ORDER : [C.S. Sudha, J.] 1. What is the extent or scope of power of the Rent Control Court in the matter of amendment of a rent control petition vis-à-vis Section 23 (i) (j) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act)? Is the power of amendment confined to mere ‘errors’ or ‘omissions? Can not amendments, which go beyond the scope of ‘errors’ or ‘omissions, be allowed in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 151 or Order VI Rule 17? Does Section 23 (i) (j) place any embargo on the powers of the Rent Control Court in the matter, as argued persuasively on behalf of the tenant? Is the position still res integra? We proceed to examine the same. 2. This rent control revision under Section 20 Act, has been filed against the judgment dated 13/08/2019 in R.C.A.No.15/2018 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCAA), Kottayam, which appeal is against the order dated 16/02/2018 in R.C.P.24/2015 on the file of Rent Control Court (RCC), Changanacherry. The revision petitioner herein, is the appellant in the appeal and the respondent-tenant in the R.C.P. The respondent herein, is the respondent in the appeal and the petitioner-landlord in the R.C.P. The parties and the documents will be referred to as described in the R.C.P. 3. R.C.P.No.24/2015 was filed by the petitioner-landlord claiming eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. According to the petitioner, he is the landlord of the petition schedule building which has been let out to the respondent in which he is conducting a business in the name and style 'Urvashy Stores'. The monthly rent of the building is Rs.1,250/-. The petitioner is an employee in the State Bank of Travancore and his son, John Thomas is a final year B.Tech (Mechanical) student. The petitioner's son is dependent on him. The petition schedule building is an extremely old one. The residential building of the petitioner is also situated in the same property. Both the buildings are in a dilapidated condition and a portion of the same has already collapsed. The buildings badly require to be reconstructed. The petitioner intends to start a business in the sale and service of agricultural implements and allied articles for his son. The said business requires a show room for exhibiting the various implements, a godown and space for servicing. The buildings badly require to be reconstructed. The petitioner intends to start a business in the sale and service of agricultural implements and allied articles for his son. The said business requires a show room for exhibiting the various implements, a godown and space for servicing. The petition schedule building is situated in an ideal locality for the said business. The petitioner has sufficient means for starting the proposed business. The petitioner also intends to join the business of his son after his retirement. The plan of the building has been prepared in such a way as to use a portion of the proposed building for residential purpose of the petitioner and his family and the remaining portion, for running the business. The space where the schedule building is situated has to be left as a vacant space under the Building Rules. The said area is intended to be used as a parking area for the proposed business. The petitioner has no other building(s) in his possession for starting the proposed business and hence he bona fide requires vacant possession of the schedule building. It is also alleged that the respondent is not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3). 4. The respondent entered appearance and filed counter denying the allegations in the R.C.P. He denied the need alleged and contended that it is a mere ruse for eviction. The petitioner is in possession of other buildings which can be used for the proposed business. He also claimed the protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3) 5. As per order dated 10.03.2017 in I.A.No.546/2017, the R.C.P. was mended. As per the amended R.C.P., it is alleged that after the institution of the R.C.P, the petitioner had demolished his residential building and started construction of the proposed building. Then, the contractor who undertook the work informed him that the total cost of the construction would cross Rs.1crore, though the estimate was for Rs.83,80,000/-only. In that event, it would become impossible for the petitioner to start the proposed business as the additional amount required for the construction would upset all his plans. Hence, he was constrained to make some changes in the plan of the building reducing the plinth area from 413 sq.mtrs to 233 Sq.mtrs. In that event, it would become impossible for the petitioner to start the proposed business as the additional amount required for the construction would upset all his plans. Hence, he was constrained to make some changes in the plan of the building reducing the plinth area from 413 sq.mtrs to 233 Sq.mtrs. He has also decided that the building portion facing the M.C road be retained after necessary reinforcement of the same, for using it as the business place. The portion where the schedule building is situated is required to be kept vacant as a car parking area. Accordingly, a fresh building plan has been prepared. 6. Additional counter has been filed by the respondent contending that the attempt of the petitioner is to fill up the lacuna in the pleadings after realizing the drawbacks in the case set up. 7. Before the RCC, PWs1 to 3 were examined and Exts. A1 to A5 were marked on the side of the petitioner. DW1 was examined and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on the side of the respondent. The reports, plans and photographs filed by the advocate commissioner have been marked as Ext.C1 to C3(a). The RCC, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence as well as after hearing both sides, granted the prayer for eviction under Section 11(3). In R.C.A.No.15/2018 filed by the tenant, the RCAA has confirmed the findings of the RCC. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the RCC and the RCAA, the tenant has come up in revision. 