JUDGMENT : (Nikhil S. Kariel, J.) 1. Heard learned senor advocate Mr. Dhaval Dave appearing with learned advocate Mr. Virendra Gohil on behalf of the petitioner, learned advocate Mr. Vinay Bairagar appearing for learned advocate Ms. Himani Kini for respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 and learned senior advocate Mr. Asim Pandya appearing with learned advocate Mr. Prerak Oza on behalf of respondent nos. 4 to 9. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow this petition; (B) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue Writ of Certiorari or Writ in Nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the order dated 21/04/2023 passed in S.A.No.155 of 2020 by the Hon'ble Presiding Officer D.R.T.-II Ahmedabad,at Annexure-A to this petition in the interest of justice; (C) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue Writ of Mandamus or Writ in Nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction by directing the Respondent no.1 Bank to immediately execute and register Sale deed in favor of the petitioner in respect of property being Survey no. 24 P-3/P-2 Rajpar Road Morbi at Khanpar Taluka Morbi District Morbi admeasuring about 8094 sq.mtr. in the interest of justice; (D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of order dated 21/04/2023 passed in S.A.No.155 of 2020 by the Hon'ble Presiding Officer D.R.T.-II Ahmedabad at Annexure-A to this petition in the interest of justice; (E) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay further proceedings of IA no. 1370 of 2022 and SA No. 155 of 2020 in the interest of justice; (F) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Respondent no.1 Bank to refund the TDS amount of 1.00% of Sale Consideration amounting to Rs.1,56,410/- which is already deposited by the Petitioner. This amount was inadvertently paid to the Bank and which had remained to be deducted from the Sale Consideration at the same was otherwise fully paid being a sum of Rs.1,56,41,000/-. This amount was inadvertently paid to the Bank and which had remained to be deducted from the Sale Consideration at the same was otherwise fully paid being a sum of Rs.1,56,41,000/-. (G) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Respondents to award exemplary costs to the petitioner; (H) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may be considered fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 2.1. At this stage, it would be apposite to note that the petitioner, in addition to challenging an order dated 21.04.2023 passed in Securitisation Application No. 155 of 2020 by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, had also sought a prayer against the respondent no.1 – bank to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the present applicant. Such prayer being in the context of the submission that the applicant was the successful auction purchaser of a property belonging to the private respondents herein, of which, the possession had been taken of and auction had been conducted by the respondent bank under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Securitisation Act’). 2.2. It would appear that the respondent bank vide their reply dated 17.06.2023 have submitted that the registered sale deed of the auctioned property purchased by the petitioner has been executed and registered with the office of the Sub-Registrar, Morbi. Thus, it would appear that the said prayer would no longer be required to be considered. 3. At this stage, it requires to be observed that from a perusal of the prayers, since it would be evident that the present petition is in the nature of challenging an interim order passed by the learned DRT, the present petition could have been disposed of by directing the petitioner either to approach the statutory appellate forum against the said order or learned DRT could have been directed to decide the securitisation application as expeditiously as possible, yet, since it appears that the petitioner, having approached this Court by filing the present petition and having been granted at-interim relief, has misused the same and hence, the present petition would have to be dealt with appropriately, than as noted herein above. 4. 4. Insofar as the facts leading to filing of this petition, considering the prayers, the petition would revolve around a very limited set of facts which would be briefly narrated herein below. Furthermore, it is required to be mentioned that such an introduction to the facts is required more particularly in context of the petition as well as the submissions of the learned counsels which were both extensive but, completely unrequired and probably with a view to prejudice the Court. 4.1. As far as relevant facts are concerned, it would appear that the respondent bank had conducted auction of a property bearing property at Survey No.24P-3/P-2, situated at Rajpar Road, Khanpar, Taluka District Morbi. The said property admeasuring around 8094 sq.mtrs. was belonging to one M/s. Shrinathji Cotton and Oil Industries – respondent no.4 herein and whereas, the same had been mortgaged with the respondent no.1 bank for availing financial facilities. 4.2. Since the loan had not been repaid and the loan account had been declared as NPA, measures under the Securitisation Act had been initiated, resulting in possession of the property having been taken over and the same being sold by way of auction dated 23.02.2022. It would appear that the present petitioner being the highest bidder, for an amount of Rs. 1,56,41,000/- against reserved price of Rs. 1,30,41,000/- had received sale intimation and sale confirmation letter from the bank on the date of auction itself and whereas, the petitioner had deposited the sale amount as per the terms and conditions of the bank. 4.3. It would appear that, thereafter, the petitioner had requested the bank to complete the process of execution of sale deed and registration thereof and whereas it appears that later on, the auction process had been stalled on account of the order of status-quo being granted by the learned DRT. It would appear that in the meanwhile, the petitioner had