JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The prayers in the afore captioned Writ Petition (Criminal) seeking for Habeas Corpus are as follows: “i. Issue a writ of Habeas Corpus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents 2 to 4 to produce the body of Miss. Vaishnavi Vipin, aged 4 years, D/o. Vipin Das, 27, Ranchhod Nagar-1, Godhra Road, Halol, Panchmahals, Gujarat before this Hon'ble Court and set her at liberty. ii. Dispense with filing of the translation of vernacular documents and iii. Such other order or direction deems fit and proper for this Hon'ble Court in facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Heard Sri.K.B.Arunkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri.E.C.Bineesh, learned Prosecutor appearing for official respondent No.1 and Sri.P.K.Sajeevan, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondents 2 to 4. 3. The case set up in the above Writ Petition (Criminal) is to the effect that the petitioner had married the daughter of R-2 & R-3 (who is also the sister of R-4) on 14.12.2016. A girl child viz. 'Vaishnavi Vipin' was born to the above couple on 28.11.2018, as evident from Ext.P-1 Birth Certificate. The petitioner's parents have been settled in Gujarat for a very long time. The petitioner's father passed away some time back. The petitioner, now aged 38 years, is working as Principal Software Engineer in a Bangalore based company in Gujarat. The child has been studying in Pre-Kindergarden Nursery section in Vijayaben Mohanbhai English Medium School, Halol, Panchmahal, Gujarat, which is said to be a well reputed school providing schooling up to 12th Standard and various other extracurricular activities. The petitioner's sister, aged 35 years, is also settled in Gujarat along with her husband and child and it is about 3 hours journey from the petitioner's residence. Further, it was found, some time in April, 2020 or so, that the petitioner's wife 'Juny' was suffering from cancer ailments and she was given medical treatment in Gujarat itself, as evident from Ext.P-2 series of documents. Respondents 2 & 3 (the parents of the petitioner's wife) requested that the petitioner's wife should be given treatment at the Regional Cancer Centre, Thiruvananthapuram (RCC). According to the petitioner, he could not immediately leave Gujarat because of his employment responsibilities and as he had to settle some of the loans taken for expending money for his wife's treatment. Respondents 2 & 3 (the parents of the petitioner's wife) requested that the petitioner's wife should be given treatment at the Regional Cancer Centre, Thiruvananthapuram (RCC). According to the petitioner, he could not immediately leave Gujarat because of his employment responsibilities and as he had to settle some of the loans taken for expending money for his wife's treatment. That, accordingly, respondents 2 & 3 had gone to Gujarat and had taken the petitioner's wife and child to Kerala, for giving treatment to the petitioner's wife at RCC, Thiruvananthapuram on 25.9.2022. Thereafter, the petitioner was not made aware about the subsequent developments regarding the medical treatment. The petitioner was thus constrained to come down to Kerala on 30.9.2022 to know about his wife's treatment and R-2 to R-4 were behaving to the petitioner in a very indifferent manner. Thereafter, with great difficulty, the petitioner could meet his wife, some time in the first week of October, 2022 and she was discharged from the Hospital at Thiruvananthapuram on 8.10.2022. The petitioner had then taken his wife for further treatment at Apollo Hospital, Karukutty, Ernakulam district. Later, on 9.10.2022 she was shifted to another hospital at Ottapalam, Palakkad district, which is near to the residence of R-2 to R-4. On 10.10.2022, the petitioner's wife 'Juny' had breathed her last. Ext.P-3 is the Death Certificate in that regard. Further that, R-2 to R-4 were thereafter not permitting the petitioner to have access to the child despite various requests. The petitioner was thus constrained to give various representations and complaints before the SHO, Ottapalam and SHO, Shornur. Ext.P-4 is one such petition filed before the SHO, Ottapalam, within whose jurisdiction R-2 to R-4 had confined the child in their residence. It is in the light of these averments that the petitioner had filed the instant Writ Petition with the afore mentioned prayers. 4. The pleas in the writ proceedings have been initially sought to be resisted by contesting respondents 2 to 4, by filing counter affidavit dated 8.11.2022. Various allegations were made against the petitioner, to the effect that the petitioner has treated his wife cruelly and that, he has demanded dowry, etc. Further that, he has never taken any steps to give proper medical treatment to his wife, when she was suffering from cancer ailments, etc. Various allegations were made against the petitioner, to the effect that the petitioner has treated his wife cruelly and that, he has demanded dowry, etc. Further that, he has never taken any steps to give proper medical treatment to his wife, when she was suffering from cancer ailments, etc. These averments have been denied by the petitioner in his detailed reply affidavit dated 14.11.2022, filed in this case. The allegation that the petitioner had earlier never allowed his wife to come down to