ORDER : 1. All these petitions are filed claiming same relief by different petitioners, but the issue involved in these petitions is one and the same. Therefore, I am of the view that it is appropriate to decide all the petitions by common order taking Writ Petition No.15762 of 2017 as leading petition. 2. W.P. No.15762 of 2017 came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:- “….to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Orders, Direction or Directions to declare the action of the 4th respondent in dispensing with the service of the petitioners vide letters dated 17.03.2016 and 31.05.2016 with effect from 30.06.2016 without observing the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 as illegal, void and unsustainable and to issue a consequential direction to the 4th respondent to act in accordance with law and pass...” 3. The brief facts of the case are that the Visakhapatnam Port Trust – respondent No.2 herein, is a statutory body incorporated under the Major Port Trust Act and that the Cargo Handling Division – respondent No.3 herein, which was previously known as Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board functioning under Dock Workers (for short “VDLB”) functioning under Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948. The said Statute was repealed in the year 2010 and the Dock Labour Board was merged in respondent No.2’s organization, but is called as Cargo Handling Division. There was a Registered Scheme of 1959 and an unregistered scheme of 1968 in VDLB, through which the workers were engaged for the operations on the ships. Whenever the Stevedoring Companies place indents on the DLB for clearing the ships, the DLB will engage its workers for the said purpose. 4. While so, after the Thermal Coal Handling Operations in the Visakhapatnam Port is introduced in the year 1985, the requirement of labour has increased tremendously. To overcome the situation, VDLB has sought permission of respondent No.1 herein to engage private labour, for which permission has been accorded to VDLB vide letter dated 06.03.1985, to engage private labour to the extent of short supply of Dock Labour Board (for short “DLB”), subject to the condition that the private labour shall be engaged only after the entire available labour of DLB are engaged. After receipt of said permission, the engagement of private labour in the works of VDLB was started. Thereafter, in May, 1992, the Trade Unions in VDLB have gone on strike, demanding the employment of the children of the deceased employees and medically unfit employees, which has resulted in a settlement entered between the Trade Union, the Stevedoring Companies and the Visakhapatnam Clearing and Forwarding Agents. In the said settlement, it was agreed that a system of streamlining the procedure of employment of private labour would be evolved, but, however, the same could not be implemented immediately. But, in June, 1993, it was agreed to form a pool for regulating the employment of the private labour. As such, the Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool – respondent No.4 herein, has come into existence on 24.12.1993, with the following objects: (a) To identify, enroll and allot work and regulate the private workers engaged by the members and users of Stevedors Association and Visakhapatnam Clearing & Forwarding Agents Association of Visakhapatnam only against short supply labour of the VDLB. (b) Through jointly promote the welfare of the workers and who are identified and enrolled in the Trust. (c) To utilize the funs of the Trust for the above purpose and also for other charitable purposes such as Education, Health, Sports and Elevation of sufferings of the poor and the needy, etc. (d) To carry out the public utility activities within the meaning of charitable purposes as defined in the Income Tax Act. 5. Respondent No.4 Pool was established on 19.01.1994 as a public trust by the Visakhapatnam Stevedors Association and Visakhapatnam Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association with the objectives of identifying, enrolling, allotting the work and regulating private workers engaged by the members and users of both the Associations against the short supply of the labour by the VDLB, to generally promote the welfare of the workers who are identified and enrolled in the Trust, to utilize the funds of the Trust for the above purposes and for such other charitable purposes and to carry out other public utility activities. 6. The main activities of respondent No.2 Port Trust is of loading and unloading the vessels, which necessitates the employment of man power on large scale. 6. The main activities of respondent No.2 Port Trust is of loading and unloading the vessels, which necessitates the employment of man power on large scale. Respondent No.3 would be supplying labour for these activities and if shortage of manpower is found, the same would be met from out of the members of respondent No.4 pool. 7. The main grievance of all the petitioners herein is that they have been working continuously from the past 20-25 years, engaged in the works of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 through respondent No.4 and has put in more than 240 days of work in every year in the last 20-25 years. Respondent No.4 is the immediate employer and respondent No.2 is the Principal employer of the petitioners. While the matter being so, all of a sudden, respondent No.4 had issued a notice dated 17.03.2016 to each and every petitioner herein and other similarly situated persons, wherein it is stated that the port is mechanizing its operations and the necessity for engaging Cargo Pool Workers for unloading thermal coal from railway wagons is diminishing and that the work would be totally unavailable after certain period, hence, there is no need for Cargo Pool Workers. The services of the petitioners were not required from 31.05.2016. However, the petitioners were permitted to work up to 30.06.2016 by the subsequent letter of respondent No.4 dated 31.05.2016. The two said notices were not preceded by any other information being given to the petitioners nor any payments were offered to the petitioners as a compensation for loss of employment. 8. In W.P.No.15762 of 2017, no interim order was passed. But, in W.P.Nos.16652 and 16846 of 2016, while ordering notice before admission, on 28.06.2016 this Court passed the following order: “In the meanwhile, the 5th respondent is restrained from engaging any other worker for the work that is being performed by the petitioners till today.” 9. Respondents did not file any counter. