JUDGMENT : Subrata Talukdar, J. 1. The short point in this appeal is whether the Appellants/State of West Bengal and the Respondent/the Writ Petitioners were bound by a contract requiring each of the parties to fulfil their respectful contractual obligations. The appellants/the State submit that the Memo dated 29th of April, 1977 bearing No. PW (MD)/4M-4/74/284 of the Public Works Department, Metropolitan Development Branch, Government of West Bengal issued by the Deputy Secretary to the writ petitioners does not create any binding obligation on the part of the State to lease out a plot of land in favour of the writ petitioner. 2. It would be now relevant for this discussion to quote the Memo dated 29th of April, 1977, which reads as follows:- “Government of West Bengal Public Morka Department Metropolitan Development Branch 18, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta - 1. No. PW (10)/44-4/24/304 Dated Calcutta the 29.4.1977. From: Shri B.K. Dutta Roy, W.D.C.5. Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. To: Shri Hoti Lal Hohta, C/o. Bally Jute Co. Ltd. (Mill No. 2) 102, Narkel danga Main Road, Calcutta-700051 Sir, I am directed to say that the Screening Committee in the last meeting considered your x application for a plot measuring 5 Cottahs and after due deliverations recommended your case for a plot of size stated above. 2. Price of 5 cottahs plot has since been revised to Rs.8,000/- per cottha excluding the extra cost locational advantages. Additional charges for locational advantages are noted on the separate sheet en....... 3. Your are hereby requested to inform this office if you are willing to take a lease of a plot measuring 5 cottahs at the price mentioned in para 2 above within 15 days from the date of issue of this letter together with an affidavit (speciman signed) sworn in before a 1st class Magistrate stating the rein separately the extent of vacant land and building in square meters held by you. Your wife or unmarried minor children jointly or severally in the Urban areas in India, if any, if nothing is heard from you within the said period, no further correspondence will be made and your case will be enclosed.” Additional Charge for locational advantage are : Type of plot Additional amount payable for locationwise adventages. Your wife or unmarried minor children jointly or severally in the Urban areas in India, if any, if nothing is heard from you within the said period, no further correspondence will be made and your case will be enclosed.” Additional Charge for locational advantage are : Type of plot Additional amount payable for locationwise adventages. (1) South-East Corner Plot Rs.1250/- per cottah Corner ii) South-West" Rs.1000 /- '' Plot (iii) North-East Rs.750/- '' (iv) North West" Rs.500/- " (1) Park facing/park near adjoining plots. Open Rs.750/- " (iii) Plot edjoining spaces Green verge. Rs.250/- " Road (1) Facing Type I Road facing 11. Facing Type II & Rs.750/- per cottah III Road, & Rs.500/- " " (iii) Facing Type IV & V Road Rs.250/- " " Facing (i) Eash, South East, Souths & South West Facing Rs.500/- per cottah Direction (ii) North East and North Facing plots. Rs. No. Extra enarge. (iii) West and North West facing plots. (-) Rs.250/- per cottah. Commercial- (i) For a 2 7 3 cottah Rs.500/- per cottah plot Shop allowable plots. (ii) For a 4 Cottah plot Rs.750/- per cottah (iii) For a 5 and 6 & 7 Cottah plot.” Rs.1000/- per cottah. 3. It is relevant to point out that attached to the said Memo were details of different types of plots namely, corner plot, road facing, plots allowing commercial usage etc. along with the additional amounts payable against the location-wise advantages of such plots. 4. The State further submits that having regard to the tenure and purport of the said Memo dated 29th of April, 1977, there was only a willingness on the part of the State to offer a plot to the writ petitioner. Such willingness cannot be interpreted to have been converted into a concluded contract. The State therefore is under no contractual obligation to grant the writ petitioner lease of a plot of land measuring 5 cottahs as stated in the said Memo dated 29th April, 1977 (supra). 5. In support of his submissions that the proposal of the State was never converted into a promise and consequently no concluded contract has come into place, the State relys upon the authority reported in (2017) 13 SCC 243 at Paragraphs 12 to 15. 6. 5. In support of his submissions that the proposal of the State was never converted into a promise and consequently no concluded contract has come into place, the State relys upon the authority reported in (2017) 13 SCC 243 at Paragraphs 12 to 15. 6. The State also places an alternative argument to the effect that even if it is arguably held that the said Memo dated 29th April, 1977 which was replied to by the writ petitioner on 6th May, 1977 created an agreement between the parties, such an agreement is not specifically enforceable because of the fact that the essential conditions of the said plot of land, i.e. its description and location, were yet to be finalised between the parties. The State submits that since there was no promise extended to the writ petitioner, no promissory estoppel applies against the State. Similarly, since no promise was extended by the State, the question of the writ petitioner changing his position pursuant to such promise also does not arise. 