approached this Court by preferring Special Civil Application No. 13531 of 2022 inter alia praying for a direction to the bank to issue sale certificate etc. It appears that certain interim orders had been passed by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court, more particularly, noticing certain discrepancies and whereas in the considered opinion of this Court, more particularly as stated herein above, since such orders may not have any bearing on the present issue, the same are not being dealt with here. It appears that certain interim orders had been passed by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court, more particularly, noticing certain discrepancies and whereas in the considered opinion of this Court, more particularly as stated herein above, since such orders may not have any bearing on the present issue, the same are not being dealt with here. Suffice it to state that ultimately, vide order dated 14.03.2023, a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court had disposed of the said petition being SCA No. 13531/2022 insofar as observing that since the sale certificate is issued in favour of the petitioner, the said grievance would not survive. Certain other observations and directions have been issued by the learned Coordinate Bench vide the said order and whereas, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same may not have any bearing as far as the present issue is concerned. 4.4. It would appear that after disposal of the writ petition, since the respondent bank did not take appropriate steps for registering the sale deed, an application had been preferred before the DRT inter alia for direction against the respondent bank. Certain other prayers had also been sought for more particularly as regards an earlier order of the learned Tribunal as well as seeking compensation from the officers of the bank and with regard to refund of TDS amount as prayed for being one of the prayers in the present petition etc. 4.5. It would appear that the main securitisation application preferred by respondent nos. 4 to 9 against the measures under the Securitisation Act taken by the bank had been listed on 21.04.2023 i.e. the day on which the order impugned was passed and (on the very date) the auction purchaser i.e. the petitioner was joined in the main securitisation application. An Interim Application No. 1370/2022 was also taken cognizance of and whereas, the present petitioner appears to have been given liberty to file reply to the said interim application which was as per the order itself qua the auction conducted on 23.02.2022 i.e. the auction in question. 4.6. It would further appear that upon a request made by the applicants therein i.e. the respondent nos. 4.6. It would further appear that upon a request made by the applicants therein i.e. the respondent nos. 4 to 9 herein, more particularly, informing the learned Tribunal that since the possession of the property was handed over to the auction purchaser and sale certificate had already been issued, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the auction purchaser may be directed not to further alienate the property in question. The said request had been opposed by the learned advocate for the petitioner submitting that the petitioner having paid the amount of consideration as per the auction, he could not be restrained from enjoying or alienating the property and whereas, statement of learned advocate that an application would be filed for seeking a direction against the respondent bank to execute the sale deed was also recorded. It appears that it is in the said context that the interim application, referred to herein above, was filed by the petitioner on the very day. 4.7. Be that as it may, the learned Tribunal had in the impugned order dated 21.04.2023 observed that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, more particularly in the interest of justice, the auction purchaser i.e. the petitioner herein was directed not to alienate the property till the next date of hearing. Most importantly it would appear that the learned Tribunal had kept the matter for hearing on Interim Application No. 1370/2022 as well as for final hearing on the 10.05.2023 i.e. approximately after a period of three weeks. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4.8. It would appear that a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide a detailed order dated 02.05.2023 had directed to issue notice upon the respondents and had also granted ad- interim relief in terms of paragraph no. 16(b) and 16(e). It would appear that later, vide order dated 03.05.2023, the learned Coordinate Bench had modified the order dated 02.05.2023 more particularly since on account of some inadvertence instead of granting interim relief in terms of prayer (d) and (e), it was mentioned as granting prayers (b) and (e) and whereas, the interim relief was modified to be read as granted in terms of paragraph nos. 16(d) and (e). 4.9. 16(d) and (e). 4.9. Prayer 16(d) was in the nature of staying implementation, execution and operation of the order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned DRT in SA No.155/2020 referred to herein above and prayer 16(e) was in the nature of staying further proceedings of IA No. 1370/2022 and SA No.155/2020. Thus, in addition to staying the impugned interim order, the entire proceedings of securitisation application had also been stayed. 5. The present petition had been extensively heard by this Court on 20.07.2023 and whereas since this Court was of the prima facie opinion that while appropriate directions could be issued to the learned DRT to finally dispose of the securitisation application, till such time the petitioner would not deal with the property in question. It would also be apposite to state that a prima facie consensus also appears to have been arrived at between the learned advocates as regards the same and whereas, the matter had been adjourned to 21.07.2023 more particularly for the purpose of learned senior advocate for the petitioner to take appropriate instructions from the petitioner in that regard. 