JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. I.A. No. 2373 of 2023: 1. This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 41 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 2. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that the delay of 41 days in preferring the instant appeal may be condoned. 3. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned SC-IV appearing for the respondents has not objected to such prayer of the learned counsel for the appellant rather he has submitted that the delay be condoned so that the issue be decided on merit. 4. This Court, considering the reason assigned therein and having no opposition on behalf of the respondents, is of the view that the delay of 41 days in preferring the instant appeal is required to be condoned. 5. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 41 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. L.P.A. No. 646 of 2022: 6. The instant appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 11.10.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5559 of 2018, whereby and whereunder, the order of punishment withholding of increment for six months as per the order contained in Memo No. 2157/Go has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 7. The brief facts of the case which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under: The writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Sub-Inspector, PTC, Hazaribagh in the year 1994 and while the writ petitioner was posted as Officer-in-charge, Mohanpur Police Station, anticipatory bail application being A.B.A. No. 621 of 2016 was filed before the High Court in which case diary was called for but the case diary could not have been sent within time, as such, SDPO, Deoghar had been directed to be present before the Court and he also filed detailed show cause wherein specific statement had been given that the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar has initiated a departmental proceeding against Shri Upendra Singh, I.O. on 07.12.2016 for dereliction in duty for non-compliance of the order dated 22.02.2017 passed by the Court, the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar was directed to conclude the departmental proceeding against Sri Upendra Singh, I.O. of the case and submit a report within 12 weeks. The writ petitioner, after some time, received a charge sheet contained in Memo NO. 444 dated 12.02.2017 on the alleged charge that the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Deoghar by his letter contained in Memo No. 3345/Sadar dated 09.12.2016 has informed that while he was posted as the officer-in-charge of the Mohanpur Police Station and did not take any interest in the matter due to which the case diary could not have been sent to the High Court within time which shows the carelessness, dereliction of duty and violating the orders of a police officer. The writ petitioner was directed to file his show cause within seven days and departmental proceeding no.32/17 was initiated against him. It is the case of the writ petitioner that no specific allegation has been alleged against the writ petitioner rather no letters mentioned therein were issued in the name of the writ petitioner being the Officer-in-charge, Mohanpur Police Station or were handed over to him rather the responsibility has been fixed on the writ petitioner merely because he was the officer-in-charge of the Mohanpur Police Station. The writ petitioner submitted his reply and the departmental proceeding proceeded and the enquiry report dated 29.04.2017 was submitted holding the writ petitioner guilty of the charges and communicated the same to the writ petitioner by letter contained in Memo No. 1248 dated 02.05.2017 and was directed to file his show cause. The writ petitioner filed his reply on 08.05.2017 denying all the charges levelled against him. But, the writ petitioner received an order contained in Memo No. 2157/Go dated 10.05.2017 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar whereby the annual increment of the writ petitioner for six months was withheld. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner filed appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka on 29.05.2017 which was rejected affirming the order of punishment. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5559 of 2018, whereby and whereunder, order of punishment passed by the original and appellate authority has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 8. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5559 of 2018, whereby and whereunder, order of punishment passed by the original and appellate authority has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 8. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred pleading in the writ petition as referred hereinabove that the appellant-writ petitioner while working as officer-in-charge of the Mohanpur Police Station was departmentally proceeded by serving memorandum of charge dated 12.02.2017, whereby and whereunder, the allegation has been levelled that in spite of the due communication made by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer for sending the case diary in connection with Mohanpur P.S. Case No. 149/14, the same was not send to the High Court and as such, the same amounts to dereliction in duty, indiscipline and non-adherence of the order as also unbecoming of a police officer. The appellant-writ petitioner submitted his reply denying the allegation that no communication was ever received prior to 20.09.2016 for sending the case diary in connection with the aforesaid police case and immedicably on receipt of the communication dated 27.09.2016, the case diary was submitted by the then investigating officer, namely, Shri Upendra Singh. The aforesaid fact has not been considered to be correct and accordingly, the order of punishment has been passed by inflicting the punishment of withholding six months annual increment vide order dated 10.05.2017 as contained in Memo No. 2157. The appellant-writ petitioner preferred appeal