ORDER : The tone for this judgment can be set by what the following clauses 39 & 40 from the Magna Carta of 1215 read : “To none shall we sell, To none shall we deny And to none shall we delay right or justice” 2. This Reference arose from a learned Single Judge’s order dated 17.1.2017 made under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. She doubted the correctness of the Division Bench’s view in ANTHONY SWAMY vs. CHOWRAMMA, ILR 1989 KAR 1284, that ‘once a petition for grant of probate or letters of administration is contested, that petition automatically takes the form of a regular suit… in which the petitioner shall be the plaintiff and the person who appeared to oppose the grant shall be the defendant…’. Therefore, she opined that the proviso to Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of Schedule II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (hereafter ‘1958 Act’), would become applicable and as a consequence, ad valorem court fee is payable. Another Division Bench inter alia comprising one of us (Dixit, J.), directed ‘the Registrar (Judicial) to place the petition before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the administrative side for necessary orders’. Hon’ble the Chief Justice, having constituted this Bench has placed the Reference at its hands. 3. FOUNDATIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE : Petitioner has instituted P & S.C.No.39/2012 under the provisions of Section 270 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereafter ‘1925 Act’), seeking the grant of Letters of Administration on the basis of the subject testament, no executor having been named therein. The respondents entered appearance and opposed the Petition. Their application in I.A. No. IV filed under Sections 288 & 289 of the 1925 Act to treat the subject P & SC proceeding as a regular suit in terms of section 295 of the Act, having been favoured, the said proceeding is registered as O.S.No.488/2015. Subsequently, their two applications i.e., I.A.Nos.6 & 7 filed under Section 11 of the 1958 Act read with Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, 1908, also came to be allowed by the learned trial Judge vide order dated 16.4.2015, directing the petitioner to value the suit on ad valorem basis in terms of Article 11(l) of Schedule II of the 1958 Act and pay the court fee accordingly. This has been the subject matter of challenge in the present Writ Petition, that has on Reference landed at our hands. 4. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES : (a) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in substance argued that a probate proceeding, as generically called, is instituted by the presentation of a Petition u/s 270 of the 1925 Act; ordinarily, it is tried summarily after notice to other side if any, or on citation; once contested, the same needs to be tried in the manner a civil suit is tried under CPC, that too ‘as far as possible’, as provided u/s 295 of the Act; merely because it is tried in a procedure prescribed by CPC for the trial of a regular suit, the proceeding does not become a suit as such and therefore, Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of Schedule II to the 1958 Act providing for the payment of ad valorem court fee, is not applicable. He hastens to add that for the invocation of said Article, the filing of caveat as provided u/s 284 of the 1925 Act, is a sine qua non and that admittedly, there being no such caveat in the trial proceedings, the said Article has to remain miles away. So arguing, he seeks invalidation of the impugned order. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on certain decisions. (b) Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents per contra contended that: the Division Bench in ANTHONY SWAMY, supra, having considered all aspects of the matter, has answered the question to the effect that a contested probate proceeding partakes the character of a regular suit, wherein the petitioner becomes the plaintiff and the contestant becomes the defendant, regardless of the caveat and therefore, the court fee has to be paid on ad valorem basis in terms of Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of Schedule II to the 1958 Act. Since matter involved payment of court fees, the learned Advocate General was notified. We had requested for the assistance from the learned Deputy Solicitor General. Accordingly, learned Addl. Advocate General and the learned Deputy Solicitor General have made their submissions and filed their synopsis. In support of their contentions, they too have banked upon certain rulings. 5. We have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. Dhyan Chinnappa for the State and learned Deputy Solicitor General Mr. H. Shanti Bhushan. Advocate General and the learned Deputy Solicitor General have made their submissions and filed their synopsis. In support of their contentions, they too have banked upon certain rulings. 5. We have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. Dhyan Chinnappa for the State and learned Deputy Solicitor General Mr. H. Shanti Bhushan. We have perused the Petition Papers and relevant of the Rulings cited at the Bar. We have framed the following question for answering the Reference : Whether a petition filed under Section 270 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 seeking grant of probate or letters of administration, regardless of the caveat under Section 284, on being contested under Section 295 automatically metamorphizes into a regular suit and therefore, such a petition has to be valued on ad valorem basis in terms of Article 11(1) of Schedule II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 ? 