5.1. On 21.07.2023, a shocking aspect had been brought to the notice of this Court inasmuch as it would appear that after the ad-interim relief had been granted by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.05.2023 as modified vide order dated 03.05.2023, the petitioner had mortgaged the property with the Bank of India. Since this Court was of the prima facie opinion that such alienating of the property was noting but an attempt to overreach the process of the Court, for which appropriate action requires to be taken against the petitioner and whereas, an opportunity was granted to the petitioner to intimate whether the petitioner would be inclined to restore the status-quo ante as prevailing prior to the date of mortgage. 5.2. It would appear that vide an additional affidavit dated 25.07.2023, the petitioner has informed the Court that the petitioner was the lawful purchaser for valuable consideration of the auctioned property. 5.2. It would appear that vide an additional affidavit dated 25.07.2023, the petitioner has informed the Court that the petitioner was the lawful purchaser for valuable consideration of the auctioned property. It is also intimated that while the sale deed had been executed after the ad-interim relief granted by this Court as referred to herein above and whereas the petitioner had after execution of the sale deed decided to avail a loan from the Bank of India to purchase plant and machinery and to meet the working capital for requirement to run the factory and whereas an application had been submitted to the Bank of India and the said bank having positively considered the same, the loan sought for had been granted and as a requirement of availment of loan, the property had been mortgaged in favour of Bank of India on 19.07.2023. Thus, the contention of the petitioner by way of the additional affidavit being that the petitioner had become owner of the property and whereas there is not a whisper about whether the petitioner would restore status-quo ante or why it would not be possible for the petitioner to do the same. 6. Be that as it may, this Court had heard the petition thereafter and whereas learned Counsel for the petitioner had called upon to explain why the present petition should be entertained in view of the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy and why appropriate directions under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be issued against the petitioner more particularly for having misused an interim order of this Court. 6.1. Learned senior advocate Mr. Dave on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the order impugned i.e. dated 21.04.2023 requires to be set aside by this Court more particularly since the same is an unreasoned order, passed without any specific application in that regard and passed without giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner. Learned senior advocate would further submit that since ad-interim relief granted by this Court dated 02.05.2023 and modified vide order dated 03.05.2023 staying order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned DRT whereby the petitioner was restrained from alienating the property, therefore, the petitioner was well within his rights to mortgage the property in question. Learned senior advocate would further submit that since ad-interim relief granted by this Court dated 02.05.2023 and modified vide order dated 03.05.2023 staying order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned DRT whereby the petitioner was restrained from alienating the property, therefore, the petitioner was well within his rights to mortgage the property in question. Learned senior advocate would submit that the proceedings under Securitisation Act initiated by the financial creditors would lose its efficacy if the auction under the Securitisation Act were interfered with by the Tribunal in such a summary manner. 6.2. Thus, learned senior advocate would submit that the petition may not be rejected on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy whereas no action requires to be taken against the petitioner more particularly since the petitioner was acting well within the law. 7. This petition is vehemently resisted by learned senior advocate Mr.Asim Pandya appearing with learned advocate Mr. Prerak Oza on behalf of the respondent – borrowers. 7.1. Learned senior advocate would submit that having regard to the provisions of the Securitisation Act, the present petition itself is not maintainable more particularly since the petitioner has an alternative, efficacious remedy against an order passed by the learned DRT. Learned senior advocate would further submit that as such, no error has been committed by the learned DRT since the securitisation application preferred by the applicant was questioning the measures taken by the bank under the Securitisation Act and whereas pending such an application, the respondent – auction purchaser was directed not to alienate the property since such alienation would result in third party rights being created which would unnecessarily lead to multiplicity of litigation. 7.2. Learned senior advocate would further submit that as such, the learned Tribunal had kept the securitisation application for final hearing on 10.05.2023 i.e. approximately three weeks after the date of the impugned order and whereas ideally the applicant ought to have participated in conducting of the final hearing which would have cleared the entire issue. 7.3. Insofar as the misuse of the ad-interim relief is concerned, learned senior advocate would submit that the same is a serious issue which requires appropriate interference by this Court. 