In this connection, it is pertinent to state that this attempt to profit from the testimony of Shri N.G. Shah does not in any way help the cause of Shri Parikh but actually shows the inherent weakness in his case when his other submissions in this behalf are examined viz. The photostat copy of an affidavit dated 23.01.1994 of Shri H.A. Panchal wherein he had inter-alia stated " I say that I am a friend of Shri Ashok H. Parikh, Development Officer, Kadi Branch. I had taken LIC policy for myself and I had given the cheque towards the premium of the same. This by implication would mean that Shri Panchal had handed over the cheque to Shri Parikh. In his reply dated 13.01.1992 to the charge sheet dated 20.12.1991, Shri Parikh had inter alia stated "thereafter Shri Panchal handed me over cheque no.00298 drawn on the bank of India, Rakhial Branch, Ahmedabad for the same, only the cheque no.00298 is not for his annual premium falling due on 13.03.1991. Unfortunately, in the first week of March a premium notice of Mr. Panchal got attached with the blank cheque of Shri Chawla favouring LIC. When I realised the mistake I contacted Shri Panchal and explained that his premium for policy no.830818495 had been paid by someone else's cheque". This part of his reply clearly shows that the cheque in question of Shri Panchal was not received personally by Shri N.G. Shah but the same was personally received by Shri Parikh only. When I realised the mistake I contacted Shri Panchal and explained that his premium for policy no.830818495 had been paid by someone else's cheque". This part of his reply clearly shows that the cheque in question of Shri Panchal was not received personally by Shri N.G. Shah but the same was personally received by Shri Parikh only. (d) As regards the contention of Shri Parikh that he accepted the mistake as he was given to understand that if he did not contest the case, a lenient view would be taken appears to me as baseless and lacking in credibility in view of the reasoned findings of the Enquiry Officer in his Report. I find that the complainant, Shri Chawla preferred a complaint in May 1991 which he intended to withdraw by his letter dated 20.03.1992. Shri Panchal on the other hand had complained to the office by his letter dated 6.10.1991 and subsequently by his letter dated 19.03.1992 he had stated that he had no complaint against Shri Parikh. It is evident that the complainants sought to withdraw the same after a lapse of 10 and 5 months respectively from the date of their complaints and that too after the issue of the said charge sheet. In view of this, it is obvious that these letters were obtained by Shri Parikh in order to save himself from the consequences that flow for the serious misconduct of misappropriation. (e) The charges proved against Shri Parikh clearly indicate not only temporary misappropriation but fraud as well. I find that one of the pleas advanced by Shri Parikh in his reply to the Show Cause Notice was that he was inexperienced and in his present appeal he has mentioned that he had carelessly stated that he admitted his mistake or the lapse. In this context, I observe that Shri Parikh is a B.Com. And that he was an agent of the corporation for 6 years before becoming a Development Officer since 1990. In this background, his above arguments do not stand for a moment's scrutiny." 8. In the light of aforesaid situation which is prevailing hereinbefore, it clearly transpires that the grievance raised by the petitioner has been examined by the authority and as such, simply because the same is not found in favour of the petitioner's wish, the said decision making process does not become irregular or illegal. In the light of aforesaid situation which is prevailing hereinbefore, it clearly transpires that the grievance raised by the petitioner has been examined by the authority and as such, simply because the same is not found in favour of the petitioner's wish, the said decision making process does not become irregular or illegal. So much so that the same has been re-examined by the appellant authority as well by a detailed order and hence the conjoint effect of aforesaid circumstances are clearly indicating that the authority here has properly examined the grievance of the petitioner and then arrived at a decision which in no circumstance possible to be construed as illegal. 9. In respect of departmental proceedings, time and again the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the authoritative principle by observing that only the decision making process is to be examined rest of the things are within the domain of employer to deal with its own employee and as such considering the aforesaid authoritative principle, the conjoint effect of relevant material would clearly indicate that the authority did consider the case but arrived at a different conclusion than what was expected by the petitioner and as such in considered opinion of this Court no case is made out to call for any interference. 10. So far as grievance of Mr. Bhaskar Tanna, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is concerned, with respect to lesser penalty or that the penalty has been imposed upon under dictation of higher authority is not possible to be accepted in view of the fact that the said notings are not available on the record and as against that the respondent authority has clearly observed in their written submissions that in earlier round of litigation in Special Civil Application No.1451 of 1994 the authority has categorically stated on oath that no such assurance was given and the disciplinary authority was firmed in its opinion that penalty of removal deserves to be imposed and the said stand was right from the beginning as not disputed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and as such in the absence of any such substantiating material, it is not safe to jump to a conclusion that punishment of stop increment was suggested at any point of time and when the material is not available, it is not for this Court to take a definite with stand certainty. As a result of this, such contention or submission has not appealed to the Court to arrive at a different conclusion. As a result of this, the overall consideration would lead to a situation where the petitioner had been extended an adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry, the process of inquiry had been undertaken in a fair and transparent manner. The petitioner was also given an opportunity to cross-examine the management witnesses and simultaneously petitioner did not examine those relevant witnesses which according to petitioner were very material. Hence, there appears to be no violation of principles of natural justice and it is not the case that any procedural lapse material in nature has been crept in conducting the inquiry as stipulated under the relevant regulation. Hence, overall consideration of material on record would lead to above situation where it is not possible for this Court to substitute the finding which has been arrived at by the authorities below. 