6. We are inclined to answer the above question in the negative and hold that the Petition continues to be a ‘probate proceeding’ only, as distinguished from a suit, although it will be tried ‘as nearly as may be’ in the procedure in which an ordinary civil suit is tried. For this view of ours, following are the reasons : I. PROBATE CAVEAT VS. CPC CAVEAT; THEIR DIFFERENCES AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: (a) Section 270 of 1925 Act provides for the grant of probate of a will or letters of administration to the estate of a deceased by the District Judge, under the seal of his Court. Section 284 provides for lodging of caveat in the form prescribed in Schedule V in a pending or contemplated probate proceeding. Section 285 interdicts the trial of probate proceeding till after the caveator has been notified whether he is a party eo nomine or not. The Apex Court in KRISHNA KUMAR BIRLA vs. RAJENDRA SINGH LODHA, 2008 (4) SCC 300 has observed that this section does not lay down any qualification for the caveator and therefore, once a caveat is filed it is for the court to determine as to the existence of caveatable interest. It hardly needs to be stated Section 148A of CPC 1908 also speaks of Caveat. There is a certain difference between a ‘Probate Caveat’ and a CPC Caveat, although their object is same. It hardly needs to be stated Section 148A of CPC 1908 also speaks of Caveat. There is a certain difference between a ‘Probate Caveat’ and a CPC Caveat, although their object is same. (b) Firstly, the format for Probate Caveat given in Schedule V to the 1925 Act is different from the one prescribed in the CPC. State Amendments too have prescribed the formats, suitable to their provinces. Once caveat is filed, all further proceedings in the probate jurisdiction stand halted till after the caveator is notified. Our High Court Rules referred to infra mandate impleading of the caveator as the opponent to the said proceedings and there is no option left to the probate seeker. The Probate Caveat relates to the final outcome of the proceedings. On the other hand, CPC Caveat does not halt the main proceedings, its object being to oppose grant of interim relief ex parte. The main proceeding can go on even when there is a caveat on record, unlike a caveated probate proceeding. It is open to a litigant not to implead CPC Caveator as a party to the proceeding at all, even when he may be a necessary or proper party subject to risk of dismissal for non-joinder. There are other differences too, which may not be much relevant for the adjudication of this matter. II. OUR HIGH COURT RULES OF 1964 & 1966 IN RE PROBATE & LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION AND SOME ASPECTS OF PROBATE CAVEAT : (a) This Court on the administrative side has promulgated two sets of Rules concerning the grant of probate and letters of administration. The first set is titled ‘RULES GOVERNING PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION MATTERS, 1964’ (hereafter ‘1964 Probate Rules’) promulgated under Section 129 of the Code. The second set is called ‘RULES GOVERNING PROBATE AND SUCCESSION MATTERS, 1966’ (hereafter ‘1966 Probate Rules’) promulgated in exercise of Article 227 of the Constitution of India with the approval of Governor of Karnataka. Both these Rules are published vide Notification No.Spl.327/63 dated 2.1.1967. The 1964 Probate Rules govern the procedure when application for the grant of probate or letters of administration is filed in this court only in its original jurisdiction. The 1966 Probate Rules apply to the courts that are ‘subject to the superintendence of the High Court of Karnataka’. Both these Rules are published vide Notification No.Spl.327/63 dated 2.1.1967. The 1964 Probate Rules govern the procedure when application for the grant of probate or letters of administration is filed in this court only in its original jurisdiction. The 1966 Probate Rules apply to the courts that are ‘subject to the superintendence of the High Court of Karnataka’. (b) It is noteworthy that the subject matter, text & context of the provisions of these two sets of Rules are identical. Even the serial number of Rules, formats prescribed for the application, caveat, orders, decrees, etc., are also same. Rule 8 in both the sets of Rules adopts Schedule V of CPC as the format for Probate Caveat. However, Section 284(4) of the 1925 Act prescribes Schedule V to the Act as a short format for caveat. Rule 9 mandates issuance of notice to the Caveator in Form 5 and requires impleadment of the Caveator as a defendant to the Probate proceeding. This is in marked difference to CPC Caveat which does not mandate impleadment of the Caveator as a party to the suit proceeding. CPC Caveat is confined to resist the grant of interim relief unlike the Probate Caveat which opposes the main prayer. Rule 10 almost duplicates the intent of Section 295 of the 1925 Act, by employing the expression ‘as far as practicable’ when the said Section uses the term ‘as nearly as may be’. Rule 12 speaks of order for grant of Probate or Letters of Administration obviously in non-contentious cases whereas Rule 13 speaks of format of ‘decree’ in contentious cases falling under Section 295 of the 1925 Act. III. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF VALUATION OF SUBJECT MATTER OF PROBATE PROCEEDINGS AND LEVY OF COURT FEE : Chapter VI of the 1958 Act enacts the provisions as to valuation of subject matter and payment of court fees in respect of applications for the grant of “probate, letters of administration & certificates of administration.” The opening provision of this Chapter i.e., Section 52 read with Schedule III prescribes the forms for the valuation of estate of the deceased. Section 53 read with Article 6 of Schedule I provides for the levy of Court fee chargeable for the grant of probate or letters of administration, on slab basis. Section 53 read with Article 6 of Schedule I provides for the levy of Court fee chargeable for the grant of probate or letters of administration, on slab basis. Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of Schedule II to this Act provides for the valuation of subject matter of the probate proceeding and levy of Court fee, where the value of such subject matter exceeds ten thousand rupees. The proviso states that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, the court fee shall be paid on one half of the fee prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I on the market value of the estate minus the fee already paid on the application. Succinctly stated, this valuation is on ad valorem basis. IV. PROBATE PROCEEDINGS VS. SUIT PROCEEDINGS; NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCES: The question as framed by us above, has certain building blocks such as, ‘petition’, ‘Caveat’, ‘contention’ & ‘suit’. Therefore, some deliberation on the same, becomes profitable. (a) SUIT IN GENERAL: The word ‘suit’ is not defined in CPC, in 1925 Act or in 1958 Act. Section 26(1) of the Code reads ‘Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint …”. Order IV Rule 1 of the Code too states the same. The word ‘suit’ ordinarily means, and apart from context, must be taken to mean a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of plaint. The main provisions governing the suit proceedings are enacted in sections 28 to 35A of the Code and the details have been relegated to the Rules of procedure in the First Schedule to the Code. Ordinarily, a suit culminates into a judgment & decree, subject to all just exceptions. Thus, ordinarily a proceeding instituted otherwise than by the presentation of a plaint, is not a suit. (b) DEEMED DECREE IN NON-SUIT PROCEEDINGS: Further, a proceeding regardless of the mode of its institution may result into a decree by statutory deeming. For instance, the outcome of the proceedings under Sections 2, 3 & 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 becomes a decree by the deeming provision enacted in Section 8 which reads ‘Orders for sale to be deemed decrees.-Any order for sale made by the Court under section 2, 3 or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure’. It has been a settled position of law that the deeming provision should be strictly construed and be given full effect to, vide STATE OF BOMBAY vs. PANDURANG VINAYAK CHAPHALKAR, (1953) SCR 773, wherein the Apex Court observed: “When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done … full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion…” As a concomitant of this, merely because an order is deemed to be a decree, such a deeming cannot be stretched too far to mean that the proceeding in which such an order came to be made should be treated as a suit. Ordinarily, suits are instituted in the civil courts. If they are instituted elsewhere, they are not suit proceedings, unless the law otherwise provides. For instance, Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995, provides for the institution of suits, in respect of certain disputes only in the Wakf Tribunals and the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred. In the light of this discussion, one can ordinarily assume three components in a suit viz., Plaint/Counter Claim, the court in which plaint is presented and the decree into which such a proceeding culminates. All this leaves no manner of doubt as to there being a certain legal difference between a plaint and an application. (c) PLAINT, SUIT, APPLICATION & PETITION; DIFFERENCES INTER SE: The subject P & SC proceeding is commenced by filing a petition under Section 270 of the 1925 Act and not by the presentation of a plaint. This section has the following text : “When probate or administration may be granted by District Judge.—Probate of the will or letters of administration to the estate of a deceased person may be granted by a District Judge under the seal of his Court, if it appears by a petition, verified as hereinafter provided, of the person applying for the same that the testator or intestate, as the case may be, at the time of his decease had a fixed place of abode, or any property, moveable or immoveable, within the jurisdiction of the Judge.” CPC, 1908 as amended in the State of Karnataka employs the word ‘plaint’ as many as 130 times, the word ‘suit’ 849 times, the word ‘application’ 460 times and the word ‘petition’ 23 times. By our estimate, the 1925 Act uses the word ‘plaint’ only once i.e., in Sec. 372, the word ‘suit’ 32 times, the word ‘application’ 81 times and the word ‘petition’ 37 times. The 1958 Act employs the word ‘plaint’ 206 times, the word ‘suit’ 415 times, the word ‘application’ 172 times and the word ‘petition’ 56 times. