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2023 DIGILAW 1036 (AP)

B. Pedda Venkata Narayana v. C. Chinna Boreddy

2023-07-11

T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO

body2023
JUDGMENT: 1. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 27.08.2005 in O.S.No.32 of 2000 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Kadapa (for short "the Trial Court"), the appellants/defendants No.1 and 2 preferred this appeal. 2. For convenience's sake, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in the O.S. 3. It is a suit filed for specific performance directing the defendants to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs.75,000/- and execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiff's case is that the schedule property belongs to the defendants. On 30.01.1997, the defendants approached the plaintiff and agreed to sell him the schedule property for Rs.5,75,000/-. They received an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff towards the part of the balance sale consideration and agreed to receive Rs.75,000/- on or before 30.12.1997 and execute the registered sale deed with the expenses of the plaintiff. The defendants executed the sale agreement on the same day, agreeing to the terms and conditions. The plaintiff is ready and willing to fulfil his obligations under the agreement and pay the remaining balance. The defendants are postponing the same and promising to execute the sale deed in a short period. The plaintiff learned that the defendants are attempting to evade the sale agreement to gain unlawfully as the value of the property increased. 5. (i) The defendants filed their written statement, denying the existence of the sale agreement dt.30.01.1997 and contending that the plaintiff fabricated it for unlawful gain. The 1st defendant and his brother B.Chinna Venkata Narayana intended to construct a multi-storied shopping complex on the property and adjacent site. Due to misunderstandings, the 1st defendant took over his brother's site on 04.07.1995 and paid an advance of Rs.3,90,000/- under an agreement to purchase the site. On 05.11.1994, the 1st defendant obtained the plan approval and issued brochures for booking shop rooms in the proposed complex. Sri Kamisetty Subbarao agreed to take four rooms and made an advance payment of Rs.50,000/- while other rooms were also booked. When 1st defendant approached K.Subbarao, he consented, provided the name to be changed to Kamisetty Complex, with Kamisetty Krishnamoorthy and M.V.N.Prabhu as partners. The said attempt failed as a dispute arose between them. To proceed with construction, Sri Kamisetty Subba Rao agreed to invest, and as a security, the defendants deposited their title deeds with him. When 1st defendant approached K.Subbarao, he consented, provided the name to be changed to Kamisetty Complex, with Kamisetty Krishnamoorthy and M.V.N.Prabhu as partners. The said attempt failed as a dispute arose between them. To proceed with construction, Sri Kamisetty Subba Rao agreed to invest, and as a security, the defendants deposited their title deeds with him. This deposit was documented in a letter of deposit dt.01.06.1996, confirmed by the defendants in an agreement dt.19.06.1996. The defendants owed Rs.3,76,815/- to K. Subbarao and his business establishments. (ii) Furthermore, the defendants entered a partnership agreement 23.12.1995 with eight individuals named 'Ganesh Building and Developers'. Disputes arose among them. Upon representation made by one Balaiah and the plaintiff, these defendants were asked to sign the blank stamp papers which were later used to create a suit agreement. The defendants learned that the plaintiff and the eight individuals conspired to acquire the entire property for themselves as they anticipate significant profits of approximately Rs.1,00,00,000/- upon project completion. 6. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed relevant issues. Before the Trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 to 3 got examined and marked Ex.A.1. On behalf of the defendants, DW.1 got examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.17. 7. After considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court decreed the suit with costs, directing the defendants to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months and to deliver possession. 8. I have heard Sri G.Rama Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1 and 2 and Sri S. Kaleemulla, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. 9. The learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants argues that the trial court failed to properly consider the defendants' specific case regarding the entrustment of blank stamp papers to the plaintiff for mediation and settlement of disputes between the defendants and their partners. The trial court also failed to consider that the first stamp was fabricated by the Sub-Registrar/ex-officio stamp vendor. In contrast, the second and third stamps were created by Venkateswarlu, a licensed stamp vendor. Despite cross-examining the plaintiff extensively, no explanation or reason is provided for this inconsistency. The trial court also failed to consider that the first stamp was fabricated by the Sub-Registrar/ex-officio stamp vendor. In contrast, the second and third stamps were created by Venkateswarlu, a licensed stamp vendor. Despite cross-examining the plaintiff extensively, no explanation or reason is provided for this inconsistency. The trial court also failed to take into account the fact that both attesting witnesses (PWs.2 and 3) are related to the Plaintiff and admitted to signing as witnesses to a subsequent document executed by the defendants, at the plaintiff's suggestion, involving a portion of the property in favour of other partners of Ganesh Complex. Given this background, the learned Judge should have disregarded their testimonies, but made a significant error in accepting them. The trial court also failed to recognize the admissions made and the fact that the spacing between the body of the agreement and the signatures on the first page and the subsequent pages is neither uniform nor evenly spaced, indicating possible interpolation on the already signed blank stamp papers, especially considering that the alleged scribe is a licensed document writer. Additionally, the trial court ought to have acknowledged that the suit agreement appears fraudulent as no explanation was provided for the delay in paying the meager remaining balance of Rs.75,000/-. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a notice issued to the defendants demanding the balance of the sale consideration and the execution of a registered sale deed on the same day. 10. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that the trial Court correctly appreciated the facts of the case and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any modifications. 11. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1. Is the trial Court justified in granting relief of specific performance? 2. Is the Judgment passed by the trial Court need any interference? POINT Nos.1 & 2: 12. In a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, heavy burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove not only the execution of the sale agreement but also his entitlement for the relief there under. Mere proof of the agreement, does not, by itself, entail grant of relief. POINT Nos.1 & 2: 12. In a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, heavy burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove not only the execution of the sale agreement but also his entitlement for the relief there under. Mere proof of the agreement, does not, by itself, entail grant of relief. The Court is required to weigh several aspects before the decree for a specific performance is passed. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to the Court to decree specific performance. The Court is not bound to grant specific relief merely because it is lawful. The discretion conferred upon the courts is not arbitrary but must be exercised reasonably and soundly, guided by judicial principles. While exercising discretion, the Court is required to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case meticulously. The Court should see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage over the plaintiff. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) Thr. L.R.s. Vs. A.M.Krishnamurthy, (2022) S.C.C. Online 840, wherein the Apex Court held that: 35. Even in a first appeal, the first Appellate Court is duty-bound to examine whether there was continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. This proposition finds support from Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396 and H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa, (2006) 2 SCC 496 where this Court approved the views taken by the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, A.I.R. 1928 PC 208. 36. In Malluru Mallappa v. Kuruvathappa, (2020) 4 SCC 313 , this Court observed and held:- "13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings of the original Court. Ordinarily, the appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law and fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. The first Appeal is a valuable right of the appellant, and all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first appellate Court is required to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The Court of First Appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law and facts and with the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties. Therefore, the first appellate Court is required to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The Court of First Appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law and facts and with the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties. The Judgment of the first appellate Court must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions. 14. In light of above well settled legal position, now I address all the issues of law and facts. The 1st defendant is the husband of the 2nd defendant. They own schedule property measuring Ac.0.10½ cents located in Proddatur Municipality, referred to as the schedule property. The plaintiff as PW.1 testified that on 30.01.1997, the defendants approached and agreed to sell the schedule property to him for Rs.5,75,000/-; he made a initial payment of Rs.5,00,000/- and an agreement (Ex.A.1) was executed in his favour; the defendants agreed to receive the remaining balance of Rs.75,000/- on or before 30.12.1997. The plaintiff also got examined P.W.2-Boreddi Venkata Narapureddy and P.W.3-Banka Rajasekhara Reddy, who attested the Ex.A1-Agreement. They confirmed the execution of Ex.A1-Agreement and its terms and conditions. The plaint schedule shows existence of minor constructions in the schedule property. But no specific details are provided. 15. According to P.W.1, two days before the filing of the suit, he learned that the defendants are trying to evade the sale agreement to gain unlawfully. As per Ex.A1-Agreement, the time stipulated for payment of balance sale consideration is on or before 30.12.1997, but the suit is filed on 18.12.1997. The learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants contends that even as per the plaintiff’s case, the suit is premature, and he is not entitled to the relief of specific performance, at best he may sue for damages. In Baby @ Varghese V. Gopakumar RFA.No.84 of 2004(c) dated 20.11.2013, the High Court of Kerala referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jawahar Lal Wadhwa V. Haripada Chakroberty, A.I.R. 1989 SC 606, wherein it held as follows: 'It is settled law that where a party to a contract commits an anticipatory breach of the contract, the other party to the contract may treat the breach as putting an end to the contract and sue for damages, but in that event, he cannot ask for specific performance. The other option open to the other party, namely, the aggrieved party, is that he may choose to keep the contract alive till the time for performance and claim specific performance but, in that event, he cannot claim specific performance of the contract unless he shows his readiness and willingness to perform the contract.' Based on the said position of law, the High Court of Kerala observed as follows: …….. An anticipatory breach of contract could not give him a cause of action to sue for a specific performance. When that be so, the suit instituted by the plaintiff before the period of completion of the sale complaining anticipatory breach by the defendant was premature. 