before the Deputy Inspector General, Santhal Pargana Region but the said appeal has also been dismissed vide order dated 26.07.2017 affirming the order passed by the original authority. The writ petitioner being aggrieved thereto, has filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5559 of 2018 questioning the order of punishment passed by the original authority as also the appellate authority by raising the issue that no fault lies on his part since no communication prior to 20.09.2016 was made for sending the case diary in connection with the aforesaid police case. The learned Single Judge has not accepted the aforesaid aspect of the matter based upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey, 2020 SCC Online SC 954 wherein proposition has been laid down that there should be least interference by the High Court in exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of disciplinary proceeding against which the present appeal has been preferred. 9. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right perspective since in the memorandum of charge, reference of various communications has been made. For ready reference, the charge against the appellant-writ petitioner is being referred as under: 10. It has been contended that only communication which was made to the writ petitioner was dated 20.09.2016 basis upon which the case diary was submitted on 27.09.2016, as such, the appellant-writ petitioner has not committed any dereliction in duty. Reference of the order passed in A.B.A. No. 621 of 2016 dated 22.02.2017 has also been pointed out wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court in seisin of the application filed under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. has made an observation while accepting the reply of the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar, who has stated that a departmental proceeding against Shri Upendra Singh, the investigating officer of the case, was initiated for dereliction in duty for non-compliance of the order passed by the High Court. 11. This Court has directed to conclude the departmental proceeding against Shri Upendra Singh, the investigating officer of the case and submit a report to the Court within 12 weeks. 12. It has been contended that since this Court while considering the anticipatory bail application has accepted the version of the Superintendent of Police wherein specific imputation of dereliction in duty was against Shri Upendra Singh, the investigating officer of the concerned case but very surprisingly the writ petitioner has also been departmentally proceeded without any basis. But, the aforesaid fact has not been appreciated in right perspective rather basing upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey (supra) the impugned order of punishment has been refused to be interfered with. 13. But, the aforesaid fact has not been appreciated in right perspective rather basing upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey (supra) the impugned order of punishment has been refused to be interfered with. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that it is not that the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court completely bar the jurisdiction of the power of judicial review in the matter of interference to be shown in the decision of the administrative disciplinary authority but the same is least to be exercised and the guidelines have also been formulated in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 followed in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 . 14. The argument has been advanced, therefore, that there was no communication to send the case diary and in absence thereof, it cannot be said that dereliction in duty has been committed on the part of the writ petitioner and the aforesaid fact having not been considered by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, the same cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law. 15. Per contra, Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned SC-IV appearing for the respondent-State of Jharkhand has defended the decision taken by the administrative authority while passing the order of punishment by advancing his argument that the memorandum of charge with specific imputation has been furnished to the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner was subjected to regular departmental proceeding and there is no complaint of any violation of principles of natural justice. 16. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the aforesaid fact and based upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey (supra), if declined to interfere with the order of punishment, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 17. It has been contended that the appellant has admitted the fact about receipt of all the communications for sending the case diary to this Court. 17. It has been contended that the appellant has admitted the fact about receipt of all the communications for sending the case diary to this Court. The reply which has been furnished by him that he has done his part of duty by forwarding the communications, for sending the case diary to this Court, to the investigating officer, the aforesaid version establishes dereliction of duty on the part of the writ petitioner, officer in-charge, who was holding the post during the relevant time. 18. Further contention has been raised that the writ petitioner since was posted as officer in-charge of the concerned police station, as such, as per Rule 81 of the Police Manual authorizes the officer in-charge of full management and administrative control of the concerned police station. The moment the communication has been made by the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar through the SDPO of sending the case diary to this Court, it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner, in the capacity of officer in-charge of the concerned police station, to follow up so as the case diary be reached to this court in pursuance of the direction passed by this Court but, he has failed to discharge his duty in utmost sincerity and punctuality and merely explanation has been furnished that he has referred the said letters to the concerned investigating officer. 19. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has been taken into consideration and considering the same to be casual approach in discharge of his official duty, amount to dereliction, as such, in that view of the matter, holding the writ petitioner guilty by imposing punishment of withholding increment for six months cannot be said to be improper. 20. The learned Single Judge by taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, if has declined to interfere with the impugned order, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 22. The undisputed fact in this case is that the appellant-writ petitioner was posted during the relevant time in the capacity of officer in-charge of the Mohanpur Police Station. A police case being Mohanpur P.S. Case No.149 of 2014 was instated. 22. The undisputed fact in this case is that the appellant-writ petitioner was posted during the relevant time in the capacity of officer in-charge of the Mohanpur Police Station. A police case being Mohanpur P.S. Case No.149 of 2014 was instated. The writ petitioner in the capacity of the officer in-charge has delegated the duty of investigation to be conducted by one Shri Upendra Singh. The accused of the said case had made an application for grant of anticipatory bail by filing application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. A Bench of this Court has called upon the case diary. The same was communicated to the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar. The Superintendent of Police, Deoghar communicated the same to the officer in-charge through the SDPO so as the case diary be reached to the High Court as per the direction passed by this Court in A.B.A. No. 621 of 2016, but the case diary had not been sent within time. 23. This Court was compelled to called upon the S.P., Deoghar. The S.P., Deoghar had given undertaking by taking the same to be dereliction in duty by the investigating officer, Shri Upendra Singh and has apprised this Court that a departmental proceeding has been decided to be initiated against Sri Upendra Singh. 24. The departmental proceeding had been initiated against Shri Upendra Singh by issuance of memorandum of charge levelling therein the charge of dereliction in duty. 25. The same charge has also been levelled upon the appellant/writ petitioner on the ground that he was holding the post of officer in-charge of the concerned police station. The appellant had filed response to the said show cause and has admitted the fact therein that all the letters as has been referred in the charge sheet has been received and forwarded to the investigating officer for sending the case diary to this court. Further reply that since he has forwarded the said communication to the investigating officer, as such, it cannot be said that there is any dereliction in duty. The disciplinary authority has not accepted the said response and considering the accountability of the writ petitioner which he was holding in the capacity of officer in-charge of the police station has inflicted the punishment of withholding six months’ annual increment. 26. The disciplinary authority has not accepted the said response and considering the accountability of the writ petitioner which he was holding in the capacity of officer in-charge of the police station has inflicted the punishment of withholding six months’ annual increment. 26. The said order was challenged by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5559 of 2018 but the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the same by taking into consideration the nature of allegation levelled and the charge having been found proved as also considering the power of judicial review which is to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 27. The argument has been advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant that the part of the duty which has been assigned to the writ petitioner had duly been discharged, hence, the charge itself is not proper. Further, ground has been taken that the S.P., Deoghar has given undertaking before this Court that it is the fault of the investigating officer and accordingly, decision has been taken to initiate a departmental proceeding. 28. The contention, therefore, has been raised that once the S.P. has decided to initiate a departmental proceeding against the investigating officer, where is the occasion to initiate departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner since the decision of initiation of departmental proceeding against Shri Upendra Singh is based upon the appreciation of the fact and by taking into consideration the part of the duty which is to be discharged by the writ petitioner by sending the communication to the concerned investigating officer. 29. This Court, in order to appreciate the argument, deems it fit and proper to first consider what is the duty assigned to the officer in-charge posted in the concerned police station. 30. The duty which is to be discharged by the officer in-charge of the concerned police station has been conferred and stipulated in Rule 81 of the Police Manual, whereby and whereunder, the officer in-charge of the concerned police station has been empowered with full administrative and managerial control over the concerned police station where one or the other has been deputed as the officer in-charge. For ready reference, Rule 81 of the Police Manual is being referred as under: “81. For ready reference, Rule 81 of the Police Manual is being referred as under: “81. Station-in-charge.