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool is the employer of the petitioners and it engaged the petitioners continuously in the works of respondent Nos.2 and 3 since more than 20 years. Respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool is an industry as its activities fall within the definition of an industry as provided under Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “I.D.Act”). Respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool is an industry as its activities fall within the definition of an industry as provided under Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “I.D.Act”). Respondent No.4 has been engaging the petitioners for the last 20 years and paying remuneration to them. No compensation has been offered to the petitioners nor anything has been paid to them so far towards the termination of their services as a measure of compensation. The action of respondent No.4 in removing the petitioners from employment amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the I.D.Act. It is further contended that the cause shown by respondent No.4 while removing the petitioners from service with effect from 31.06.2016 is also not genuine and requested to allow the writ petitions. In support of his contentions, he relied on the judgment of this Court in “Sri Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Amalapuram Vs. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171 ” 11. Learned standing counsel for the respondents contended that there is no relationship of employer and employee or industry and workmen between the Visakhapatnam Port Trust and petitioners as their services were engaged by respondent No.4- Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool, and that the writ petitions are not maintainable against Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool, which is not a Government body and the petitioners did not seek any relief against the other respondents as the present impugned notice was given by respondent No.4, and requested to dismiss the writ petition. In support of his contentions, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in “Ramakrishna Mission Vs. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303 .” 12. However, learned counsel for respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool stated that settlement has arrived by and between the workmen and respondent No.4 during pendency of these writ petitions and filed copies of vouchers evidencing payment of Exgratia, retrenchment compensation, and Gratuity to most of the petitioners. 13. In view of the fact that most of the petitioners have received Exgratia, retrenchment compensation, and Gratuity, the said statement made by the learned counsel for respondent No.4 was not denied by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. These writ petitions are filed challenging the notice dated 17.03.2016 issued by respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool, Visakhapatnam. 15. 14. These writ petitions are filed challenging the notice dated 17.03.2016 issued by respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool, Visakhapatnam. 15. Before entering into the merits of the case, this Court feels it appropriate to decide as to “whether the writ petition is maintainable against respondent No.4, which is a private organization”, and, “whether respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution?” 16. Writ of Mandamus can be granted only against the State and its instrumentalities when a demand made by private individuals to do or not to do an act or thing by the State or its instrumentalities and denied the same by the authorities. 17. If a person or authority is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition Under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law. 18. To decide “whether respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool is a ‘State’”, it is necessary to refer to the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, which reads thus: “12.Definition: In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.” 19. In “Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2013) 10 SCC 733” the Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed its earlier judgments and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable, which is as follows: “18. In “Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2013) 10 SCC 733” the Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed its earlier judgments and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable, which is as follows: “18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.” 20. A Writ of Mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the petitioner has a sufficient legal interest. A mandamus can be issued to an official or a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the Statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or Corporation to carry out duties placed on them by the Statute authorizing their undertaking. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a Statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities. 21. In “Binny Ltd. and Ors. Vs. V.Sadasivan, AIR 2005 SC 3202 ”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “It is difficult to draw a line between the public functions and private functions when it is being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.” 22. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.” 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also quoted the Commentary on Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fifth Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell in Chapter 3 para 0.24 therein it has been stated as follows: “A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the state. Charities, self-regulatory organizations and other nominally private institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's of London, churches) may in reality also perform some types of public function. As Sir John Donaldson M.R. urged, it is important for the courts to "recognize the realities of executive power" and not allow "their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be exerted." Non-governmental bodies such as these are just as capable of abusing their powers as is government.” 23. These observations make it abundantly clear that in order to seek writ of Mandamus against respondent No.4, the petitioners have to prove that respondent No.4 was established to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of public and accepted by the public as having authority to do so. 24. It is to be observed that the determination of a body as a 'State' is not a rigid set of principles. What is to be seen is whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government, albeit if the control is mere regulatory, whether under statute or otherwise, it will not serve to make the body a State. Also, the presence of some element of public duty or function would not by itself suffice for bringing a body within the net of Article 12 (See: Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 649 ).” 