visit her parents etc. has been countered on the basis of Ext.P-9 document, which is the plane tickets, on the basis of which his wife had visited her parents after COVID. Further that, the petitioner has produced Ext.P-11 medical documents to show that he had earlier given effective treatment to his wife, etc. He had produced Ext.P-10 series of photographs to show that he was leading a happy family life with his wife, etc. 5. We specifically queried to Sri.P.K.Sajeevan, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondents 2 to 4, as to whether any complaints were given against the petitioner, regarding the alleged harassment, cruelty and demand of dowry, etc. prior to the institution of the present case. 6. The counsel for R-2 to R-4 has fairly submitted before us that R-2 to R-4 have never given any such prior complaints. 7. The specific case of the petitioner is that these allegations are falsely foisted against him only to deny the custody of the child, which is lawfully entitled to him, etc. 8. In the instant case, the parties are Hindus and are governed by the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Going by the provisions contained in Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the father is the natural and legal guardian of the child. Further, it is the admitted case that the mother of the child (the petitioner's wife) is no more. The custody of the child was with the petitioner and his wife till they were residing at Gujarat and the child has been studying in a Pre-Kindergarden Nursery section of a school at Gujarat. The child will complete the age of 4 years only on 28.11.2022. There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner had to sent his wife and child, in the third week of September, 2022, in connection with his wife's treatment at the RCC, Thiruvananthapuram. The child will complete the age of 4 years only on 28.11.2022. There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner had to sent his wife and child, in the third week of September, 2022, in connection with his wife's treatment at the RCC, Thiruvananthapuram. Thereafter, the petitioner's wife had died. R-2 & R-3 got access and custody of the child only based on these facts and circumstances. The petitioner had given consent, regarding the custody of the child, only when he was constrained to sent his wife for treatment at Thiruvananthapuram. Even after the death of the petitioner's wife, respondents 2 to 4 are not giving back the custody of the child to the petitioner. 9. The Apex Court has held, in the celebrated decision in Gohar Begum v. Suggi Alias Nazma Begum & Ors. [ AIR 1960 SC 93 ], by placing reliance on the decision of the English case R v. Clarke [(1857) 7 EL & BL 186 = 119 ER 1217], that the refusal of the opposite side therein, to return back the custody of the child to the natural and legal guardian, would amount to illegal detention, as envisaged in Sec.491 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In Gohar Begum's case supra, Gohar Begum was the mother of the child born in an illegitimate relationship. Gohar's mother's sister was retaining the custody of the infant female child. The Apex Court noted the legal position that, under Mohammedan Law, the mother of an illegitimate female child is entitled to the custody of the child. The Apex Court held that the child's mother's sister had no legal right to the custody of the child and her refusal to hand over the child to the mother (Gohar Begum) was nothing but illegal detention within the meaning of Sec.491 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec.491 of the old Cr.P.C., inter alia, deals with a person who is illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody and it empowered the High Court to set at liberty such a person who is illegally or improperly detained. The Apex Court categorically held that Gohar Begum, being the mother of the child and the natural guardian, as per the personal law, is entitled to maintain writ proceedings. The Apex Court categorically held that Gohar Begum, being the mother of the child and the natural guardian, as per the personal law, is entitled to maintain writ proceedings. It may be pertinent to refer to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in paras 7 to 10 of Gohar Begum's case supra [ AIR 1960 SC 93 ], which read as follows: “7. On these undisputed facts the position in law is perfectly clear. Under the Mohammedan law which applies to this case, the appellant is entitled to the custody of Anjum who is her illegitimate daughter, no matter who the father of Anjum is. The respondent has no legal right whatsoever to the custody of the child. Her refusal to make over the child to the appellant therefore resulted in an illegal detention of the child within the meaning of Section 491. This position is clearly recognised in the English cases concerning writs of habeas corpus for the production of infants. In R v. Clarke [(1857) 7 EL & BL 186 : 119 ER 1217] Lord Campbell, C.J., said at p. 193: “But with respect to a child under guardianship for nurture, the child is supposed to be unlawfully imprisoned when unlawfully detained from the custody of the guardian; and when delivered to him, the child is supposed to be set at liberty.” The courts in our country have consistently taken the same view. For this purpose the Indian cases hereinafter cited may be referred to. The terms of Section 491 would clearly be applicable to the case and the appellant entitled to the order she asked. 