JUDGMENT : 1. Instant leave to appeal is preferred aggrieved from order dated 17.08.2019 in criminal complaint case no. 499/2011 passed by Special Metropolitan Magistrate (NI act cases) no. 10 Jaipur Metropolitan, whereby learned trial court has not only stopped the proceedings but closed the proceedings respondent accused. 2. The fact of the matter is that a criminal complaint under section 138 NI act was filed on 22.12.2011 after dishonor of cheque issued by respondent in favour of complainant amounting to Rs.25 lakhs. After summoning and recording of plea, evidence of complainant was concluded on 04.07.2014. Thereafter when the matter was fixed for examination of respondent accused under section 313 Cr.P.C., application under section 91 Cr.P.C. was filed by accused. Since, the matter was fixed for compromise/argument on application but finally on 26.10.2018 learned trial court had passed an order whereby application dated 05.10.2018 and 25.09.2018 were disposed of, but before it on 16.04.2018 while taking receipts on record time was granted to accused upto 17.09.2018 for remaining payment. Learned trial court on 26.10.2018 had observed that parties have settled the dispute for an amount of Rs. 19 lakhs and out of which evidence of payment of Rs. 17.15 lakhs is available on record and remaining amount Rs. 1.85 lakhs is due to be paid by accused and for making payment of same, demand draft dated 04.10.2018 is submitted on record. Thereafter, a detailed order on 08.01.2019 was passed and at the end of the day the matter was closed on 17.08.2019. Hence, this leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. 3. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that appellant is an illiterate and rustic villager having no understanding of law and was forced to mark his thumb impression on order sheets whenever he was present before the trial court despite the fact that proceedings were not written in his presence. He further submitted that the record of trial court clearly indicated that a huge sum of money was said to be paid in cash to complainant through counsel and the receipts which were produced on record clearly indicated that these receipts were signed by the counsel of complainant. He further submitted that none of these receipts bear the thumb impression of complainant to ensure acknowledgment of payment, thus, making them doubtful. He further submitted that none of these receipts bear the thumb impression of complainant to ensure acknowledgment of payment, thus, making them doubtful. He further submitted that no such amount as indicated in these receipts were ever paid to complainant but learned trial court without recording the satisfaction and verification for compromise as provided under section 320 Cr.P.C., had proceeded to close the proceedings. He further submitted that herein learned trial court had referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Meters and Instruments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kanchan Mehta reported in (2018) 1 SCC 560 to close the proceedings against respondent accused but learned trial court had failed to appreciate the fact that proceedings under section 138 NI act is instituted at the behest of complainant and if complainant is not satisfied and has raised doubt over receipt of payment, then, the matter is required to be considered and decided on merits. He further submitted that the entire facts and circumstances of the case clearly indicate that a poor and uneducated complainant was cheated by his own advocate by intermingling with other party as complainant had never received any payment under the transaction for which receipts were signed by his counsel. He further submitted that the process adopted by learned trial court clearly indicate that the proceedings were not conducted in line with established procedure and practice under the law. He further submitted that no compromise can be recorded unless parties have agreed for and consented for the same. He further submitted that this is a case of cheating, fraud and also of breach of trust. Therefore, while referring the record and order-sheets of learned trial court, he submitted that the proceedings and order passed by the court below are illegal and perverse, therefore, liable to be set aside. 4. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondent accused on the ground that after the compromise between the parties, payments were made to son of complainant who is a policeman but due to his service, he didn’t signed the receipts. He further submitted that had it been the case of misuse of office by any lawyer appointed by complainant, then the matter has to be agitated before learned trial court but trial court had dismissed the application under section 340 of Cr.P.C. by the very same order. He further submitted that had it been the case of misuse of office by any lawyer appointed by complainant, then the matter has to be agitated before learned trial court but trial court had dismissed the application under section 340 of Cr.P.C. by the very same order. He further submitted that under the compromise, the entire money was paid in piecemeal and at no point of time it had