JUDGMENT : KRISHNA RAO, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 17th May, 2018 passed in WP No. 14603 (W) of 2016 (Shri Pranab Kanti Dey vs. WBSEDCL and Others) wherein the Honb’le Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant and upheld the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. 2. The appellant was an employee of West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and was posted as Senior Assistant (A) at Burdwan Electricity Supply Sector-1 from 14th February, 2000 to 5th May, 2001. The appellant was assigned with the duty of meter reading of various places under HO 4, HO 5, GO 4 Zone. 3. On 3rd March, 2001, the Inspector In-charge of Burdwan Police Station on the complaint of one Nabani Dey on the allegation of demand of bribe by the appellant from one consumer, namely Sujit Kumar Mitra to reduce the amount of his energy bill had registered a case against the appellant being G.R.P.S Case No. 19 of 2001 under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant was caught red handed while accepting bribe and was arrested. 4. After initiation of criminal proceeding, the Disciplinary Authority had issued a Memo dated 23rd July, 2001 to the appellant informing the appellant that the Disciplinary Authority proposed to hold an enquiry under Regulation 61 and 63 of the Employees Service Regulation against the appellant and accordingly Article of charges along with list of documents and list of witnesses were served to the appellant. 5. On receipt of the Memorandum along with Article of charges, the petitioner had submitted his representation for supply of documents including the two diaries of the officers conducted inquiry and allow the appellant to go through the said documents. The appellant had also requested for stay of the departmental proceeding till the disposal of the criminal case initiated against the petitioner. 6. The request made by the petitioner was not considered by the respondents and the Disciplinary Authority had appointed Enquiry Officer as well as Presenting Officer to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. 7. The appellant had also requested for stay of the departmental proceeding till the disposal of the criminal case initiated against the petitioner. 6. The request made by the petitioner was not considered by the respondents and the Disciplinary Authority had appointed Enquiry Officer as well as Presenting Officer to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. 7. As the authorities refused to stay the proceeding, the appellant had preferred a writ petition before the Hon’ble Single Bench being WP No. 14711 (w) of 2003 and on 15th January, 2004, the Hon’ble Single Judge pleased to pass an order to the effect that the appellant will be at liberty to appear at the enquiry/ disciplinary proceeding but the appearance of the appellant at the said proceeding shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the appellant. The Hon’ble Single Judge also directed the authorities not to make any disciplinary order without the leave of the Court and if witness or witnesses are examined or if any evidence is taken in the matter that too will be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the appellant. 8. As there was no stay granted by the Hon’ble Single Judge, accordingly, the respondents have proceeded with the departmental proceeding. Nothing were served upon the appellant by the Enquiry Officer and the appellant had appeared before the Enquiry Officer and also cross examined the witnesses except some witnesses. The Enquiry Officer on completion of enquiry had submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority. 9. The Disciplinary Authority had forwarded the enquiry report to the appellant for his reply and on 24th March, 2006, the appellant had submitted his representation against the enquiry report. 10. In the meantime, the appellant was acquitted by the Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Special Court), Burdwan from the criminal case on 23rd December, 2011. 11. The writ petition filed by the appellant being WP No. 14711 of 2003 was taken up for hearing on 15th January, 2014 and the Hon’ble Single Judge had disposed of the said writ petition directing the respondents to issue second show cause notice to the petitioner within fortnight from date and the Disciplinary Authority was directed to pass an order after giving an opportunity of hearing within four weeks from the date of submission of petitioner’s response to the second show cause notice. 12. 12. In compliance of the order passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge dated 15th June, 2014, the Disciplinary Authority had issued second show-cause notice on 21st June, 2014 to the appellant. On receipt of second show cause notice, the appellant has submitted his reply on 28th July, 2014. After receipt of the reply of second show cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order on 26th August, 2014 by imposing the following penalties : “(i) Forfeiture of 50 % of admissible pension for lifetime. (ii) Suspension period in respect of Shri Dey will be confirmed. He will not get anything beyond the subsistence allowances paid to him for the entire period of suspension.” 13. Being aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 26th August, 2014, the appellant has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 9th October, 2014. The Appellate Authority by an order 4th dated February, 2015 had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority. 