7.3. Insofar as the misuse of the ad-interim relief is concerned, learned senior advocate would submit that the same is a serious issue which requires appropriate interference by this Court. Learned senior advocate would further submit that as it is, it would appear that except for this Court proposing a formula whereby the securitisation application could be directed to be heard within a specific period of time and till such time the auctioned property would not be alienated by the petitioner and whereas, the time had been sought for to take instructions on the said aspect and it was intimated to the Court that the property had been mortgaged in the interregnum, the petitioner did not of his own voluntarily intimate this Court about his actions. Learned senior advocate would submit that the present was the exact situation which was attempted to be prevented by the interim order dated 21.04.2023 impugned in the present petition. 7.4. Learned senior advocate would submit that the aspect of whether the measures taken by the bank under the Securitisation Act were legal or not, is now pending consideration of the learned Tribunal in the securitisation application preferred by the respondents. It is submitted that in a situation where the submissions made by the borrowers find favour with the learned Tribunal, the measures taken could be set aside by the learned DRT including the auction and whereas at such time, the question would be as to the status of the Bank of India from whom the petitioner has availed of a loan mortgaging the very property. Learned senior advocate would submit that while in such a scenario, if the petitioner was to repay the amount of mortgage, then it would not be a difficult situation, but, considering the hastiness with which the loan had been obtained during the tenure of the ad-interim relief, if the petitioner defaults in the said loan, then the borrowers would have to continue litigating with the Bank of India for the property in question. 7.5. Learned senior advocate would further submit that insofar as the ad-interim relief is concerned, the same is always subject to further orders or the final order that may be passed by the Court concerned. 7.5. Learned senior advocate would further submit that insofar as the ad-interim relief is concerned, the same is always subject to further orders or the final order that may be passed by the Court concerned. Learned senior advocate would submit that an ad-interim relief could not be construed as a final relief and the parties ought not to change their positions on the basis of ad-interim relief. Learned senior advocate would further submit that staying of the order of the learned DRT granting status-quo by itself ipso facto would not entitle the petitioner to have alienated the said property. 7.6. Learned senior advocate would submit that such an action on the part of the petitioner of alienating the property more particularly without even either taking permission or intimating to this Court about the same, is nothing but an action on the part of the petitioner of overreaching the process of the Court more particularly without any adjudication on merits. 7.7. Learned senior advocate would submit that the reference to the earlier proceedings in the petition and in the oral submissions have no relevance to the present facts more particularly since the present proceedings and such reference appears to be with a view to prejudice the Court. 7.8. Thus submitting, learned senior advocate would request this Court to reject the present petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy and further would request that this Court may direct the petitioner to restore status-quo ante, failing which, appropriate proceedings may be directed to be initiated against the petitioner. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Vinay Bairagar appearing for learned advocate Ms. Himani Kini for the respondent bank would submit that while numerous allegations have been leveled against the bank by the petitioner, the bank has acted strictly in accordance with law. It is submitted that insofar as the reference to the earlier writ petition is concerned, the same may not be of any consequence in the present scenario. Learned advocate would also submit that as far as the aspect of execution and registration of sale deed is concerned, the petitioner had taken a slot for registration on 08.04.2023 unilaterally without any coordination with the officers of the bank more particularly the said date being a non-working Saturday and whereas on the very next slot i.e. on 12.05.2023 the sale deed had been executed by the bank in favour of the petitioner. 8.1. 8.1. Learned advocate would further submit that as far as the bank is concerned, the prayer against the bank being satisfied, therefore, no further submissions are required to be made on behalf of the respondent bank. 9. Heard learned counsels for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. 9.1. At the outset, since the question has been raised about entertainability of the petition on the ground of alternative remedy, this Court deems it appropriate to address the same. As per the scheme of the Securitisation Act, the financial creditor i.e. the secured creditor who has given money as loan to borrower, is empowered to take steps / measures under the Act in case of default by the borrower. The measures which could be taken by the secured creditor is stated at Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act which includes taking over possession and assignment or sale of the secured asset. Section 17 entitles any person including the borrower to question the measures under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act before the jurisdictional DRT within a specified time period. Section 18 entitles any person aggrieved by any order made by the learned DRT under Section 17 to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within a particular period of time. The right to prefer an appeal is circumscribed by requirement to prefer the same within a period of 30 days and also by requiring the appellant to make pre-deposit as per the Act itself. Thus, as far as an order passed by the learned DRT is concerned, the same could be challenged by the petitioner under Section 18 before the learned Appellate Tribunal. Thus, it would appear that the petitioner has an alternative remedy in form of an appeal to a statutory appellate authority against the order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal. 9.2. Insofar as entertaining a petition inspite of availability of an alternative remedy, while a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable inspite of availability of alternative remedy, yet, whether the same is required to be entertained, would be subject to exceptions to the self-imposed restraint of not entertaining petitions on face of availability of alternative remedy. The exceptions to the rule being well recognized that is where the writ petition is preferred for enforcement of any fundamental right, where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, where the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of a legislation is challenged. As far as the exceptions referred to herein above, the only submission which could be corelatable to the exceptions was the submission with regard to the petitioner not having been afforded adequate opportunity by the Tribunal before passing of the order in question. 