11. The Court is also of the opinion that this is a peculiar background of facts wherein the petitioner went on agitating and reagitating the issues and authority has rightly said that for service tenure of two years, 30 years has been spent in litigation the matter is now required to be put to quietus at least after this much period of time specially when there is no visible irregularity, illegality or perversity reflecting from the stand of the authority in decision making process. Hence, the Court sees no reason to entertain the petition. 12. However, at this stage Mr. Tanna, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has made a reference to few decisions delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. As against that, Mr. Yogi K. Gadhia, learned advocate appearing for the authority has placed on record few decisions and as such the Court deems it proper to deal with the same since non dealing of the same may again give a leverage to the petitioner to continue to agitate further. 13. Mr. As against that, Mr. Yogi K. Gadhia, learned advocate appearing for the authority has placed on record few decisions and as such the Court deems it proper to deal with the same since non dealing of the same may again give a leverage to the petitioner to continue to agitate further. 13. Mr. Bhaskar Tanna, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a decision delivered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi versus Syndicate Bank, Head Office, Manipal reported in 1991 (0) AIJEL-SC 18883 and a perusal of the said decision would indicate that Ministry of Finance gave directive to appellate authority to adhere to the punishment advised by Commission and the said directive was not properly considered and as such in the light of same, the Bombay High Court on the contrary has observed that directives for Ministry of finance was wholly without jurisdiction and plainly contrary to statutory regulations and therefore, a close perusal of facts of the said case would indicate that the said judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner. Further, a decision in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi versus Union of India reported (1995) 6 SCC 749 is tried to be placed on record but the said judgment per se is not of any assistance to the petitioner as it relates to a different issue altogether as can be seen from the facts and controversy of the said decision itself. On the contrary, in the said decision in paragraph 25, it has been observed that while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraint inherent in exercise of power of judicial review. It is because of this, that substitution by High Court's view of authority regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. No doubt in the given case, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction but at the same time it depends upon the individual facts and the interference is permissible only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. Looking to the present background of facts, it does not transpire that petitioner has made out any case to call for any interference since there is no infirmity in decision making process and as such when that be so it is not open for this Court to just substitute the punishment in a routine manner. 14. Looking to the present background of facts, it does not transpire that petitioner has made out any case to call for any interference since there is no infirmity in decision making process and as such when that be so it is not open for this Court to just substitute the punishment in a routine manner. 14. Yet another decision is pressed into service in the case of M.V.Bijlani versus Union of India reported in wherein on facts itself the said decision is of no avail to the petitioner since in that case the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after a long lapse of 6 years and the disciplinary proceeding remain pending for 7 years and then the appellant was removed from the services whereas here the situation is quite contrast as there is no such delay occasioned on the contrary in a timely schedule manner. The inquiry is completed against the petitioner and here is the case in which for a service tenure of only 2 years, the petitioner has spent 30 years in litigating under one proceedings or the other and then valiant attempt is tried to be made to set aside the punishment of removal, and as such in considered opinion of this case, facts are quite distinct and as such the said decision is of no assistance to the petitioner in any form. Further by giving a mere chit the decisions have been placed of the year 2022 but in what manner the same are applicable is not stated before the Court. Just tendering of the judgment would not help out the petitioner to bring down the submission of interference with penalty which has been inflicted upon in a legally permissible manner. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out any case to call for any interference. Even after perusal of the said decision independently, this Court is of the opinion that they are not of much assistance to the petitioner in present background of facts. Hence, even on applying the principle laid down, no distinguishable circumstance pointed out to which may call for any interference. 15. As against this, Mr. Yogi Gadhia, learned advocate appearing for the authority has pressed into service few decisions to substantiate his case. Hence, even on applying the principle laid down, no distinguishable circumstance pointed out to which may call for any interference. 15. As against this, Mr. Yogi Gadhia, learned advocate appearing for the authority has pressed into service few decisions to substantiate his case. First judgment which has been relied upon is the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India versus Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya reported in wherein the order of removal was the subject matter of judicial review before the Court in which it has been propounded that once an employee had been granted an opportunity on the ground of compassion mainly on the ground that justice demands but the same cannot be extended again and again and once an employee fails to avail an opportunity, the bank cannot be directed to give another opportunity for the sake of justice. Now here it has been categorical case of authority which has been stated before the Court that during the course of inquiry, enough opportunity was given to examine and cross-examine the witnesses but it is the petitioner who has chosen not to avail such opportunity and rather has failed to examine his own witness from the defense list and apart from that even after once having granted an opportunity to make a request by way of representation and if the same has not been exceeded to by authority in its domain to exercise jurisdiction again and again to grant an opportunity in respect of quantum of penalty, the same would not subserve the interest of justice. Hence to some extent, the aforesaid judgment appears to have rightly been pressed into service. 