JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The present Criminal Appeal is filed by the appellant-original accused under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 20.9.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, Patan in Special A.C.B. Case No. 20 of 2002, whereby, the learned Special Judge has convicted the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1 year and awarded fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, three months simple imprisonment and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 3 years for the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) r/w Sections 13(1)(d), 1, 2, 3 etc. of the Prevention of Corruption Act and awarded fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, three months simple imprisonment. Both the conviction and sentence run concurrently. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the Appeal are that, the accused was Talati-cum-Mantri at village Kanoda. The complainant Rameshkumar Mafatlal Patel lodged his complaint alleging that his uncle Amrutlal had expired and regarding his uncle’s land Varsai Entry is to be made in favour of his son Chandubhai Amrutlal. Therefore, Chandubhai told the accused to make necessary Varsai Entry in his favour and for that work the accused has demanded Rs. 200/- as illegal gratification. On 15/11/2000 when the complainant went to Panchayat Office, the accused told him to give the amount of Rs. 200/- for the work of his uncle’s son being done by him. Therefore, the complainant gave Rs. 100/- to the accused and further told him that he will pay the remaining amount of Rs. 100/- in a day or two. Thereafter, the complainant has given complaint being Exh.20 at A.C.B. Office, Mehsana on 16/11/2000 and a trap was arranged. 2.1 The two panchas were called. They were introduced inter se and thereafter, demonstration was carried-out on two currency notes of Re. 50/- each given by the complainant. The basic characteristic of the anthracene powder was also explained and thereafter, the first part of the Panchnama was drawn. The trap which was arranged on 16.11.2000 was failed due to unavailability of the accused. They were introduced inter se and thereafter, demonstration was carried-out on two currency notes of Re. 50/- each given by the complainant. The basic characteristic of the anthracene powder was also explained and thereafter, the first part of the Panchnama was drawn. The trap which was arranged on 16.11.2000 was failed due to unavailability of the accused. Therefore, on 17.11.2000 as the accused was found in the village, again the panchas were called and trap was arranged. The smeared currency notes which were retained in a packet, were again smeared with the anthracene powder. The demonstration was performed and the said currency notes were put in the pocket of the complainant. The third part of the Panchnama was drawn at the Police Station. The instructions were given to the complainant to go along with Panch-1 at the Gram Panchayat Office, Kanoda and to meet the accused and to talk with him about the Varsai Entry and when the accused demanded remaining amount of Rs. 100/- the smeared currency notes were to be given to the accused. Thereafter, it was found that the accused was not present in the Office and therefore, the said trap was failed. On the next day, the accused was seen in the village and therefore, the complainant and the Panch-1 went to the House of the Accused. At the house of the accused, the complainant introduced the Panch-1 as the partner of his nephew in a Tractor and told that new Tractor has been purchased and Rs. 15,000/- have been deposited in the Bank and for the remaining amount the loan has to be obtained. Therefore, some papers are required to be presented. The accused told that the papers would be ready within 15 days. Thereafter, the complainant told him that the amount of Rs. 100/- of previous work is to be paid and the complainant took out the smeared currency notes of Rs. 100/- and offered the same to the accused and the same were accepted by the complainant by his right hand. Thereafter, the complainant has given the signal and from the possession of the accused the smeared currency notes were seized. 3. On completion of the investigation and after receiving the sanction to prosecute the present appellant, the Investigating Officer has filed charge-sheet before the Special Court. Thereafter, the complainant has given the signal and from the possession of the accused the smeared currency notes were seized. 3. On completion of the investigation and after receiving the sanction to prosecute the present appellant, the Investigating Officer has filed charge-sheet before the Special Court. As the case is triable by the Special Court i.e. Sessions Court, Patan, the Sessions Court, Patan (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”) has framed charges at Exh.8 against present appellant. 4. In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined four witnesses and also produced documentary evidence before the Trial Court, which are as under: Oral evidences: 1. Patel Rameshbhai Mafatlal Complainant Exh.12 2. Thakor Somaji Savdhanji Panch-1 Exh.15 3. Chaudhari Ramjibhai Prabhudas Trap Officer Exh.19 4. Zala Lalubha Gopalsing I.O. Exh.27 Documentary evidences: 1. Complaint Exh.20 2. Trap Panchnama Exh.16 3. Seizure Memo Exh.22 4. Varsai Entry-four copies Exh.28 5. Sanction Order Exh.30 5. After examination of the witnesses in detail and after considering the documentary evidence and after hearing the arguments advanced by both the sides, the Trial Court has passed the impugned order of conviction convicting the appellant for the offences as mentioned hereinabove. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction dated 20.09.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, Patan in Special A.C.B. Case No. 20 of 2002, the appellant accused has filed the present appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 7. Heard Mr. K.B. Anandjiwala, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-accused and Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State of Gujarat. 