16. The learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff relied on Virgo Industries (Eng.) P.Ltd V. Venture Tech Solutions P. Ltd, (2013) 1 SCC 625 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: 15. ……. There is no universal rule to the above effect inasmuch as “the question of a suit being premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court” as held by this Court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India, (2005) 4 SCC 315 . In the case above, this Court has taken the view that whether a premature suit is required to be entertained or not is a question of discretion and unless "there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event", the Court must weigh and balance the several competing factors that are required to be considered including the question as to whether any useful purpose would be served by dismissing the suit as premature as the same would entitle the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on a subsequent date. We may usefully add in this connection that there is no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1963, requiring a plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for the expiry of the due date for the performance of the agreement in a situation where the defendant may have made his intentions clear by his overt acts. 17. After careful examination of the case law submitted, this Court finds that the argument put forth by the appellant's Counsel lacks merit. 17. After careful examination of the case law submitted, this Court finds that the argument put forth by the appellant's Counsel lacks merit. As the said contention was not raised in the written statement, no specific issue was framed, and no arguments were put forth before the trial Court. The appellants consistently maintained that they did not execute the Ex.A.1-agreement at all. Given the circumstance, it cannot be considered the suit was filed prematurely as the appellants refused to fulfill the terms of Ex.A.1-agreement. 18. The Counsel for the appellants/defendants submits that ordinarily the requirement of law is issuance of registered notice by the plaintiff demanding the accepting of (balance) sale consideration and execution of the sale deed by the defendants. But admittedly, no such notice was issued by the plaintiff before filing the suit. In this regard, the appellants’ Counsel relied on the decision of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Baddam Prathap Reddy V. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy, 2008 5 ALD 200 , wherein it observed as follows: 17. This Court, however, hastens to add that, in law, oral demand by the buyer of immovable property, as such, being sufficient compliance with requirements of Form Nos.47 and 48, cannot be ruled out. In such circumstances, the proof of oral demand should be strong and unimpeachable and mere allegation, that too, in a passing manner would not be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. This aspect of the matter, however, has to be gone into a little deeper in an appropriate case, but it would be sufficient to leave the issue with the observations as made hereinabove. 18. A study of four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant namely, Abdul Khader Rowther V. P.K. SaraBai, 1989 (43) ELT 797 (SC); Syed Dastagir V. T.R.Gopalakrishnasetty, A.I.R. 1999 SC 3029; Pushparani S.Sundaram and Ors V. Pauline Manomani James (Deceased) and Ors., (2002) 9 SCC 582 and Manjunath Anandappa Urf. ShivappaHanasi V. Tammanasa and Ors., A.I.R. 2003 SC 1391, would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of the sale deed is not complied with prior to the filing of the suit, it will weaken the case of the plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of a contract in respect of the immovable property. ShivappaHanasi V. Tammanasa and Ors., A.I.R. 2003 SC 1391, would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of the sale deed is not complied with prior to the filing of the suit, it will weaken the case of the plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of a contract in respect of the immovable property. If a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would - to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S.Sundaram (supra) it was held. 20. ………. If a suit is filed for a specific performance of agreement of sale without making prior demand by way of a notice on the defendant - vendor, such a suit is not in compliance with Form Nos.47 and 48. Therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. This Court also hastens to add that in appropriate case, subject to strictly proving such allegation, an oral demand can also be proper compliance with requirement of law, but this question has to be gone into in detail in appropriate case. 19. Upon careful examination of the plaint averments and the evidence provided by PW.1, it is apparent that there is no indication of an oral demand made by the plaintiff to the defendants for the execution of a registered sale deed upon receiving the consideration amount before filing the suit. Although the plaint mentions that the defendants did not provide a satisfactory response to the plaintiff's request and the plaintiff suspects the defendants' intentions, the details such as the dates of the demands and the presence of witnesses during these demands are not disclosed. Furthermore, the reason for not issuing a legal notice before filing the suit is not provided. Without such crucial details, this Court cannot accept the plaintiff's contention that there was an oral demand made before initiating the suit. In light of the observations made in the cited decision, this Court concludes that the suit does not comply with Form Nos.47 and 48. 