9.3. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said submission could not be countenanced either on facts or on law. A perusal of the order dated 21.04.2023 itself reveals that against request made by the learned counsel appearing for the borrowers, learned Tribunal had heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and whereas, it is only thereafter that the learned Tribunal had passed the interim order. Thus, while it appears that the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner had been heard, it also appears that adequate reasons had also been provided by the learned DRT. Again, what would be relevant to note is that the main application had been listed for further consideration after three weeks and whereas, the order being an interim order, it was always open for the petitioner to have requested the learned DRT to have modified or revoked the said order. Under such circumstances, it would not appear that the order had been passed in violation of principles of natural justice which would enable the petition to be entertained by this Court inspite of existence of an alternative remedy. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the present petition is required to be disposed of as not being entertained since the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy and whereas, there is nothing submitted to this Court whereby the order impugned would fall in any of the exceptions to the self imposed restraint in face of availability of alternative remedy. 9.4. 9.4. The above observations of this Court are following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court most recently explained in case of South Indian Bank Limited vs. Naveen Mathew Philip, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court had inter alia reiterated the principles with regard to entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inspite of availability of an alternative remedy and also considering the said proposition from the view point of the SARFAESI Act, more particularly reiterating the law laid down with regard to not interfering in SARFAESI matters by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself. 10. Having stated that the present petition would not be entertained by this Court, the next question which requires consideration is whether this Court requires to take any action against the petitioner and whereas how would this Court balance the equities more particularly in view of the borrower having created a mortgage on the property by prima facie misusing an ad-interim order of this Court. 10.1. At this stage, before discussing on this issue any further, this Court seeks to rely upon observation of a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Sujal Leasing and Finance Limited vs. Pathal Ganga Tube Well [Appeal from Order No. 503/1997; Dt. 10.02.1998], referred to by both, learned senior advocate for the petitioner as well as learned senior advocate for the borrowers. Paragraph no.5 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced herein below for benefit:- “5. The chain of events that has taken place as disclosed in the Order under appeal leaves no room for any other conclusion then that the appellant-Defendant has acted in a manner to over reach the decision of the Court in the matter subjudice before it and to infractuate whole proceedings by his own act. It is not a case where defendant has exercised his right under the Contract, before filing of the suit nor it is a case where he has exercised such right before notice of application has been served upon him. It is not a case where defendant has exercised his right under the Contract, before filing of the suit nor it is a case where he has exercised such right before notice of application has been served upon him. The fact that law does not favour ad-interim ex-parte order and requires that orders are made in the presence of the parties does implicitly call restraint from the parties after they are apprised of respective case and the materials, inviting attention of the Court on application for interim relief to desist from indulging into any such activities which results into proceedings getting infructuous and erodes the confidence of the people in the basic efficacy of the Institution of Court as an effective tool of administration of justice.” 10.2. From the observations of the learned Coordinate Bench, it would be apparent that even grant of an interim relief implicitly calls for restraint from parties not to indulge in any activities which would amount to overreach the decision of the Court and which would also amount to infructuate the proceedings and thereby eroding the confidence of the people in the efficacy of the institutions of the Court. 