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referrants’ said Glanville Williams, [Towne vs. Eisner, (245) U.S. 418]. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opines: “A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged; it is a skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used”., [G. Williams, Language and the Law, 61 Quarterly Review, p. 73 (1945)] It has been a settled principle of interpretation that when the legislature uses different words in a statute, normally they are intended to mean different things. Otherwise, the difference in legislative phraseology would loose significance and as a consequence, what is said is not what is meant. It hardly needs to be stated that there is no definition of the word ‘application’ or ‘petition’ in the CPC nor in the 1925 Act nor in the 1958 Act. Therefore, these words too have to be construed in common parlance. Obviously, a ‘plaint’ is different from an ‘application’ or ‘petition’; merely because all they are filed in the civil courts, the difference obtaining between them inter se, does not wither away. V. CAVEATED PROBATE PROCEEDING VS. CONTESTED PROBATE PROCEEDING : (a) A probate proceeding may be caveated or non-caveated. When caveated or otherwise opposed, it becomes a contentious proceeding, is true or the statutory scheme. All caveated proceedings becomes contentious; however, all contested proceedings need not be caveated. The probate proceeding even when contested or caveated, does not result into a decree, which ordinarily a civil suit does bring about. The cognate provisions enacted in sections 289 & 290 of the 1925 Act state that the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be in the form prescribed in Schedules VI & VII to the Act, with the seal of court, superadded. The cognate provisions enacted in sections 289 & 290 of the 1925 Act state that the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be in the form prescribed in Schedules VI & VII to the Act, with the seal of court, superadded. The form & text of probate given in Schedule VI to the Act are as under : “I, ………, Judge of the District of………, or Delegate appointed for granting probate or letters of administration in (here insert the limits of the Delegate's jurisdiction), hereby make known that on the……… day of ……… in the year………, the last will of ……… late of ………, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed, was proved and registered before me, and that administration of the property and credits of the said deceased, and in any way concerning his will was granted to………, the executor in the said will named, he having undertaken to administer the same, and to make a full and true inventory of the said property and credits and exhibit the same in this Court within six months from the date of this grant or within such further time as the Court may, from time to time, appoint, and also to render to this Court a true account of the said property and credits within one year from the same date, or within such further time as the Court may, from time to time, appoint.…” Appendix D to CPC (including those of State Amendments), gives as many as two dozen formats for decrees. The texts of the formats are much different from the text & form in which probate of a will is granted. There is nothing to indicate in the 1925 Act that the order granting probate shall be deemed to be a decree. Even section 299 of the Act which provides for appeal is phrased as “Every order made by a District Judge … shall be subject to appeal…” whereas section 96 of CPC which provides for first appeal is worded as ‘…an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court…’ (b) True it is that Rule 13 of the 1966 Probate Rules directs drawing of a decree in Form 7 when the cases fall under Section 295 of the 1925 Act i.e., contentious probate proceedings. However, clause (b) of this Rule directs that the probate or letters of administration shall be drawn up in the form prescribed in Schedule VI or VII of the 1925 Act, on stamp paper of requisite value. There is an arguable incoherence between what the 1925 Act says and what these Rules provide for, in treating the order for the grant of probate or letters of administration. The former, in so many words, treats the outcome of the probate proceeding as the ‘order’ whereas the latter calls it a ‘decree’. It hardly needs to be stated that what is stated in the parent statute i.e., 1925 Act should prevail over what is prescribed in the subordinate legislation i.e., the Probate Rules, 1964, if there be repugnance between them. CONCLUSION: To put all this concisely, a suit ordinarily can be defined as a proceeding instituted by the presentation of a ‘plaint’ (Section 26 read with Order VII Rule 1) in a civil court, resulting into a decree (Section 33). However, these ingredients lack in a proceeding commenced by the filing of a ‘petition’ under Section 270 of the 1925 Act, for the grant of probate of a will or letters of administration, whether caveated or not, and whether contested or not. Therefore, a probate proceeding for all practical purposes is much different from a suit proceeding. VI. AS TO CONTENTIOUS