20. Without such crucial details, this Court cannot accept the plaintiff's contention that there was an oral demand made before initiating the suit. In light of the observations made in the cited decision, this Court concludes that the suit does not comply with Form Nos.47 and 48. 20. Upon reviewing the trial court's judgment, it is evident that the court did not consider the documents marked as Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.17, it raises concerns about the trial Court’s application of judicial mind. The court's rationale for this omission was based on the admission of D.W.1 that the plaintiff had no involvement or relevance to these documents. Therefore, the trial court deemed the consideration of these documents irrelevant and stated that they need not be considered. The trial Court also did not show any interest in understanding the purpose for marking of Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.17 documents. The defendants relied on these documents to establish the circumstances that compelled them to sign blank stamp papers and to demonstrate their disputes with the mentioned individuals. According to the defendants, they signed the Ex.A.1-agreement of sale with the intention of resolving the disputes. In light of the case facts, it is the trial court's responsibility to examine the contents of these documents and determine whether the documents establish the intended purpose. The trial Court’s disregard for these documents undermines the thorough examination of the case. 21. In Civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient ground for decision if the facts and circumstances are such that no reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree of probability in the case is such that as to include any hypothesis besides the one to be proved then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot be said to have discharged onus of proof of establishing that theory. But, if the evidence is strongly prepondering in favour any of the two theories set up, the Court is entitled to act on it. 22. The 1st defendant, as DW.1, testified that he and his brother B.Chinna Venkata Narayana had a joint plan to construct a multi-storied shopping complex on the suit property and the adjacent sites. They applied to the Municipality seeking permission for the plan’s approval from the Town Planning Department in Hyderabad. 22. The 1st defendant, as DW.1, testified that he and his brother B.Chinna Venkata Narayana had a joint plan to construct a multi-storied shopping complex on the suit property and the adjacent sites. They applied to the Municipality seeking permission for the plan’s approval from the Town Planning Department in Hyderabad. However, due to misunderstanding with his brother, DW.1 took over the site belonging to his younger brother on 04.07.1994 by paying an advance amount of Rs.3,90,000/- under an agreement. In support of his contention, DW.1 relied on copy of the unregistered agreement of sale (Ex.B.17) which was executed by his younger brother on 11.10.1994 in his favour for the part of the schedule property. According to the D.W.1’s testimony, on 05.11.1994, he obtained the approval for the plan from the Town Planning Department and issued Brouchers for the shop rooms to be constructed. The defendants’ intention was to commence constructions under the name ‘Ganesh Complex’. 23. The defendants relied on Ex.B1, the original application for registration of their firm dated 05.06.1996. Ex.B.1 was forwarded by the defendants to the Registrar Firms under the name of ‘Ganesh Enterprises’. Ex.B2 consists of a letter addressed by the auditor of Ganesh Enterprises to the District Registrar of Firms in Kadapa, indicating that the firm comprised of two partners. The registration fee of Rs.200/- sent by a separate money order, and the letter requested the District Registrar of Firms to issue the registration certificate as soon as possible. However, Ex.B.3 written endorsement dt.25.07.1996 reveals that the District Registrar of Firms returned the application with specific objections. 24. The defendants relied on Ex.B.4 letter dt.12.02.1996 addressed by the Director of Town and Country Planning, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, to the Municipal commissioner, Proddatur, wherein it is informed that the proposals forwarded through the letter dated 12.01.1996 by the Municipal Commissioner for the construction of Stilt floor, 1st and 2nd floors for Bachelor Quarters in Sy.Nos.417/7 at 9th Ward, Proddatur, by Sri B.P.V.Narayana (Plaintiff herein) and Smt.Vijaya Kumari has been examined, and permission for the same is approved as per the corrections made in the plan enclosed, subject to the following conditions: 1. The applicant shall hand over the site for the formation of a 48' 8" inches wide road as suggested by the Planning Department in RDP.No.1/86 free of cost through a registered gift deed to the Municipality before the permit is released by the Municipality. 2. The application shall give an undertaking on Rs.100/- stamp paper to the extent that building shall not be converted for any commercial use without obtaining the land use conversion from the Government. 3. The covered parking area on the ground floor shall not be used for any other purpose than parking. 