10.3. This Court also seeks to place reliance on the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of M/s. Style (Dress Land) vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Another, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 89 . Paragraph No. 15 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose is quoted herein below for benefit:- “15. Regarding awarding of the interest by the High Court for the period of stay it is argued that as in Sahib Singh's case no such direction was issued, the appellants could not be burdened with the liability of paying the interest and that at the rate of 18% per annum was excessive and exorbitant. It is settled principle of law that as and when a party applies and obtains a stay from the Court of law, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. Mere passing of an order of stay cannot be presumed to be the conferment of any additional right upon the litigating party. This Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Assn. Mere passing of an order of stay cannot be presumed to be the conferment of any additional right upon the litigating party. This Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Assn. [ 1992(3) SCC 1 ] held that the said portion of order by the court mean only that such order would not be operative from the date of its passing. The order would not mean that the order stayed had been wiped out from existence. The order of stay granted pending disposal of a case comes to an end with the dismissal of substantive proceeding and it is the duty of the Court in such cases to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the Court. Again in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. & Ors. Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. [ 1997 (5) SCC 772 ] the Court held that the grant of stay had not the effect of relieving the litigants of their obligation to pay late payment with interest on the amount withheld by them when the writ petition was dismissed ultimately. Holding otherwise would be against public policy and the interests of justice. In case law Kashyap Zip Industries vs. Union of India [ 1993 (64) ELT 161 ], interest was awarded to Revenue for the duration of stay under court's order, since the petitioners therein were found to have the benefit of keeping back the payment of duty under orders of the Court.” [Emphasis by this Court] 10.4. From the above observation, it would be abundantly clear that grant of a stay could not in any manner be construed to mean that the original order impugned has been wiped out from existence. That grant of interim relief is always at the risk and responsibility of the parties aplying to the same. 11. Corelatating the above observations with the facts of this case, it would appear that while the order of the learned DRT impugned dated 21.04.2023 had been stayed, it could not be presumed that such order dated 21.04.2023 was no longer in existence and whereas, the petitioner was not free to alienate the property in a manner in which he chooses. 11.1. 11.1. At this stage, it would also be apposite to refer to the scheme of the Securitisation Act more particularly Section 17(3) of the Act which inter alia empowers the learned DRT to set aside any of the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) upon coming to a conclusion that the same was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Learned DRT is also empowered to direct restoration of possession and to further declare any measures taken by the secured creditor as invalid and to pass such other direction as considered appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the Act. In the considered opinion of this Court, Section 17(3) empowers the learned DRT to undo any actions which has been taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) including the proceeding of auctioning a property. It would thus appear that while the respondent nos. 4 to 9 i.e. the borrowers had challenged the measures under the Securitisation Act taken by the respondent no.1 bank before the learned DRT and whereas during the pendency of such securitisation application, the bank had conducted auction of the property where the petitioner was the successful purchaser and whereas all such proceedings would be subject to the final outcome of the securitisation application preferred by the borrower. 11.2. Now, taking into consideration the extent of power under Section 17(3) of the Securitisation Act and also considering the fact that the securitisation application preferred by the borrower under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act challenging the measures under Section 13(4) taken by the respondent no.1 bank was pending consideration of the learned Tribunal, therefore, it would appear that the petitioner as auction purchaser would be entitled to the ownership rights over the property in question yet, the same would be subject to the final outcome of the securitisation application preferred by the borrower. It would also be apposite to observe here that having regard to the scheme of the Securitisation Act, more particularly, having regard to the extent of power available under Section 17(3) of the Act, the auction purchaser would be deemed to be aware about the legal position that any auction under such Act would be subject to final outcome of a litigation initiated by the borrower challenging the action of the secured creditor including the action of auctioning the property. 11.3. In the considered opinion of this Court, in an auction under the Securitisation Act, the auction purchaser is not entitled to claim an absolute right till the proceedings questioning the measures taken by the bank are pending consideration of the competent forum. Furthermore, having regard to the scheme of the Act, even after the sale certificate being issued in favour of the auction purchaser and the sale deed has been registered in favour of the auction purchaser, the same would be subject to the final decision to challenge against the measures under the Securitisation Act and whereas, in case the auction purchaser deals with the property in question, the same would be subject to the final orders passed by the competent forum in a challenge as stated herein above. 