PROBATE PROCEEDING AUTOMATICALLY BECOMING A SUIT PROCEEDING : (a) The vehement contention of learned advocate appearing for the private respondent that once the probate proceeding is contested, regardless of caveat, the same shall be registered as ‘a suit’ under the 1966 Probate Rules, is only a partial truth. How the Registry nomenclatures a particular proceeding in its Registers as a matter of procedure and that cannot decide the nature of the proceeding, to the prejudice of the litigant. His further contention that every contentious probate proceeding in the light of these Rules becomes a suit proceeding for the purpose of valuation & court fee, cannot be countenanced since these Rules being a piece of subordinate legislation have to yield to the parent statute, namely 1925 Act. Section 295 of the said Act reads as under : “295. His further contention that every contentious probate proceeding in the light of these Rules becomes a suit proceeding for the purpose of valuation & court fee, cannot be countenanced since these Rules being a piece of subordinate legislation have to yield to the parent statute, namely 1925 Act. Section 295 of the said Act reads as under : “295. Procedure in contentious cases.—In any case before the District Judge in which there is contention, the proceedings shall take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular suit, according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, shall be the plaintiff, and the person who has appeared to oppose the grant shall be the defendant.” (b) The text & context of Section 295 show that the focal point of this provision is ‘procedure’ in which the petition for probate or letters of administration, on being contested, shall be tried, and not the nature of such a proceeding. In other words, what the Parliament addresses is the nature of procedure, and not the nature of proceeding as such, they being poles asunder. If the Law Maker intended that the application for the grant of probate or letters of administration once contested/caveated, should be converted into a suit, it would have enacted a deeming provision like the one texted in Section 8 of the Partition Act, 1893, supra, the kind of which is conspicuously absent in the 1925 Act. This view gains further support from the expression ‘as nearly as may be’, employed in the very provision itself. It is pertinent thus to note that the prescription of suit procedure for the trial of a contentious probate proceeding, is not stricto sensu. Had it been otherwise, the expression ‘as nearly as may be’ would not have been employed. (c) Even for the trial of Election Petitions, the provisions of CPC are made applicable by virtue of Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which also employs the very same expression i.e., ‘as nearly as may be’, as its text below shows : “[87. (c) Even for the trial of Election Petitions, the provisions of CPC are made applicable by virtue of Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which also employs the very same expression i.e., ‘as nearly as may be’, as its text below shows : “[87. Procedure before the High Court.— “Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of suits…” (Emphasis is ours) The Apex Court in KAILASH vs. NANHKU, 2005 (4) SCC 480 while construing this provision observed : “…the procedure provided for trial of civil suits by the CPC is not in its entirety applicable to the trial of election petitions. The applicability of the procedure is circumscribed by two riders; firstly, the CPC procedure is applicable “as nearly as may be”; and secondly, the CPC procedure would give way to any provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder.” Therefore, merely because Section 295 mandates the trial of contentious probate proceeding in the procedure applicable to the trial of a suit under CPC, one cannot hastily jump to the conclusion that the said proceeding should be deemed to be a suit. The words ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ employed in this section are intended to give the rights to the petitioner and to the contestant, that do ordinarily avail to the parties to a suit, and nothing more. VII. “NON-CAVEATED” CONTENTIOUS PROBATE PROCEEDING; VALUATION & LEVY OF COURT FEE: (a) Learned counsel for the private Respondents contended that whether the probate proceeding on being contested becomes a suit or not, the applicant is liable to pay ad valorem Court Fees by virtue of Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of Schedule II to the 1958 Act, as if it is a suit proceeding, is bit difficult to countenance. The reasons for this are not far to seek: The Apex Court in SECY. TO GOVT. OF MADRAS vs. P.R. SRIRAMULU, 1996 (1) SCC 345 observed : “It cannot be disputed that the administration of justice is one of the main functions of the State. It is also a fact that the functions of the State in the modern times have become too extensive encompassing a large area of activity. TO GOVT. OF MADRAS vs. P.R. SRIRAMULU, 1996 (1) SCC 345 observed : “It cannot be disputed that the administration of justice is one of the main functions of the State. It is also a fact that the functions of the State in the modern times have become too extensive encompassing a large area of activity. Now the State has not only to maintain a system of administration of justice for the maintenance of law and order, but