14. Being aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 26th August, 2014, passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 4th February, 2015 passed by the Appellate Authority, the appellant has preferred a writ petition being WP No. 6667 of 2015 and the said writ petition was disposed of by the Hon’ble Single Judge on 19th March, 2015 by setting aside the order of punishment dated 26th August, 2014 and the order of Appellate Authority dated 4th February, 2015 without going into the merit of the charges against the appellant and the Disciplinary Authority was allowed to continue the departmental proceeding from the same stage as obtaining upon the receipt of the petitioner’s reply to the second show cause notice by giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and directed to decide the matter in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from date. 15. After the order passed by the Hon’ble Single Bench, an opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner and after hearing of the petitioner and after considering the reply to the second show cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order by imposing the following punishment on 27th April, 2015 : “(i) Forfeiture of 50 % of admissible pension for lifetime. (ii) Suspension period in respect of Shri Dey will be confirmed. (ii) Suspension period in respect of Shri Dey will be confirmed. He will not get anything beyond the subsistence allowances paid to him for the entire period of suspension.” 16. Being aggrieved with the order of punishment, the appellant has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 22nd May, 2015 and by an order dated 19th February, 2016, the Appellate Authority had disposed of the appeal by upholding the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 17. Mr. Sadananda Ganguly, Learned Advocate representing the appellant submits that the authorities have initiated the departmental proceeding against the appellant on the basis of the criminal case initiated against the appellant and facts, documents and evidence of both the cases are the similar but the authorities failed to stall the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant till the disposal of the criminal proceeding. 18. Mr. Ganguly submits that the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority and the Hon’ble Single Judge have not considered that the appellant has been acquitted from the criminal case by the competent Court of Law and the order of acquittal has not been challenged and the same attained its finality. 19. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the respondent authorities have not sustained any pecuniary loss but inspite of same, the authorities have passed an order of punishment by forfeiture of 50% of pension for lifetime and without allowing any benefit beyond the subsistence allowance paid to the appellant for entire period of suspension. 20. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the respondents have concocted a false story against the appellant only to implicate the appellant in a false case and the same was proved during the trial in the criminal case as the appellant has acquitted from the criminal case. 21. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the respondents cannot forfeit the admissible pension of the appellant as the appellant has served in the company for about 26 years without any allegation. He further submits that the appellant is suffering huge loss due to deduction in the family pension of the appellant. 22. Mr. Ganguly submits that the authorities cannot impose any penalty which is not provided in the Regulation for recovery of sum as a measure of punishment unless the WBSEDCL sustained any pecuniary loss caused by the appellant due to his willful negligence. 22. Mr. Ganguly submits that the authorities cannot impose any penalty which is not provided in the Regulation for recovery of sum as a measure of punishment unless the WBSEDCL sustained any pecuniary loss caused by the appellant due to his willful negligence. He further submits that forfeiture of 50 % of pension was imposed upon the appellant as punishment but the said punishment is not provided in the Service Regulation. 23. Mr. Ganguly relied upon the judgments: (i) State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another, (1987) 2 SCC 179 (ii) Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and Others, AIR 2010 SC 75 (iii) G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 (iv) Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 679 (v) Imtiyaz Ahamad Malla vs. State of Jammu Kashmir and Others, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 678 of 2021 dated 28th February, 2023 24. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Kumar Panja, Learned Senior Counsel representing the respondents, submits that the scope of criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding are quite distinct, exclusive and independent from each other. He submits that standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding and in disciplinary enquiry are not same. 25. Mr. Panja submits that the Enquiry Officer during enquiry time and again had issued notices to the appellant informing the appellant with regard to hearing of the departmental proceeding but the appellant has not appeared before the Enquiry Officer on several occasions. Even the Enquiry Officer has provided an opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses and to adduce defence witness but the appellant failed to cross-examine some of the witness and also failed to adduce any evidence on his behalf nor he has examined himself to prove his defence. 