8. Heard Sri.M.P.Madhavankutty, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri.Anantha Krishna, the learned counsel for the respondent. 9. The only point that arises for consideration is, whether the findings of the RCAA suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. 10. Section 20 of the Act allows the aggrieved party to challenge the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceedings of the appellate authority. The power of revision is limited to making a scrutiny of the records to satisfy itself as to the three tests laid down in Section 20. This Court cannot convert itself into evidence collecting or fact-finding court. The scope of interference by the revisional court is restricted to cases where the RCC or the RCAA has relied on irrelevant consideration, ignored valuable items of evidence or applied wrong principles of law. This Court cannot convert itself into evidence collecting or fact-finding court. The scope of interference by the revisional court is restricted to cases where the RCC or the RCAA has relied on irrelevant consideration, ignored valuable items of evidence or applied wrong principles of law. The revisional authority has to satisfy itself of the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceedings of the appellate authority. It can interfere only when the impugned order is illegal, irregular or improper. Where there is no illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the orders of RCC or the RCAA, there is no justification for invocation of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 11. The main argument advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant is that the RCC has substantially erred in allowing amendment of the R.C.P., for which it had no power. In support of this argument reference is made to the decision reported in Abdul Kareem M. v. P.Muhammed Shafi, 2017 (2) KHC 820 . By the amendment, an entirely new case, non-existent at the time of filing the R.C.P. has been brought in, which is totally impermissible. It was also argued that the RCC, unlike a civil court does not have the power to allow amendments under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. What powers are available have been enumerated in Section 23 of the Act. The RCC cannot go beyond what is enumerated therein and if it does so, it is an exercise of power which it does not have, contends the tenant. 12. In the R.C.P the pleadings regarding the need alleged initially read: - “5. It is submitted that the petitioner intends to start the business of the sale and 3 service of agricultural implements and allied articles for his son John Thomas. The said business requires a show room for exhibiting the various implements, a godown and the space for servicing. The locality where the scheduled building situates is ideal for the above said business, The said Thomas John has the expertise to conduct the proposed business. The petitioner has sufficient means for running the proposed business. He also intends to join the business after his retirement. The locality where the scheduled building situates is ideal for the above said business, The said Thomas John has the expertise to conduct the proposed business. The petitioner has sufficient means for running the proposed business. He also intends to join the business after his retirement. The plan of the building is prepared in such a way as to use a portion of the proposed building for the residential purpose for the petitioner and his family and to use the other portion for housing the business. The space where the scheduled building situates, is to be left as vacant space under the Kerala Municipal Building Rules. The said area is to be used for car parking, as parking space for vehicles is an inevitable part of the proposed business. The petitioner has no building other than the scheduled building in his possession either in the locality or within the Municipal limits. Thus the petitioner bona fide requires vacant possession of the scheduled building”. After the amendment, the words ‘the Kerala Municipal Building Rules’ in para 5 has been deleted and paragraph 5A has been incorporated, which reads: “5A. It is submitted that after the institution of the above petition, the petitioner demolished the residential building and started the construction of the proposed building. At that time the contractor who undertook the work informed him that the total cost of the construction might cross one crore, even though the estimate was for Rs.83,80,000/-. In that event it would become impossible for the petitioner to start the proposed business as the extra amount required for the construction would ruin his purse. Hence he was constrained to make some changes in the plan of the building, reducing the plinth area from 413 sq.mtrs to 233 sq.mtrs. It was decided that the building portion facing the M.C Road should be retained after reinforcement for using that portion as the business place. The portions where the scheduled building situates is needed to be kept as vacant, as car parking area. Accordingly a fresh building plan was prepared.” 13. A reading of the aforesaid pleadings in the R.C.P would make it apparent that no new case has been brought in by the petitioner as contended by the tenant. Some changes were certainly brought about in the building plan for which the landlord has offered a reasonable and cogent explanation also. Accordingly a fresh building plan was prepared.” 