7. The State heavily relies on its discretion to extend its grant of land and/or any other form of largesse in terms of a rational policy by applying a number of factors such as good conscience and public trust. In support of its arguments, the State relies on the authorities reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 (at Paragraphs 11,12 and 21), (2005) 1 SCC 201 (at Paragraph 24), (2011) 5 SCC 29 (at Paragraphs 65, 66, 67), (2011) 6 SCC 125 (at Paragraphs 30, 43), (2012) 3 SCC 1 (at Paragraphs 75, 76, 78 to 85 & 89) and 2021 SCC Online Cal 2010 (at Paragraphs 24 to 29 & 37). 8. With regard to its stand that the principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation would not apply in the facts of this case, the State/appellants rely on (1995) 1 SCC 274 , (1995) 4 SCC 301 and (2002) 2 SCC 188 . 9. The State therefore submits that the Judgement impugned of the Hon’ble Single Bench dated 27th of September, 2002 be set aside. 10. Per contra, on behalf of the writ petitioner/the respondent to this appeal, it is contended that the said Memo dated 29th April, 1977 was replied to by the writ petitioner on 6th May, 1997. 9. The State therefore submits that the Judgement impugned of the Hon’ble Single Bench dated 27th of September, 2002 be set aside. 10. Per contra, on behalf of the writ petitioner/the respondent to this appeal, it is contended that the said Memo dated 29th April, 1977 was replied to by the writ petitioner on 6th May, 1997. The writ petitioner submits that as required by the said Memo dated 29th April, 1977 (supra), the writ petitioner affirmed an affidavit stating that neither himself nor his wife or unmarried children jointly or severally hold any immovable property to the extent of vacant land and building jointly or severally in any Urban Agglomeration in any part of India. 11. It would be now useful for this discussion to quote the letter dated 6th May, 1977 addressed by the writ petitioner to the Deputy Secretary, Public Works Department, Metropolitan Development Branch, Government of West Bengal (supra) with its attached affidavit. The said communication dated 6th May, 1977 reads as follows:- “Care Bally Jute Co. Ltd. (Mill No.2) 102, Harkeldanga Main Road, Calcutta - 7000511 6th May, 1977. HAND DELIVERY Shri B.K. Dutta Roy, W.B.C.S, Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Public Works Department, Metropolitan Development Branch, 18, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta - 700001 Dear sir, I am pleased to note from your letter No. 1149,48L (AL) dt. 29.4.77, that the Screening committee have recommended my case to allot a plot of 5 cottah in Sector 1 of the North Salt Lake City Extension Area. I further note that the price of 5 cottah plot has since been revised to Rs.8,000/- per cottah plus additional charges for locational advantages. Please note that I am willing to take a lease of plot measuring 5 Cottah at the above price provided the location of the plot is suitable to me. I hope that the plots being allotted by you are already developed. Please, therefore, let me know the details of the plot which are available with you for allotment. Please also arrange to send me a copy of your terms and conditions for payment and the lease. contd.. Meanwhile, as advised by you, I am sending herewith an Affidavit dt. 6.5.77 as per your specimen on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.5/- sworn in before Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta. Please acknowledge receipt. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/- (MOTI LAL MOHTA) Enclo: As above.” 12. contd.. Meanwhile, as advised by you, I am sending herewith an Affidavit dt. 6.5.77 as per your specimen on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.5/- sworn in before Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta. Please acknowledge receipt. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/- (MOTI LAL MOHTA) Enclo: As above.” 12. The writ petitioner therefore contends that with the affirmation of the affidavit (supra) and acceptance of the proposal to pay the lease hold price of a plot, the said letter dated 29th April, 1977 was acted upon thereby leading to binding contractual obligations between the parties. It is submitted that a similar issue arose in the Judgement reported in AIR 1980 Cal 320 wherein the Hon’ble Court was, inter alia, pleased to direct the State to demise the plot in issue in favour of the writ petitioner. 13. Further, relying on the authority reported in AIR 1997 CAL 214 and 1991) CLJ 647, it is submitted that similar directions were passed by the Hon’ble Court upon the State to execute and register the lease deed in favour of the lessee. Also referring to the authority reported in 2012) 1 CLJ 626, the writ petitioner submits that on a similar issue a plot of land was directed to be allotted by the Hon’ble Single Bench which, when challenged in appeal, the Hon’ble Division Bench was pleased to dismiss the appeal and affirm the order of the Hon’ble Single Bench. 