it has also to provide a system to enable its citizens to canvass their rights against wrongs done to them… States came forward to levy fee by legislative amendments in order to cover up the expenses towards the pay allowances and pensions of judicial officers and establishment staff, their residential accommodations, court buildings, repairs, and maintenance thereof as well as provision for transport, libraries and stationery besides other expenses under various heads and machinery engaged and employed for the administration of justice”. There is a distinction between a ‘tax’ and a ‘fee’. There must be a broad co-relationship with the Court Fees collected and the cost of administration of civil justice, although strictly speaking, it is not on quid pro quo basis. A greater latitude avails to the State in providing for the levy of a small fee in some cases and a large fee in other. Thus the assurance of the Magna Carta “To none shall we sell justice” is only an ideal rhetoric, the pragmatics being the life blood of administration of justice. (b) The provisions of law relating to suit valuation and court fees have to be construed with a reasonable strictness and in favour of the litigant who is required to shell out money from his purse. Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of the 1958 Act has the following text : “Application for probate or letters of administration or for revocation thereof not falling under clause (i) or an application for a certificate under Part X of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or Bombay Regulation VIII of 1927.— (1) if the amount or value of the estate does not exceed Rs.2,000. Five rupees xxx (3) If the amount or value exceeds ten thousand rupees. Five rupees xxx (3) If the amount or value exceeds ten thousand rupees. Twenty rupees Provided that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, one half the scale of fee prescribed in Article I of Schedule I on the market value of the estate less the fee already paid on the application shall be levied.” There is unanimity at the Bar as to what is applicable to the case at hands, is the above Proviso. It speaks inter alia of two cumulative ingredients viz., (i) “a caveat is entered” and (ii) “application is registered as a suit”. As already mentioned above, a contentious probate proceeding has to be tried as a suit “as nearly as possible”, even when no caveat is entered since caveat is not a sine qua non for such a proceeding, to become ‘contentious’. Once the proceeding is contested, the same is required to be registered as a suit, as per the extant Rules and accordingly, the subject P & SC has been registered too. What is markedly significant is the conspicuous absence of ‘caveat’ in the subject proceeding. The Proviso becomes invocable only if both the above ingredients concurrently obtain, and not otherwise. (c) There is yet another reason which supports the above view: It is a rule now firmly established that the legislative intent must be found by reading the statute as a whole; this principle is equally applicable in construing different parts of the same section in a statute. The section must be constructed as a whole, whether or not one of its parts is a saving clause or a proviso vide JENNINGS vs. KELLY, (1939) ALL.E.R. p 464 – 70. If the words of a Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone, in such cases, best declare the intent of the law giver. It is also settled that in construing a provision of a statute, no word employed therein can be rendered otiose. The legislature in its wisdom has framed the subject proviso as an exception to the general rule. The proviso employs the expression ‘if a caveat is entered’. Countenancing the contention of respondent therefore amounts to surgically amputating this part of the proviso, which the courts cannot venture. The legislature in its wisdom has framed the subject proviso as an exception to the general rule. The proviso employs the expression ‘if a caveat is entered’. Countenancing the contention of respondent therefore amounts to surgically amputating this part of the proviso, which the courts cannot venture. In other words, even when the probate proceeding is contentious, the petitioner cannot be asked to value the subject matter in terms of this proviso and to pay 50% of the ad valorem court fees i.e., on the market value of the estate. VIII. AS TO SOME ASPECTS OF CAVEATABLE INTEREST : (a) In order to appreciate the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it is relevant to consider the provisions of Section 284 of the 1925 Act, which read as under : “284. Caveats against grant of probate or administration.