ORDER : Chandra Kumar Songara, J. Instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been preferred on behalf of accused-petitioners with the prayer for quashing of F.I.R. No.269/2019 dt.10.10.2019 registered at Police Station Ganj District Ajmer for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code, along with all subsequent proceedings. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-petitioners has submitted that the impugned F.I.R., along with all subsequent criminal proceedings, is prima-facie illegal & perverse. Counsel has further submitted that previously, a different F.I.R. was lodged against the complainant in 2014, wherein he was accused of committing theft of ancestral jewelry but the matter was compromised. Counsel has also submitted that on account of business relations, certain amount has been given, taken & then returned back to the complainant pertaining to business transactions. By taking advantage of these entries in the bank accounts, a false story has been prepared by the complainant with regard to agreement to sale. The complainant had broken the lock & removed costly items belonging to the petitioners from the alleged property-in-dispute i.e. Flat No.3 and connected premise, including bank passbook & jewelry items, for which an F.I.R. No.271/2019 came to be lodged by the petitioners. Counsel has contended that the complainant has also given notice of specific performance on 24.09.2019 pertaining to the false oral agreement to sale for which the petitioners have given reply on 03.10.2019 denying the existence of any such agreement and the complainant lodged the impugned F.I.R. on 10.10.2019. Therefore, the complainant wants to impart criminal colours to a civil dispute. Counsel has further contended that the Investigating Officer has also failed to consider that if the notice for specific performance is being given by complainant then how a criminal case would arise from such a situation. Pertaining to extortion & forcefully getting documents signed, a separate criminal complaint has also been lodged before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Ajmer. Lastly, counsel has prayed that the present petition may be allowed and the impugned F.I.R., along with all subsequent criminal proceedings, be quashed & set aside. 3. In support of his submissions, during the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the accused-petitioners, has placed reliance upon the following judgements:- (i) Anand Kumar Mohatta & Another v. State (Govt. Lastly, counsel has prayed that the present petition may be allowed and the impugned F.I.R., along with all subsequent criminal proceedings, be quashed & set aside. 3. In support of his submissions, during the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the accused-petitioners, has placed reliance upon the following judgements:- (i) Anand Kumar Mohatta & Another v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home & Another, AIR 2019 SC 210 , (ii) Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar & Another, (2000) 4 SCC 168 and (iii) Dalip Kaur & Others v. Jagnar Singh & Another, (2009 AIR SC 3191. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, while opposing the submissions made herein-above, has submitted the factual report, which is taken on record. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-complainant No.2, while opposing the submissions, has submitted that in the present F.I.R., after investigation, the charge-sheet has been filed against the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 & 120-B of I.P.C. and cognizance for aforesaid offences has also been taken by the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No.2, Ajmer against them vide its order dated 09.02.2023. Counsel has further submitted that the Court of learned Additional District Judges No.1, Ajmer, vide its order dated 19.01.2022 had allowed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.27/2020 titled as Smt. Mamta Bothra & another v. Smt. Sabri Devi & Others filed by them, setting aside the order dated 09.11.2020 passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate (West), Ajmer, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.18/2020 titled as Smt. Mamta Bothra & another v. Smt. Sabri Devi & Others. Being aggrieved with the order dated 19.01.2022 passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge No.1, Ajmer, the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2 filed a writ petition i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3778/2022 before Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court, which was dismissed by Co- ordinate Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 12.07.2022. Lastly, Counsel has prayed that the present petition filed by accused-petitioners be rejected. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the material made available on record as well as the judgements, cited herein-above. 7. In the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta & Another (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, has held as under :- "17. Lastly, Counsel has prayed that the present petition filed by accused-petitioners be rejected. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the material made available on record as well as the judgements, cited herein-above. 7. In the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta & Another (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, has held as under :- "17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court." 8. In the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, has held as under :- "15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed." 9. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed." 9. In the case of Dalip Kaur & Others (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court, has held as under :- 12. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. {See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 ]}." 10. In the case of N. Soundaram v. P.K. Pounraj & Another, (2014) 10 SCC 616 , Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in Choudhary Bhajan Lal on the scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has observed as under :- "It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and to secure the ends of justice [See State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal]. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482, CrPC. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. [See Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora] (2013) 10 SCC 581 ." 11. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. [See Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora] (2013) 10 SCC 581 ." 11. In the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 CRILJ 2419, Hon'ble Apex Court, on scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in Para 23 (iv), (v) & (vii), has observed as under :- "iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule." 12. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Another v. Akhil Sharda & Others, (2022) 6 SCR 772 , Hon'ble Apex Court, has observed as under :- "7. Having gone through the impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions no mini trial can be conducted by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered." 13. In the case of Vijayander Kumar and Others v. State of Rajasthan & Another, (2014) 3 SCC 389 , Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para 12, has held as under :- "12. Learned counsel for the respondents is correct in contending that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may also be available to the informant/complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint discloses a criminal offence or not. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint discloses a criminal offence or not. This proposition is supported by several judgements of this Court as noted in paragraph 16 of judgement in the case of Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka and Another v. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners Private Limited." 14. From perusal of F.I.R. impugned, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence has been committed. The specific allegations in the F.I.R. impugned have been levelled against the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2. The allegations in the F.I.R., prima-facie, satisfy the essential ingredients of the offences alleged and the Police has statutory right to investigate the matter. Moreover, as per factual report, after investigation, the charge-sheet has been filed, qua accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B of I.P.C. and cognizance for alleged offences has also been taken by the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No.2, Ajmer, vide its order dated 09.02.2023. As per factual report, the accused-petitioner No.1, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain has criminal antecedents of one another case (F.I.R. No.66/2021) registered at Police Station Ganj, Ajmer. 15. As per submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondent-complainant No.2, being aggrieved with the order dated 19.01.2022 passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, No.1, Ajmer, the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain, filed a writ petition i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3778/2022 before Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court, which was also dismissed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 12.07.2022, no case is made out for quashing of F.I.R. No.269/2019. 16. In the facts & circumstances of the case so also in the light of the judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court, no case for quashing of impugned F.I.R. No.269/2019 registered at Police Station Ganj District Ajmer for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, & 120-B of Indian Penal Code, is made out, qua the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain. 17. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed, qua the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain. 18. 17. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed, qua the accused-petitioner Nos.1 & 2, namely Smt. Sabri Devi Jain & Jeetmal Jain. 18. So far as accused-petitioner Nos.3 to 5, namely Ravindra Singh Rathore, Tripti Jain & Payal Jain are concerned, looking to the factual report & charge-sheet, the present petition filed on their behalf has become in fructuous and the same is, hereby, dismissed as having become in fructuous. Consequently, the present petition stands disposed of. Miscellaneous application, if any, also stands disposed of.