ORDER : 1. This Civil Revision Petition filed under article 227 of the Constitution of India assails the order in I.A.No.366 of 2019 of learned Principal District Judge, Nellore. 2. The facts leading to the present Revision Petition are as mentioned below: A woman and her two sons together filed O.S.No.14 of 2009 before learned Senior Civil Judge, Kovur of Nellore District seeking partition of plaint schedule properties and grant separate possession of 1/3rd share of plaint schedule property and for costs and such other reliefs. The said suit was laid against 5 defendants and on contest issues were settled and suit was tried and by a judgment dated 28.11.2017, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. While answering the contested facts, the learned trial Court observed that plaint schedule properties were not available for partition and they were personal properties of defendant No.1. 3. The plaintiffs who lost the suit by the judgment dated 28.11.2017 intended to prefer an appeal and the time available for preferring the appeal was up to 28.11.2017. By that outer date they did not prefer the appeal. However long thereafter, those three plaintiffs filed I.A.No.366 of 2019 under Section 5 of Limitation Act and under Section 151 of CPC before learned Principal District Judge, Nellore seeking to condone delay in presenting the appeal. That petition was filed by all the three plaintiffs and in support of the petition, a sworn affidavit of the first plaintiff was filed. Defendants/respondents filed their counter. After due inquiry, the learned Principal District Judge, Nellore dismissed the petition. It is that order which is assailed in the present revision petition. In the impugned order, the learned Principal District Judge mentioned that while the delay is more than 400 days, the affidavit and the petition mentioned the delay as 83 days. In the opinion of that Court, the said petition seeking condonation of delay was prepared with such a negligence. It is further recorded that the condonation petition was filed on the premise that the first plaintiff is aged and has been sick and was unable to meet her counsel to have the appeal presented and that occasioned the delay but the fact remained that her sons who are also the plaintiffs and petitioners in I.A.No.366 of 2019 were capable of perusing their legal remedies in presenting the appeal but they did not do so. Such long delay was not satisfactorily explained and therefore, the learned first appellate Court refused to condone the delay. 4. In the present Civil Revision Petition, the learned counsel for petitioners K.Pallavi appearing for them argued that it was poor health condition of first revision petitioner that caused the delay and the nature of litigation is one for partition and an appeal could be considered as continuation of suit and in such event, the learned Principal District Judge, ought to have adopted liberal approach in condoning the delay and such liberal approach is the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag V. Mst.Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 . 1. “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 2. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 3. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 4. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay. Every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 5. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 6. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or an account of culpable negligence, or an account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 7. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 7. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5. In the said case it was a delay of four days and the appeal was presented by the State and the appeal raised very important questions regarding principles of evaluation in a land acquisition case. It was in the above referred facts and situation their Lordships laid down the earlier referred principles. Based on these principles, the order impugned is sought to be set aside. 6. Despite notices none entered appearance for respondents. 7. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for revision petitioners and having considered the material placed before this Court. The point that falls for consideration is: “Whether the impugned order occasioned failure of justice requiring interference?” POINT:- The purpose of prescribing periods of limitation is to see that the dispute would not be raised beyond certain time limits so that people could govern themselves peacefully exercising their own rights over the properties. Section 5 of Limitation Act requires the petitioners to show sufficient cause that caused the delay. The delay in this case is 444 days as could be seen from the material papers that are filed. There is a copy of I.A.No.366 of 2019 and in it at the bottom of the page, below the prayer portion, list of documents are mentioned indicating the medical certificate of the first plaintiff showing that she took treatment in a hospital for her sickness from 14.05.2018 to 05.01.2019. The said I.A.No.366 of 2019 was filed on 18.04.2019. As stated earlier, the out limit for presenting the appeal papers was 28.11.2017. Thus from 28.11.2017 till the first plaintiff became sick on 14.05.2018, she shall be presumed to be healthy in that long period of time but plaintiff did not choose to file the appeal. Though her sickness was cured and she re-gained health on 05.01.2019, the appeal was not preferred. The petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed three and half months thereafter on 18.04.2019. During that period also the first plaintiff was healthy. Though her sickness was cured and she re-gained health on 05.01.2019, the appeal was not preferred. The petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed three and half months thereafter on 18.04.2019. During that period also the first plaintiff was healthy. The affidavit of the first plaintiff filed in support of I.A.No.366 of 2019 did not choose to explain in any acceptable terms as to why the appeal could not be preferred up to 14.05.2018 on which the date she became sick. Her affidavit did not say when she became sick, when she regained her health and where she obtained treatment. It simply says that she has been on bed for a long time and was unable to move because of her ill health. Her own affidavit shows that at a belated stage, she had applied for certified copies of trial Court judgment and decree and at belated stage she contacted her advocate. It does not indicate when she obtained certified copies of judgment and decree and when she contacted her advocate to present the appeal. Thus, except making bald and vague statements nothing relevant and acceptable to a Court of law finds place in her affidavit. All these aspects are critically commented in the counter filed by defendants/respondents in I.A.No.366 of 2019. One could see that her application mentions 83 days delay. In the impugned order learned Principal District Judge mentions that during the course of arguments that learned counsel for plaintiffs admitted that the delay was more than 400 days. Thus, on facts learned Principal District Judge is right when he recorded the observation that without any care and caution, the application was presented for his consideration. The other aspect of the matter is about first plaintiff’s two sons. It is undisputed that they are hale and healthy. They are also parties in I.A.No.366 of 2019 and they along with their mother presented the appeal papers before the first appellate Court. Nothing prevented those two sons to pursue the litigation by contacting their counsel within the prescribed time or soon thereafter. They did not do and no cause is mentioned for their failure. It is that aspect of the matter that clinched with the learned Principal District Judge in finding no reason to condone the delay. He dismissed the petition. Nothing prevented those two sons to pursue the litigation by contacting their counsel within the prescribed time or soon thereafter. They did not do and no cause is mentioned for their failure. It is that aspect of the matter that clinched with the learned Principal District Judge in finding no reason to condone the delay. He dismissed the petition. Learned counsel for revision petitioners submit that the two sons are not taking care of her and therefore they did not take enthusiasm in preferring the appeal. This is a matter that is not part of the record and that submission does not stand to scrutiny since those two sons are also seeking condonation of delay. To enable them to prefer the first appeal, it has been the law that satisfactory explanation of delay is a sine-qua-non before a Court liberally considers and condones the delay. In the cited ruling also, that has been laid down. As a principle if no sufficient cause is shown in a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and if it is seen that petition suffers from laches and negligence Courts cannot condone the delay on any equitable grounds as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Amalendu Kumar Bera V. The State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 . 8. In the above referred circumstances, this Court finds that the learned Principal District Judge appropriately considered the matter before him and properly analysed the facts and properly applied the law and this Court finds no reason to revise it. Point is answered against the petitioners. 9. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.