ORDER : The petitioner is accused in Crime No.302/2021 of Cherthala Police Station, Alappuzha District, alleging commission of offences under Sections 354, 354D, 376(2)(n), and 45 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3(a) r/w. S.4, S 5(i), 5(p) r/w. S. 6, S.7 r/w. S.8, S. 9(p) r/w S.10, 11(iv) r/w. S.12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. The matter is now pending as S.C. No.402/2021 on the file of the Fast Track Special Court, Cherthala, Alappuzha Division. 2. In brief, the allegation against the petitioner/accused is that the petitioner/accused trespassed into the house of the minor victim, aged 16 (between the dates 10.12.2020 and 05.02.2021) and committed penetrative sexual assault on her and thereby, he committed the offences alleged against him. 3. The petitioner/accused has approached this Court, challenging Annexure VII order in Crl.M.P. No.570/2023 in S.C. No.420/2021 on the file of the Fast Track Special Court, Cherthala. Crl.M.P. No.570/2023 was an application filed by the Prosecution under Section 311 Cr.P.C, seeking to recall (for further examination) PW3 (the victim) to prove the age of the victim by producing her SSLC book. The learned Special Judge, on a consideration of the matter and after considering the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner/accused, has allowed the petition. The learned Special Judge found that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner/accused that the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C cannot be used to summon a document was not acceptable as mere production of the document will not suffice, and when the prosecution seeks to examine PW3 to tender evidence regarding the contents of the SSLC book, the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C could be invoked for the said purpose. The Special Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Varsha Garg V. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 986, to hold that where the evidence is essential for a just decision of the case, it is incumbent on the court to exercise power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The contention of the petitioner/accused that there was nothing to show that the production of the document was essential for a just decision in the case was rejected. It was held that Jarnail Singh V. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 3467 , is the authority for the proposition that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules is applicable in determining the victim's age in cases where offences under the POCSO Act are involved. It was found that since the prosecution is seeking to produce the SSLC certificate of the victim to prove her age and since that document is the first of the documents that can be relied upon to prove the age of the victim under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, the production of the document was essential for a just decision of the case. The contention of the petitioner/accused, based on the judgment of this Court in Smrithy George v. State of Kerala, 2023 (5) KHC 137 , was rejected by the Special Court on the finding that the decision was rendered in a situation where the document sought to be produced was not part of the record and had not been seized by the police and where genuineness of the document had been seriously disputed. The court also found that the document now sought to be produced cannot be treated as a new piece of evidence, and therefore, the law laid down in Smrithy George (supra) will not apply to the facts of the case. The contention raised that successive applications cannot be permitted was also rejected on the ground that the earlier petition filed by the prosecution had been rejected only on the ground that it was not a proper application and the same had been dismissed specifically reserving the liberty of the prosecution to file a fresh application in the proper form. The learned Special Judge, therefore, allowed the petition filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C and issued a summons to PW3 to produce her SSLC book/certificate. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the order of the learned Special Judge is not sustainable in law. Learned counsel refers to the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C as also the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C to contend that where production of a document is required, the remedy lies in applying under Section 91 Cr.P.C and not by applying under Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that this contention of the petitioner/accused, raised before the Special Court, has not been properly considered by the Special Court. It is then submitted that the attempt of the prosecution is clearly to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case. Learned counsel places considerable reliance on the judgment of this Court in Karthik S. Nair V. State of Kerala, 2023 (5) KHC 468 , to contend that where an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C is filed to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case, such an application must be rejected. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Smrithy George (supra) to contend that at the fag end of the trial, the Court should not issue a summons for the production of a document that does not form part of the record and which was not seized by the police during the course of the investigation. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 1086 to contend that successive applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. could not be entertained by the Court. It is pointed out that the earlier application filed by the prosecution had already been dismissed, and it was not open to the prosecution to file successive applications seeking the same relief. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor has taken me through the order of the Special Judge in CMP No.570 of 2023. He contended that the order does not suffer from any legal infirmity whatsoever. It is pointed out that the finding of the Special Judge is that when a witness is also sought to be examined to prove a document or for production of a document, the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. could be invoked and is not necessary to invoke the power under Section 91 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the wording of Section 91 Cr.PC. clearly indicates that where the summons is issued only for the production of a document, it is enough that the person to whom the summons is issued produces the document and it is not necessary for the person to whom the summons is issued to appear before the Court. It is submitted that in this case, PW3, who was already examined by the Court, is to be re-examined for proving her age also by producing her SSLC certificate. It is submitted that in such circumstances, only the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. could be invoked. It is submitted that in this case, PW3, who was already examined by the Court, is to be re-examined for proving her age also by producing her SSLC certificate. It is submitted that in such circumstances, only the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. could be invoked. It is submitted that the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the prosecution is attempting to fill up the lacuna in the prosecution case is also not acceptable. It is submitted that going by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh (supra), the Secondary School Leaving Certificate is the most reliable document to prove the age of the victim. It is submitted that in the facts of this case, already the birth certificate of the victim had been proved by summoning and examining the Registrar of Births and Deaths (as PW22). It is submitted that to avoid any further dispute regarding the age of the victim, the Secondary School Leaving certificate of the victim was also sought to be marked in evidence. It is submitted that this cannot be characterized as a case where the prosecution sought to fill up any lacuna in the prosecution case. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2292 to contend that even if a mistake was committed by the prosecutor and the same is sought to be rectified by re-examination of the witness, the same cannot be said to be filling up of a lacuna in the prosecution case. It is submitted that this is not a case where repeated applications were filed by the prosecution for recalling a witness. It is submitted that the earlier application filed by the prosecutor was dismissed on technical grounds, reserving the liberty of the prosecution to file a fresh application, and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the prosecution was filing repeated applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the judgment of this Court in Smrithy George (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case, as that was a case where the Court had frowned upon the practice of summoning documents which were not seized during the investigation and the genuineness of which was seriously disputed. It is also submitted that the judgment of this Court in Karthik S.Nair (supra) was a case where the prosecution had put a question to the de-facto complainant while in the box as to whether he could identify the accused who were in the dock. The witness identified one among the accused (A1 in that case), while he could not identify accused No.2. This was sought to be rectified by recalling the said witness (defacto complainant in that case), and that attempt by the prosecution was found to be an attempt to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case insofar as it relates to accused No.2. It is submitted that the said decision is therefore not authority for the proposition that PW3 cannot be recalled in the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference with Annexure-VII order in CMP No.570 of 2023 in SC No.402 of 2021. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to summon a document is only to be rejected. As rightly held by the learned Special Judge, the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C. no doubt empower a Court to summon a document, but the provisions of Sub Section(2) of Section 91 make it clear that Section 91 applies in a case where only a document is sought to be produced and not in a case where the witness is also to be examined to prove or mark the contents of a document. In this case, PW3 is sought to be re-examined for marking and accepting her Secondary School Leaving Certificate as evidence. The language of Section 311 Cr.P.C does not admit of any limitation as is sought to be placed upon it by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Varsha Garg (supra) it was held:- “31. Having clarified that the bar under Section 301 is inapplicable and that the appellant is well placed to pursue this appeal, we now examine Section 311 of Cr.PC. Section 311 provides that the Court “may”: (i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; and (ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined. Section 311 provides that the Court “may”: (i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; and (ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined. 32. This power can be exercised at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC. The latter part of Section 311 states that the Court “shall” summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person “if his evidence appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Section 311 contains a power upon the Court in broad terms. The statutory provision must be read purposively, to achieve the intent of the statute to aid in the discovery of truth. 33. The first part of the statutory provision which uses the expression “may” postulates that the power can be exercised at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The latter part of the provision mandates the recall of a witness by the Court as it uses the expression “shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Essentiality of the evidence of the person who is to be examined coupled with the need for the just decision of the case constitute the touchstone which must guide the decision of the Court. The first part of the statutory provision is discretionary while the latter part is obligatory. 34-36…….. 37. The power of the court is not constrained by the closure of evidence. Therefore, it is amply clear from the above discussion that the broad powers under Section 311 are to be governed by the requirement of justice. The power must be exercised wherever the court finds that any evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. The statutory provision goes to emphasise that the court is not a hapless bystander in the derailment of justice. Quite to the contrary, the court has a vital role to discharge in ensuring that the cause of discovering truth as an aid in the realization of justice is manifest. 38. The statutory provision goes to emphasise that the court is not a hapless bystander in the derailment of justice. Quite to the contrary, the court has a vital role to discharge in ensuring that the cause of discovering truth as an aid in the realization of justice is manifest. 38. Section 91 CrPC empowers inter alia any Court to issue summons to a person in whose possession or power a document or thing is believed to be, where it considers the production of the said document or thing necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC. 39. Section 91 forms part of Chapter VII of CrPC which is titled “Processes to Compel the Production of Things”. Chapter XVI of the CrPC titled “Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrates” includes Section 207 which provides for the supply to the accused of a copy of the police report and other documents in any case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report. 25 Both operate in distinct spheres. 