ORDER : Goutam Bhaduri, J 1. Heard. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 06.8.2013 passed by Third Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, Surguja whereby a suit seeking compensation for electrocution death of a child was dismissed at the first date of hearing. 3. A case was filed by one Dhanushdhari Yadav against the respondents that on 07.7.2010, his only son namely Ashosk Yadav, who was aged about 7 years, died of electrocution. It was pleaded that on 07.7.2010 he went for study to school at Kudkel and during recess while playing he went to answer the call of nature to the land of the respondents wherein an open live wire was on the field. He came into contact with such wire, got electric shock, resulting into his death. It was stated that the respondent has acted gross negligently which caused death of son of the appellant, therefore, suit for compensation was filed. The suit was filed on 29.01.2013 with a pleading that the suit could not be filed within one year as such, a separate application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is attached to condone the delay. Along with the plaint, an application under Section 33 of the CPC was also filed to sue as an indigent person. The learned trial Court, before the case was registered as a civil suit, dismissed it by order dated 06.8.2013 holding that the suit is barred by time. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that without framing any issues or going into the facts, the trial Court misdirected itself to dismiss the suit without even quoting the facts that within how much period of limitation the suit was required to be filed. She would further submit that it is a tortuous liability, as such, Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act 1963’) would not apply rather Article 113 of the Act 1963 would apply wherein, three years time is envisaged when the right to sue accrues. She further submits that the right to sue accrued with death on 07.7.2010, and the suit having been filed on 29.01.2013, was very much within the limitation. She placed reliance in matter of Rupabai and Ors. Vs. Sushilabai and Ors., 1998 (1) JLJ 305 . She further submits that the right to sue accrued with death on 07.7.2010, and the suit having been filed on 29.01.2013, was very much within the limitation. She placed reliance in matter of Rupabai and Ors. Vs. Sushilabai and Ors., 1998 (1) JLJ 305 . Learned counsel would further submit that this kind of issues cannot be decided at the threshold by dismissal of the appeal and reference is made to the matter Satti Paradesi Samadhi and Pillayar Temple vs. M. Sankuntala (Dead) Throu. Ledgal Representatives and Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 674 . Further she would submit that any wrong pleading made by the counsel would not affect the right of the parties as law will have its own force and reference is made to Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society vs. Balwan Singh and Ors., (2015) 7 SCC 373 . The learned counsel submits that therefore, the case is required to be remanded for adjudication afresh and the appellant may also be given liberty to add necessary parties, if so advised. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions and would submit that the impugned order is well merited. He would submit that after the death of his son, the appellant was dormant and after lapse of sufficient time, the suit was filed, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Perusal of the plaint allegation would show that death of son of the appellant occurred on 07.07.2010 due of electrocution. The negligence was attributed to the defendants that on their field live electric wire was lying, son of the appellant came into contact with the wire and was electrocuted. The plaint allegation would further show that suit for compensation of Rs.33 lakh was filed on 29.01.2013. In the judgment rendered in the similar facts in the case of Rupabai (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that when the alleged act of passing electric current in the wire fencing cannot be considered to be an act done in pursuance of any enactment in force at the time of the incident and Article 72 of the Act 1963 shall apply in cases where the compensation is claimed for doing or for omitting to do any act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force. In view of that, applicability of Article 72 of the Act 1963 was ruled out. At para 5, the Court held has under:- “5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for appellants and perused the record, as also the Impugned Order. On perusal, it is found that the application cum suit under the provisions of Order 33 CPC has been filed on behalf of the appellant-plaintiffs, claiming damages for the death of deceased Gajrajsingh as a result of the wrongful act of the defendant under Law of Torts. The alleged act of passing electric current in the wire fencing of the disputed field cannot be considered to be an act done in pursuance of any enactment in force at the time of the incident. Article 72 of the Limitation Act shall apply in cases where the compensation is claimed for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force. In view of the facts on hand as stated above, the act of the respondent-defendant cannot be held to be an act done in pursuance of any enactment in force at the time of the incident. As such, the trial Court has committed an error in applying Article 72 of the Limitation Act, holding the application cum suit field on behalf of the appellants to be barred by the limitation.” 8. Perusal of the order would show that it is a cryptic order. No reference has been made as to how the suit filed by the appellant was barred by time. The Court misdirected itself on the basis of the pleadings made by the appellant wherein at para 6 it is stated that the suit could not be filed within one year and separate application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was filed to condone the delay. The Supreme Court in the matter of Himalayan Coop. (Supra), held that generally, admission of facts made by counsel are binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal, however, if the doubt exists as to the purported admission, the Court should be wary to accept such admission unless and until the counsel or advocate is authorised by his principal to make such admission. Consequently the client would not be bound by statement of the admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. 9. Consequently the client would not be bound by statement of the admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. 9. In the instant case the background would show that the appellant comes from the rural background, death of his son caused due to electrocution on 07.7.2010, obviously therefore what would be the intricacies of the law of limitation and applicability of law to condone the delay if any, it is not expected that a litigant would know. Prima facie it appears that the counsel travelled on a misconception of law and made certain statement in the plaint. Obviously those statements which goes against law, the appellant cannot be held bound to it. Even otherwise, the submissions made which is per inquirium by the counsel would not be binding on the client. For the sake of brevity, para 32 of the said judgment is quoted as under:- “32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel are binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission, the court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. A lawyer generally has not implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professions responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. We may add that in some cases, lawyer can make decisions without consulting the client. While in others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights.” 10. We may add that in some cases, lawyer can make decisions without consulting the client. While in others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights.” 10. Further more, reading of the order would show that without any reference of preliminary issue or anything of like nature, the suit was held to be barred by limitation. The Supreme Court has held that a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from the facts as in every case starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. This preposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638 was affirmed subsequently by judgment passed in Satti Paradesi Samadhi (Supra) and held that a plea of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law. On a plain consideration of language employed in sub-rule (2) of Order 14 it can be stated with certitude that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. For the sake of brevity para 14 of the judgment is quoted hereunder:- “14. In Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta [ (2006) 5 SCC 638 ], while dealing with the issue of limitation, the Court opined that: (SCC p. 652, para 19) “19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact.” The Court further proceeded to state that a plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. On a plain consideration of the language employed in sub-rule (2) of Order 14 it can be stated with certitude that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. In the said judgment the Court opined as follows: (Ramesh B. Desai case [ (2006) 5 SCC 638 ], SCC p. 650, para 13) “13. In the said judgment the Court opined as follows: (Ramesh B. Desai case [ (2006) 5 SCC 638 ], SCC p. 650, para 13) “13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon [ AIR 1964 SC 497 ] and it was held as under: (AIR pp. 502- 03, para 18 : SCR p. 421) ‘18. … Under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided trial of the suit.’ Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but the principle enunciated in the above quoted decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.” 11. Primarily after going though the plaint allegation, it shows that the suit was filed on 29.01.2013 for a death by electrocution on 07.7.2010, meaning thereby, within three years of cause of action accrued, the suit was filed. Consequently, it would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1963 which envisages that any suit for which no period of limitation is prescribed in the Schedule, the limitation period would be three years when the right to sue accrues. 12. Accordingly, we set aside the order of learned trial Judge and remand the case for fresh adjudication before the learned District Judge, Ambikapur, Surguja. The parties shall be at liberty to amend their pleading as also for addition of the parties, if so advised. 13. The parties shall appear before the District Judge, Ambikapur on 29.3.2023. The District Judge shall make all efforts to dispose of the case on merits after notice to all the parties, as early as possible. The appeal is allowed.