11.4. At this stage, this Court in this regard seeks to refer to the observations of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Punjab National Bank vs. M/s. Mithilanchal Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Others [Letters Patent Appeal No. 159-160/2020, Dt. 17.08.2020]. Paragraph nos. 33 and 34 being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced herein below for benefit:- “33. At first we proceed to deal with the scheme as envisaged in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Under subsection (1) of Section 17 any person aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor can prefer an appeal (application) to the Debts Recovery Tribunal within 45 days from the date on which such measures had been taken. Under subsection (2) of Section 17, the Tribunal is bound to consider whether any of the measures referred to under sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditors are in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under subsection (2) of Section 17, the Tribunal is bound to consider whether any of the measures referred to under sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditors are in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under subsection (3) of Section 17, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case, and evidence produced by the parties, if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules, and require restoration of the management of the business or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may declare such action as invalid and restore possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the business to the borrower, as the case may be. As a necessary corollary, sub-section (4) of Section 17 provides that if the Tribunal declares that the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub- section (4) of Section 13 was in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of Section 13 to recover his secured debt. 34. On a plain reading of Section 17, it is seen that the Tribunal has wide powers to restore possession in favour of the borrower, if such action taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 is declared invalid. Even where the property is sold or dealt with, pending hearing of the application under Section 17, the Tribunal is not rendered powerless to restore possession in favour of the borrower, if such action taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 is declared invalid. In such an eventuality, sub-section (3) of Section 17 gives ample powers to the Tribunal to direct restoration of the possession or restoration of management, as the case may be or to pass such other order, as it may consider proper and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13.” 11.5. A perusal of the law laid down by this Court makes it abundantly clear that Section 17 confers wide power on the Tribunal to ensure that if in a challenge by the borrower against any action taken under Section 13(4) is declared invalid, then the Tribunal is empowered to direct restoration of possession or restoration of management or pass any order as it may consider proper and necessary in such relation. The Hon’ble Division Bench has also observed that even if the property is sold or dealt with pending hearing of the application under Section 17, then the Tribunal is not rendered powerless. 11.6. At this stage, this Court clarifies that having come to a conclusion that the petition does not require to be entertained, yet, the above observations more particularly with regard to the power available with the learned Tribunal under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act has been discussed, more particularly in connection with the submission made by learned senior advocate for the petitioner that having given valuable consideration for the property which the petitioner had purchased in auction, the petitioner was the lawful purchaser and could deal with the property. 12. Insofar as the aspect with regard to overreaching the process of the Court, it would appear that the decision to deal with the property was a deliberate decision, not influenced by factors which were beyond the control of the petitioner. A perusal of the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner reveals that after the sale had been registered in favour of the petitioner, more particularly after the ad-interim relief had been granted by this Court vide order dated 02.05.2023 modified vide order dated 03.05.2023, the petitioner had decided to put the property to use. The petitioner therefore had decided to avail loan from the Bank of India to purchase plant and machinery and also to meet the working capital required to run the factory. For such purpose, the loan had been applied and whereas upon the loan being sanctioned, mortgage had been created in favour of the Bank of India on 19.07.2023 by deposit of title deeds with the Bank. 12.1. The above narration clearly indicates that the petitioner was not hard pressed in the sense that he had availed of some loan to purchase the property through auction and for repayment of the said loan, the petitioner had mortgaged the subject property with the Bank. 12.1. The above narration clearly indicates that the petitioner was not hard pressed in the sense that he had availed of some loan to purchase the property through auction and for repayment of the said loan, the petitioner had mortgaged the subject property with the Bank. The sequence of events clearly show that after ad-interim relief had been granted vide orders dated 02.05.2023 and 03.05.2023 and upon a registered sale deed being entered into, the petitioner had decided to put the property to beneficial use. While in normal circumstances no fault could have been found with the petitioner, yet, an extraordinary circumstance prevailed in the instance case in as much as in the present petition whereby the validity of the order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned DRT was pending final adjudication. While, the said order was stayed by this Court vide orders dated 02.05.2023 and 03.05.2023, the same could not be construed as giving a blanket permission to the petitioner to deal with the property in any manner he desired. 12.2. In the considered opinion of this Court, grant of ad-interim relief implicitly envisages that the person who is beneficiary of the ad-interim relief would not take any precepitative action so as to either; i. change the position of the subject matter in issue to the detriment of the respondents, ii. would not take any steps to overreach the judicial process, or iii. in case the petitioner desire to take any steps which might have the tendency as no.