8. We therefore think that the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly wrong in their view that the child Anjum was not being illegally or improperly detained. The learned Judges have not given any reason in support of their view and we are clear in our mind that view is unsustainable in law. 9. Before making the order the court is certainly called upon to consider the welfare of the infant concerned. Now there is no reason to think that it is in the interest of the child Anjum to keep her with the respondent. 9. Before making the order the court is certainly called upon to consider the welfare of the infant concerned. Now there is no reason to think that it is in the interest of the child Anjum to keep her with the respondent. In this connection it is relevant to state that at some stage of the proceedings in the High Court the parties appeared to have arrived at a settlement whereby it had been agreed that the child Anjum would be in the custody of the appellant and the respondent would have access to the child. The learned Judges of the High Court however were not prepared to make an order in terms of this settlement because, as they said, “It did not appear to be in the interest and welfare of the minor”. Here again they give no reason for their view. Both parties belong to the community of singing girls. The atmosphere in the home of either is the same. The appellant as the mother can be expected to take better care of the child than the respondent. Trivedi has acknowledged the paternity of the child. So in law the child can claim to be maintained by him. She has no such right against the respondent. We have not been able to find a single reason how the interests of the child would be better served if she was left in the custody of the respondent and not with the appellant. 10. We further see no reason why the appellant should have been asked to proceed under the Guardian and Wards Act for recovering the custody of the child. She had of course the right to do so. But she had also a clear right to an order for the custody of the child under Section 491 of the Code. The fact that she had a right under the Guardians and Wards Act is no justification for denying her the right under Section 491. That is well established as will appear from the cases hereinafter cited.” 10. A similar scenario has been considered by the Apex Court in the case in Tejaswini Gaud & Ors. v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari & Ors. [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ]. In that case, R-1 in the appeal (father of the minor child) before the Apex Court had married one 'Zelam'. Later, it was found that Zelam was suffering from cancer. v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari & Ors. [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ]. In that case, R-1 in the appeal (father of the minor child) before the Apex Court had married one 'Zelam'. Later, it was found that Zelam was suffering from cancer. Subsequently, Zelam gave birth to the abovesaid child in the said wedlock on 14.8.2017. While, the child's mother was undergoing treatment, the child was then with her father (R-1) for some time. Later, R-1 (father of the minor child) was hospitalized as he was suffering from some serious ailments. During that time, when both the parents of the child were not keeping well, the care and protection of the child was given to the sister of the mother's child as well as the said sister's husband. Later, the child's mother Zelam died. Thereafter, the child's deceased mother's sister and other relatives refused to hand over the custody of the child to R-1 herein (father of the minor child). The Apex Court, by placing reliance on the previous decision of the Apex Court in Gohar Begum's case supra [ AIR 1960 SC 93 ], has noted, in para 11 of Tejaswini Gaud's case supra, that under Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the father is the natural and legal guardian of a child. Further, indisputably, the mother of the child was no more. Hence, on the basis of the dictum laid down in Gohar Begum's case supra, it was held that, since R-1 therein, being the father and natural guardian of the child and as the child's mother was no more, the deceased mother's relatives had no right to retain the custody of the child. Further, the Apex Court also held that, in such cases, the primary requirement to be considered is the welfare of the child. Therein, reliance was placed on the previous decision of the Apex Court in Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal [ (2009) 1 SCC 42 , para 51], wherein, it has been held that the term “welfare”, used in Sec.13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, must be taken in its wider sense and the moral and ethical welfare of the child must also weigh with the Court as well as the physical well being of the child. It was further categorically held therein that, though the special statutes, which govern the rights of the parents or guardians, may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way of the Court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases. Further, the Apex Court has also noted the dictum laid down in Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal [ (1973) 1 SCC 840 , para 7] wherein, it has been held that the principle on which the Court should decide the fitness of the guardian mainly depends on two factors: (i) the father's fitness or otherwise to be the guardian, and (ii) the interests of the minor. It has been categorically held by the Apex Court, in para 21 of Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ], that, in the said case, the appellants are the sisters and brother of the deceased mother of the child and they do not have any authority of law to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas, as per Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent therein, being the father and natural guardian of the minor child, is having the legal right to claim the custody of the child and the entitlement of the father, to have the custody of the child, is not disputed and the child, being a minor aged 1½ years, cannot express its intelligent preferences and hence, it was held that, in the facts and circumstances of the said case, the father being the natural guardian and as the mother is no more, the extra ordinary remedy, seeking custody of the child, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable, etc. Further, it has been very pertinently held by the Apex Court, in para 36 of Tejaswini Gaud's case supra, that the appellants therein had contended that handing over of the minor child to the first respondent therein (father) would adversely affect her and that the custody can be handed over after a few years. Further, it has been very pertinently held by the Apex Court, in para 36 of Tejaswini Gaud's case supra, that the appellants therein had contended that handing over of the minor child to the first respondent therein (father) would adversely affect her and that the custody can be handed over after a few years. The Apex Court noted that the child was only 1½ years old and the child was with the father for about 4 months after her birth and, if no custody is granted to the 1st respondent therein (father), the Court would be depriving both the child and the father of each other's love and affection, to which they are entitled. As the child is at a tender age, her choice cannot be ascertained at that stage. It was further held that, with the passage of time, she might develop more bonding with the appellants therein (relatives of the deceased mother of the child) and after some time, the child may be reluctant to go with her father, in which case, the 1st respondent father will be completely deprived of his child's love and affection. Keeping in view the welfare of the child and the right of the father to have her custody and after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court held that the High Court, in that case, was right in holding that the welfare of the child will be best served by handing over the custody of the child to the 1st respondent Father. Further, the Apex Court has also noted, in para 37 thereof, that taking away the child from the custody of the appellants therein and handing over the custody to the 1st respondent therein might cause some problem initially but that the same will be neutralised with the passage of time. However, it was ordered that till the child is settled down in the atmosphere of the 1st respondent-father's house, appellants 2 & 3 therein (relatives of the deceased mother of the child) shall have access to the child initially for a period of 3 months for the entire day, etc. 11. It will be pertinent to refer to the contents of paras 14, 19, 20, 21 and 34 to 37 of the decision of the Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ], which read as follows: “14. 11. It will be pertinent to refer to the contents of paras 14, 19, 20, 21 and 34 to 37 of the decision of the Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ], which read as follows: “14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from an illegal or improper detention. The writ also extends its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor child. For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law. 20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus. 21. In the present case, the appellants are the sisters and brother of the mother Zelam who do not have any authority of law to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent father is a natural guardian of the minor child and is having the legal right to claim the custody of the child. The entitlement of father to the custody of child is not disputed and the child being a minor aged 1½ years cannot express its intelligent preferences. Hence, in our considered view, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the father, being the natural guardian, was justified in invoking the extraordinary remedy seeking custody of the child under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 34. As observed in Rosy Jacob [Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC 840 ] earlier, the father's fitness has to be considered, determined and weighed predominantly in terms of the welfare of his minor children in the context of all the relevant circumstances. The welfare of the child shall include various factors like ethical upbringing, economic well being of the guardian, child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, etc. The child Shikha lost her mother when she was just fourteen months and is now being deprived from the love of her father for no valid reason. The welfare of the child shall include various factors like ethical upbringing, economic well being of the guardian, child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, etc. The child Shikha lost her mother when she was just fourteen months and is now being deprived from the love of her father for no valid reason. As pointed out by the High Court, the father is a highly educated person and is working in a reputed position. His economic condition is stable. 