JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Rajendra Krishna, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent JBVNL. 2. In the present petition, the prayer is made for quashing of the order dated 06.06.2023. The prayer is also made to supply certain data. 3. Mr. Rajendra Krishna, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has challenged the provisional assessment in W.P.(C) No.349 of 2009 which was dismissed by learned Single Judge by order dated 29.1.2009. Aggrieved with that, LPA No.65 of 2009 was filed and the said LPA was allowed by order dated 09.02.2023. He submits that the order of learned Single Judge that has been quashed, the matter was remitted back to the learned Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh who is the competent authority to take a decision in light of section 126 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003. He submits that in view of the Division Bench judgment the petitioner filed the objection and without providing any opportunity of hearing in terms of section 126 of the Indian Electricity Act 2003, the impugned order dated 06.06.2023 has been passed. He submits that in view of the provision made therein, an opportunity of hearing was required to be provided, however, the said has not been made and he submits that in view of that the writ petition is maintainable and to buttress his argument he relied in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . On this ground, he submits that the impugned order may kindly be quashed. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Yadav, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent JBVNL submits that after the remand, the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.65 of 2009 the petitioner was called upon and the petitioner on 10.4.2023 has filed his objection as contained in Annexure-8. He submits that a detailed objection is there and considering the submission of the parties the learned Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh has passed the order and he has dealt with all the aspect of the matter and this writ petition is not maintainable. He submits that a detailed objection is there and considering the submission of the parties the learned Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh has passed the order and he has dealt with all the aspect of the matter and this writ petition is not maintainable. He further submits that the petitioner is having remedy under section 127 of the Indian Electricity Act of filing of the appeal, however, without availing the said remedy, he has filed the present petition and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , particularly, paragraph nos. 15, 16 and 17 of the said judgment which are quoted below: “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/reassessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana [ (1985) 3 SCC 267 ] this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar's wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. 17. In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assessee described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of the instant case. In light of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the writ court ought not to have entertained the writ petition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned the correctness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequential demand notices issued thereon. 828. Infliction of major punishments.—(a) of the punishments permitted by Rule 824, the items in serials (a) to (l) of that Rule shall be regarded as major punishments, and shall be inflicted by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent. (b) Without prejudice to the provision of the Public Servants Enquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction shall be passed on any police officer (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal Court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself (see Appendix 49). (c) In case in which, forfeiture of increment is proposed to be an adequate punishment, this may be inflicted without formal enquiry in the form of a proceeding but every such matter shall state clearly: first, the charges against the defaulter; then his answers to each charge, one by one; and lastly, the finding upon each charge of the officer inflicting the punishment. In such cases, the Superintendent need not hold the enquiry himself, nor shall the delinquent have the—right to appear before him, but he has the right to appear before the officer deputed to record the evidence and to take his defence; and such officer, who shall not be below the rank of inspector, shall come to a clear finding on each charge and shall submit the record with his recommendations to the Superintendent for orders. (d) These provisions shall not be followed when the Governor is assured that it is not possible to do this in the interest of the safety of the State according to Article 311 (2) of Indian Constitution or it is not possible to follow these provisions entirely and there is no suspicion that in not following them the accused may not get justice. Whenever such a possibility arises, the, officer who is competent to remove or reduce delinquent in the rank shall formally give orders as decided by the Governor which shall be considered final.” 5. In view of the above submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, it appears that it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(C) No.349 of 2009. The learned Single Judge by order dated 29.01.2009 has been pleased to dismiss the said writ petition. The petitioner has preferred LPA No.65 of 2009 and the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 09.2.2023 has remanded back the matter to the Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh to pass a fresh order after providing adequate opportunity to the petitioner and pursuant thereto, the petitioner has filed the objection by way of Annexure-8 and thereafter the Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh has passed the order in view of the observation of the Division Bench. Looking into the order impugned herein, the Court finds that the learned Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh has observed that the appellant was given notice for filing objection on this matter by letter no.409 dated 17.3.2023 and thereafter the appellant has filed the objection on 10.4.2023 against the assessment made under section 126(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003. The said order also speaks of consideration of submissions made by the consumer, contentions raised therein, the submission of the respondent officer and provisions made out under the Act, Supply Code and relevant Tariff Order, he has passed the said order. The said order also speaks of consideration of submissions made by the consumer, contentions raised therein, the submission of the respondent officer and provisions made out under the Act, Supply Code and relevant Tariff Order, he has passed the said order. He has also taken care of the order of the Division Bench passed in LPA No.65 of 2009. The contention of the petitioner has been dealt with by the Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh at running page no.117 of the said impugned order. The Senior Manager (C&R), Electric Supply Circle, Hazaribagh has refuted the contention raised by the petitioner which has also been considered by Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh at running page 118 of the said impugned order and thereafter the Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh has passed the order. Paragraph no.9 of the impugned order, the Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh has personally recorded that the appellant consumer has submitted that the instances detected during inspection do not constitute theft of energy as per section 135 of the Act. 6. In view of all these facts and looking into the impugned order, it cannot be said that without providing any opportunity of hearing the said order has been passed. Thus, the judgment relied by Mr. Rajendra Krishna, the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Limited(supra) is not helping the petitioner as after the remand, the Superintending Engineer Hazaribagh has taken care of and has passed the order. Unauthorized use of electricity and assessment therein under section 126 of the Indian Electricity Act are appealable under section 127 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 and if such a remedy is there and that too, after a final order, the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction it would ordinarily refuse to interfere as the statutory provision of appeal is there. There is no doubt that availability of alternative remedy, although not absolute bar to exercise of writ jurisdiction. High Court may exercise it only in exceptional cases depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free from exceptions. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free from exceptions. The Courts including this Court have taken the view that statutory remedy if provided under specific law impliedly oust the jurisdiction of civil court. The High Court in its exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ for appropriate proceeding despite availability of alternative remedy. This jurisdiction the High Court would exercise with some circumspection in exceptional cases particularly where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act are under challenge. These classes of cases are being mentioned by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which is in the opinion of this Court is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative remedy or other remedy by itself has not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of the given case. The further question that would inevitably come for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised. The intention behind selfimposed rule is clear. If High Court has to exercise its writ jurisdiction so widely has to regularly override the statutory procedure, the High Court would become over-loaded with vast number of cases to be determined of the litigants and this will defeat the legislature’s intention in enacting statutory mechanism to ensure speedy disposal of the cases. 7. In the case in hand, after the remand the Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh has exercised the power in accordance with law. He has given full opportunity of hearing and has also considered the objection of the petitioner. Thus, the contention of the petitioner is not accepted by the Court. The determination of dispute in this case and validity of demand which squarely fall within the domain of specified authority, and in that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Thus, the contention of the petitioner is not accepted by the Court. The determination of dispute in this case and validity of demand which squarely fall within the domain of specified authority, and in that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No.3307 of 2023 is dismissed with liberty to avail the alternative remedy of appeal under section 127 of Indian Electricity Act, 2003. 9. Pending petition if any also stands dismissed accordingly.