8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its true and proper spirit and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court is erroneous and the findings recorded by the Trial Court is perverse. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further contended that the person from whom the appellant has alleged to have demanded the amount for passing and mutating the entry in the revenue record has not deposed but filed an affidavit in the Criminal Case and has stated on oath that there was no demand raised by the present appellant at all and the false case was filed by the complainant against present appellant. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the said aspect is not considered by the trial Court, while passing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and therefore, impugned judgment and order of conviction is against the settled principle of law and against the facts of the present case. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that as the appellant was serving in village Kanoda District Patan, however, in the present case prosecution has sought the sanction from the District Development Officer, Mehsana instead of Patan and therefore, the sanction against present appellant accorded by the authority has no power to accord the sanction for prosecution against present appellant and for that the trial is vitiated and the present appeal deserves to be allowed on that count, as the sanction is de-hors the settled legal principles and against the law. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted in view of the above facts impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence may be quashed and set aside and the appellant may be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 9. Mr. K.B. Anandjiwala, learned Senior Counsel has referred to and relied upon the following decisions: (1) Bharatkumar Jaimanishnker Mehta vs. State of Gujarat, 1982 (1) GLR 605 (2) M.R. Purushotham vs. State of Karnataka, 2015 (3) SCC 247 (3) N. Vijaykumar vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 (3) SCC 687 (4) Soundarajan vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police Vigilance Anticorruption Dindigul, 2023 (3) Supreme 636 (5) Jagtar Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2023 (2) Supreme 737 (6) Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2023 (2) Supreme 742 (7) State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police vs. S. Subbegowda, Criminal Appeal No. 1598 of 2023 10. On the other hand, Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned APP for the respondent State of Gujarat has opposed the appeal and submitted that the appellant was caught red handed by the Trapping Officer. She further submitted that the appellant is found with tainted currency notes and mark found on the figure tips of the present appellant. She submitted that the prosecution has rightly proved the case of illegal gratification against present appellant. She further submitted that the appellant is found with tainted currency notes and mark found on the figure tips of the present appellant. She submitted that the prosecution has rightly proved the case of illegal gratification against present appellant. She further submitted that the prosecution has proved the charge levelled against present appellant beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent material and evidence and therefore, the learned Trial Judge has rightly, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, passed the impugned order of conviction and sentence. She submitted that present appeal deserves to be dismissed and the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court deserves to be confirmed. 11. I have heard the learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties and gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence and I have gone through the depositions of the four witnesses recorded by the Trial Court. 12. As per the say of the complainant i.e. PW-1 his cousin brother namely Chandubhai, went to the office of the appellant, who was working at the relevant point of time as Talati-cum-Mantri of village Kanoda, for the purpose of mutation of the entry in the revenue record. It is further say of the complainant that the appellant has demanded illegal gratification from the Chandubhai and in turn the Chandubhai has informed the said fact to the PW-1 being a complainant and on receipt of the said fact from his cousin brother, he went to the office of the appellant and inquired about the amount demanded by the present appellant and then he went to the office of the A.C.B. Police Station, Mehsana and filed the impugned F.I.R. on 17.11.2000 before the A.C.B. Police Station, Mehsana. It is further say of the informant that the appellant has accepted Rs. 100/- prior in point of time and for remaining amount of Rs.100/ he has demanded from the said Chandubhai being a cousin brother of the informant. It is further say of the informant that the appellant has accepted Rs. 100/- prior in point of time and for remaining amount of Rs.100/ he has demanded from the said Chandubhai being a cousin brother of the informant. The prosecution has not examined said Chandubhai as a witness nor he has cited as witness in the charge-sheet and therefore, no correct facts brought to the notice of the Trial Court by the prosecution by not examining the concerned witness, who alleged to have went to the present appellant and met for the purpose of mutation of entry in the revenue record and has not substantiated the said with regard to the illegal gratification. However, the reason best known to the prosecution, the prosecution has not proved the said aspect with regard to the illegal gratification demanded by the present appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In fact from the bare perusal of the evidence of the PW-1 it appears that he has in his cross-examination has admitted the fact that there was no prior meeting with the present appellant by the informant and there was no demand raised by the present appellant from the informant with regard to illegal gratification. PW-1 has also admitted the fact that he went to the