JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Gautam Saha assisted by Shri Neeraj Pandey, learned counsel appearing for first respondent and Shri Bal Mukund, learned counsel appearing for second and fourth respondent. 2. Respondent-appellants, by the instant intra court appeal, have challenged the judgment and order dated 18 January, 2019, passed by the learned Single Judge, in Harsh Vardhan vs. Secretary, Government of India and others, Writ-A No. 36901 of 2017, whereby, the writ petition instituted by the first respondent/petitioner came to be allowed. 3. The respondent/petitioner challenged the communication dated 25 July 2016, issued by the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, whereby, the request of the respondent for voluntary retirement and pensionary benefits was rejected being inadmissible as the respondent-petitioner had not completed 20 years of qualifying service. Further, direction was sought by the writ petitioner to grant pensionary benefits after accepting his application for voluntary retirement. The writ court allowed the writ petition setting aside the orders impugned, therein, and directed to treat the petitioner in regular service w.e.f. 9 May 1988, and treat him to have voluntary retired w.e.f. 8 May 2008, consequently, directed to give the writ petitioner all consequential relief as admissible to him. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/petitioner has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is submitted that shipping and navigation on inland waterways falls in Entry 32 of the Concurrent List to the Seventh Schedule, accordingly, would be barred under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short ''Rules'). 5. Reliance has been placed on the Full Bench decision rendered by this Court in Sheet Gupta vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2010 All 46 . 6. Per contra the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant is Inland Waterways Authority of India, constituted under the Inland Waterways Authority of India Act-1985, by Parliament enactment, in exercise of its powers on a subject matter enumerated under Entry 24 of the Union List, providing for shipping and navigation inland waters, declared by Parliament of India by law to be national waterways. 7. 7. Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules reads thus : "Special appeal:- An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award-(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge." 8. The Full Bench, inter alia, in paragraph 18 of the report held as follows : "1. x x 5. 6. The order made by one Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award of (i) the Government or (ii) the officer or (iii) authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act, i.e., under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India." 9. Accordingly, Special Appeal (intra court appeal) would not lie against an order made or purported to be made with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. 10. On specific query, it is not being disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner that Inland Waterways Authority, NOIDA, has been constituted by a Parliamentary enactment referable to Entry 24 of Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. 11. 10. On specific query, it is not being disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner that Inland Waterways Authority, NOIDA, has been constituted by a Parliamentary enactment referable to Entry 24 of Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. 11. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the respondent-petitioner with regard to maintainability of the appeal being devoid of merit is rejected. 12. The respondent-petitioner, in anticipation of creation and sanction of post, including, post of Assistant Public Relations Officer (for short ''APRO'), by the Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, came to be appointed on the post of APRO on ad hoc basis, for a period of one year, on 22 April, 1988. Thereafter, petitioner came to be transferred at various stations. 13. The Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, with concurrence of Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) approved creation of 54 posts, including, one post of APRO, after relaxing the existing ban orders. The post of APRO was created from 22 April 1988, i.e., from the date of initial appointment of the petitioner. Later on, vide Office Memorandum dated 25 July 1994, petitioner was confirmed on the post of APRO w.e.f. 9 May 1989. Thereafter, petitioner came to be promoted to the post of Section Officer on 21 March 2001. 14. Petitioner, on 4 February 2008, sent a representation/notice to the appellant/Chairman, Inland Waterways Authority of India, NOIDA, seeking voluntary retirement, stating that he would be completing 20 years qualifying service w.e.f. 22 April 2008, therefore, sought retirement from service w.e.f. 30 April 2008, on personal grounds. Petitioner on 25 February 2008, again wrote to the appellant/Chairman reiterating his request for voluntary retirement. 15. On the application, Director, Inland Waterways Authority, NOIDA, conveyed to the petitioner the decision vide communication dated 12/13 May 2008, stating, therein, that petitioner would complete 20 years of regular service in June 2010. In other words, the period of service rendered by the petitioner on the post of APRO on ad hoc basis w.e.f. 22 April 1988, till his appointment on the post of APRO on 7 June 1990, would not be computed towards his regular service for the purpose of considering the benefits, accordingly, petitioner was informed that the period of 20 years would be computed from 7 June 1990, and not from an earlier date. 16. 16. In other words, application for voluntary retirement was not considered as petitioner had not completed 20 years of service after the ad hoc service rendered by him. Thereafter, petitioner submitted his resignation to the Chairman vide communication dated 5 September 2008, wherein, it was stated that the petitioner tenders resignation from the post of Section Officer w.e.f. 6 October 2008, due to personal reasons. The acceptance of the resignation of the petitioner came to be communicated vide Office Memorandum dated 14 November 2008, that petitioner would be relieved from service w.e.f. 30 October 2008, afternoon. 17. It appears, thereafter, petitioner vide application dated 27 November 2008, represented to the Secretary, Government of India/appellate authority, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highway, Department of Shipping, requesting the authority to treat his date of appointment 9 May 1988, for computation of qualifying period of regular service of 20 years for the purpose of voluntary retirement. 