(i) or (ii) herein above, then as a prudent person who has taken recourse to the legal process, the petitioner would also be required to move an appropriate application before the Court concerned for permission to take any such steps. 12.3. The petitioner having not taken any steps as above and not even having informed his learned senior advocate about the intention of the petitioner to deal with the property, clearly reflects the intent of the present petitioner to overreach the process of law. 12.4. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that the petitioner had preferred an affidavit-in-rejoinder which had been affirmed by the petitioner on 18.07.2023. The said affidavit also does not appear to even passingly mention that the petitioner intend to deal with the subject property during the pendency of the present petition. 12.4. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that the petitioner had preferred an affidavit-in-rejoinder which had been affirmed by the petitioner on 18.07.2023. The said affidavit also does not appear to even passingly mention that the petitioner intend to deal with the subject property during the pendency of the present petition. It would also require to be mentioned here that while the petitioner had preferred additional affidavit on 25.07.2023, more particularly whereby the details of the loan availed from the Bank of India and the mortgage created with the Bank of India on 19.07.2023 is mentioned, yet, there are no documents as regards the loan in question annexed with the affidavit showing that on the date before a substantial hearing has taken place before this Court on 20.07.2023 i.e. on 19.07.2023, the property had been mortgaged with the Bank of India. 13. All the above aspects lead to an inescapable conclusion that the petitioner having been the successful bidder in the auction wanted to deal with the property to the detriment of the present petition as well as to the detriment of the securitisation application preferred by the borrowers before the learned DRT. It could also be observed that the petitioner had alienated the property, more particularly, to overreach the process of this Court initiated by the petitioner himself vide the present petition. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that appropriate action requires to be taken against the petitioner and whereas, the petitioner also is required to be directed to restore status-quo ante prevailing before the date of the ad-interim order i.e. 02.05.2023 and 03.05.2023. 14. At this stage, this Court also seeks to rely upon the observation of the Full Bench of the High Court of Patna in case of The King vs. Parmanand and Others, reported in AIR 1949 PAT 222. Observation of the High Court at paragraph no.23, which reads as ‘it is a cardinal principle that when a matter is pending for decision before a Court of justice nothing should be done which might disturb the free course of justice and this Court will discountenance any attempt on the part of any executive official, however, high he may be, to prejudice the merits of a case and to usurp the functions of the Court which has got seisin of the case.’ are relied upon by this Court. [Emphasis by this Court] 14.1. In the instant case, it would appear that the decision on the part of the petitioner to avail loan mortgaging the property by taking disadvantage of ad-interim relief granted by this Court even when the matter was pending before this Court, was a clear attempt to disturb the free course of justice and the same would not be countenanced. 14.2. Furthermore, since this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has overreached the due process of law and has misused the interim order of this Court, hence, the petitioner is required to be saddled with appropriate costs. 15. In view of the above discussion, observations and conclusions, the following directions are passed by this Court:- (i) The present petition is rejected as not entertained, more particularly, in view of the alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 18 of the Securitisation Act to approach the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal against the impugned order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned DRT. (ii) Considering that the learned Tribunal had kept the matter for final hearing, it would also be open for the petitioner to, in the alternative to the above, request the learned DRT to dispose of the application at the earliest and whereas, in case such application is received, the learned Tribunal shall endeavor to decide the main securitisation application within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of such application. (iii) The petitioner is directed to restore the status-quo ante as regards the subject auctioned property prevailing prior to the orders dated 02.05.2023 and 03.05.2023 within a period of four weeks from today. (iv) In case the petitioner does not comply with the above direction i.e. direction no.(iii), then it would be open for the respondents including private respondents to take appropriate steps in accordance with law including taking steps under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1982. (v) It is clarified that the learned DRT and the learned DRAT as the case may be, shall hear the petitioner on the question of finally deciding the securitisation application or challenge to order dated 21.04.2023 by the learned DRAT only after the petitioner submits compliance of direction no.(iii) as above. (vi) The petitioner is also directed to deposit cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) to be payable to the Gujarat High Court Legal Services Authority. (vi) The petitioner is also directed to deposit cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) to be payable to the Gujarat High Court Legal Services Authority. The same shall be done within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.