25. According to the defendants, they received a notice dated 16th April 1996, referred to as Ex.B5, from the Municipal Commissioner. Ex.B5 notice informed them of the requirement to execute a registered gift deed within one week from the date of service. Additionally, Ex.B6 is a copy of the approved plan issued by the Municipal Administration. Ex.B11 contains remarks from the Town Planning Supervisor, dated 24th June 1994, which indicate that the 1st defendant and his brother, submitted an exemption plan to the Director of Town and Country Planning, Government of Andhra Pradesh. This plan was for the construction of a shopping complex in Survey No. 417/A, Proddatur, and requested permission for its development. Ex.B11 further states that the Town Planning Supervisor inspected the site, and the site owner proposed the construction of 43 shop rooms on the ground floor and the first floor on the northern side of the existing Archana Theatre, in accordance with the sanctioned plan. The applicant's site was designated as part of the residential area, and the proposed shopping complex was situated near the Municipal Vegetable Market. The letter requested that the proposals be forwarded to the Director of Town and Country Planning for the approval of the shopping complex. 26. As testified by D.W.1, Kamisetty Subba Rao had agreed to invest in the defendants shopping complex venture. Subba Rao, initially paid an advance of Rs.50,000/- and booked multiple rooms in the complex. To secure the amounts advanced or to be advanced by Kamisetty Subba Rao, the defendants deposited the Title Deeds with him for the purpose of creating an equitable mortgage. Kamisetty Subba Rao through the firms under his management provided advances totaling Rs.3,76,815/- between 21.08.1996 to 15.03.1997. The defendants are obliged to repay the said amount to Kamisetty Subba Rao and his business establishments. 27. Kamisetty Subba Rao through the firms under his management provided advances totaling Rs.3,76,815/- between 21.08.1996 to 15.03.1997. The defendants are obliged to repay the said amount to Kamisetty Subba Rao and his business establishments. 27. It is also the defendant's case that before approaching Kamisetty Subba Rao, the defendants entered into an agreement of partnership on 23.12.1995 with the following eight persons, namely (1) Vankadara Balaiah, (2) Madisetty Pullaiah, (3) Muraga Venkata Malikarjuna, (4) Thallam Subramanyam, (5) Akuthota Gopala Krishnaiah, (6) Sannuti Sudharani, (7) Kummanuru Hymavathi and (8) Sreeram Sunkaiah Gupta, for the construction and promotion of the commercial complex under the name and style of “Ganesh Builders and Developers”. According to the evidence of defendants that the eight persons mentioned earlier neither allowed the defendants to proceed with the work of plans nor had they seriously taken upon themselves responsible for assisting the defendants under the guise of ensuring full benefits to the defendants and promoting the construction and complex made the defendants execute several documents in favour of Thallam Subramanyam and others as a security for the amounts to be advanced by them. 28. In the cross-examination of DW.1, it is revealed that construction work had commenced in 1996 on the property mentioned in the plaint schedule. According to DW.1, the construction had progressed to the stage of having pillars and walls. He denied the suggestion that the plaint schedule property was still vacant. Since the plaint schedule indicates the presence of minor constructions, the plaintiff cannot contend that the property is vacant. In the cross-examination of PW.1, it is brought to light that he was unaware of whether the 1st defendant had obtained plan approval for constructing 100 rooms on the property measuring Ac.0.20 cents, which includes the schedule property. PW.1 also admitted that he did not have knowledge of the 1st defendant taking a loan of Rs.53,00,000/- from Vankadhara Balaiah and others under an agreement to construct rooms on the schedule property. 29. The PW.1’s testimony shows that he had no knowledge as to how the defendants acquired the schedule property; he did not make inquiries before entering into the transaction. PW.1 mentioned that there are 20 pillars to the south of the property, but he could not provide details regarding their height. He also could not recall whether there were any walls in existence on the property. PW.1 mentioned that there are 20 pillars to the south of the property, but he could not provide details regarding their height. He also could not recall whether there were any walls in existence on the property. PW.1 stated that there were no constructions on the property he purchased, and he was unaware of the existence of a road between the schedule property and the Municipal Vegetable Market. This testimony indicates that PW.1 did not conduct any enquiry regarding the title of the property or familiarize himself with the surrounding structures before entering into the alleged agreement. In the cross-examination, PW.1 stated that the agreement Ex.A1 consists of three pages on different stamp papers from 1996. PW.1 denied the suggestion that there was an ink variation at the end of Page No.2. He admitted that on Page No.1, the lines were written with a gap between them, while Pages Nos.2 and 3 did not have the same gap as on Page No.1. 30. It is also the defendants’ case that they had been jockeyed into an unenviable position, and to settle the disputes between the defendants and the eight persons mentioned earlier, the defendants went to the plaintiff along with the eight persons named earlier, requesting to arbitrate the matter. On their pressure and the representation made by one Balaiah and the plaintiff, the defendants were asked to sign on the blank stamp papers; at the time of obtaining their signatures on blank stamp papers, the plaintiff took away the original agreement that has passed between the defendants and the above named eight persons; the accounts relating to the construction made were being maintained by Pullaiah and Sunkaiah and Thallam Subramanyam; the account books and the vouchers were with them. 31. According to the DW.1’s testimony, the defendants believe that the plaintiff and the eight individuals conspired to unlawfully acquire the schedule property due to the promising prospect of an estimated income of Rs.1,00,00,000/- upon