18. On 5 October 2010, the appellate authority communicated its decision on the appeal to the Chairperson of Inland Waterways Authority of India, NOIDA, for reckoning the petitioner's qualifying service of 20 years from 9 May 1988. In other words, the regular service of the petitioner was to be counted from 9 May 1988, for computation of qualifying services for service benefits, including, voluntary retirement. Accordingly, a request was made to the Chairman to revise/revisit the earlier order dated 28 April 2008, and pass an appropriate order, thereon. 19. In response, the authority of Inland Waterways Authority of India, NOIDA, vide communication dated 16 June 2014, addressed to the Secretary, Government of India, reiterated its earlier stand and said that the period of ad hoc appointment and service of the petitioner may not be computed towards qualifying service, but, only from the date petitioner came to be appointed on temporary basis, i.e., from 9 May 1988, would be taken to compute 20 years of service for the purpose of voluntary retirement. 20. In this backdrop, the short question that arises for determination is as to whether petitioner after tendering his resignation can seek voluntary retirement from service. 21. The facts, inter se, parties are not in dispute. 22. It is not in dispute that petitioner sought voluntary retirement from the service which came to be rejected as petitioner did not complete the qualifying service at 20 years for being eligible to claim voluntary retirement. 21. The facts, inter se, parties are not in dispute. 22. It is not in dispute that petitioner sought voluntary retirement from the service which came to be rejected as petitioner did not complete the qualifying service at 20 years for being eligible to claim voluntary retirement. Petitioner did not challenge the rejection order while in service before the appellate authority or before any competent court/tribunal. On the contrary, petitioner tendered his resignation on personal ground which came to be duly accepted by the competent authority and communicated to the petitioner. In other words, petitioner ceased to be the employee of the Inland Waterways Authority of India, from the date of acceptance of his resignation, i.e., 30 October, 2008. Thereafter, petitioner raised the issue before the appellate authority with regard to the period of computation of his qualifying service for voluntary service. 23. Rule 26 of the Central Service Pension Rules, 1972 (for short ''CCS Pension Rules') provides that resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service. The Rule, 26 is extracted : "26. Forfeiture of service on resignation.-(1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails a forfeiture of past service." 24. In Union of India and Others vs. Braj Nandan Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 325 , Supreme Court held that the language of Rule 26(1) is couched in mandatory terms. It provides that resignation from service or post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in public interest, entails forfeiture of past service. "Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. ... ... ... The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service." 25. The Rule categorically and unequivocally provides that upon resignation, an employee forfeits his past service. The Supreme Court in BSES Yamuna Power Limited vs. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma, (2020) 3 SCC 346 , on similar facts, while relying and considering the earlier decisions rendered in LIC vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479 , and Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. LIC, (2016) 3 SCC (L&S) 12, noted the distinction and the consequence of resignation and voluntary retirement. The Court was of the opinion that after resignation, the employee upon forfeiture of his past service cannot turn around to claim voluntary retirement as the question of voluntary retirement, thereafter, is of no legal consequence, as his past service stands forfeited upon resignation, even presuming that the employee had served 20 years of service. 26. Paragraph 16 and 17 of the report is extracted : "16. This argument cannot be accepted. Even if he was denied voluntary retirement on 25-5-1990, the first respondent did not challenge this and 17 of the report is extracted: decision but resigned, on 7-7-1990. The denial of voluntary retirement does not mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation. No evidence has been placed on the record to show that the first respondent took issue with the denial of voluntary retirement between 25-5-1990 and 7-7-1990. To the contrary, in the legal notice dated 1-12-1992 sent by the first respondent to the appellant, the first respondent admitted to having resigned. The first respondent's writ petition was instituted thirteen years after the denial of voluntary retirement and eventual resignation. In the light of these circumstances, the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be invoked before this Court to claim pensionary benefits when the first respondent has admittedly resigned. 17. The first respondent's writ petition was instituted thirteen years after the denial of voluntary retirement and eventual resignation. In the light of these circumstances, the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be invoked before this Court to claim pensionary benefits when the first respondent has admittedly resigned. 17. On the issue of whether the first respondent has served twenty years, we are of the opinion that the question is of no legal consequence to the present dispute. Even if the first respondent had served twenty years, under Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules his past service stands forfeited upon resignation. The first respondent is therefore not entitled to pensionary benefits." 27. In the facts of the case in hand, admittedly, petitioner tendered his resignation. The consequence of the resignation was forfeiture of his past service in view of Rule 26. The issue of voluntary retirement, therefore, could not have been raised by the petitioner thereafter as his past service stood effaced. The validity of the order rejecting the application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement could have been raised by the petitioner while in service and not after quitting service upon resignation. 28. Accordingly, we are unable to persuade ourselves in accepting the opinion of the learned Single Judge. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 18 January, 2019, is set aside and quashed. 29. Consequently, the writ petition being Writ - A No. 36901 of 2017 (Harsh Vardhan vs. Secretary, Government of India and others), stands dismissed. 30. No Cost.