—(1) Caveats against the grant of probate or administration may be lodged with the District Judge or a District Delegate. (2) Immediately on any caveat being lodged with any District Delegate, he shall send copy thereof to the District Judge. (3) Immediately on a caveat being entered with the District Judge, a copy thereof shall be given to the District Delegate, if any, within whose jurisdiction it is alleged the deceased had a fixed place of abode at the time of his death, and to any other Judge or District Delegate to whom it may appear to the District Judge expedient to transmit the same. Form of caveat. (4) The caveat shall be made as nearly as circumstances admit in the form set forth in Schedule V.” A plain reading of the said provision makes it clear that the caveats against the grant of probate or letters of administration may be lodged to the District Judge or District Delegate. The caveat shall be made as nearly as circumstances admit, in the form set forth in the Schedule V. The grant of probate in no way decides any question of title of the deceased to the properties bequeathed by a will nor does it affect other’s title thereto. The testamentary bequest displaces normal rule of intestate succession to the estate of the deceased. The testamentary bequest displaces normal rule of intestate succession to the estate of the deceased. Therefore, it has been recognized all along that anyone who stands to gain by the absence or invalidation of the will, is entitled to oppose the grant of probate and even a remote heir of the deceased or a distant possible successor to the estate is recognized as having caveatable interest and therefore, he is competent to oppose the petition for the grant of probate. (b) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ELIZABETH ANTONY vs. MICHEL CHARLES JOHN CHOWN LENGERA, AIR 1990 SC 1576 , had an occasion to consider inter alia the provisions of Sections 227, 263, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288 of the 1925 Act for adjudging the caveatable interest. At paras 7 & 10 of the decision, it is observed as under : “7. Relying on these decisions the learned counsel urged that the petitioner in the instant case has substantial interest in the estate. The learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute the legal position. He, however, contended that there was absolutely no material before the Courts below to substantiate the alleged interest of the petitioner in the estate. It is submitted that the so-called Will said to have been executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne, daughter of Mrs. Mary Aline Browne has not been filed. Likewise, the gift-deed also was not filed. Coming to the trust of John Browne it is submitted that the trust does not exist and got extinguished. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that except mentioning these three aspects in a bare manner no other material was placed before the Court. Having gone through both the orders we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner did not establish her caveatable interest. We have perused the entire order of the trial court in this context. Admittedly neither the original nor a copy of the Will said to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne, was filed. Now coming to the trust, it is in the evidence of P.W.1 that John Browne Trust has come to an end in March, 1972 and the same was not in existence. The trial Court has considered both the documentary and oral evidence in this regard and has rightly held that the petitioner has no existing benefit from the trust... Now coming to the trust, it is in the evidence of P.W.1 that John Browne Trust has come to an end in March, 1972 and the same was not in existence. The trial Court has considered both the documentary and oral evidence in this regard and has rightly held that the petitioner has no existing benefit from the trust... Accordingly the learned Judge held that the petitioner has not established that she has a caveatable interest justifying her opposition to the probate proceedings for grant of letters of administration. In this state of affairs, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the petitioner has caveatable interest… 10. The learned counsel, however, lastly submitted that the petitioner in spite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her right, to prove that the alleged Will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne (sic) is not a genuine one and that it is a fictitious one. We must point out that by granting a probate, the court is not deciding the disputes to the title. Even with regard to a probate granted, it can be revoked as provided under Section 263 of the Act in any one of the cases mentioned therein. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings of the Sub Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable interest will come in the petitioner's way in seeking revocation of the grant of probate. It is needless to say that the findings regarding the caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are relevant only to the extent of granting of probate. But they cannot deprive his right, if he has any, to invoke Section 263 of the Act it is up to the petitioner to satisfy the Court.” However, much reliance cannot be placed by the respondents on the above decision inasmuch as in the case at hands, admittedly, no caveat has been filed opposing the grant of letters of administration. The Proviso to Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of the 1958 Act as already mentioned above speaks not of caveatable interest but the filing of the caveat in a petition seeking a probate or letters of administration. Once such caveat is filed, it is for the Probate Court to decide whether there is caveatable interest or not, for maintaining the caveat. The Proviso to Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of the 1958 Act as already mentioned above speaks not of caveatable interest but the filing of the caveat in a petition seeking a probate or letters of administration. Once such caveat is filed, it is for