project completion. However, the plaintiff did not choose to call any of the eight individuals as witnesses to demonstrate that he did not act as a mediator to settle disputes between the defendants and them. The defendants are not obligated to call those individuals to establish their disputes. The plaintiff's case does not dispute the fact that the eight individuals had conflicts with the defendants. The defendants are not obligated to call those individuals to establish their disputes. The plaintiff's case does not dispute the fact that the eight individuals had conflicts with the defendants. Although the defendants provided specific explanations regarding the circumstances that led them to sign blank stamp papers, the plaintiff did not file a rejoinder to clarify his position. It is noteworthy that in his chief examination, the plaintiff did not explicitly deny the pleas made by the 1st defendant. The plaintiff's chief affidavit does not address the defendants' contentions, except stating that the contents of the written statement are false and baseless. When such specific pleas are raised by the defendants, the plaintiff is expected to explain his stance as to whether he acted as a mediator between the defendants and the mentioned eight individuals. The defendants’ submitted documents related to the Ganesh Enterprises and approval orders from the Municipality for the construction of bachelor quarters on the ground, first, and second floors of the schedule property. However, despite the existence of some constructions as indicated in the plaint schedule, PW.1 did not provide details about the nature of existing structures on the schedule property. 32. In the cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that he lacked knowledge about the 1st defendant obtaining approval for constructing over a hundred rooms on the site, including the schedule property. He also confirmed his unawareness of the 1st defendant taking a significant loan for constructing rooms on the schedule property. When the defendants have taken such a stand, naturally the plaintiff is expected to make enquiry about the correctness of stand and place the relevant material before the Court to disprove the same. But even no attempt is made. Moreover, when confronted with the suggestion that the 1st defendant had made constructions on the site, PW.1 denied it. 33. In the cross-examination, PW.1 stated that there were no constructions on the property he purchased. Therefore, PW.1's denial regarding the existing structures on the schedule property appears to be inaccurate. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not explicitly stated who raised minor constructions in the plaint schedule property. However, this conflicts with the information provided in the plaint schedule, which mentions the presence of structures. PW.1 needs to explain this inconsistency. This raises doubts about the accuracy of PW.1's account regarding the structures on the schedule property. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not explicitly stated who raised minor constructions in the plaint schedule property. However, this conflicts with the information provided in the plaint schedule, which mentions the presence of structures. PW.1 needs to explain this inconsistency. This raises doubts about the accuracy of PW.1's account regarding the structures on the schedule property. The defendants have produced evidence, including Ex.B4, which supports their claim that the 1st defendant obtained plan approval for the construction of over 100 rooms on the property. This plan approval encompasses the extent of Ac.0.20 cents, which includes the schedule property. Ex.B4 further corroborates the defendants' case by demonstrating that they applied for the construction of a stilt floor, first floor, and second floor for bachelor quarters on the schedule property on February 12, 1996. 34. The defendants relied on Ex.B15, a letter dated 24th May 1999, to establish the existence of a dispute between them and the eight individuals mentioned earlier. In this letter, addressed by the Superintendent of Police, Cuddapah, to the District Collector, Cuddapah, it is mentioned that B. Vijaya Kumari submitted a petition stating that they had planned to construct a shopping complex in Survey No.417. They had agreed with Thallam Subramanyam, Balaiah, Pullaiah, Krishna Murthy, Hymavathi, Sudharani, Mallikarjuna, and Sunkaiah to start the construction. However, due to strained relationships among them, the construction was halted. The Circle Inspector of Police instructed the petitioner to register the entire site in the name of the counter-petitioners, with the counter-petitioners required to allocate 20% of the constructed rooms to the petitioner. The Circle Inspector of Police also mentioned that the petitioner and counter-petitioners were called and questioned regarding the matter. The petitioner agreed to enter into an agreement as stated by them. However, the petitioner later retracted and filed the present petition, leading to the advice for the counter-petitioners to approach the Civil Court. Ex.B15 letter demonstrates the existence of disputes between the defendants and the aforementioned eight individuals. 35. In M.Narsinga Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 1 SCC 691 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 15. The word "proof" needs to be understood in the sense it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. 