14. On the point of legitimate expectation, it is submitted by relying on the authority of (2016) 11 SCC 31 , that the concept of legitimate expectation applies to the facts of this case since the status of the writ petitioner changed to a bona fide right with the issuance of the said letter dated 29th of April, 1977 (supra) by the State on the basis of the recommendation by the Screening Committee. It is asserted by the writ petitioner that thereafter the Writ Petitioner had taken steps and/or acted on the basis of the promise extended by the State’ Memo dated 29th April, 1977 and such fact stands recorded by the subsequent letter of the writ petitioner dated 6th May, 1977. 15. Having heard the parties and considering the materials placed, this Court must notice the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Another vs. BPL Mobile Cellular Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2008) 13 SCC 597 . 15. Having heard the parties and considering the materials placed, this Court must notice the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Another vs. BPL Mobile Cellular Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2008) 13 SCC 597 . S.B. Sinha, J. speaking for the Bench held at Paragraphs 47, 48, 49 and 50 as follows:- “47. Section 8 of the Contract Act reads as under: “8. Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration.—Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal.” It provides the acceptance of the proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance. It can be divided in two parts : (1) performance of the conditions of a proposal; and (2) acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal. The latter corresponds to general divisions of proposals into those which offer a promise in exchange for an act or acts and those which offer a promise for exchange for a promise. The bills were raised on the basis of the said premise. They were accepted. The promise on the part of the appellant was acted upon by the respondent. The appellants, thus, now should not ordinarily be permitted to take a different stand. This aspect of the matter was considered in Amrit Banspati Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ AIR 1966 All 104 ] wherein it was stated: “Section 8 of the Contract Act provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal is an acceptance of the proposal. The language of the section is rather vague but its meaning is clear. It is based on the principle that if an offer is made subject to a condition, the offeree cannot accept the benefit under the offer without accepting the condition. He cannot take the attitude, "I shall accept the benefit but reject the condition".” 48. In Union of India v. Rameshwarlall Bhagchand [ AIR 1973 Gau 111 ] it was stated : (AIR p. 112, para 6) “6. He cannot take the attitude, "I shall accept the benefit but reject the condition".” 48. In Union of India v. Rameshwarlall Bhagchand [ AIR 1973 Gau 111 ] it was stated : (AIR p. 112, para 6) “6. Section 8 provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal. According to Section 2(a) of the Contract Act when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal; and clause (b) of Section 2 states that when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal when accepted becomes a promise. Section 2(f) enacts that promises which form the consideration or part of the consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises.” It was furthermore observed : (AIR pp. 112-13, para 8) “8. Some English decisions were referred to with approval in Patna case [Union of India v. Jethabhai Jesinbhai Patel and Co., AIR 1960 Pat 30 ] relied upon by Shri Dam, I think that those cases have no bearing on and relevancy to Section 8 of the Act. It is mentioned on p. 59 of the Pollock and Mulla's Commentary on the Indian Contract Act, 8th Edn., that "nothing like the terms of Section 8 occurs in the original draft of the Indian Law Commissioners, nor so far as known to us, in any authoritative statement of English law" and that the terms of the section "appear to have been taken from the draft Civil Code of New York with slight verbal alteration". It follows from these excerpts that the English law has no provision parallel to Section 8 of the Act and as such recourse to English decisions for determining the scope of Section 8 may not be very apposite. Sections 7 to 9 of the Contract Act describe the various modes in which proposal may be accepted, and, if I may say so, Section 8 provides the acceptance of a proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance, such as verbal or written communication contemplated by Sections 7 and 9. Sections 7 to 9 of the Contract Act describe the various modes in which proposal may be accepted, and, if I may say so, Section 8 provides the acceptance of a proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance, such as verbal or written communication contemplated by Sections 7 and 9. Therefore, in a way Section 8 provides undoubtedly a unique provision in the Contract Act. It embraces a case to cite an instance, of a reward offered for the finder of a lost article. If a person restores the found article to the one who offered the reward, without accepting the latter's proposal in any other manner, the act or conduct or restoration itself is considered sufficient acceptance of the proposal to merit the reward. True that it is an ordinary rule of law that an acceptance of an offer made ought to be notified to the person who makes the offer. But since such notification is required for the benefit of the person making the offer the latter may dispense with notice to himself if he deems that course to be desirable. If the person making the offer to another intimates him expressly or impliedly a particular mode of acceptance the offeree can adopt that mode to conclude a binding bargain. If a man writes to another to send him certain goods, then the dispatch of goods would surely amount to acceptance of the offer.” 