the Probate Court to decide whether there is caveatable interest or not, for maintaining the caveat. It hardly needs to be stated that in the absence of caveatable interest, if the caveat is entered, it cannot be construed as a caveat in terms of the said proviso. However, much deliberation in this regard is not needed since admittedly, no caveat is entered in the court below opposing the probate proceeding. (c) One of us namely B. Veerappa J, in W.P.No.11369/2019 (GM-CPC) between Sri. B.M. Venkataramanagowda & others vs. The Executive Engineer & others, disposed off on 19.03.2019 has broadly taken the above view, in a case having more or less a comparable fact matrix. This view gains support also from the decision of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in GOURI BALA SADHUKHAN vs. JIBAN KRISHNA SADHUKHAN, (1973) ILR 2 CAL 363. The learned Single Judge of the said Court has referred to a pari materia proviso to Article 1(g) in Schedule II to the Court Fees Act, 1870, which reads as under : “Provided that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, one half the scale of fee prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I on the market value of the estate less the fee already paid on the application shall be levied.” (Emphasis is ours) The Court at Para 10 observed : “10. If we now look again at the proviso to Schedule II, Article 1(g)(ii), we find that this proviso is invoked when two conditions are satisfied, namely, (i) a caveat has been entered and (ii) the application is registered as a suit. IX. AS TO WHETHER THE WORD ‘AND’ EMPLOYED IN A STATUTE CAN BE CONSTRUED AS ‘OR’: (a) Learned counsel for the contesting respondents contends that the word ‘and’ appearing in the proviso to Article 11(l)(ii)(3) to the Schedule to the 1958 Act between the expressions ‘if a caveat is entered’ and ‘the application is registered as a suit’ has to be construed as ‘or’. Countenancing this contention virtually amounts to rephrasing the statute and therefore, we do not agree with the same. Countenancing this contention virtually amounts to rephrasing the statute and therefore, we do not agree with the same. It hardly needs to be stated that the word ‘and’ is a conjunction whereas the word ‘or’ is a disjunction. The legislature has consciously used the conjunction, presumably borrowing the text from the proviso to 1(g) in Schedule II to the Court Fees Act, 1870. No special circumstances are shown for construing the conjunction as a disjunction. (b) The above aspect of the matter was duly considered in GOURI BALA SADHUKHAN, supra, in the light of the Court Fees Act, 1870. What the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court observed at paras 11, 12 & 14 is worth adverting to : “11. The learned Government Pleader has argued, before us that the word ‘and’ in this proviso should be read, as ‘or’ to bring out the real object of the Legislature. According to him, the object was that this proviso would be applicable either when a caveat is entered or when the application is registered as a suit.” “12. To us it seems that the argument of the learned Government Pleader is not in conformity with the well-known canons of construction of fiscal statutes … in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the Legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter...” 14. Applying these principles to the proviso under consideration, we shall not be justified in reading the word ‘and’ as ‘or’ as suggested by the learned Government Pleader. Applying these principles to the proviso under consideration, we shall not be justified in reading the word ‘and’ as ‘or’ as suggested by the learned Government Pleader. X. AS TO WHETHER THE CASE IN ANTHONY SWAMY vs. CHOWRAMMA STATES THE CORRECT POSITION OF LAW : The Division Bench of this Court in deciding ANTHONY SWAMY, supra, had no occasion to consider the provisions of Section 284(4) of the 1925 Act and therefore, the learned Single Judge referred the matter to a larger Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. A perusal of the said decision unmistakably shows that the Division Bench has not adverted to the provisions of Section 284. Had its attention been drawn to the said provision, arguably, its view would have been different. However, non-advertence to a provision of a statute renders it a decision sub-silentio. Even otherwise, the opinion expressed therein being inconsistent with what has been observed by us, the said decision is bereft of any precedential value and therefore, is overruled. For the reasons stated above, we answer the Reference as under : A proceeding instituted by filing of a petition u/s.270 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for the grant of probate or letters of administration, on being contested u/s.295, regardless of the caveat filed u/s.284, shall continue to be a ‘probate proceeding’ only, as distinguished from a civil suit, although it will be tried as nearly as may be in the procedure in which an ordinary civil suit is tried and that in the absence of any caveat filed under Section 284, the subject matter of such a petition need not be valued on ad valorem basis in terms of proviso to Article 11(l)(ii)(3) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. The Registry to place this order along with the File at the hands of the Roster Bench, for deciding the matter, in accordance with law.