office of village panchayat for the purpose of payment of property tax and he met the appellant, as he has to pay property tax of Rs. 137.50 ps. He has further admitted in his cross-examination that out of 137.50 ps. the currency note of denomination of Rs. 100/- is deteriorated condition and therefore not accepted by the present appellant and therefore, he has asked the appellant that he will change the said currency notes and send somebody to the appellant. Therefore, the defence raised by the present appellant is substantiated from the say of the PW-1, however learned Trial Judge has not given the benefit in favour of the present appellant which is otherwise creates a serious doubt on the story put-forward by the prosecution with regard to the illegal gratification demanded by the present appellant. Even from the bare reading of the evidence of PW-1, there was no demand made by present appellant in uncertain terms, which is the preliminary requirement to prove the demand by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The said fact is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Even from the bare reading of the evidence of PW-1, there was no demand made by present appellant in uncertain terms, which is the preliminary requirement to prove the demand by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The said fact is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Even from the bare perusal of the reading of the oral evidence of the PW-1 complainant, the fact reveals that there was no demand in actual words made by the present appellant. 13. Even from the bare perusal of the oral evidence of PW-2, it appears that he has also further confirmed that as per prior understanding and the instruction given by the trapping officer, the informant has to ask the appellant with regard to the work of the mutation of the entry in the revenue record and for that he has to pay the said amount as illegal gratification, instead of that he has confirmed that the fact which is stated on oath is not part of panchnama and as per the understanding and instruction of the trapping officer, which goes to the rout of the matter and therefore, the evidence of PW-2 is shaken on this aspect and has not supported the case of the prosecution. Though, he is not declared hostile but his deposition is not impeachable and therefore, the impugned order passed by the Trial Judge, relying upon such evidence is erroneous and bad in law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. Even from the bare perusal and reading of the oral witness of PW-3 who is trapping officer, it is clearly established that there was no clear demand made by the present appellant. As it is prime and preliminary requirement to prove the charge against the appellant under Section 7 r/w Section 13(1)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is based on only conjectures and surmises and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14.1 It is also revealed from the oral evidence of the witnesses that though the appellant is working in Patan District, but the Investigating Officer has sought the sanction from the another district. In fact the sanctioning officer is not competent to accord the sanction for prosecuting the appellant accused for the offence under the Prevention and Corruption Act. 14.1 It is also revealed from the oral evidence of the witnesses that though the appellant is working in Patan District, but the Investigating Officer has sought the sanction from the another district. In fact the sanctioning officer is not competent to accord the sanction for prosecuting the appellant accused for the offence under the Prevention and Corruption Act. For that prosecution has not sufficiently established the said fact beyond reasonable doubt that how and under what manner they have sought the sanction from the District Development Officer, Mehsana against the present appellant and whether he is competent to grant the sanction against the present appellant. 15. The trapping officer, in his deposition, has categorically stated on oath that he has not instructed the informant-complainant that as and when the appellant raised the demand, on such amount he has to pay tainted currency notes, which is contrary to the deposition of the PW-2 who is panch witness and this contradiction is proved and established on record. Therefore, the prosecution has not properly established the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the appellant could have granted the benefit of such doubt as the demand was not property proved and established by the prosecution by leading the evidence and therefore, appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant deserves to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 16. In the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Neeraj Dutta (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that merely the amount was found from the possession of the accused, the charge under Section 7, 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not considered to be proved. If either of the ingredients are not satisfied, as enunciated by the Honb’le Apex Court in the catena of the decisions with regard to demand and acceptance. In such demand and acceptance are to be established and proved by leading cogent material evidence by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 17. At this Stage, it is appropriate to take into account the observations made by this Court and Hon’ble Apex Court in following decisions referred and relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. 18. In the decision in case of State of Karnataka (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “8. 17. At this Stage, it is appropriate to take into account the observations made by this Court and Hon’ble Apex Court in following decisions referred and relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. 