25. In “Ramakrishna Mission Vs. Also, the presence of some element of public duty or function would not by itself suffice for bringing a body within the net of Article 12 (See: Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 649 ).” 25. In “Ramakrishna Mission Vs. Kago Kunya” (referred supra), the Supreme Court held that before an organization can be held to discharge a public function, the function must be of a character that is closely related to functions which are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Binny Ltd. and Ors. Vs. V.Sadasivan” (referred supra) held as follows: “The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action.” 27. But, in the present case, the writ petitioners stated in the affidavit itself that as the agreement for streamlining the procedure of employment of private labour could not be implemented, they were agreed to form a pool for regulating the employment of the private labour, accordingly, respondent No.4 has come into existence on 24.12.1993. The petitioners have not filed any document to show that respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool was established under a statute to perform a "public function" and to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and the same is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. The name of “respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool” itself shows that it is a ‘private workers pool’ and formed for the benefit of the workers, which is not directly or indirectly connected to the State or its instrumentalities. Further, the Government does not have deep and pervasive control over it. 28. The name of “respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool” itself shows that it is a ‘private workers pool’ and formed for the benefit of the workers, which is not directly or indirectly connected to the State or its instrumentalities. Further, the Government does not have deep and pervasive control over it. 28. Respondent No.4 being a non-statutory body with neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a Statute, a writ petition for mandamus does not lie against it. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable against respondent No.4. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment of this Court in “Sri Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Amalapuram Vs. N.Seetharama Raju” (referred supra) to establish that respondent No.4 is an industry and its activity falls within the definition of an industry as provided under Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. In the said judgment, this Court held as follows: “A Co-operative society may be an industry if it satisfies the requirements of the definition of ‘industry’ in S.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In such a situation, the provisions of Chapters V-A and V-B will apply, and certain protection would be available to the employees in the matter of termination. Since some of the provisions of the said Chapters are based upon public policy, they will be enforced by way of a writ of mandamus, in case they are violated.” 30. The law laid down by this Court in the said judgment is not applicable to the present facts of the case as respondent No.4 is not an industry as it is a workers pool. The law laid down by this Court in the said judgment is not applicable to the present facts of the case as respondent No.4 is not an industry as it is a workers pool. For better appreciation of the case, this Court feels it relevant to refer to Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which reads thus: (j) " industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co- operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,-- (i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or (ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes— (a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948 ); (b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment. but does not include— (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. but does not include— (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub- clause," agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951 ); or (2) hospitals or dispensaries; or (3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or (4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or (5) khadi or village industries; or (6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or (7) any domestic service; or (8) any activity, being a profession practised by an individual or body or individuals, if the number of persons employed by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such profession is less than ten; or (9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a cooperative society or a club or any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten” 31. In the present case, the petitioners have not filed any document to show that respondent No.4 was established under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Further, they have not filed any iota of evidence to establish employee and employer relationship between them and respondent No.4. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No.4 is an industry and the petitioners are workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and their termination would fall within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is rejected. Further, there is no contract of employment between respondent No.2 – Visakhapatnam Port Trust or respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool and the petitioners. 32. For the aforesaid reasons, W.P.No.15762 of 2017 is liable to be dismissed as it is not maintainable. 33. Further, there is no contract of employment between respondent No.2 – Visakhapatnam Port Trust or respondent No.4 – Cargo Handling Private Workers Pool and the petitioners. 32. For the aforesaid reasons, W.P.No.15762 of 2017 is liable to be dismissed as it is not maintainable. 33. In view of the above detailed order, W.P.Nos.16652 and 16846 of 2016 are also liable to be dismissed as they are not maintainable. 34. Accordingly, W.P.Nos.15762 of 2017, 16652 and 16846 of 2016 are dismissed granting liberty to the petitioners to approach respondent No.4 with a request to settle their claims as has been done to most of the petitioners. There shall be no order as to costs. 35. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in the Writ Petitions, shall stand closed.