26. Mr. Panja submits that as per the direction passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge after acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case, a second show cause notice was issued and further personal opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant and thus it cannot be said that the appellant has not given an opportunity of hearing. 27. Mr. 26. Mr. Panja submits that as per the direction passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge after acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case, a second show cause notice was issued and further personal opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant and thus it cannot be said that the appellant has not given an opportunity of hearing. 27. Mr. Panja had referred to Regulation 11 (d) (ii) of WBSEB Employees (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Regulation, 1985 is not applicable in the present case but Regulation 11A of the said Regulation is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 28. Mr. Panja submitted that due to the absence of the appellant in the Departmental proceeding on many of the dates fixed by the Enquiry Officer about 3 years 7 months delay was caused. 29. Mr. Panja submitted that during the enquiry all the procedures were followed and there is no procedural error and there is no violation of principles of natural justice. 30. Mr. Panja relied upon the following judgments: (i) T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. and Others vs. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 (ii) Govt. of A.P. and Others vs. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 (iii) Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Mangalore vs. Central Arecanut and Coca marketing and Processing Coop. Ltd. Mangalore, (2006) 2 SCC 381 31. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the materials on record and the judgments relied by the parties. 32. The Disciplinary Authority initiated enquiry against the appellant on the charge that the appellant was allotted reading zone HO2 at his request which includes JB Mitra Road, Burdwan. The appellant visited on his own the premises of one Late Jogesh Chandra Mitra for meter reading on February 16, 2001 and on visual checkup of the meter in that premises, the appellant had informed to Sujit Kumar Mitra, the grandson of the deceased consumer that the amount of average bill was being raised since 6/95 is on the lower side as the meter was found stopped. The amount of average bill of the premises would be tripled on the next time when the meter reading will be properly assessed by the appellant. At the same time, the appellant had offered to Sujit Kumar Mitra that the appellant can help to reduce the amount of meter reading provided the appellant is paid gratification amount of Rs. 3000/-. The amount of average bill of the premises would be tripled on the next time when the meter reading will be properly assessed by the appellant. At the same time, the appellant had offered to Sujit Kumar Mitra that the appellant can help to reduce the amount of meter reading provided the appellant is paid gratification amount of Rs. 3000/-. Though Sri Mitra did not agree to the proposal of the appellant but the meter reading of the meter would be much high as stated by the appellant, Sri Mitra was this compelled to agree to the illegal demand of the appellant. Sri S.K Mitra, the consumer concerned in order to inform the same to the Board Authority, had sent his brother Sukrit Kumar Mitra at Headquarter of WBSEB on February 21, 2001 and submitted a complaint. On the basis of the complainant of Sri Sukrit Mitra, the Authority of the Board laid a secret trap to apprehend the appellant red-handed and on 3rd March, 2001, the vigilance officers accompanied by DEB officials and Executive Magistrate have caught the appellant red-handed in presence of OSD (V) and other vigilance officials, Executive Magistrate and police officials seized the money comprising 6 numbers of 500 denomination rupee note total amounting to Rs. 3000/-. 33. A regular enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry Officer had issued notices for appearance of the appellant but the appellant has not appeared before the Enquiry Officer on several occasions. The Enquiry Officer had examined altogether eight (8) witnesses and fifteen (15) documents were exhibited. The appellant has neither examined any witness on his behalf nor had examined himself in the said enquiry. The Enquiry Officer after analysing the evidence of the witnesses as well as the documents exhibited had submitted enquiry report wherein the Enquiry Officer held that charge levelled again the appellant is proved. 34. The enquiry report was duly served upon the appellant and the appellant has submitted his representation. In the meantime, the appellant was acquitted from the criminal case and on completion of the disciplinary proceeding and acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case, the Disciplinary Authority had issued 2nd show cause notice to the appellant proposing the punishment upon the appellant. In the meantime, the appellant was acquitted from the criminal case and on completion of the disciplinary proceeding and acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case, the Disciplinary Authority had issued 2nd show cause notice to the appellant proposing the punishment upon the appellant. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the year 2003 was taken up for hearing on June 25, 2014 wherein the Hon’ble Single Judge had directed the appellant to respond to the 2nd show cause notice within a fortnight and directed the Disciplinary Authority to pass an order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant within four weeks from the date of submission of reply to the second show cause notice. 