18. In the decision in case of State of Karnataka (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “8. For the ready reference, the relevant part of Sub-Section (1), (3) and (4) of Section 19 are reproduced herein below: “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution: (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014): (a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government. (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2)....... (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974): (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under Sub-Section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under Sub-Section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation: For the purposes of this section: (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction. (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 9. Similar provision is contained in Section 465 of Cr.P.C. on whether finding or sentence is reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity. It reads as under: “465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity: 1. Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation of revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. 2. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” 10. 2. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” 10. Having regard to the afore-stated provisions contained in Section 19 of the said Act, there remains no shadow of doubt that the statute forbids taking of cognizance by the Court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of the Government/authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). It is also well settled proposition of law that the question with regard to the validity of such sanction should be raised at the earliest stage of the proceedings, however could be raised at the subsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e. at the stage of final arguments in the trial. Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to Sub-Section (3) and Sub-Section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. It is also significant to note that the competence of the court trying the accused also would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot be gainsaid that in case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law. 11. It cannot be gainsaid that in case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law. 11. The combined reading of Sub-Section (3) and (4) of Section 19 makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under Sub-Section (1), unless in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-Section (4) further postulates that in determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned, or resulted in failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. The explanation to Sub-Section (4) further provides that for the purpose of Section 19, error includes “competency of the authority to grant sanction.” Thus, it is clear from the language employed in Sub-Section (3) of Section 19 that the said Sub-Section has application to the proceedings before the Court in appeal, confirmation or revision, and not to the proceedings before the Special Judge. The said Sub-Section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, confirmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where the appellate or revisional court finds that the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity. 12. This Court in case of Nanjappa vs. State of Karnataka has very aptly dealt with the intricacies of Section 19(1) as also Section 19(3) and 19(4) of the said Act as to at what stage the question of validity of sanction accorded under Section 19(1) of the said Act could be raised, and what are the powers of the court in appeal, confirmation or revision under Sub-Section (3) of Section 19 of the said Act. “22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. “22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution. 23. Having said that there are two aspects which we must immediately advert to. The first relates to the effect of sub-section (3) to Section 19, which starts with a non-obstante clause. Also relevant to the same aspect would be Section 465 Cr.P.C. which we have extracted earlier. 23.1. It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable tenacity worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section 19(3), any error, omission or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution of an accused was of no consequence so long as there was no failure of justice resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that in terms of Explanation to Section 4 “error includes competence of the authority to grant sanction.” The argument is on the face of it attractive but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny. 23.2. It was contended that in terms of Explanation to Section 4 “error includes competence of the authority to grant sanction.” The argument is on the face of it attractive but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny. 23.2. A careful reading of Sub-Section (3) to Section 19 would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-Section (3), in other words, simply forbids interference with an order passed by the Special Judge in appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or revisional court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub-section (3) has no application to proceedings before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution of the accused had not been produced as required under Section 19(1). 23.3. Sub-Section (3), in our opinion, postulates a prohibition against a higher court reversing an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It does not forbid a Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage of the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for want of a valid order sanctioning the same. 23.4. The language employed in Sub-Section (3) is, in our opinion, clear and unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, sufficiently evident even from the language employed in subsection (4) according to which the appellate or the revisional court shall, while examining whether the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to say, that a conjoint reading of sub-sections 19(3) and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction or the validity of the proceedings including finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher court and not before the Special Judge trying the accused. 