49. In LIC v. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Kamba [ (1984) 2 SCC 719 : AIR 1984 SC 1014 ] this Court on acceptance of provisions as envisaged under Sections 7 and 8 of the Contract Act, 1872 opined : (SCC p. 727, para 14) “14. … Acceptance must be signified by some act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law raises a presumption of acceptance.” 50. Chitty on Contracts at pp. 134-35 talks about the criteria where the agreement would not be held to be in reply to acts, further agreement is required. It was stated: “Even an agreement for sale of land dealing only with the barest essentials may be regarded as complete if that was the clear intention of the parties. Thus in Perry v. Suffields Ltd. [(1916-18) All ER Rep Ext 1325 : (1916) 2 Ch 187 (CA)] an offer to sell a public-house with vacant possession for £7000 was accepted without qualification. Thus in Perry v. Suffields Ltd. [(1916-18) All ER Rep Ext 1325 : (1916) 2 Ch 187 (CA)] an offer to sell a public-house with vacant possession for £7000 was accepted without qualification. It was held that there was a binding contract even though many important points, e.g. the date for completion and the question of paying a deposit, were left open. In another case a buyer and seller of corn feed pellets had reached agreement on the 'cardinal terms of the deal : product, price, quantity, period of shipment, range of loading ports and governing contract terms'. The agreement was held to have contractual force even though the parties had not yet reached agreement on a number of other important points, such as the loading port, the rate of loading and certain payments (other than the price) which might in certain events become payable under the contract. And a publisher's oral commitment to publish a book has been held to amount to a binding contract, even though no details were specified in the agreement and nothing more precise was said about the author's remuneration than that he was to be paid a royalty to be agreed, or in default of agreement a fair one. In all these cases, the courts took the view that the parties intended to be bound at once in spite of the fact that further significant terms were to be agreed later and that even their failure to reach such agreement would not invalidate the contract unless without such agreement it was unworkable or too uncertain to be enforced.” 16. Furthermore, at Paragraph 54 the Bench held as follows:- “54. It is not a case where the contract is sought to be terminated on the ground of a mistake. Only a higher rate is sought to be enforced on the basis of internal circulars.” 17. To the mind of this Court, the principles connected to performance by conduct as laid down In Re: BSNL (supra) apply also to the facts of this case. It is on record that the respondent/writ petitioner had acted in terms of the offer extended by the State vide the Memo dated 29th April, 1977. To the mind of this Court, the principles connected to performance by conduct as laid down In Re: BSNL (supra) apply also to the facts of this case. It is on record that the respondent/writ petitioner had acted in terms of the offer extended by the State vide the Memo dated 29th April, 1977. By preparing the Affidavit of Undertaking as also expressing its readiness to pay the price of the said plot per cottah as required by the letter dated 29th April, 1977 (supra), the respondent/writ petitioner had acted in fulfilment of the provisions of Section 8 of the Contract Act. In other words, the respondents/writ petitioner having acted upon the promise of the appellants, the appellants/the State cannot now ordinarily be permitted to take a different stand. 18. Further to the mind of this Court, the eligibility of the respondent/writ petitioner to apply for a plot has been vetted by the Screening Committee and the offer of the State vide the letter dated 29th April, 1977 is pursuant to the clearance obtained from the Screening Committee to make such offer to the respondent/writ petitioner. 19. In the above view of the matter, the appellant/the State cannot now hide behind technicalities by arguing that State largesse requires to be distributed in a rational manner. 20. For the above reasons, the order impugned of the Hon’ble Single Bench dated 27th September, 2002 does not require any interference. 21. APO/145/2019 with WPO/3836/1994 stand thus dismissed. 22. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of a server copy of this Judgement and Order placed on the official website of the Court. 23. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities. I agree. - Supratim Bhattacharya, J.