35. On receipt of reply to the second show cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order of punishment and against the said order, the appellant had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority but the same was also rejected. Against both the orders, the appellant had filed the writ application and by an order dated March 19, 2015, the Hon’ble Judge had set aside both the orders on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not given to the appellant in terms of the order passed by the Hon’ble Judge dated June 25, 2014. By setting aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, the Hon’ble Judge had allowed the Disciplinary Authority to continue the departmental proceeding from the stage as obtaining upon the receipt of the appellants reply to the second show cause notice. 36. In the reply to the 2nd show cause notice, the appellant has raised the following issues: (i) Disciplinary Proceeding is not maintainable consequent upon the acquittal of the appellant from the criminal proceeding on the same cause of action. (ii) All witnesses are common in both departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding. (iii) Criminal Court has not accepted the charge of taking bribe by the appellant. (iv) Opportunity of cross examination of P.W.3 was not afforded to the appellant which is violation of natural justice. 37. The appellant relied upon the judgment of Capt. Paul Anthony (Supra) and G.M. Tank (Supra) in support of the contention of initiation of criminal proceeding and departmental proceeding on the similar facts and acquittal from the criminal case by the competent Court. 37. The appellant relied upon the judgment of Capt. Paul Anthony (Supra) and G.M. Tank (Supra) in support of the contention of initiation of criminal proceeding and departmental proceeding on the similar facts and acquittal from the criminal case by the competent Court. In the case of M. Paul Antony case (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, “the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.” The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the “raid and recovery” at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.” In the case of G.M. Tank (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 38. In the criminal case while acquitting the appellant, the learned District and Sessions Judge (Special Court), Burdwan held that: “Considering all this, I think that much lacuna has been found on the documents produced by the prosecution. I think this benefit of doubt certainly tilts in favour of the accused persons and so I have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.” 39. The order of acquittal in a criminal case which the appellants relying upon, the same is not the acquittal honourably and it is on benefit of doubt. In the case of G.M. Tank (Supra), it is held that “The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honorable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal.” 40. In the present case, the appellant is not acquitted honourably but he is acquitted on benefit of doubt and thus the judgments relied by the appellant is not applicable in the present case. Subsequent to the judgment of G.M. Tank and M.Paul Antony (Supra), there are several judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering an order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In the case of Samar Bahadur Singh (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “7. Subsequent to the judgment of G.M. Tank and M.Paul Antony (Supra), there are several judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering an order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In the case of Samar Bahadur Singh (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “7. Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, we find that the department has been able to prove the case on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of the counsel appearing for the appellant are found to be without any merit.” In the case of Southern Railway Officers Assn. (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” 41. As regard the opportunity of cross-examination of P.W.3 was not accorded to the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, the Hon’ble Single Judge while disposing of Writ Petition No. 14711(w) of 2003 dated 25th June, 2014 directed that: “Since the second show cause notice has been issues, it will be open to the petitioner to urge all objections, including the point as to whether the petitioner has been honourably acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The petitioner will also be entitled to urge the ground that the petitioner had not cross-examined the management witnesses before the inquiry officer. If the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the petitioner was not afforded due opportunity to cross-examine the management witnesses and that despite the petitioner’s best diligence the petitioner could not attend the inquiry proceedings, the disciplinary authority will be free to make an appropriate order. If the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the petitioner was not afforded due opportunity to cross-examine the management witnesses and that despite the petitioner’s best diligence the petitioner could not attend the inquiry proceedings, the disciplinary authority will be free to make an appropriate order. If, however, the disciplinary authority is of the view that the petitioner chose