JUDGMENT VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J. - Since these Revisions are preferred by the de-facto-complainant against the very same Accused Nos., 1 and 2, relating to the same incident and as the issue involved in these Criminal revision cases are one and the same, these matters are taken up together, for disposal, by this Common Order. 2. Crl.R.C.No.1125 of 2009 is preferred by the de-facto complainant against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 09.04.2009in C.C.No.01/2008, on the file of learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikakulam (for short "trial Court"), wherein, Accused Nos., 1 and 2 are acquitted for the offences punishable under Ss. 448, 324 and 509 of the IPC. 3. Crl.R.C.No.1127 of 2009 is preferred by the de-facto complainant against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 09.04.2009in S.C.No.60 of 2008, on the file of the trial Court, wherein, Accused Nos., 1 and 2 are acquitted for the offences punishable under Ss. 448, 324 and 354 of the IPC. 4. The petitioner herein is de-facto complainant and the Respondent Nos., 2 and 3 herein are accused before the trial Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred as arrayed before the trial Court. 5. The brief facts of prosecution case is that, on 19/8/2007, at about 9.30 PM, Accused Nos.1 and 2 trespassed into the house of petitioner, dragged her into street, abused her and her husband in filthy language. They also assaulted husband of de-facto-complainant viz., Baburao by means of stick, inflicted injury with blade, when he tried to pacify the issue. Basing on the report given by complainant, on the next day i.e., on 20/8/2007 at about 2.30 PM, SI of Police, Gara P.S. having received medical intimation, registered crime No.74 of 2007 for the offences punishable under Ss. 448, 354, 323 r/w. 34 of IPC. After completion of investigation, police laid charge sheet against the Accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sec. 448, 509, 324 r/w. 34 of IPC. 6. During the examination under Sec. 239 Cr.P.C., accused pleaded innocence and claimed to be tried. The same complainant in C.C.No.1 of 2008, who is petitioner herein, filed a private complaint against the same accused herein, before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Srikakulam. After recording the sworn statement of the complainant and another witness, learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Ss. The same complainant in C.C.No.1 of 2008, who is petitioner herein, filed a private complaint against the same accused herein, before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Srikakulam. After recording the sworn statement of the complainant and another witness, learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Ss. 354, 448 and 323 r/w. 34 of IPC and committed the case to the Court of Sessions. In turn, learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikakulam registered it as S.C.No.60 of 2008 and made over the same to the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikakulam for disposal. 7. As narrated above, C.C.No.01 of 2008 is based on police report and P.R.C.No.54 of 2007 i.e., S.C.No.60 of 2008 is based on a private complaint. On the request made by both the counsel, learned Assistant Sessions Judge, recorded the evidence in S.C.No.60 of 2008 for the purpose of C.C.01 of 2008 also. On appearance of accused before the Assistant Sessions Judge, accused Nos. 1 and 2 abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. 8. P.Ws. 1 to 6 were the witnesses examined, Exs. P1 to P7 were the documents marked, apart from M.Os. 1 and 2 material objects placed before the trial Judge. On behalf of defence, D.Ws.1 and 2 were the witnesses examined, contradiction in the evidence of P.W.3 is marked as Ex.D1. 9. After hearing both counsel, on appreciation of evidence on record, learned trial Judge found A1 and A2 not guilty for the offences charged and acquitted them. 10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgments of acquittal passed in favour of accused, defacto-complainant preferred these revisions. In fact, both are on case against accused Nos.1 and 2 based on the complaint given by de-facto-Complainant to the effect that, on a particular day and time, A-1 and A-2 trespassed into their house, dragged her into the road, abused her and assaulted her husband and beat him. Hence, it is appropriate to pass common order, attending these two revisions. 11. Heard Sri A. Ravi Sankar, learned counsel for revision petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor for State/1st respondent and Sri Aravapalli Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos., 2 and 3. 12. Now the point that would emerge for determination in these revisions are: Whether there order of the learned Judge, acquitting the Accused/Respondent Nos. 11. Heard Sri A. Ravi Sankar, learned counsel for revision petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor for State/1st respondent and Sri Aravapalli Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos., 2 and 3. 12. Now the point that would emerge for determination in these revisions are: Whether there order of the learned Judge, acquitting the Accused/Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 from the charges leveled against themsuffers any procedural irregularity or manifest error of law warranting interference of this Court in revision? Determination by the Court 13. Before venturing into determination of the case, it is essential to keep in mind certain postulates fundamental in exercise of revision against an order of acquittal as summarized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., in the context of the then Sec. 439 under old Cr.P.C. as follows; (1963) 3 SCR 412 . "7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Subsec. (4) of Sec. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be : where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of Sec. 439(4). We have therefore to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles." Emphasis Supplied 14. Further, in Thankappan Nadar v. Gopala Krishnan, (2002) 9 SCC 393 . in the context of the Cr.P.C., 1973, it was held by a Three Judge Bench that the in a revision application preferred by the de-facto complainant against acquittal, the jurisdiction under Sec. 397 and Sec. 401 is sparing as observed below; "8. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh [ (1998) 7 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1574] this Court after considering various decisions, observed as under : (SCC pp. 226-27, para 9) "9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Sec. 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. 226-27, para 9) "9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Sec. 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial." Emphasis Supplied 15. Learned counsel for revision petitioner would submit that, though, there is ample evidence on record proving the guilt of accused, learned trial judge without considering them, acquitted the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, from the charges framed against them. 16. Refuting the above submissions, learned counsel for accused Nos.1 and 2 would submit that, P.W.1 isde-facto-complainant, P.W.2 is her husband and P.W.3 is their daughter. Family of de-factocomplainant is in the habit of filing false cases against the villagers, who do not co-operate with P.W.1. 2 and 3, from the charges framed against them. 16. Refuting the above submissions, learned counsel for accused Nos.1 and 2 would submit that, P.W.1 isde-facto-complainant, P.W.2 is her husband and P.W.3 is their daughter. Family of de-factocomplainant is in the habit of filing false cases against the villagers, who do not co-operate with P.W.1. The defence put forth to the prosecution witnesses is that, on one day A-1 brought a car to go to camp, but P.W.1 kept their tractor across the road to cause obstruction of the passage, when accused requested her to remove the tractor and to provide way, then she bore grudge against accused and lodged a false case. 17. It is the case of prosecution that Accused Nos.1 and 2 trespassed into the house of P.W.1, made galata, and dragged P.W.1 to the road by holding her tuft. Though, F.I.R is not be all and all, the information, which was given to the police, at the earliest point of time to some extent free from vices like addition and deletion, improvements, created stories etc. 18. Ex.P1 is the statement of P.W.1, recorded by Out Post police. The evidence on record would show that, P.W.2 who is husband of P.W.1 is also present, at the time of giving statement. There is no whisper about the reference of Accused No.1 in Ex.P1 as to the allegation connected to trespass. The record shows that again this couple approached learned Magistrate and filed private complaint, against accused Nos.1 and 2, which appears to be an improvement. 19. It was elicited in the evidence of P.W.4 that he is relative of P.Ws. 1 to 3, as such, P.Ws. 1 to 3 relate to one family and P.W.4 also got acquaintance with them. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is vivid to the effect that, there was no power supply in the village at about 8 PM, A1 abused P.W.1 and that is the root cause for the entire incident. 20. Prosecution could not examine one Bojjamma (LW.4) who was an eye witness, for the said incident. It was elicited in the cross examination of P.Ws. 2 and 3 that, one Krishna Mohan, who was their neighbor witnessed the incident. But no such Krishna Mohan was introduced by the prosecution on their behalf. But on the other hand, the defence examined said Krishna Mohan as D.W.1. It was elicited in the cross examination of P.Ws. 2 and 3 that, one Krishna Mohan, who was their neighbor witnessed the incident. But no such Krishna Mohan was introduced by the prosecution on their behalf. But on the other hand, the defence examined said Krishna Mohan as D.W.1. Nothing has been elicited in the evidence of DW.1 as to any enmity between D.W.1 and P.W.1 to speak falsehood. Record further shows, D.W.1 is none other than the brother's son of P.W.2. D.W.1 testified that on the alleged date of incident, while he along with D.W.2 sat in front of their house on the road and no such incident occurred in front of the house of P.W.1. 21. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that, learned Judge after thorough examination of evidence on record, rightly arrived at the conclusion that, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused/respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for the offences charged, accordingly acquitted them. As such, the impugned judgments do not warrant any interference of this Court and both the revisions are liable to be dismissed. 22. Accordingly, Crl.R.C.1125 of 2009 and Crl.R.C.1127 of 2009 are dismissed. No costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.