16. Yet another decision delivered by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat versus Ashokkumar Shantilal Doshi reported in wherein an order of dismissal was the subject matter of challenge which was based upon the misconduct of misappropriation of public money and in that case, it has been clearly observed that in such kind of case about misappropriation the punishment of dismissal would be the only adequate punishment. Now, in the context of aforesaid decision, a perusal of this case if to be looked into in which the grave charge was that the petitioner was working on a sensitive post in public sector undertaking and he took a cheque of Mr. Now, in the context of aforesaid decision, a perusal of this case if to be looked into in which the grave charge was that the petitioner was working on a sensitive post in public sector undertaking and he took a cheque of Mr. Chawla struck off the policy number return on the reverse side of cheque and presented it for payment of premium of Mr. Panchal. He then took the cheque of Mr. Panchal and use it for 4 new proposals and this having been unearthed a serious complaint was made by Mr.Chawla on 08.05.1991 as well as by another person Mr. Panchal on 06.10.9091 and as such when such kind of even temporary misappropriation has taken place, which fact has been admitted by way of a mistake in his reply there is hardly any case made out by the petitioner to call for any interference in penalty. It may be that same notings might have been secured by the petitioner but the same has not been acted upon nor has been admitted by the authority and the same is not forming part of the record. There is hardly any scope for the Court to rely upon the same and consider the request for substitution of penalty and hence, outrightly the Court is not inclined to accede to the request even if the same has not been possible to be placed by the authority. 17. Yet another decision which has been relied upon in the case of Diwan Singh versus Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in wherein also in Life Insurance Corporation itself the said delinquent was faced with a charge / misconduct of temporary embezzlement of fund and the forgery and the authority had passed an order of dismissal and it was further found out that the finding of inquiry officer was not against the evidence on record. In that context, the High Court of Allahabad was found to have affirmed the penalty and the same has not been disturbed by Hon'ble Apex Court. It has been observed in the said decision that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the Courts. In that context, the High Court of Allahabad was found to have affirmed the penalty and the same has not been disturbed by Hon'ble Apex Court. It has been observed in the said decision that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the Courts. At this stage, it may also be worth to be noticed that there was a forged entry of Rs.533/- only was made and the concerned employee was visited with the penalty of dismissal and as such relying upon several other decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed which deserves to be quoted hereunder:- "9. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane[2] in which unaccounted amount was only Rs.93/- this Court expressed its opinion in para 12 as under: " Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal". 10. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra[3], this Court has made following observations in paragraph 25 of the judgment: - "..... In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law...." 11. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal[4], this Court, following the case of Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari and others[5], has opined that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law...." 11. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal[4], this Court, following the case of Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari and others[5], has opined that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. It has been further held that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant. In said case (Rajasthan SRTC), the respondent/employee was awarded punishment of removal from service. In the present case it is compulsory retirement. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that on earlier occasion, appellant was awarded minor punishment, for his misconduct, regarding defalcation of stamps. And now he is found guilty for the second time. Therefore, in the above circumstances in view of the law laid down by this Court, as above, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs." 18. A further decision has also been pressed into service by learned counsel but the ratio is almost similar and as such the same with a view to not over burden the present order not discussed at length. 19. The decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court last in line which is pressed into service deserves to be considered while arriving at a conclusion. The said decision is passed recently which is in the case of M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. versus Shri Rajendra D. Harmalkar reported in 2022 (4) SC 1. Here, the Hon'ble Apex Court has at great length examined the scope of judicial review in respect of departmental proceedings and quantum of punishment and as such, since this Court has considered the same relevant observations deserves to be quoted hereunder:- "Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration by this Court is, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court is justified in interfering with the conscious decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the punishment of dismissal from service, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. 7. On the question of judicial review and interference of the courts in matters of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, a few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to: (i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to order and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the wellknown principles known as 'Wednesbury principles'. In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was said that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. (ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under: "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being factfinding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." (iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 , in paragraph 19, it was observed and held as under: "19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case." 20. From the aforesaid authoritative proposition which has been propounded by Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that no case is made out by the petitioner to interfere with action of respondent authority impugned in the petition. Hence, on overall consideration of material on record, the submissions and the authoritative principles propounded by the decisions as stated above, the petition found to be meritless and accordingly, same stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule, if any, stands discharged.