23.5. The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that if the trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence, the same should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or irregularity in the order sanctioning the prosecution under Section 19(1). Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional court would in such cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the objection touching the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.” 13. In State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others, this Court had an ocasion to deal with the various aspects contained in Section 465 of Cr.P.C. more particularly to deal with the expression “A failure of justice has in fact been occasioned” as contained therein. Since, the provisions contained in Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and in Section 465(1) of Cr.P.C. are pari materia, the observations made in the said decision would be relevant. “14. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the above contExt.It is extracted below: “465. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” 15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in any enquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences in criminal courts. Yet the legislature dis-favoured axing down the proceedings or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error, omission or irregularity has occasioned “a failure of justice” the superior court shall not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error, omission or irregularity. 16. What is meant by “a failure of justice” occasioned on account of such error, omission or irregularity? This Court has observed in Shamnsaheb M. Multtani vs. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 577 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 358 thus: (SCC p. 585, Para 23) “23. We often hear about ‘failure of justice’ and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an expression which could be fitted in any situation of a case. The expression ‘failure of justice’ would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon [the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. vs. Deptt. of the Environment, (1977) 1 All ER 813 : 1978 AC 359 : (1977) 2 WLR 450 (HL)]. The criminal court, particularly the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.” 18.1 In the decision in case of Neeraj Dutta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “LEGAL POSITION 8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect from 26th July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “7. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act - Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations: (a) “Expecting to be a public servant” - If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification.” - The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration” - The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing.” - A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (d) “A motive or reward for doing.” - A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” 9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “13.Criminal misconduct by a public servant: (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct: (a).......................... (b).......................... (c).......................... (d) if he: (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. (e)..........................” The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act. 10. The Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus: “74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’ or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (Emphasis added) The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (Emphasis added) The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under: In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.” (Emphasis added) 18.2 In the decision in case of Jagtar Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “9. The conclusions of the Constitution Bench judgment referred above, have been summarized in paragraph 74, which read thus: “74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event of complaint turns ‘hostile’ or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the presumption can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. (f) In the event of complaint turns ‘hostile’ or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the presumption can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (Emphasis added) 10. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under: In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.” (Emphasis added) 12.If the evidence produced on record by the prosecution is examined in the light of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (supra), the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally sustained.” 18.3 In the decision in case of Soundarajan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta has reiterated that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the accused and the acceptance thereof. 11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26th July 2018, is ‘gratification’. There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted by the accused. 