JUDGMENT : Both the petitions are being heard together as common FIR as well as order taking cognizance are under challenge in both the petitions. 2. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Sardhu Mahto, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Saurav Kumar, learned counsel for opposite party no.2. 3. These petitions have been filed for quashing the FIR as well as the order taking cognizance dated 29.04.2015 in connection with G.R. No.168 of 2014 arising out of Adityapur P.S. Case No.62 of 2014, pending in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella. 4. The FIR was lodged alleging therein that the land situated at Mouza Gamharia P.S. Adityapur, Thana No.66, Adityapur N.A.C. Ward No.11, comprised under Khata No.133, 134, 135 and 137 are the joint ancestral properties of the informant, his brother Bijay Moral, along with maternal aunt Smt. Andi Bej @ Das and maternal uncle Mansa Ram Bej and other co-sharers. It was further alleged that according to the informant, he is the descendant of Nadia Bej who lied behind him, his son namely, Mansharam Bej (accused no.1) and two married daughters namely Amodi Bej @ Das and Moni Bej @ Moral as his legal heirs and successors. The informant and Bijay Moral are the sons of Moni Moral who has already died. It was also alleged that the present petitioners are representatives of M/s Usha Martin Ltd., managed to bring into existence a Registered Sale Deed No.796 dated 26.02.2013 in respect of aforesaid joint family property knowing it fully that the Title (Partition) Suit No.46 of 2011 is pending against accused no.1 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division)-I at Seraikella. Hence the aforesaid sale deed is void and illegal. On 10.12.2013, the present petitioners gave out to the complainant that they have purchased the land and openly threatened to dispossess the complainant. The complainant issued lawyer's notice and it was alleged that the said lawyer's notice has been received by the petitioners on 07.12.2013, but did not reply. Therefore, the FIR was lodged. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have not purchased the land for their own purpose and they are simply employees of M/s. Usha Martin Limited, Vth Phase, Adityapur Industrial Area, P.S. Gamharia and the company is the actual purchaser of the land in question. Therefore, the FIR was lodged. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have not purchased the land for their own purpose and they are simply employees of M/s. Usha Martin Limited, Vth Phase, Adityapur Industrial Area, P.S. Gamharia and the company is the actual purchaser of the land in question. He submits that the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.2466 of 2015 was posted as Deputy General Manager (Public Relation) in the said company and the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.2467 of 2015 is the representative of the said company. He submits that there is no post of Manager (Estate) in the petitioners' company as show accused no.2 in the complaint petition. He further submits that the petitioners have only acted on behalf of the company and the land was purchased for the said company. He submits that the allegation is against accused no.1 as he sold the land in question to the company and the petitioners herein are only the purchased on behalf of the company. He also submits that Title (Partition) Suit No.46 of 2011 was pending between the informant and accused no.1, which has also been disclosed in the complaint petition. He submits that in this background, the case has been unnecessarily lodged against the petitioners. On these grounds, he submits that the FIR may kindly be quashed. 6. Mr. Saurav Kumar, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.2 submits that in spite of legal notice, the petitioners have not replied and accused no.1 was having knowledge of the said Title (Partition) Suit, who happened to be co-sharer of the land in question. He submits that in this background, the learned court has rightly taken cognizance against the petitioners. 7. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the FIR as well as the order taking cognizance. Looking into the FIR, it transpires that the allegations are made that accused no.1 has sold the land in question to the company through the petitioners, who happened to be employees of M/s Usha Martin Limited. In the FIR itself, Title (Partition) Suit No.46 of 2011 has been disclosed. The accused no.1 has appeared in the said Title (Partition) Suit and that has also been stated in the FIR. The petitioners are only the purchaser on behalf of the company. In the FIR itself, Title (Partition) Suit No.46 of 2011 has been disclosed. The accused no.1 has appeared in the said Title (Partition) Suit and that has also been stated in the FIR. The petitioners are only the purchaser on behalf of the company. In the FIR itself, it has been alleged that the sale deed is void, illegal and hit under the principle of lispendance. It appears that the present case has been filed on the ground that the sale deed is void and illegal, that can be a subject matter of civil dispute and that cannot be ground for filing FIR. Further, the petitioners are only employees of the said company and they have purchased the said land on behalf of the company. The case of the petitioners is fully covered in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar; [ (2009) 8 SCC 751 ]. 8. Recently the case passed in Mohd. Ibrahim (supra) was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 27 of the judgment passed in Randheer Singh v.State of Uttar Pradesh and others; [ (2021) 14 SCC 626 ] and in view of the dispute which is identical in that case, the case has been quashed. Paragraph 27 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “27. In Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929], this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 757-60, paras 19-24 & 27-30) “19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. 22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code. A clarification 23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. 24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of “fraud” is ‘deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage’. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract. * * * 27. 24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of “fraud” is ‘deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage’. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract. * * * 27. The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term “dishonestly” which is defined in Section 24 as follows: ‘24. “Dishonestly”.—Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”.’ 28. To “defraud” or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include: (i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421 and 424) (ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section 207) (iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210) (iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243) (v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (Sections 246 to 253) (vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to 261) (vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266) (viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420) (ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section 422) (x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration (Section 423) (xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to 471 and 474) (xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (Section 477) (xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (Section 496) It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law. Section 504 of the Penal Code 29. The allegations in the complaint do not also make out the ingredients of an offence under Section 504 of the Penal Code. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever he wants. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an “insult with intent to provoke breach of peace”. The statement attributed to the accused, even if it was true, was merely a statement referring to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the first appellant in favour of the second appellant. Conclusion 30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do not make out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code, but may technically show the ingredients of offences of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing hurt under Section 323IPC.”” 9. In the above quoted case, that case is also arising out of the land purchased by the petitioner of that case. The case of the petitioners is fully covered in view of the aforesaid two judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 10. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, so far as these petitioners are concerned, the FIR as well as the order taking cognizance dated 29.04.2015 in connection with G.R. No.168 of 2014 arising out of Adityapur P.S. Case No.62 of 2014, pending in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella are quashed. 11. It is made clear that this Court has not interfered with the FIR as well as the order taking cognizance, so far as accused no.1 is concerned and the trial against accused no.1 shall proceed, in accordance with law, without prejudiced to this order. 12. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed and disposed of. 13. Pending I.A., if any, is disposed of.