exceeded the limit of cash transaction as prescribed under any of the provision of law. He further submitted that mere recording of payment of particular amount means that by the time said amount was paid in installments. He further submitted that complainant is fully aware of the fact that his son had received the entire amount in cash and thus the dispute is between complainant and his son but unnecessarily this proceeding is launched by complainant just to harass the respondent, therefore, the order of learned trial court in closing the proceedings is in compliance of order of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of M/s Meters & instruments Pvt. Ltd. (supra), as learned trial court has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned order. Further, it is submitted that several other orders were passed and they were not challenged by appellant complainant. Therefore, by challenging the closure of proceedings, no useful purpose will be served as other orders have already attained finality. He further submitted that appellant had already challenged this order before the revisional court and same was dismissed. He further submitted that the entire amount under the compromise was already been paid and acknowledged by complainant by executing the documents, therefore, if there is any dispute, then it is between complainant, his son and his lawyer not with respect to respondent accused. He further submitted that the compromise dated 17.03.2015 clearly indicate that the amount was received in cash and same was acknowledged by putting a thumb impression on the document itself. He further submitted that the receipts clearly indicated that the payment on multiple occasions were made by respondent, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties on merits of the case at the stage of leave to appeal and perused the record requisitioned from learned trial court 6. He further submitted that the receipts clearly indicated that the payment on multiple occasions were made by respondent, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties on merits of the case at the stage of leave to appeal and perused the record requisitioned from learned trial court 6. The order passed by learned trial court referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s Meters & instruments Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which was considered by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Re: expeditious trial of cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, AIR (2021) SC 1957. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of Re: expeditious trial of cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (supra), held that the law laid down in aforesaid M/s Meters & instruments Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is not a good law and the trial court has no power to close the proceedings as provided under section 258 of Cr.P.C. 7. Herein, the impugned order is in two parts. Firstly, it disposes of application under sections 340 and 195 Cr.P.C., which was not challenged here and we are not dealing the same. After dismissal of this application trial court has proceeded to pass the following order : ^^i=koyh ds voyksdu ls ;g Hkh izdV gksrk gS fd vfHk;qDr }kjk U;k;ky; ds vkns'kkuqlkj leLr jkf'k vnk dj nh pqdh gSA ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; ds U;kf;d n`"Vkar 2017 lqizhe dksVZ 973 fØehuy vihy la[;k 1731@2017 ehVlZ o bULVªwesUV izk- fy- cuke dapu esgrk esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd “though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent the court in the interest of justice on being satisfied that complainant has been duly compensated can in discretion close the proceeding & discharge the accused” vfHk;qDr ds }kjk mHk; Ik{kdkjku ds e/; gq, jkthukes ds rgRk lEiw.kZ jkf'k vnk dh tk pqdh gSA vfHk;qDr ds fo:) izdj.k esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh 'ks"k ugha jgh gSA vr% vfHk;qDr ds fo:) izdj.k esa dk;Zokgh lekIr dh tkrh gSA vfHk;qDr }kjk izLrqr Mh-Mhla[; k 545146 jkf'k 1]85]000@& :i;s fnukafdr 04-10-2018 ifjoknh ysus gsrq Lora= gSA i=koyh QSly'kqekj gksdj ckn rdehy nkf[ky nQ~rj gksA** 8. Aforesaid order clearly indicated that learned trial court had recorded that entire amount under the compromise was paid by accused and nothing survives in the matter, therefore, the proceedings are closed. Aforesaid order clearly falls within parameters of Section 258 Cr.P.C. Section 258 Cr.P.C. provides that in summons case, instituted otherwise than upon complainant, for the reasons recorded by Magistrate of First Class, may stop proceedings at any stage. Besides above, the closure as provided under Section 256 of Cr.P.C. aforesaid order clearly indicates that no specific satisfaction regarding payment was recorded on 17.08.2019 but they were recorded in previous proceedings as referred during the course of arguments by counsel for both the parties and these orders were passed on 08.01.2019, 26.10.2018 & 16.04.2018. An objection of respondent is that these orders were not challenged by appellant. On this point law is very well settled when any appeal is there for consideration before appellate court, then all interim orders passed in case under challenge can be considered at the time of consideration of final order, therefore, power of appellate court cannot be interpreted in narrow manner. For this purpose, Section 386 of Cr.P.C. can be referred to wherein direction for further inquiry in case of order of acquittal can be made by Appellate court. 