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2023 DIGILAW 1040 (ALL)

Madresh v. U. P. S. R. T. C.

2023-04-17

J.J.MUNIR

body2023
JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. This is an appeal by the claimants of Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 48 of 1992, seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 2. According to the claimant-appellants, who are dependents of the late Rajvir Singh, the deceased, on the 2nd of December, 1991 was proceeding from Roorkee to Meerut on board Maruti Car, bearing registration No. DNC-2281. He was travelling on the car alongwith Raj Kumar and some others. The car was moving according to the rule of the road and at a controlled speed. At forty minutes past seven in the evening, as the car reached the Village Siwaya, a bus, owned by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'UPSRTC'), bearing registration No. UHN-2268, approached from the opposite direction. It was driven at the high speed of about 70 kilometers per hour and negligently. It hit the Maruti Car, leading to injury being sustained by several persons. One Raj Kumar died on the spot. Rajvir Singh, who sustained grievous injuries, was admitted to the Medical College Hospital. He breathed his last on 3/4.12.1991. A First Information Report about the accident was lodged with the Police, leading to the registration of a case. Rajvir Singh's body was sent to autopsy, that was carried out at the P.L. Sharma Hospital, Meerut. 3. According to the claimant-appellants (for short, 'the claimants'), the deceased was a Constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police and aged thirty-six and a half years at the time of his demise. He was a healthy man and in the usual course of life would have gone on to celebrate his 85th birthday. The deceased was in receipt of a total salary of Rs.1961/- per mensem. Due to Rajvir Singh's untimely demise, the claimants have been destituted and left without a source of income. The claimants have also been denied their love and affection. A compensation in the sum of Rs.8,10,000/- was, accordingly, claimed. 4. A written statement was filed on behalf of the UPSRTC, who are opposite party No. 1 to the claim petition and respondent No. 1 to this appeal. The UPSRTC have generally denied the allegations in the claim petition. The particulars of the accident have been denied, leading to Rajvir Singh's death. It has been averred that burden lay upon the claimants to establish the factum of the accident. The UPSRTC have generally denied the allegations in the claim petition. The particulars of the accident have been denied, leading to Rajvir Singh's death. It has been averred that burden lay upon the claimants to establish the factum of the accident. It is the further case of the UPSRTC that the accident did not happen on account of negligence of the bus driver, but it is a case of contributory negligence, where the bus driver and the driver of the Maruti Car ought to share the liability in equal proportion. It was also pleaded that the compensation sought is excessive and without basis. The case further pleaded is that compensation cannot come to the claimants as a lottery or windfall. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the National Insurance Company Limited, Branch Office Haridwar through the Divisional Manager, Begum Bridge, Meerut, opposite party No. 4 to the claim petition and respondent No. 4 here, who are Insurers of the Maruti Car. The Insurance Company aforesaid took a stand that it is the claimants' burden to establish the factum of the accident and all other things necessary to entitle them to compensation. It was the Insurance Company's case that the car was not being driven negligently and not responsible for the accident. It was the offending bus alone, that has to be held liable. The Insurance Company too said that the compensation demanded was excessive. 6. Upon pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi) : ''1. Whether the accident in question happened on 2.12.1991 at 7.40 p.m. in the jungle of Shivaya, Police Station Daurala, Meerut on account of negligent driving at a high speed by the drivers of bus No. UHN-2268 and Martu car No. DNC-2282? If yes, its effect. 2. Whether the claimants are entitled to receive any compensation? If yes, how much and from which party? 7. On behalf of the clamants, Smt. Madresh, the widow, was examined as PW-1, whereas Constable Ajay Pal Singh, an eye-witness of the accident, was examined as PW-2. In the claimants' documentary evidence, a copy of the FIR, the charge-sheet, the site plan, the postmortem report and the deceased's salary certificate, besides his High School Certificate were filed. On behalf of the UPSRTC, the bus driver, Raj Kumar was produced in the witness-box and examined as DW-1. 8. In the claimants' documentary evidence, a copy of the FIR, the charge-sheet, the site plan, the postmortem report and the deceased's salary certificate, besides his High School Certificate were filed. On behalf of the UPSRTC, the bus driver, Raj Kumar was produced in the witness-box and examined as DW-1. 8. It must be noticed that the claim petition has, of course, been pursued by the claimants before the Tribunal and defended by the UPSRTC. The other three opposite parties do not appear to have much contested the claim before the Tribunal. Before this Court, the appeal has been supported by the claimants and resisted on behalf of the UPSTRC. None of the other parties have appeared at the hearing before this Court. 9. Heard Mr. Pravindra Singh, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. Vikas Sahai, learned Counsel appearing for the UPSRTC. No one appears on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 10. The lower Court records have been carefully perused. 11. Since this appeal is limited to a claim for enhancement of compensation, this Court proposes to scrutinize the findings of the Tribunal on Issue No. 2 alone. There is no cavil about the findings on the first issue. 12. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the claimants that the Tribunal has erred in law in applying a multiplier of 12', instead of 15', on account of the fact that the widow was in receipt of a family pension of Rs.500-600/- per month. He submits that the pension payable to the widow is not legally deductible, or in any manner relevant to a quantification of the dependency. It is also argued that the Tribunal has not awarded anything towards future prospects of the deceased. Also, nothing has been awarded towards loss of consortium to each of the claimants, besides award towards loss of estate and adequate funeral expenses. 13. Mr. Vikas Sahai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the UPSRTC, on the other hand, has supported the impugned judgment and says that it makes for a just award, which ought not to be disturbed. 14. In order to work out the compensation and pass a just and fair award, the most fundamental figure to be determined is the deceased's monthly income. 14. In order to work out the compensation and pass a just and fair award, the most fundamental figure to be determined is the deceased's monthly income. Happily in this case, the deceased was a Government servant, whose income, whether high or low, is accepted in law and by the society with a kind of trust, faith and reverence, which the income of the richest of men may not command. The deceased's income in this case has the infallible certification of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Haridwar, who has issued a certificate dated 20.12.1991, paper No. 38-Ga. We have perused the said certificate. It shows the deceased's income to be Rs. 1961. The monthly income of the deceased is, therefore, to be regarded as Rs.1961/-, the annual income working out to a figure of Rs.23,532/-. 15. The deceased left behind five dependents, to wit, his widow Smt. Madresh, two minor daughters, Km. Kalpna and Km. Alpna, aged 13 and 11 years, respectively, and two sons, Master Atul and Master Pintu, aged 8 years and 4 years, respectively. Going by the principle for determining the number of surviving family members, in turn to quantify the deduction towards personal and living expenses for the deceased, Rule 220-A (2)(iii) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, 'the Rules of 1998') serves as the guide. The Rule postulates that for the purpose of calculation of the number of family members in Clause (ii), a minor dependent will be counted as half a unit. Therefore, the four children of the deceased would make for two dependents, whereas the widow would constitute one. Thus, it has to be held that the deceased was survived by three dependent family members. According to Rule 220-A(2)(ii) of the Rules of 1998, deduction towards personal and living expenses for a married person in order to work out the survivors' dependency, where he is survived by dependents in the bracket of 2 to 3 shall be one-third. The same deduction for living expenses of the deceased is envisaged in Paragraph No. 30 of the decision in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , where the dependent family members are 2-3. Thus, in this case, out of the annual income of the deceased, a one-third has to be deducted towards personal and living expenses. 16. Thus, in this case, out of the annual income of the deceased, a one-third has to be deducted towards personal and living expenses. 16. The next issue to be considered, in order to work out the dependency, is the appropriate multiplier to apply. According to the guidance of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (supra) in Paragraph No. 42 of the report, for the dependents of a deceased in the age bracket of 36-40 years, the applicable multiplier is 15'. Here, the deceased was aged thirty-six and a half years. There is no cavil about his age as the High School Certificate is on record as paper No. 40-Kha. The High School Certificate shows the deceased's date of birth as 1st July, 1955. At the time of his demise, on 3/4.12.1991, the deceased would, therefore, be aged as 36 years or as the Tribunal says, thirty-six and a half years. Therefore, the applicable multiplier would clearly be 15' and not 12', as adopted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has adopted a lower multiplier, apparently referring to the fact that the widow is in receipt of a family pension of Rs.500-600/-. The fact that the widow is in receipt of family pension is absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of working out the dependency for the claimants. In this regard, the law on the issue has been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan and others, (2013) 7 SCC 476 , where it has been held: 18. The first issue is ''whether provident fund, pension and insurance receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction''. 19. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this Court in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [ (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197]. In the said case, this Court held that provident fund, pension, insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. are all a ''pecuniary advantage'' receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ''pecuniary advantage'' liable for deduction. are all a ''pecuniary advantage'' receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ''pecuniary advantage'' liable for deduction. The following was the observation and finding of this Court: (SCC pp. 111-12, para 35) ''35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event viz. accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there is no semblance of any co-relation. The insured (the deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against the tort-feasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.'''' 17. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal went wrong in scaling down the multiplier to 12', instead of adopting the appropriate multiplier of 15'. 18. So far as the future prospects of the deceased are concerned, he was aged 36 years or thereabouts. According to Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, the deceased falls in the category of 40 years and below, entitling his dependents to add future prospect to his income to the extent 50% of his salary. 19. The issue if the award of future prospects would be governed by the decision in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 or Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. In Urmila Shukla (supra), it was held: ''9. Ltd. v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. In Urmila Shukla (supra), it was held: ''9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at ''just compensation'' in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.'' 20. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the right to determination of future prospects would be governed by Rule 220-A(3) and not the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra). 21. It was urged on behalf of the UPSRTC that Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 would not be applicable to the present case, because they were introduced w.e.f. 26th September, 2011, whereas the accident in this case had happened in the year 1991. This question fell for consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held : ''31. This question fell for consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held : ''31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law Courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.9.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 8.5.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.9.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 8.5.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 , it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula v. Godhu, AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423 , the Court had observed as under :If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068 , effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior Court. 37. 36. In Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068 , effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior Court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 , it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 , which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.9.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature.'' 22. No decision by a Larger Bench or the Supreme Court has been brought to the notice of this Court overruling the law as aforesaid laid down in Sushil Kumar. There is, thus, no difficulty in applying the provisions of the Rules of 1998, here and elsewhere, for the determination of compensation payable to the deceased in this case. 23. The claimants are entitled to receive compensation under the conventional heads. This issue was again the subject-matter of consideration by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi, where it has been held : ''48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. 23. The claimants are entitled to receive compensation under the conventional heads. This issue was again the subject-matter of consideration by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi, where it has been held : ''48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) ''54. we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.'' 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: ''3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses - actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000'' 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.'' (emphasis by Court) 24. The question of award of compensation for loss of consortium was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it was held : ''21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, ''consortium'' is a compendious term which encompasses ''spousal consortium'', ''parental consortium'', and ''filial consortium''. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of ''company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation''. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of ''parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training''. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 25. In the circumstances, this appeal deserves to succeed and in order to make a just award, the impugned award shall stand modified and revised as follows : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) 1961 (ii) Annual Income (of the deceased) 1961x12 = 23532 (iii) Annual Income + Future Prospects (monthly income x 50%) 23532+11766 = 35298 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income - one-third deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased 35298-11766 = 23532 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier 23532 x 15 = 352980 (vi) Claimant's entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents' Consortium 15000+15000+40000x5 = 230000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.352980+ Rs.230000 582980 26. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.5,82,980/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. The entire sum of enhanced compensation shall be payable to the claimants in the manner that 60% of the compensation shall go to the widow, and out of the balance 40%, the other four claimants shall equally share. The entire sum of enhanced compensation shall be payable to the claimants in the manner that 60% of the compensation shall go to the widow, and out of the balance 40%, the other four claimants shall equally share. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the UPSRTC, pursuant to the impugned award or the interim orders passed by this Court, shall be adjusted against the award. Costs easy.