not to attend the meetings before the inquiry officer without sufficient cause, it will also be open to the disciplinary authority to proceed in accordance with law.” P.W.3 is one Sadasib Karmakar and his examination in chief was completed in the presence of the appellant and the Enquiry Officer has offered cross-examination to the appellant on 16th January, 2004 but he has not cross-examined and desired to cross-examine P.W.3 after 9th February, 2004. The Enquiry Officer had fixed the enquiry on 18th February, 2004 with due notice to the appellant and the appellant had appeared in the enquiry on 18th February, 2004 but has declined to cross-examine P.W.3. As per record, it is established that an opportunity was given to the appellant for cross-examination of P.W.3 but the appellant declined to cross-examine the witness thus the plea taken by the appellant that no opportunity was given to the appellant to cross examine P.W.3 is not sustainable. The appellant had challenged the order of Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority in the second Writ Petition No. 6667 (w) of 2015 and the Hon’ble Single Judge had disposed of the said writ petition by setting aside the orders of both the authorities and directed the Disciplinary Authority to continue the disciplinary proceeding against the appellant from the same stage as obtaining upon the receipt of the appellant’s reply to the show cause notice and the appellant as well as the Disciplinary Authority have acted upon and thus on that score also chance of cross-examination of the P.W.3 is not sustainable. 42. During the personal hearing of the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, the appellant has raised the following issues: (i) Company has not sustained pecuniary loss due to him or for his act. (ii) Company had plotted a concocted story to book him. (iii) Company cannot forfeit admissible pension of an employee. (iv) He is suffering huge loss for reduction of pension. 43. (ii) Company had plotted a concocted story to book him. (iii) Company cannot forfeit admissible pension of an employee. (iv) He is suffering huge loss for reduction of pension. 43. As regard concocted story against the appellant, the charges have been proved in the regular enquiry in which the appellant had participated and the appellant failed to prove his defence and thus the same is not sustainable. As regard the punishment of forfeiture of 50 % of pension for life time: Punishment is provided under Regulation 62 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board Employee’s Service Regulation which reads as follows: “62. Without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, an employee who is found to be guilty of any act of misconduct or of any breach of discipline is punishable indicated below, according to the gravity of the breach of misconduct. The punishment will not only depend on the findings in the case under review, but also on his record, The imposition of penalties may be ordered by the Secretary or by the respective appointing authorities or any other officers of the Board empowered in this behalf. (1) Censure (2) Withholding or increment or Promotion (3) Suspension (4) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage the time-scale. (5) Recovery from pay of any sum as a measure of punishment forming part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Board wilful negligence or breach of orders. (6) Removal from service which does not debar future employment. (7) Dismissal from service which ordinarily debars employment.” The Disciplinary Authority has passed the following order of punishment: “Forfeiture of 50% of admissible pension for life time. Suspension period in respect of Sri Dey is confirmed. He will not get anything beyond the subsistence allowance paid to him for the entire period of suspension.” 44. This Court finds that the order of punishment is not in consonance with Regulation 62 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board Employee’s Service Regulation as it is not the case of the respondents that on the any wilful or negilegent act or misconduct on the part of the appellant, the Board has sustained any pecuniary loss. The enquiry was initiated against the appellant on the allegation of demand of illegal gratification and the appellant was caught red handed while accepting bribe. 45. The enquiry was initiated against the appellant on the allegation of demand of illegal gratification and the appellant was caught red handed while accepting bribe. 45. This Court is of the considered view that with regard to the findings of both the authorities, there is no illegality and not required to be interfered with but the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not in accordance with the punishment prescribed in Regulation 62 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board Employee’s Service Regulation, thus only the punishment awarded to the appellant is set aside and remanded the matter back to the Appellate Authority to impose suitable punishment in terms of Rule 62 of the Regulation. 46. The Appellate Authority is directed to pass appropriate order of punishment in accordance with provisions of Regulation 62 of West Bengal State Electricity Employee’s Service Regulation within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 47. FMA 159 of 2019 with IA No. CAN 2 of 2018 is thus disposed of. 48. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of a server copy of the Judgment and Order placed on the official website of the Court. 49. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities. I agree - Subrata Talukdar, J.