13. A reading of the aforesaid pleadings in the R.C.P would make it apparent that no new case has been brought in by the petitioner as contended by the tenant. Some changes were certainly brought about in the building plan for which the landlord has offered a reasonable and cogent explanation also. That in no way has changed the need put forward. It is true that a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Kareem (Supra) has held that if a cause of action for eviction on a new ground is intended to be incorporated by way of amendment after the filing of the R.C.P, that ground cannot be allowed to be incorporated by way of amendment if the same was not available on the date of filing of the petition. It has also been held that a cursory reading of Section 23(1)(j) of the Act itself would show that amendment of the rent control petition after filing the same, is permissible, where there is any 'defect' or 'error' only in the R.C.P. According to the Bench, it therefore follows as per the Act, that amendments to the Original Petition cannot be allowed, unless the matters sought to be incorporated by way of amendment come under 'error' or 'omission' and that amendments, which go beyond the scope of an 'error' or 'omission' cannot be allowed in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 151 or Order VI Rule 17 CPC. 14. In the case on hand, unlike in Abdul Kareem (Supra), no new case has been brought in by way of amendment. Moreover, the powers of the RCC vis a-vis those contained in Section 23 of the Act or the scope or extent of the powers of the RCC or a Tribunal, is no longer res integra. In Associated Cement Companies v. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 , a 5 Judge Constitution Bench of the Apex Court was called upon to consider the principal point of law as to whether the State of Punjab (2nd respondent therein), exercising its appellate jurisdiction under R.6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art.136(1) of the Constitution and also the powers of a tribunal. It has been held thus- “9. It has been held thus- “9. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Art.136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one common characteristic; both the Courts and the tribunals are "constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions." (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, 1955 (1) SCR 267 at p. 272: AIR 1954 SC 520 at p. 522). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly 'prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basis and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State. (Emphasis supplied) Explaining that the doctrine of rigid and strict separation of powers on which the Australian Constitution is based, is not applicable to our Constitution, it held- “27. (Emphasis supplied) Explaining that the doctrine of rigid and strict separation of powers on which the Australian Constitution is based, is not applicable to our Constitution, it held- “27. This technical aspect of the matter which is present under the constitutions based on rigid separation of powers, should not be ignored when we are dealing with the question posed under Art.136(1) of our Constitution. Under our Constitution, there is no rigid separation of powers as under the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not be constitutionally inappropriate or improper to say that judicial power of the State can be conferred on the hierarchy of Courts established under the Constitution as well as on tribunals which are not Courts strictly so called. Indeed, the fact that Art.136(1) refers to Courts and tribunals and makes the determination, sentence or order passed by them subject to appeal to this Court by special leave, shows that our constitution assumes that judicial power of the State can be vested in and exercised by both Courts and tribunals alike. We have already seen that the function discharged by Courts and tribunals mentioned in Art.136(1) is essentially the same, though the nature of the questions entrusted to their jurisdiction, the procedure required to be followed by them, and the extent and character of their powers may be different.” After referring to Australian decisions, it held- “30. We have referred to these two decisions only for the purpose of emphasising the fact that the technical considerations which flow from the strict and rigid separation of powers, would not be applicable in dealing with the question about the status of respondent No. 2 by reference to Art.136(1) of our Constitution. The use of the expression "judicial power" in the context, cannot be characterised as constitutionally impermissible or inappropriate, because our constitution does not provide, as does Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, that judicial power can be conferred only on Courts properly so called. If such a consideration was relevant and material, then it would no doubt, be inappropriate to say that certain authorities or bodies which are given the power to deal with disputes between parties and finally determine them, are tribunals because the judicial power of the State had been statutorily transferred to them. If such a consideration was relevant and material, then it would no doubt, be inappropriate to say that certain authorities or bodies which are given the power to deal with disputes between parties and finally determine them, are tribunals because the judicial power of the State had been statutorily transferred to them. In that case, the more appropriate expression to use would be that the powers which they exercise are quasi-judicial in character, and tribunals appointed under such a scheme of rigid separation of powers cannot be held to discharge the same judicial function as the Courts. However, these considerations are strictly speaking, inapplicable to the Indian constitution, because though it is based on a broad separation of powers, there is no rigidity or exclusiveness involved in it as under S.71 as well as other provisions of Ch. III of the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not be inappropriate to say that the main test in determining the status of any authority in the context of Art.136(1) is whether or not inherent judicial power of the State has been transferred to it. 31. xxxx 32. xxxx 33. The question which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether the State Government is a tribunal when it exercises its authority under R.6(5) or R.6(6). No rules have been made prescribing the procedure which the State Government should follow in dealing with appeals under these two sub-rules, and there is no statutory provision conferring on the State Government any specific powers which are usually associated