—(a) within the limits of his jurisdiction the officer-in-charge of a police-station is responsible for the management and working of all his Subordinates and for investigation and detection crimes. In order to check crime, his first aim should be to obtain correct information about criminals, vagrants or ever wandering gangs resident in or passing through the Police-station, and either to watch them effectively or to take such active measures against them as may be legal. The foremost means to this end are:—— (1) an intimate knowledge of the area committed to his charge and of its inhabitants, and the, enlistment of their sympathy and co-operation; (2) the regular and early reporting by chaukidars of facts as to crime and criminals, suspicious characters and strangers; (3) the active surveillance of registered criminals and suspects; (4) the careful maintenance nce and study of the crime directory and surveillance records; (5) the efficient use of road patrols; (6) submission of prosecution reports in bad livelihood cases; (7) generous co-operation with officers of neighbouring police-stations. (b) The station officer shall not neglect or ignore above means and, by constantly moving about within is jurisdiction and by visit to residents, shall assure himself that he receives complete and correct informations at regular intervals. It will be easy to hunt out active criminals by keeping up-to-date information about crime and criminals and preventive action can also be taken at appropriate time. (c) Responsibility for registers. —The responsibility for proper maintenance of all registers and records at a police-station rests on the officer-in charge who may take the assistance of his subordinates in doing this work. (d) Collection of intelligence.—The Police-station-in-charge shall collect intelligence on all matters of public importance in his jurisdiction and also communicate in superior officers even though such matters may have no connection with any criminal offence. (e) Arms and explosives stores, etc.—The officer-in-charge of P.S. shall inspect all factories. -hops and stores and firework shops licensed under the Arms and Explosives Act once in every three months (See Appendix 26).” 31. The admitted position herein is that the learned Single Judge of this Court while exercising the power conferred under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. has called upon the case diary. The said order was communicated by the officer of this Court to the officer of S.P., Deogahr. The admitted position herein is that the learned Single Judge of this Court while exercising the power conferred under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. has called upon the case diary. The said order was communicated by the officer of this Court to the officer of S.P., Deogahr. The officer of the S.P., Deoghar communicated the same through the SDPO, Deoghar to the officer in-charge of the concerned police station so as to reach the case diary without any delay. Reference of the letters have been made in the memorandum of charge. 32. The officer in-charge, in reply has admitted that all the reference of letters made in the memorandum of charge have been acted upon by sending the same to the investigating officer so that the case diary be sent. The case diary was finally sent on 27.09.2016. The contention has been raised on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner that he has performed his part of duty by forwarding the said letters to the investigating officer, therefore, the very charge itself levelled against him is improper. 33. But, this Court is not in agreement with such submission reason being that when the communication has been made based upon the judicial order passed by this court in exercise of power conferred under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. and duly been communicated to the officer in-charge of the concerned police station through the SDPO by the office of the S.P., Deoghar, it was bounded duty of the writ petitioner to follow or to take appropriate effective measure so that the case diary be sent to this Court and the matter be heard at an early date. 34. The sending of the case diary also assume paramount importance since the prayer of once accused person was for pre-arrest bail. 35. The question of consideration, therefore, of the case diary will have more importance so as to pass appropriate order by the Court in exercise of power conferred under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. since the matter was of pre-arrest bail. But, the officer in-charge even though has been conferred with all administrative managerial control over the concerned police station, has simply forwarded the said communications to the investigating officer which has been considered by the appellant -writ petitioner to be the sufficient discharge of his official duty in the capacity of officer in-charge. 36. But, the officer in-charge even though has been conferred with all administrative managerial control over the concerned police station, has simply forwarded the said communications to the investigating officer which has been considered by the appellant -writ petitioner to be the sufficient discharge of his official duty in the capacity of officer in-charge. 36. The case diary when has been sent after inordinate delay, S.P. of the concerned district was called upon by this Court while hearing the bail application. The Superintendent of Police has accepted the fault committed on the part of the investigating officer and given an undertaking that departmental proceeding has been decided to be initiated against Shri Upendra Singh, the investigating officer and as has been informed to this Court at bar tat the same punishment as has been imposed against the writ petitioner has also been imposed upon Shri Upendra Singh who had died during COVID-19 pandemic. 37. The issue that merely by forwarding the communication to the investigating officer is said to be sufficient discharge of the officinal duty is the issue for consideration in the instant case. 38. This Court is of the view that when the officer in-charge is overall in-charge of the concerned police station and the once the communication has been received by him through S.P. Deoghar/SDPO Deoghar based upon the judicial order passed by this Court, it was the duty of the officer in-charge of the concerned police station to ensure compliance of the judicial order as also the order passed by the higher authorities so that the case diary be sent. Merely by communicating the said letter to the investigating officer, according to our considered view, cannot be said to be discharge of his official duty with utmost sincerity taking into consideration the conferment of power of the officer in-charge as under Rule 81 of the Police Manual. 