40. In the present case, the application of the prosecution for the production of the decoding registers is relatable to the provisions of Section 91 CrPC. The decoding registers are sought to be produced through the representatives of the cellular companies in whose custody or possession they are found. The decoding registers are a relevant piece of evidence to establish the co-relationship between the location of the accused and the cell phone tower. The reasons which weighed with the High Court and the Trial Court in dismissing the application are extraneous to the power which is conferred under Section 91 on the one hand and Section 311 on the other. The summons to produce a document or other thing under Section 91 can be issued where the Court finds that the production of the document or thing “is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, trial or other proceeding” under the CrPC. The summons to produce a document or other thing under Section 91 can be issued where the Court finds that the production of the document or thing “is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, trial or other proceeding” under the CrPC. As already noted earlier, the power under Section 311 to summon a witness is conditioned by the requirement that the evidence of the person who is sought to be summoned appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case.” The learned Special Judge has correctly applied the law laid down in Varsha Garg (supra) to hold that in cases like this, the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. can be invoked to ensure a just decision in the case. The said decision is also authority for the proposition that the Court is not a hapless bystander in the derailment of justice, and since the purpose of any trial is the discovery of truth, the Court must endeavour to do everything within its power to ensure that the truth is finally brought out. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is only Section 91 Cr.P.C. that could have been invoked is only to be rejected. 9. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that relying on the judgment in Karthik S.Nair (supra), I am of the view that the decision has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case where the defacto complainant, while in the box, was specifically asked to identify the accused in the dock. Both the accused were in the dock at the relevant time. The defacto complainant had only identified accused No.1 and did not identify accused No.2. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a petition under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to reexamine the defacto complainant for identification of accused No.2. It was in such circumstances that this Court concluded that the prosecution was attempting to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case. Here, the birth certificate of the minor victim has already been produced and marked through PW22 (Registrar of Births and Deaths of the Municipality concerned). It was in such circumstances that this Court concluded that the prosecution was attempting to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case. Here, the birth certificate of the minor victim has already been produced and marked through PW22 (Registrar of Births and Deaths of the Municipality concerned). Going by the law laid down in Jarnail Singh (supra), the Secondary School Leaving Certificate of the victim is the first among the documents that can be relied on to prove the age of the victim in a case arising under the provisions of the POCSO Act. The fact that the prosecution was seeking to mark the Secondary School Leaving Certificate of the victim cannot be said to be a case where the prosecution has attempted to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution case. The said document is first in the order of documents that could be relied on to prove the age of the victim. What constitutes a lacuna in the prosecution case? The answer is in the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad (supra). Justice K.T Thomas speaking for the bench has explained the concept lucidly in the following words:- “7. It is a common experience in criminal courts that defence counsel would raise objections whenever courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by saying that the court could not “fill the lacuna in the prosecution case”. A lacuna in the prosecution is not to be equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by a Public Prosecutor during trial, either in producing relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from witnesses. The adage “to err is human” is the recognition of the possibility of making mistakes to which humans are prone. A corollary of any such laches or mistakes during the conducting of a case cannot be understood as a lacuna which a court cannot fill up. 8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better. (Emphasis is mine) 9. The very same decision Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India [1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 : AIR 1991 SC 1346 ] which cautioned against filling up lacuna has also laid down the ratio thus: (AIR Headnote) “It is therefore clear that the criminal court has ample power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court must obviously be dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice command the examination of any person which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” As already noted, the birth certificate of the minor victim has been produced and marked through PW22. Therefore, the attempt to produce and mark the victim's Secondary School Leaving Certificate cannot be seen as an attempt to overcome any ‘inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case’. At best, it is an oversight in the management of the case, which can definitely be overcome by filing an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C, as held in Rajendra Prasad (supra). Therefore, the law laid down in Karthik S.Nair (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. 10. Coming to the contention based on the judgment of this Court in Smrithy George (supra), I find that the said decision does not come to the aid of the petitioner in any manner. Therefore, the law laid down in Karthik S.Nair (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. 10. Coming to the contention based on the judgment of this Court in Smrithy George (supra), I find that the said decision does not come to the aid of the petitioner in any manner. The facts of the case in Smrithy George (supra) indicate that was a case where the Court was concerned with the attempt to produce documents that were not seized during the course of the investigation and did not form part of the record and the genuineness of which was seriously disputed. That is not the case here. Therefore, the decision in Smrithy George (supra) also does not come to the aid of the petitioner. 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that successive applications cannot be filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satbir Singh (supra) also does not appeal to this Court. It is true that in Satbir Singh, the Supreme Court has held that successive applications should not be entertained or encouraged. This is a case where the earlier application filed by the prosecution was dismissed on technical grounds and for want of proper cause title. While dismissing the earlier application filed by the prosecution, the right was reserved to the prosecution to file a fresh application in accordance with the law. It is accordingly that the application leading to Annexure-VII order was filed. This cannot be treated as a case where the prosecution is filing successive applications for the same purpose. Therefore, the law laid down in Satbir Singh (supra) also does not come to the aid of the petitioner. 12. No other point has been raised. The Learned Special judge has committed no error in allowing Crl.MP No.570 of 2023 in SC No.402 of 2021. Therefore, I find no reason to interfere with Annexure-VII order in Crl.MP No.570 of 2023 in SC No.402 of 2021 on the file of the Fast Track Special Court, Cherthala. The Crl.M.C. will, therefore, stand dismissed.