with the trial in Courts and which are intended to help the Court in reaching its decisions. The requirements of procedure which are followed in Courts and the possession of subsidiary powers which are given to Courts to try the cases before them, are described as trappings if the Courts, and so, it may be conceded that these trappings are not shown to exist in the case of the State Government which hears appeals under R.6(5) and R.6(6). But as we have already stated, the consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a Court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possesses the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possesses the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The main and the basic test, however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under R.6(5) and R.6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power. It has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory Rule and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal. Having regard to these distinctive features of the power conferred on the State Government by, R.6(5) and R.8(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art.136(1).” Here the tenant does not have a case that the RCC is not a Tribunal falling under Art.136(1) of the Constitution. The law laid down by the Apex court under Art. 141 of the Constitution is the law of the land, which we are bound to follow. We also refer to two Division Bench decisions of this Court. In 1991 KHC 218 it has been held- “3. There is a larger contention urged on behalf of the revision petitioner. That is about the absence of an enumerated power of the Rent Controller in permitting joint trial of the cases. It does not appeal to us. A narrower approach to the Act will prompt an. authority to search the limited space of the statute and its scheme to find out an enabling power in relation to the joinder of trials. Such a narrow approach does not commend over itself for our acceptance. It does not appeal to us. A narrower approach to the Act will prompt an. authority to search the limited space of the statute and its scheme to find out an enabling power in relation to the joinder of trials. Such a narrow approach does not commend over itself for our acceptance. A recent decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Babu Ram Gopal v. Mathura Dass and Others, JT 1990 (3) S.C. 25, has emphasised the message underlying this socially benevolent legislation intended to relieve the weakest sections of the Society. ………… 4. xxxxx 5. The increasing importance of the Tribunals in the vast changing life of the community cannot be ignored by a modern court. A modern ostrich even in the distant deserts may not make such limited use of its eyes. Many valuable rights of the modern citizen are deeply involved with the adjudicator, processes of the Tribunals. Many areas hitherto occupied by courts, are now the domains of the Tribunals. A liberal approach towards their functioning and a larger view about the powers they need, are the requirements of the times. A Tribunal should be facilitated to do all that a court could do in similar situations; and much more than that. Greater speed and a total liberation from the tentacles of technicalities, give a better look and greater efficiency for effectively manned Tribunals. If there be no statutory prohibition, the Tribunal should therefore normally be in a position to ordain its affairs and modulate its procedures in such a manner as to best subserve the interest of the public, and in particular the litigant public. Looked that way, even in the absence of an enumerated head of statutory power on the conjoint reading of S.23 and the enumerated provisions of the C.P.C. referred to in that section, would have permitted the Tribunal to pass an order which would better serve the interest of the litigant and of the Tribunal. However, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority should be circumspect in the invocation of the power arid in the issue of an order invoking such a jurisdiction.” 15. However, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority should be circumspect in the invocation of the power arid in the issue of an order invoking such a jurisdiction.” 15. Another Division Bench of this court in Rajan v. Sharafudheen, 2003 KHC 427, relying on the dictums in Ibrahim v. Joseph, 1975 KLT 167 and Abdulla v. Rent Controller, 1984 KLT 865 held that the power of the RCC under 23(1)(j) of the Act to amend any defect or error in orders or proceedings will include the power to amend the R.C.P and if the grounds other than those mentioned in the petition are available for eviction and if by an omission they were not mentioned in the petition, the error in not stating them in the petition for eviction can be allowed to be amended. Here, it would be apposite to refer to two Single Bench decisions of this Court also, wherein the learned judges dealt with the powers of the tribunals, like the RCC. The said observations, findings and conclusions made about three decades back are quite apt and relevant in the present scenario too. We refer to the relevant portions in the said decisions. In Ouseph v. Kunjipathumma, 1981 KHC 130, a learned Single Judge of this Court was called upon to adjudicate on the question whether the RCC has the power to restore a R.C.P dismissed for default. It held- “5. While Diecy was prepared to recognise the need for adjudicating bodies outside the ordinary courts only in regard to matters of business "properly so called", the very flexibility of the procedure found useful by him led to the creation of such bodies or tribunals in other areas also, with the result that even in England where their creation was being objected to on constitutional principles, tribunals have now become more and more the order of the day. These tribunals also decide legal disputes and it is no longer valid to say that judicial functions are the exclusive preserve of the ordinary courts. Wade says ("Administrative Law" -- 2nd Edn. pp. 233-234): - "Outside the ordinary courts of law there