35. In M.Narsinga Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 1 SCC 691 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 15. The word "proof" needs to be understood in the sense it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is the production of such materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Company, Ltd., observed this : "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion." 16. The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching a conclusion, the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law. The law gives absolute discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact that it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the Court may have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 36. In R.Puthunainar Alhithan V. P.H.Pandian, (1996) 3 SCC 624 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an inference from the proved facts must be so probable that if the Court believes, from the proved facts, that the facts do exist, it must be held that the fact has been proved. The inference of proof of that fact could be drawn from the given objective facts, direct or circumstantial. 37. The inference of proof of that fact could be drawn from the given objective facts, direct or circumstantial. 37. In Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the principle of Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act as under: “28. …Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved” lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The Section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, “believe it to exist” and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the Court believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and now we come to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved i.e. neither proved nor disproved.” 38. Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.17 documents show making all efforts by the defendants to construct shopping complex and 43 shopping rooms and the Bachelor quarters. The trial Court ought to have considered offering the schedule property for sale by the defendants is believable or not. 39. On the other hand, the defendants relied on Ex.B17 document dt.11.10.1994 to show that there was an agreement between 1st defendant and his brother. It shows that the 1st defendant’s younger brother intended to sell his share in the schedule property at Rs.1,30,000/- per cent. As seen from Ex.B17, it is attested by B. Vijaya Bharathi, K. Lakshmi Narayana, V. Pullaiah and Venkata Narapureddy. It is scribed by one V.Rama Mohan Rao. It shows that the 1st defendant’s younger brother intended to sell his share in the schedule property at Rs.1,30,000/- per cent. As seen from Ex.B17, it is attested by B. Vijaya Bharathi, K. Lakshmi Narayana, V. Pullaiah and Venkata Narapureddy. It is scribed by one V.Rama Mohan Rao. As seen from the Ex.A1 agreement, it is attested by PW.2 and B. Rajasekhar Reddy. 40. PW.2, B. Venkata Narapureddy, testified in favour of the plaintiff. In the cross-examination, PW.2 stated that the suit schedule property is located beside Archana Theatre and he had no knowledge whether it is jointly owned by the 1st defendant and his brothers; he was unaware of any disputes between the 1st defendant and his younger brother regarding the suit property, and he settled the matter by executing an agreement of sale in favor of the 1st defendant. PW.2 confirmed that his signature was present on the agreement, along with the signatures of Vijaya Bharathi, K.Lakshminarayana, and Pullaiah. The evidence provided by PW.2, along with Ex.B17 document, indicates that PW.2 was aware of the disputes between the 1st defendant and his brother. However, PW.2 did not dispute the case suggested by the defendants and only provided evasive replies. Considering the contents of Ex.B17, which indicate that the plaintiff agreed to purchase a portion of the schedule property from his brother for Rs.1,30,000/- per cent, it becomes difficult to believe that the defendants would agree to sell the entire schedule property, which spans Ac.0.10 ½ cents, for a sum of Rs.5,75,000/- to the plaintiff. If the 1st defendant agreed to purchase the property at Rs.1,30,000/- per cent in 1994, the value of the schedule property would be at Rs.13,65,000/-. 41. P.W.2’s testimony as a witness for the plaintiff may initially appear, supportive of the plaintiff’s case. His testimony indicates that the plaintiff was a regular customer at his shop, and they had a close acquaintance. Although PW.2 admitted his signature on Ex.B17, he did not dispute the contents of the agreement but simply stated that he did not remember the disputes between the 1st defendant and his younger brother. There is no evidence to suggest that Ex.B17, which bears PW.2's signature, was created with the intention of defeating the rights of third parties. In the cross-examination, PW.2's replies were evasive regarding the Ex.B17 transaction. There is no evidence to suggest that Ex.B17, which bears PW.2's signature, was created with the intention of defeating the rights of third parties. In the cross-examination, PW.2's replies were evasive regarding the Ex.B17 transaction. While the plaintiff is not a party to Ex.B17, PW.2 attested both Ex.A1-Agreement and Ex.B17 document. No explanation has been provided as to why the defendants would agree to sell the schedule property for Rs.5,75,000/- for an extent of Ac.0.10½ cents in 1997, when they themselves had purchased a part of the schedule property at Rs.1,30,000/- per cent in 1994. The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 confirms that the schedule property is located near Archana Theater. 42. After carefully considering the evidence provided by PW.2, this Court finds that his testimony is not reliable and trustworthy. Throughout the cross-examination, PW.2 gave evasive answers to crucial questions concerning the schedule property, including Ex.B17 transaction. It is apparent that PW.2 attempted to feign ignorance on matters that should have been within his knowledge, seemingly to avoid providing clear and meaningful responses during cross-examination. Consequently, the reliability and credibility of PW.2's evidence come into question. 