12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both demand and acceptance are established, offence of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved. 15. Under Section 464 of Cr.P.C. omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In this case, from the perusal of the cross-examination of PW-3 and other prosecution witnesses made by the Advocate for the appellant, it is apparent that the appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made on 6th August 2004 and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance on 13th August 2004. In this case, from the perusal of the cross-examination of PW-3 and other prosecution witnesses made by the Advocate for the appellant, it is apparent that the appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made on 6th August 2004 and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance on 13th August 2004. There is no doubt that this is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective. However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned. Therefore, in this case, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal. 16. We find that, in this case, the charge has been framed very casually. The Trial Courts ought to be very meticulous when it comes to the framing of charges. In a given case, any such error or omission may lead to acquittal and/or a long delay in trial due to an order of remand which can be passed under sub-section (2) of Section 464 of Cr.P.C. Apart from the duty of the Trial Court, even the public prosecutor has a duty to be vigilant, and if a proper charge is not framed, it is his duty to apply to the Court to frame an appropriate charge.” 18.4 In the decision in case of N. Vijaykumar (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “9. In these appeals, it is to be noticed that PW-2 is the key witness, and was the complainant. He was working as a Supervisor in a Voluntary Service called NACSS which was awarded sanitation work on contract basis for Ward No. 8 of Madurai Municipal Corporation. The sanctioning authority, who sanctioned to prosecute the appellant was examined as PW-1 and the complainant Thiru D. Gopal was examined as PW-2. It is evident from the deposition of PW-2, 3, 5 and 11 that they reached the office of the accused at 05:30 p.m. on 10.10.2003, and at that point of time the accused was not found in the seat and they have waited for him, and appellant has come to the office at 05:45 p.m. on his bike and took his seat. PW-2, in his deposition has stated that when he met the appellant-accused along with other witnesses, Sri Shanmugavel and Sri Ravi Kumaran appellant has made a demand for Rs. 500/- and cell phone. He has stated that in view of such demand he has handed over the powder coated currency notes and cell phone which were received by the accused and kept in the left side drawer of the table. The official witness Thiru Shanmugavel is examined as PW-3. He also stated in his deposition, that when they reached the office of the accused, accused was not in the seat. Therefore, they have waited and accused arrived in the office at 05:45 p.m. PW-2 in his deposition has clearly stated that he met the accused earlier several times and again when he met on 09.10.2003 along with PW5, the appellant-accused has demanded for Rs. 500/- and a cell phone as illegal gratification. In the cross-examination PW2, has admitted that he never saw the accused earlier and the appellant has made a demand when he met firstly on 09.10.2003. It is also clearly deposed by PW2 in the cross-examination that he was ill treated by the accused several times earlier as he belonged to scheduled caste community. From his deposition it is clear that there were ill feelings between the appellant and the PW2. It is also clear from the evidence, after handing over currency and cell phone, he along with other witnesses who have accompanied him they came out of the office and signalled to the inspector. PW2 also admitted in the cross-examination that he was not having any details regarding the purchase of M.O.2 cell phone. It is also clear from the evidence that though the trap was at about 05:45 p.m. phenolphthalein test was conducted only at 07:00 p.m. There is absolutely no evidence to show that why such inordinate delay occurred from 05:45 p.m. to 07:00 p.m. The office of the Town Assistant Health Officer and other officials of the department is also near to the office of the appellant. PW-3 in clear terms, has deposed that only on demand of anticorruption officials, the accused had taken and produced the money and cell phone, which was in the drawer of the table. PW-3 in clear terms, has deposed that only on demand of anticorruption officials, the accused had taken and produced the money and cell phone, which was in the drawer of the table. The Circle Health Inspector of Madurai Corporation, who was examined as PW4 has deposed in the cross-examination that he had no idea what was going on before he reached the office and he has also deposed that he was not aware about Rs. 500/- and cell phone, by whom and when it was kept. He, too has deposed in the cross-examination that only on the direction of the inspector the appellant-accused has taken out the money and the cell phone. The deposition of Mr. Ravikumaran who was examined as PW-5 is also in similar lines. Another key witness on behalf of the prosecution is PW-11, i.e. the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bodinayakkanur Sub-Division, who was working as the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing, Madurai during the relevant time. He also in his deposition has clearly stated that the appellant-accused was tested with the prepared Sodium Carbonate Solution at 19:00 hrs. It is clear from the deposition of all the witnesses, i.e. PW-2, 3, 5 and 11 that trap was at about 05:45 p.m. and the hands of the appellant were tested only at 07:00 p.m. Further in the cross-examination, PW-11 has clearly stated that when they were monitoring the place of occurrence for about one hour and during that period many persons came in and out of the office of the appellant. Added to the same, admittedly, after completion of the phenolphthalein test, statement of the appellant was not recorded as required under Rule 47 Clause 1 of the Vigilance Manual. Further PW-11 also clearly deposed in the cross-examination that he did not test the hands of the appellant-accused immediately after payment and handing over of the money and cell phone. Further PW-4 and PW-11 both have stated in their evidence that, only when TLO has asked the bribe amount and cell phone, the accused produced the same by taking out from the left side drawer of his table. It is fairly well settled that mere recovery of tainted money, divorced from the circumstances under which such money and article is found is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. It is fairly well settled that mere recovery of tainted money, divorced from the circumstances under which such money and article is found is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. In view of the material contradictions as noticed above in the deposition of key witnesses, the benefit of doubt has to go to the accused-appellant. 