is a host of special statutory tribunals with jurisdiction to decide legal disputes. They are one of the byproducts of an age of intensive government, and in particular they multiply under the welfare state. Wade says ("Administrative Law" -- 2nd Edn. pp. 233-234): - "Outside the ordinary courts of law there is a host of special statutory tribunals with jurisdiction to decide legal disputes. They are one of the byproducts of an age of intensive government, and in particular they multiply under the welfare state. The movement of progressive society now a days might be said (inverting the famous remark of Maine) to be from contract to status, Less and less are people left to rely on personal transactions enforced by the ordinary law courts. More and more are they made subject to regulatory schemes -- national insurance, the health service, state education, agricultural control, rent control, and many other such things are administered under elaborate Acts of Parliament. Here is a new source of social friction, for there are bound to be many disputes." "To add all this work to the tasks of the ordinary courts would not only cause a breakdown: it would also in many cases be wrong in principle. The process of the courts is elaborate, slow, and costly. Its defects ate these of its merits, for the object is to give the highest standard of justice; generally speaking, the public wants the best possible article, and is prepared to pay for it. But in administering social services the aim is different. Disputes must be disposed of smoothly, quickly and cheaply. The object is not the best article at any price, but the best article that is consistent with efficient administration. Moreover, many of these disputes are best decided by bodies on which technical experts can sit. Special forms of tribunal have therefore been devised, and the contrast between them and the ordinary courts is striking. A new system for the dispensation of justice has grown up side by side with the old one. Moreover, many of these disputes are best decided by bodies on which technical experts can sit. Special forms of tribunal have therefore been devised, and the contrast between them and the ordinary courts is striking. A new system for the dispensation of justice has grown up side by side with the old one. National insurance tribunals, rent tribunals, transport tribunals, health service tribunals, together with many others, have come to play a part in the life of the ordinary citizen which is (assuming the ordinary citizen to be law abiding) likely to be of more direct concern to him than that of the courts of law." A new system of dispensation of justice has thus been growing up, even overshadowing the ordinary courts in its reach and range; and in such a situation, is it wise or useful to still adhere to the theory that tribunals are little bodies with only some of the powers of a court, if at all granted by the legislature? If they are equally important as the courts of the land by reason of their discharging the same functions though in their respective specialised fields, why should they be denied the powers ordinarily available to courts so long, as such powers are not specifically denied to them by the statutes, in the matter of administering justice? 6. This is not to say that the difference between tribunals and courts could or should be ignored, but to suggest that the traditional approach to the question of the tribunals' powers requires reconsideration if their usefulness is not to be belittled……… After referring to the dictum in Associated Cement (Supra) it held- “7.………. Two or three important things follow from what has been seen so far. First, the administration of justice, or at any rate, a substantial part of it is now patterned in a manner different from what it was some half a century ago. Second, the special tribunals which constitute the core of this new pattern are exercising judicial functions inherent in the sovereign state. Third, the powers exercised by them are in many cases indistinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Further, exercise of such powers by them is vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. Third, the powers exercised by them are in many cases indistinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Further, exercise of such powers by them is vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. If this be the true position, the reality which cannot be overlooked from the functional point of view, how are we to proceed in delimiting the powers of these bodies in matters of procedure, at least in areas not directly covered by statutes?” Paragraphs 8 to 11 omitted 12. What, after all, is the inherent power saved by S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? A court is constituted for doing justice and must be deemed to possess all powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo wrongs in the course of administration of justice. Of course, the court must have jurisdiction over the proceedings before it can exercise the inherent power; but when that is granted, its power to advance the cause of justice by relying on unenumerated powers -- on inherent or residuary power, as it is often called, cannot be denied to it. And therefore, where a, tribunal exercises the same kind of power i.e., part of the judicial power of the state, as the Supreme Court has observed, why should it be denied similar inherent or residuary powers? If you do not like the name, call it by another; but so long as the tribunal is deciding legal disputes and determining the rights of citizens as any other court, you cannot without endangering its efficiency, deny to it all powers which are necessary for the administration of justice. This is not to convert every tribunal into a tyrant, but only to recognise the reality that tribunals have come to stay as instruments of administration of justice, and that occasions may arise where they too will have to step into areas uncharted by the statute and the rules, in the interests of justice. If a tribunal goes out of its way in the fullness of its powers, the superior courts are there to correct it, as noticed by Alien; and as also observed by him, the first adjudication is more important to the litigant than the last. 13. If a tribunal goes out of its way in the fullness of its powers, the superior courts are there to correct it, as noticed by Alien; and as also observed by him, the first adjudication is more important to the litigant than the last. 13. I would therefore say, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Dhani Devi's case ( AIR 1970 SC 759 ) that in respect of procedural matters, all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules, should be vouchsafed to a tribunal so that it may effectively exercise its judicial function........................... 