9. One more objection which was raised by learned counsel for respondent is that order dated 17.08.2019 was challenged in revision but no order of any revision proceedings is submitted for perusal of this court. The only order dated 06.08.2019 in criminal revision number 161/2019 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 18, Jaipur Metropolitan is available on record whereby revision aggrieved from order dated 09.01.2019 was dismissed. In fact, the order sheet indicated the date of order as 08.01.2019 though the order of revisional court indicated it to be 09.01.2019. Whatever be the case, but the order of revisional court indicated that present appellant has challenged the order of learned trial court whereby satisfaction of payment of Rs. 17.15 lakhs to complainant was recorded at the behest of accused. Therefore, the argument as advanced by learned counsel for respondent has no bearing upon the merits of this case. 10. Whatever be the case, but the order of revisional court indicated that present appellant has challenged the order of learned trial court whereby satisfaction of payment of Rs. 17.15 lakhs to complainant was recorded at the behest of accused. Therefore, the argument as advanced by learned counsel for respondent has no bearing upon the merits of this case. 10. Herein now, when we look at the procedure required to be adopted for trial of offences under section 138 of NI act, the same has to be tried summarily as provided under chapter XXI of Cr.P.C. The process of summary trial is almost similar to that of trial on summon cases by Magistrate as provided under chapter XX. A perusal of chapter XX and XXI of Cr.P.C. clearly indicate that no provision is there for rendition of accounts or recording satisfaction of payment to complainant by accused. Therefore, the order of learned trial court on an application of respondent accused passed on 16.04.2018, 26.10.2018 & 08.01.2019 clearly indicated that trial court not only misunderstood the provisions of trial in summons or summary cases as provided under chapter XX and XXI of Cr.P.C but travelled beyond its jurisdiction, which is very serious issue. Learned trial court was not required to go into details of payments at the stage wherein it was not adjudicating the matter on merits, therefore, the order dated 16.04.2018, 26.10.2018 & 08.01.2019 clearly indicated that these orders were contrary to the procedure established under the law. In the case of M/s Meters and Instruments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kanchan Mehta (supra), if on the basis of the judgment an application is made wherein an offer is made to pay cheque amount, after assessment of reasonable compensation and costs etc, then, only learned trial court can determine the amount. But herein, on the basis of a compromise, which was challenged by the complainant itself on multiple occasions in the proceedings itself, proceeded to rely upon and passed orders on the basis of compromise which was not admitted in toto by complainant. If the compromise was there, then the terms of payment was within 15 months from 05.01.2015, entire amount of Rs. 19 lakhs was required to be paid. If the compromise was there, then the terms of payment was within 15 months from 05.01.2015, entire amount of Rs. 19 lakhs was required to be paid. The learned trial court had to consider the fact that in compromise itself, the cut-off date 31.03.2016 was mentioned, thus, clearly lays down that if payment is not made by 31.03.2016 then this compromise shall stand cancelled, therefore, any proceedings or any payment subsequent to 31.03.2016 under the compromise has to be made with consent of complainant. Herein, the learned trial court had failed to appreciate the fact that receipts which were executed by Mr Giriraj Gurjar., advocate of complainant were of dates beyond 31.3.2016 and placed on record, which were relied by the Court, though clearly against the terms of settlement. When a document is submitted and relied upon by accused, then each and every part of the document shall be read against him as well, therefore, the condition for making payments before 31.3.2016 was imperative for execution of compromise. Herein, the receipt as placed on record, clearly indicated that most of them are executed after the 31.03.2016, beyond upper limit as prescribed under the compromise. The principle of law is that if there is any admitted document then each & every part is admissible against party submitting it. Therefore, the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the fact and rather I am constrained to observe that learned trial court has imposed an autocratic decision upon old aged complainant who hails from a village or rural background. The adoption of such procedure cannot be appreciated in any manner and in this order we are restraining ourself. 