35. The welfare of the child has to be determined owing to the facts and circumstances of each case and the Court cannot take a pedantic approach. In the present case, the first respondent has neither abandoned the child nor has deprived the child of a right to his love and affection. The circumstances were such that due to illness of the parents, the appellants had to take care of the child for some time. Merely because, the appellants being the relatives took care of the child for some time, they cannot retain the custody of the child. It is not the case of the appellants that the first respondent is unfit to take care of the child except contending that he has no female support to take care of the child. The first respondent is fully recovered from his illness and is now healthy and having the support of his mother and is able to take care of the child. 36. The appellants submit that handing over of the child to the first respondent would adversely affect her and that the custody can be handed over after a few years. The child is only 1½ years old and the child was with the father for about four months after her birth. If no custody is granted to the first respondent, the Court would be depriving both the child and the father of each other's love and affection to which they are entitled. As the child is in tender age i.e. 1½ years, her choice cannot be ascertained at this stage. With the passage of time, she might develop more bonding with the appellants and after some time, she may be reluctant to go to her father in which case, the first respondent might be completely deprived of her child's love and affection. As the child is in tender age i.e. 1½ years, her choice cannot be ascertained at this stage. With the passage of time, she might develop more bonding with the appellants and after some time, she may be reluctant to go to her father in which case, the first respondent might be completely deprived of her child's love and affection. Keeping in view the welfare of the child and the right of the father to have her custody and after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the High Court was right in holding that the welfare of the child will be best served by handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent. 37. Taking away the child from the custody of the appellants and handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent might cause some problem initially; but, in our view, that will be neutralised with the passage of time. However, till the child is settled down in the atmosphere of the first respondent father's house, Appellants 2 and 3 shall have access to the child initially for a period of three months for the entire day i.e. 8.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. at the residence of the first respondent. The first respondent shall ensure the comfort of Appellants 2 and 3 during such time of their stay in his house. After three months, Appellants 2 and 3 shall visit the child at the first respondent's house from 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. After the child completes four years, Appellants 2 and 3 are permitted to take the child on every Saturday and Sunday from the residence of the father from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and shall hand over the custody of the child back to the first respondent father before 5.00 p.m. For any further modification of the visitation rights, either parties are at liberty to approach the High Court.” 12. The Apex Court also noted a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Kamla Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh [AIR 1987 HP 34], wherein it has been held that in selecting the proper guardian of a minor, paramount consideration should be the welfare and well being of the child and in selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is bound to give due weight to the child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But that, over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored and they are equally or more important, etc. 13. As already noted by us, the petitioner is the father and natural guardian of the child, who is about to complete the age of 4 years next week. The mother of the child is no more. The child was entrusted with respondents 2 & 3 only for temporary purpose when the child's mother had to undergo medical treatment. Till September, 2022, the child was born and brought up in Gujarat and the child has been studying in the Pre-Kindergarden section of a school. Further, it has also come out, with the pleadings of the petitioner, that his mother is now aged 59 years and that, except having moderate diabetics, she is of sound health. We had also interacted with the parties, including the