14. A litigant may sometimes fail to reach a court in time for reasons beyond his control. The train may be late, the bus may break down, the car may be held up at a railway crossing. If a Rent Control Court dismisses his application for default in the meanwhile, and if it is held to be powerless to restore it even when proper reasons are shown, that will be to allow the past to persist into the present, with all the merits on one side and dry technicality on the other. S.23 of Act 2/65 is not designed to make the tribunal powerless in such matters, but only to supplement its powers with some of the well-known trappings of a court. In this view, I hold that a Rent Control Court has the power, in appropriate cases, to restore an application dismissed for default...............................". 16. Another learned Single Judge in Abdulla v. Rent Controller, 1984 KHC 357 held: - 11. It is true that courts have always taken the view that statutory tribunals which are creatures of statutes have only those powers conferred on them specifically by the statutes. But the role of such tribunals as decision-making bodies in the field of administration of justice is being recognised more and more. There is a line of thinking that in regard to such statutory tribunals, this approach to their power should be understood with caution and the application of these principles be limited to the exercise of substantive powers as distinguished from matters which are procedural. These tribunals which are playing a more and more important roles in the field of administration of justice are exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions inherent in the State. These tribunals which are playing a more and more important roles in the field of administration of justice are exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions inherent in the State. Many a time, it is difficult to distinguish the powers exercised by tribunals from those exercised by courts. Functions of Tribunals are as vital in the life of the people as functions of courts. It is therefore increasingly being recognized that such tribunals must be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties...................................... 12. Whichever way one looks at it, there could be no doubt that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction or power to allow amendment of pleadings in appropriate cases. The source of power could be traced to S.23(1)(j) of the Act or the inherent or residuary powers of the Rent Controller as a court. If it be the former, where the existence of a defect or error is made out, the Rent Controller is competent to allow an amendment to cure the defect or if it is the latter, the Rent Controller has always the jurisdiction to allow an amendment as long as it is bona fide and necessary to do justice between the parties and as long as it does lead to irreparable injury to the opposite party". 17. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decisions, which are in tune with the dictum of the Apex Court in Associated Cement (Supra). In the light of the settled position on the matter, the argument that the RCC has no power to amend the R.C.P, is only liable to be rejected. Further, in the case on hand, the respondent has no case that after the amendment of the R.C.P., he never had an opportunity to file additional pleadings or that he did not understand the case put forward by the petitioner and so he was unable to defend his case properly or effectively. Admittedly, he has filed an additional counter disputing the amended pleadings too. He was also given the opportunity to cross examine the petitioner and his witnesses as well as adduce evidence to contradict the same. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the tenant and no vested right of the tenant has been taken away by way of the amendment. 18. He was also given the opportunity to cross examine the petitioner and his witnesses as well as adduce evidence to contradict the same. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the tenant and no vested right of the tenant has been taken away by way of the amendment. 18. We went through the pleadings and the orders of both the RCC as well as RCAA. Both the RCC and RCAA have considered all the aspects of the case in detail and held that the petitioner-landlord is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The findings rendered by the aforesaid courts are findings on facts. The tenant has been unable to show that the findings rendered by the RCC or RCAA suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety warranting an interference by this Court. Hence, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment of the RCAA. In the result, the rent control revision is dismissed. Taking into account the facts and circumstances in the case, we deem it appropriate and reasonable to grant the tenant six months' time to vacate the building on condition that he files an undertaking before the RCC on or before 22/02/2023 to vacate the tenanted premises within a period of six months from today and also on condition that he pays the arrears of rent if any, on or before 22/02/2023 and also continue to pay the monthly rent on or before the 10th day of every succeeding month till he vacates the building. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.