43. P.W.3’s evidence shows that the plaintiff is his uncle by courtesy. He also does not know how 1st defendant has got the schedule property. His evidence shows that P.W.2 settled the matter between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. According to the plaintiff, he has paid an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- as of the date of the agreement. Even according to the evidence of P.W.3, he deposed that at the time of the agreement, the value of the property was Rs.60,000/- or Rs.70,000/- per cent. A reading of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, this Court views that their evidence is not inspiring confidence with regard to the execution of Ex.A1-Agreement by the defendants. 44. Another circumstance relied on by the defendants is that according to the plaintiff, a major portion of the sale agreement is said to be paid by the plaintiff, i.e. Rs.5,00,000/- on 30.01.1997, whereas they stipulated eleven months time, i.e. upto 30.12.1997 to pay a meager amount of Rs.75,000/- to the defendants. When the major portion of the amount is paid, it is not explained to fix such a long time to pay the amount of Rs.75,000/-. 45. When the major portion of the amount is paid, it is not explained to fix such a long time to pay the amount of Rs.75,000/-. 45. The other contention raised on behalf of the defendants is that no notice is given by the plaintiff before filing the suit. The plaintiff has not explained the reasons for his failure to give notice to the defendants in writing prior to filing the suit. 46. As explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts, and such inferences would remain until the same is either disproved or dispelled. The evidence indicates that the defendants had plans to construct a shopping complex comprising 43 rooms and bachelor quarters on two floors and the ground floor. However, due to disputes with the eight individuals mentioned earlier, the construction was halted, as evident from Ex.B15 letter. The defendants obtained the necessary permissions and he proposed gifting a portion of the site for the formation of a road. Given these circumstances, it would be difficult to assume agreeing the schedule property for a significantly lower amount of Rs.5,75,000/-. The defendants have submitted several documents to support their contentions, but the plaintiff has not effectively countered the defendants’ version. Moreover, during the cross-examination of DW.1, nothing was elicited to disprove his contention regarding these documents. The plaintiff has not raised specific disputes against the defendants’ case. The authenticity of the defendants’ documents has not been seriously challenged. 47. The plaintiff's claim that the defendants agreed to sell the schedule property for Rs.5,75,000/- appears dubious when considering the defendants' previous plans for extensive construction on the property. The defendants’ intention as evidenced by their plans for constructing a stilt floor, first floor, and second floor for bachelor quarters, along with 43 shop rooms suggest a higher value and purpose for the property. Given these intentions, it becomes difficult to believe that the defendants would approach the plaintiff to sell the schedule property for such a comparatively low amount. Moreover, the records indicate that the defendants were directed to donate a portion of the property, measuring 4 to 5 meters x 39.65 meters, to the Municipality for the formation of a 40- feet link road connecting Sreeramulapeta and New Market. Moreover, the records indicate that the defendants were directed to donate a portion of the property, measuring 4 to 5 meters x 39.65 meters, to the Municipality for the formation of a 40- feet link road connecting Sreeramulapeta and New Market. This is supported by Ex.B6, which is a true copy of the plan approval issued by the Municipal Administration Department. Additionally, the proposed shopping complex is said to be located near the Municipal Vegetable Market. Considering these factors, it raises doubts about the credibility of the plaintiff's claim regarding the sale of the schedule property for Rs.5,75,000/-, particularly given the defendants' prior plans and the requirement for the gifting of a portion of the property for the road formation. Though the plaintiff is not a party in relation to Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.17 documents, the defendants’ submissions hold substantive merit in refuting the plaintiff's claim. 48. It is settled law that in a suit for a specific performance, the plaintiff has to win or lose his case on his own strength and not on the weak case of the defendant. This Court views that the plaintiff failed to establish the execution of an agreement of sale in his favour by the defendants on receipt of the advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/-. All the circumstances established from the record, if taken into consideration, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance by exercising discretion under section 20 of the specific relief act. 49. For the reasons stated above and regarding the facts of the case, this Court views that the defendants have established their case. The findings and conclusions recorded by the trial court are not based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record. Non-consideration of the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants clearly vitiated the trial Court’s findings. The trial court’s Judgment is erroneous and cannot be sustained, and is liable to be set aside. In view of the findings on points 1 and 2, the Appeal has to be allowed. Accordingly, the points are answered. 50. As a result, the Appeal is allowed, and the Judgment and decree in O.S. No.32 of 2000, dated 27.08.2005 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Kadapa, is hereby set aside, and the suit is dismissed. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs throughout. 51. Accordingly, the points are answered. 50. As a result, the Appeal is allowed, and the Judgment and decree in O.S. No.32 of 2000, dated 27.08.2005 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Kadapa, is hereby set aside, and the suit is dismissed. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs throughout. 51. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.