ORDER 1. The instant appeal is preferred by appellant accused aggrieved from order dated 25.01.2023 in Sessions Case No. 126/2022 arising out of FIR No. 279/2022 registered at P.S. Jawahar Circle, Jaipur City (East) whereby learned Special Judge [SC/ST (POA) Act Cases], Jaipur Metro-I had framed charges under Sections 147, 148, 341, 323/149, 307/149 and 506 of IPC and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (POA) Act. 2. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that the sole injured in the case is Rahul and his injury report along with X-ray report is available on record which clearly indicated that injuries No.1 to 4 were found to be simple in nature and caused by blunt object whereas opinion was reserved with respect to injury No.5 and ultimately same was opined as simple in nature. He submitted that in case of simple injuries charge under Section 307 IPC cannot be framed by learned trial court but learned trial Court had failed to appreciate the fact that not a single iota of evidence is available to substantiate the charge under Section 307 IPC. He further submitted that appellant was not aware about the fact that complainant was a member of SC community and even if assuming that he was from SC community, the so called word used and mentioned in FIR itself does not constitute offence under any of the provision of SC/ST (POA) Act. He further submitted that the altercations if any occurred, is between the accused and complainant and no person from public was there to witness or view the altercations between the appellant and injured. He further submitted that no case under SC/ST (POA) Act is made out and if offence under Section 307 is not made out then charge No. 7 and 9 were not made out. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Champa Lal Dhakar Vs. Naval Singh Rajput & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 1931/2009). He further relied upon the judgments in cases of Dayanand Jat & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 2017 (4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 2127, Magha Ram Meghwal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 2017 (3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1352, Roopa Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 2020 (3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 897, Sampat Punia Vs. State of Rajasthan 2016 (4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 2169 and Sutta @ Tejuddin & Ors. Vs. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 2017 (4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 2127, Magha Ram Meghwal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 2017 (3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1352, Roopa Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 2020 (3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 897, Sampat Punia Vs. State of Rajasthan 2016 (4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 2169 and Sutta @ Tejuddin & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 2013 (2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 781. At last, he submitted that respondent complainant is having a chequered history of cases against him, and there was no evidence to cause life threatening injury on injured. 3. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned Public Prosecutor. None present for respondent No.2, despite service. 4. A perusal of record clearly indicated that the injury report of sole injured Rahul clearly indicated that injury Nos.1 to 4 are simple in nature and caused by blunt object whereas injury No.5 was also opined as simple in nature, after X-ray report. All injuries are simple in nature and none of them is caused on any vital part of the body, except aforesaid injury and X-ray reports, no other document of treatment is available on record. Herein the report and the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. clearly indicated that in written complaint it was alleged that present appellant had shown gun but same was not stated in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the weapon used for inflicting injuries as indicated in injury report clearly indicated that no deadly weapon was used in assault. When we look at the statement of injured recorded by police, it clearly indicated that the word 'Jaan Se Maarne Ke liye' was used but nothing is available to substantiate the same. The injuries and the manner of fight as available from statement of witnesses clearly indicated that neither there was injury nor there was intention to inflict life threatening injuries, thus same does not fall under Section 307 I.P.C. therefore, learned Trial Court had failed to appreciate the fact that there was no material on record to support charge under Section 307 IPC. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Champa Lal (supra) while referring provision of Section 307 I.P.C. had laid down that considering the material and evidence available on record including medical certificate, it cannot be said that intention of accused was to cause death of complainant, herein the situation is similar. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Champa Lal (supra) while referring provision of Section 307 I.P.C. had laid down that considering the material and evidence available on record including medical certificate, it cannot be said that intention of accused was to cause death of complainant, herein the situation is similar. The observations in cases of Dayanand Jat (supra), Magha Ram Meghwal (supra) Roopa Ram (supra), Sampat Punia Sutta @ Tejuddin (supra) further fortified that the injuries caused upon complainant cannot be treated as an attempt to murder. Therefore, learned trial Court had failed in appreciating the fact that there was not a single iota of evidence available on record for framing charge under Section 307 IPC. 5. As regard to other charges is concerned, more than 5 people were said to be involved and simple injuries have already been inflicted. Similarly use of abusive language and insult was also alleged, therefore, again it is matter of evidence that what type of words amount to insult or what not but one thing is sure that after discharge from charge under Section 307 IPC, the charge under Section 3(2)(v) cannot be be framed because except charge under Section 307 IPC, in no other charge, maximum punishment is of 10 years. The incident had taken place in public view and the objection cannot be accepted. 6. Considering the material available on record, charge under Sections 147, 148, 341, 323/149, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act are rightly framed by learned trial Court, therefore this appeal is liable to be allowed partially. Thus the appeal under Section 14A of SC/ST (POA) Act is partially allowed and order dated 25.01.2023 in Sessions Case No. 126/2022 passed by learned Special Judge [SC/ST (POA) Act Cases], Jaipur Metro-I is partially set aside qua present appellant and he is discharged of charge under Section 307 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (POA) Act but for remaining charges, appellant will face trial as per law. 7. The appeal and misc. application, if any, stand disposed of.