11. Herein, having considered aforesaid and also the fact that the receipts were signed by the counsel of complainant and further counter acknowledgment of receipt of money by complainant is not on record. Therefore, on the basis of application of accused, the matter cannot be closed after recording satisfaction of payment at the behest of accused. The order of learned trial court on this count of recording of compromise is again a faulty exercise. The compromise can only be recorded if offence is compoundable under the law and by the person who would be competent to compound the offence and is able to understand the proceedings. The order of learned trial court on this count of recording of compromise is again a faulty exercise. The compromise can only be recorded if offence is compoundable under the law and by the person who would be competent to compound the offence and is able to understand the proceedings. Whenever any complainant or injured victim is before the court then, it is the duty of the court to explain the fact of compromise and also to record the satisfaction that the compromise executed by him is of free will. Herein, time and again, the complainant/appellant was raising issues before learned trial court but learned trial court instead of heeding to his prayer, had swayed itself in favor of accused/respondent. Therefore, learned trial court has failed in discharging its official duties while recording the compromise. 12. Herein, the matter was fixed for recording of statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C and for disposal of application under section 91 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the learned trial court has disposed of application for taking compromise on record and on 16.4.2018 has allowed accused to pay remaining amount upto 17.09.2018 failing which have declared that the compromise will be cancelled. This is something which is not provided under the law and imposing certain conditions upon the complainant amounts to transgression. In any case the manner in which the entire process of cash transaction is carried out in this case, clearly indicated that something is not good in trial courts wherein trial courts are not insisting upon the parties to pay through negotiable instruments or through electronic transfer or digital mode. We, as a nation, are leading in digital transactions, but the process adopted by learned trial court clearly indicated that the we are working as forum like 'Sahukar' and permitting dealing in cash than adopting digital transaction. Therefore, same requires a serious consideration on administrative side by the High Court. Let a separate note-sheet be drawn to this effect and be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court with request to consider to issue certain guidelines regarding compulsory adoption of process of bank transfers or online digital mode in matters wherein the parties are making payments in any manner either before the court or out of court and the court(s) are recording their satisfaction, when compromise is filed. 13. 13. Herein, we have restrained ourselves on the issue wherein in the manner in which payment was acknowledged by the counsel for complainant and the recording of proceedings by learned trial court as we don’t want to focus on this aspect though a public order but it is really shocking for me as a Judicial Officer. Therefore, I am of the view that after setting aside of impugned order learned trial court is required to proceed in the matter from the stage wherein the proceedings were paused when the matter was fixed for recording of statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 14. In case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 853 followed in case of Satluj Jal Vidhyut Nigam Vs. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh (dead) through Lrs reported in (2019) 14 SCC 449 Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down that any order obtained by playing fraud is a nullity and non est in eye of law. Herein, entire payment under the compromise was not paid to the complainant and on the basis of misrepresentation or fraud, unauthorized and wrong statement, the order to close proceeding was passed. 15. Therefore, leave is granted and after leave the appeal is liable to be allowed and the matter is required to be remanded back. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, leave is granted. As a result of leave, the appeal preferred by complainant aggrieved from order dated 17.08.2019 is allowed and the order dated 17.08.2019 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to learned trial court to register the same on original number with direction to record the statement of respondent accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. and to proceed further in accordance with law to dispose of the matter on merits. It would be open to respondent to establish and prove compromise and payment under the compromise. Parties are directed to remain present on 29.05.2023. 17. The learned trial court is expected to expedite the matter as early as possible, preferably within a period of four months.