10. Mainly it is contended by Sri Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view” having regard to evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378, Cr.P.C. no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in the case of Chandrappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons” “good and sufficient grounds” “very strong circumstances” “distorted conclusions” “glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” Further in the judgment in the case of Murugesan (supra) relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view” High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. The relevant paragraphs in this regard where meaning and implication of “possible view” distinguishing from “erroneous view” and “wrong view” is discussed are paragraphs 32 to 35 of the judgment, which read as under : “32. In the above facts can it be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view? If the answer is in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the acquittal of the appellant-accused, on the principles of law referred to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial court did not reflect a possible view. It must be emphasised that the inhibition to interfere must be perceived only in a situation where the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view. It must be emphasised that the inhibition to interfere must be perceived only in a situation where the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view. The use of the expression “possible view” is conscious and not without good reasons. The said expression is in contradistinction to expressions such as “erroneous view” or “wrong view” which, at first blush, may seem to convey a similar meaning though a fine and subtle difference would be clearly discernible. 33. The expressions “erroneous” “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: “erroneous wrong; incorrect wrong: (1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral. Possible: (1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved. (2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.” 34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court. 35. A consideration on the basis on which the learned trial court had founded its order of acquittal in the present case clearly reflects a possible view. There may, however, be disagreement on the correctness of the same. But that is not the test. 35. A consideration on the basis on which the learned trial court had founded its order of acquittal in the present case clearly reflects a possible view. There may, however, be disagreement on the correctness of the same. But that is not the test. So long as the view taken is not impossible to be arrived at and reasons therefor, relatable to the evidence and materials on record, are disclosed any further scrutiny in exercise of the power under Section 378 Cr.P.C. was not called for.” Further, in the case of Hakeem Khan and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 5 SCC 719 this Court has considered powers of appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of trial court cannot be interdicted and the High court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Paragraph 9 of the judgment reads as under: “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court’s judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court’s ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.” 11. By applying the above said principles and the evidence on record in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having regard to material contradictions which we have already noticed above and also as referred to in the trial court judgment, it can be said that acquittal is a “possible view.” By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is clear that when the Inspecting Officer and other witnesses who are examined on behalf of the prosecution, went to the office of the appellant-accused, appellant was not there in the office and office was open and people were moving out and in from the office of the appellant. It is also clear from the evidence of PW-3, 5 and 11 that the currency and cell phone were taken out from the drawer of the table by the appellant at their instance. It is also clear from the evidence of PW-3, 5 and 11 that the currency and cell phone were taken out from the drawer of the table by the appellant at their instance. There is also no reason, when the tainted notes and the cell phone were given to the appellant at 05:45 p.m. no recordings were made and the appellant was not tested by PW-11 till 07:00 p.m. There are material contradictions in the deposition of PW-2 and it is clear from his deposition that he has developed animosity against the appellant and he himself has stated in the cross-examination that he was insulted earlier as he belonged to scheduled caste. Further there is no answer from PW-11 to conduct the phenolphthalein test after about an hour from handing over tainted notes and cell phone. The trial court has disbelieved PW-2, 3 and 5 by recording several valid and cogent reasons, but the High Court, without appreciating evidence in proper perspective, has reversed the view taken by the trial court. Further, the High Court also has not recorded any finding whether the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view” or not, having regard to the evidence on record. Though the High Court was of the view that PW-2, 3 and 5 can be believed, unless it is held that the view taken by the trial court disbelieving the witnesses is not a possible view, the High Court ought not have interfered with the acquittal recorded by the trial court. In view of the material contradictions, the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant. 12. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779 and B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55 . In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. The relevant paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in the case of B. Jayaraj (supra) read as under: “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma vs. State of A.P. (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89 and C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1. 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.P11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext.P11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” The above said view taken by this Court, fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cell phone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.” 18.5 In the decision in case of M.R. Purushotham (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “6. In such type of cases the prosecution has to prove that there was a demand and there was acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. As already seen the complainant PW-1 Ramesh did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. No other evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove the demand made by the accused with the complainant. In this context the recent decision of a three Judge bench of this Court in B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 (4) Scale 81 is relevant and it is held as follows: “8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P11) before LW-9 and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive in so far as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.” The above decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. When PW-1 Ramesh himself had disowned what he has stated in his initial complaint in Exh.P1 before PW-4 Inspector Santosh Kumar and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-3 Kumaraswamy and the contents of Exh.P1 complaint cannot be relied upon to conclude that the said material furnishes proof of demand allegedly made by the accused. The High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside.” 18.6 In the decision in case of Bharatkumar Jaimanishanker Mehta (supra), this Court has observed as under: “2. In a case of Rabindra Kumar Dey vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 , it was observed as under: “(1) that the onus lies affirmatively on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and it cannot derive any benefit from weakness or falsity of the defence version while proving its case. (2) that in a criminal trial the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty. (3) that the onus of proof never shifts. (2) that in a criminal trial the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty. (3) that the onus of proof never shifts. It is true that under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the onus of proving exceptions mentioned in the Indian Penal Code lies on the accused, but this section does not at all indicate the nature and standard of proof required. The Evidence Act does not contemplate that the accused should prove his case with the same strictness and rigour as the prosecution is required to prove a criminal charge. In fact, from the cardinal principles referred to above, it follows that it is sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he succeeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution cannot, be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the mode of proof, by standard of benefit of doubt, is not applicable to the accused, where he is called upon to prove his case or to prove the exceptions of the Indian Penal Code on which he seeks to rely. It is sufficient for the defence to give a version which competes in probability with the prosecution version, for that would be sufficient to throw suspicion on the prosecution case entailing its rejection by the Court. This aspect of the matter is no longer res Integra but is concluded by several authorities of this Court.” Now if the defence evidence is considered in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court we may say that there are two officers giving one version which is quite contrary to the version of the complainant. The case of the defence was put to the first witness examined by the prosecution. 3. As we have observed earlier the complainant is an accomplice and his evidence required independent corroboration. The panch wanted to fall in line with the prosecution case and, therefore, if the defence version is probable it would be said safely that the prosecution did not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 3. As we have observed earlier the complainant is an accomplice and his evidence required independent corroboration. The panch wanted to fall in line with the prosecution case and, therefore, if the defence version is probable it would be said safely that the prosecution did not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the defence version put by the accused is probable and as the defence version is probable it throws great doubt and the result would be that the prosecution version cannot be accepted and if the prosecution version cannot be accepted it cannot be suggested that the prosecution proved its case.” 19. In view of the above decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and in view of the facts and circumstance of the case, in my opinion, the prosecution has failed to establish the case against present appellant with regard to the demand and therefore, the first ingredient is not satisfied in the present case and hence, benefit of doubt is required to be granted in favour of the present appellant and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is required to be quashed and set aside. 20. For the foregoing reasons the present appeal is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 20.9.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, Patan in Special A.C.B. Case No. 20 of 2002 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the charges leveled against him. The fine, if any, be refunded to the appellant forthwith. The bail and bail bond shall stand cancelled. Surety, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith. 21. Direct service is permitted.