petitioner's mother. She had told us that, except the issue of moderate diabetics, she is keeping good health. The mother of the petitioner is always available in his house to take care of the child. The petitioner's sister and family are also staying not far away from his residence. The petitioner has also contended that R-2 to R-4 are not having any stable income and that, they are not having their own residence even now, etc. We need not get into those details as to the financial capacity or otherwise of respondents 2 to 4. The only issue to ascertain is as to whether the petitioner has any issues of unfitness to become the guardian of the child. The allegation made before us is that he used to treat his wife cruelly and that, he used to demand dowry. The only issue to ascertain is as to whether the petitioner has any issues of unfitness to become the guardian of the child. The allegation made before us is that he used to treat his wife cruelly and that, he used to demand dowry. It is the admitted case of respondents 2 to 4 that no such allegations were ever made against the petitioner at any point of time prior to the present dispute between the parties. The fact that the petitioner has given treatment to his wife at Gujarat, as evident from medical records, is not disputed. 14. The petitioner's counsel would submit, on the basis of instructions, that after the petitioner's wife was taken to RCC, Thiruvananthapuram, he was not made aware about any developments and if respondents 2 to 4 have expended any monies for the treatment of his wife, he is prepared to reimburse the same. That, the parties were not in talking terms and that is why the petitioner could not resolve any such issues earlier. 15. Those issues need not detain us, as the core of the issue is as to whether the Court can hold that the petitioner is not fit to be a guardian, to have the custody of the child. Some of the indications regarding fitness of guardian may be discernible from the provisions contained in Sec.39 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Sec.39 of the said Act deals with removal of guardian. The stipulations therein are regarding abuse of trust, continued failure to perform the duties of his trust, incapacity to perform duties of his trust, ill-treatment or neglect to take care of the ward, conviction of any offence, which, in the opinion of the court, is a defect of character, which unfits him to be the guardian of the ward, having an interest adverse to the faithful performance of his duties, bankruptcy, insolvency, etc. From the pleadings and materials on record, respondents 2 to 4 do not have any case that the petitioner has attracted any of such disqualifications. The petitioner is a qualified software professional, who has been working in a Bangalore based company in Gujarat for quite some time. He has produced his payslips to show that his monthly emoluments come to the rate of about Rs.1,40,000/-per month. The petitioner is a qualified software professional, who has been working in a Bangalore based company in Gujarat for quite some time. He has produced his payslips to show that his monthly emoluments come to the rate of about Rs.1,40,000/-per month. Hence, cumulatively taking into consideration all these aspects, this Court is not in a position to hold that the petitioner is, in any manner, not fit to be the guardian of the child, for any relevant and cogent reasons. The core of the matter is that the petitioner is the father and natural guardian of the child, as the parties are governed by Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The temporary care and protection of the child was entrusted to respondents 2 to 4 only for a limited period, when the petitioner's wife was constrained to have treatment for cancer ailments. Moreover, the facts of this case have a striking similarity to the facts in Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ]. Therein, the girl child was only 1½ years old. Still, the Apex Court has granted custody of the child. In the instant case, the child will complete the age of 4 years by next week, on 28.11.2022. The petitioner's mother is having overall good health and she is always available in his house in Gujarat to take care of the child. The petitioner's sister is also available in Gujarat, in case of any emergency to take care of the child. From the birth of the child up to the end of September, 2022, the child was born and brought up, for the last more than 3½ years or so, in Gujarat and the child has been studying in a Pre-Kindergarden section of a school in Gujarat. Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the welfare of the child also demands that the custody of the child should be given to the petitioner. 16. Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the welfare of the child also demands that the custody of the child should be given to the petitioner. 