39. The memorandum of charge refers about the reference of various communications, however, a ground has been taken that the reference of the memos which have been send has caused serious prejudice. 40. This Court is of the view that the same will be said to cause prejudice if the said letter would not have been accepted by the writ petitioner. 41. 40. This Court is of the view that the same will be said to cause prejudice if the said letter would not have been accepted by the writ petitioner. 41. Herein, it would be evident from the given facts of the case that more particularly, the response of the writ petitioner wherein he has admitted that the references of all the memos have been received and forwarded to the investigating officer. 42. According to the writ petitioner, the said letters have been acknowledged by him, therefore, there is no question of causing prejudice by taking the ground of non-compliance. If there is denial on the part of the writ petitioner of the receipt of the said letters as contained in various memos, then the matter would have been different but that is not the case herein as per the reply furnished by the writ petitioner which has been admitted as contained in various memos said to be received by him and forwarded to the investigating officer. 43. This Court, therefore, is of the view that merely forwarding the said letters to the investigating officer cannot be said to be sufficient discharge of his official duty and in that pretext, if the departmental proceeding has been initiated against the writ petitioner along with Shri Upendra Singh, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 44. Learned counsel for the appellant as also argued that the S.P. Deoghar has submitted that the departmental proceeding has been decided to be initiated against Shri Upendra Singh then why the departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner has been initiated, officer in-charge of the concerned police station. 45. The aforesaid contention before this Court cannot be disputed since the same has been referred in the order dated 22.02.2017 but the question is that on the basis of the submission made by the S.P., Deoghar before this Court can the power conferred to the S.P., Deoghar in initiating a departmental proceeding against the officer in-charge of the concerned police station, the writ petitioner herein, will be said to be unjustified. 46. 46. The finding of this Court will be in negative since the S.P., Deoghar being the helm of the police of the district is competent enough to monitor the discharge of the duty as per the Police Manual and in course thereof, if the S.P., Deoghar, the competent authority, has come to the conclusion that there is also failure on the part of the writ petitioner in discharge of his official duty as per the mandate of Rule 81 of the Police Manual, if the departmental proceeding has been initiated against the writ petitioner on that ground along with Shri Upendra Singh, the same according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from error. 47. This Court on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the writ petitioner has admitted the fact that all the memos have been received by him but in spite of taking due care for sending the case diary to this Court, he has merely forwarded the same to the concerned investigating officer and the same having been found to admission on the part of the writ petitioner on the basis of the reply to the show cause, in that circumstances, if the authority has found the charges to be proved, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from error. Further, based upon the aforesaid finding, if the punishment of withholding of six months’ annual increment has been imposed, the same also cannot be said to be at fault. 48. Further, based upon the aforesaid finding, if the punishment of withholding of six months’ annual increment has been imposed, the same also cannot be said to be at fault. 48. This Court, as per the discussion made hereinabove and coming to the order impugned, has found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered the entire aspect of the matter and taking into consideration the power of judicial review as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein least interference is to be shown by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review, this court is of the view that it is also a case where no interference is required as per the guidelines propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13 thereof, following guidelines have been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision which read as under: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 49. In Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 , the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the extract of para-8 thereof, is referred hereinbelow: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (LandS) 80: (1996) 32 ATC 44] : ( AIR 1996 SC 484 ) ; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [ (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (LandS) 1806] : ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ) ; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanar-ayana [ (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (LandS) 1036] : ( AIR 1999 SC 2407 ) and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil. ( AIR 2000 SC 22 )". 50. ( AIR 2000 SC 22 )". 50. This Court, in the entirety of facts and circumstances, is of the view that the impugned order requires no interference. 51. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed. 52. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.