16. Further, as already held by the Apex Court, in paras 36 & 37 of Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ], if the child is retained with her maternal grandparents in this case, she is likely to develop more bonding with them and after some time, she may be even very reluctant to go with the petitioner, who is her father, and this would result in depriving both the child and the father of each other's love and affection. Hence, this crucial aspect would also demand that the custody of the child should be given to the petitioner. True, as observed by the Apex Court, in para 37 of the Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ], that handing over of the child's custody to the father at this stage might create some problems initially and that would be resolved with the passage of time. 17. Earlier, we had passed a series of interim orders in this case, whereby the interim custody of the child was given to the petitioner. Later, we had passed orders granting interim visitorial rights to R-2 to R-4. In fact, the petitioner had fairly submitted that he will take the child to the residence of R-2 to R-4, in order to give them access to visitorial rights, even though the relationship between the parties were not cordial, to say the least. Later, in view of his employment requirements, the petitioner has to go back to Gujarat. However, we persuaded the petitioner to stay back for some more time and we had given interim custory of the child for a week to respondents 2 to 4 and the child has now been returned to the petitioner. 18. Later, in view of his employment requirements, the petitioner has to go back to Gujarat. However, we persuaded the petitioner to stay back for some more time and we had given interim custory of the child for a week to respondents 2 to 4 and the child has now been returned to the petitioner. 18. Now, Sri.P.K.Sajeevan, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 4, has submitted before us that, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud's case supra [ (2019) 7 SCC 42 ] as well as in Gohar Begum's case supra [ AIR 1960 SC 93 ], and in view of the statutory provisions, contesting respondents 2 to 4 do not have any serious dispute that the petitioner, as the natural and legal guardian of the child, has the custodial rights, since the mother of the child is no more. But that, respondents 2 to 4 are only requesting for visitorial rights of the child and also for interim custody of the child during summer holidays. 19. The abovesaid submissions of respondents 2 to 4 are recorded. 20. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted, based on the instructions of the petitioner, that respondents 2 to 4 can come over to Gujarat and see the child at any time of their choice, but after giving prior intimation and without affecting the education of the child. Further, respondents 2 to 4 can either come to Gujarat and spend time with the child for summer holidays for about a week or 10 days, or in the alternative, they can take the child from Gujarat to their residence in Kerala and return back the child to the petitioner in Gujarat within about one week to 10 days thereafter. Further, the petitioner has also pointed out that respondents 2 to 4 can interact with the child through mobile calls, as may be ordered appropriately by this Court. 21. Sri.P.K.Sajeevan, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 4, would also submit that respondents 2 to 4 have filed an affidavit dated 20.11.2022, wherein it has been stated that, as and when the custody of the child is given to respondents 2 to 4 during summer holidays, they would undertake that the minor child would be returned to the petitioner without failure within the time limit concerned. 22. The abovesaid submissions made by the petitioner are recorded. 22. The abovesaid submissions made by the petitioner are recorded. Respondents 2 to 4 are also broadly agreeable to the said suggestions. Accordingly, the following orders and directions are issued: 1. As the petitioner is the father and natural guardian of the child and as the child's mother is no more, the petitioner is entitled to have custody of the child, for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. 2. The petitioner will permit R-2 & R-3 (maternal grandparents of the child) to interact with the child through audio or video calls on all Fridays from 6 P.M to 6.30 P.M. 3. Respondents 2 & 3 can visit the child in Gujarat at any time of their choice, subject to prior intimation and without disturbing the studies of the child. 4. During summer holidays, respondents 2 & 3 can go over to Gujarat, so that the child can be with them for 10 days or so, or in the alternative, they can take the child from Gujarat to their residence in Kerala during summer holidays, with the condition that the child should be returned back to the petitioner in Gujarat within 10 days or so. 5. Further, during any other time the petitioner visits Kerala for more than 1 week and the child is also with him, then the petitioner should ensure that R-2 & R-3 can visit the child in a convenient venue. 23. Sri.P.K.Sajeevan, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4 would submit that his parties have apprehension that the petitioner may remarry and his new wife, in future, might not give sufficient care and love to the child, especially after they have a child, etc. 24. As of now, the petitioner is not remarried. If any such factual contingency arises in the future, as apprehended by R-2 and R-3, then, of course, it may be treated as a substantial change in the facts and circumstances of the case, giving rise to a new cause of action in the matter. No other orders and directions are called for. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petition (Criminal) will stand disposed of.