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2023 DIGILAW 106 (RAJ)

Nanak Ram S/o Bhagu Ram v. State of Rajasthan

2023-01-10

MADAN GOPAL VYAS, VIJAY BISHNOI

body2023
JUDGMENT Vijay Bishnoi, J. - The present criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 15.12.2017 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Srikaranpur, District Sriganganagar (for short ’the trial court’) in Sessions Case No.11/2016 (C.I.S. No.14/2016), whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced for life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/-. 2. Brief facts of the case are that P.W.-3 Najar Singh lodged a written report (Exhibit/P-5) before the SHO, Police Station, Gajsinghpur, District Sriganganagar stating therein that he is resident of Srikaranpur and having four daughters and one son namely Jagsir Singh aged about 26 years. He also stated in the written report that accused Nanak Ram is his neighbour and on 24.03.2016, at about 02:30 PM, he was at his house and his wife, son Jagsir Singh and daughter-in-law were celebrating Holi in their house; the house of neighbour Nanak Ram is seen from his house because the height of wall situated in between their houses is short; at that time, accused Nanak Ram was in drunken state and was hurling abuses, upon which, his son Jagsir Singh went to the house of Nanak Ram along with one Balvinder Singh son of Sampurn Singh and asked him not to hurl abuses, then suddenly, Nanak Ram got annoyed and brought a gun from a room of his house and fired a gunshot on the chest of his son Jagsir Singh. It is further stated in the written report that he and his family members witnessed the said incident while standing in their house. At that time, son-in-law of Nanak Singh’s brother was also present in the house and his son Jagsir Singh was taken to a government hospital at Srikaranpur in 108 ambulance where he died on account of gunshot injury caused by convict - Nanak Ram. 3. On receiving this report, the Police registered FIR No.39/2016 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act at Police Station, Gajsinghpur and started investigation. After investigation, the Police filed chargesheet against the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and the matter was committed to the trial court. 4. After investigation, the Police filed chargesheet against the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and the matter was committed to the trial court. 4. The trial court framed charges against the accused appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act. The appellant has denied the charges levelled against him and claimed trial. 5. To prove its case against the appellant, the prosecution has produced as many as 16 prosecution witnesses and also got exhibited around 41 documents. The statement of the convict appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein the appellant had stated that he had no intention to kill the deceased and the gun-shot was fired accidentally. 6. The trial court after hearing arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Public Prosecutor and after scrutinizing the evidence available on record has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, however, acquitted him from the charges for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The trial court has sentenced the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC for life imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs.2,000/-. 7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. HSS Kharlia assisted by Ms. Kinjal Purohit, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has not questioned the correctness of the findings of the trial court holding the appellant guilty of the said criminal offence, however, the only contention raised before us is that even as per the prosecution case, the only offence for which the appellant can be convicted and sentenced would be under Part II of Section 304 IPC and not under Section 302 IPC. Learned counsel has argued that from the evidence available on record, it can be gathered that though, the appellant had knowledge that his act of firing gunshot is likely to cause death, but he had no intention to kill the deceased. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant while inviting our attention towards the statements of the eye-witnesses i.e. P.W.-3 Najar Singh, P.W.-6 Sukhdev Kaur and P.W.-7 Bhagwanti has argued that the said eye-witnesses are the parents and wife of the deceased and all of them have specifically admitted in their statements that there was no animosity between the appellant and their family. Learned counsel for the appellant while inviting our attention towards the statements of the eye-witnesses i.e. P.W.-3 Najar Singh, P.W.-6 Sukhdev Kaur and P.W.-7 Bhagwanti has argued that the said eye-witnesses are the parents and wife of the deceased and all of them have specifically admitted in their statements that there was no animosity between the appellant and their family. It is further argued that as a matter of fact, deceased-Jagsir Singh and Balvinder Singh entered into the house of the appellant and started thrashing him and the appellant with the intention to threaten them had pointed the gun at Jagsir Singh and he caught hold of the barrel of the gun, however, during the scuffle, the shot was fired accidentally. It is also argued that it is a case of sudden provocation, wherein the deceased provoked the appellant and accidentally, the gunshot was fired without there being any intention on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased. 9. Learned counsel has further invited our attention towards Exhibit D-1 the statement of P.W.-3 Najar Singh recorded by the Police on 25.03.2016, wherein it is stated that the convict appellant Nanak Ram, in a drunken state of mind, started abusing, then his son Jagsir Singh went to his house to stop him, however, the convict appellant caught hold of him and both of them scuffled, then the convict brought a loaded gun and his son caught hold of the barrel of that gun, then the convict had fired the gunshot. It is submitted that the incident took place because the deceased and one another person entered into the house of the appellant and started thrashing him, then the appellant got provoked and brought a gun to threaten them, but the gunshot was fired accidentally without there being any intention on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has, therefore, submitted that the trial court has grossly erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC, though the case against him does not travel beyond Section 304 Part-II IPC. 11. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vinit Kumar Chouhan Vs. State of UP reported in 2008 R.Cr.D 178 (SC) and Balkar Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand reported in JT 2009 (5) SC 1. 12. 11. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vinit Kumar Chouhan Vs. State of UP reported in 2008 R.Cr.D 178 (SC) and Balkar Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand reported in JT 2009 (5) SC 1. 12. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the appeal and argued that the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the appellant fired gunshot with the intention to kill the deceased, therefore, the trial court has not committed any illegality in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully scrutinized the record of the trial court. 14. It is noticed that the houses of the complainant P.W.-3 Najar Singh, deceased Jagsir Singh and appellant are adjacent to each other. Both the houses are separated by a small wall. On the fateful day, people are celebrating Holi festival and the appellant was consuming liquor with one of his relatives in the courtyard of his house, which is visible from the house of the deceased also. It is alleged that the convict-appellant was hurling abuses and despite warnings, he did not stop, then deceased Jagsir Singh along with one Balvinder Singh entered into the courtyard of the appellant and both of them scuffled there. 15. It is also to be noticed that from the statements of P.W.-3 Najar Singh, P.W.-6 Sukhdev Kaur and P.W.-7 Bhagwanti, it is clear that there was no animosity between the two families and the appellant was not hurling abuses towards the deceased’s family. The above eye-witnesses, in their statements, have admitted that the convict was not hurling abuses towards them, but was using foul language, which was objected by the deceased. 16. Now, the question in this case is whether the appellant had any intention to kill the deceased or not. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rampal Singh Vs. State of U.P., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 289 while defining the distinction between Sections 300, 302 IPC on the one hand and Section 304 Part-I and Part-II of the IPC on the other has observed as under :- "9. Having completed narration of the facts and noticed the precise contentions raised before us in the present appeal, we may now refer to the law on the subject. Having completed narration of the facts and noticed the precise contentions raised before us in the present appeal, we may now refer to the law on the subject. We are of the opinion that elucidative discussion on the legal principles governing the distinction between Sections 300, 302 of the Code on the one hand and Section 304, Part I and Part II of the Code on the other, would be necessary to precisely answer the questions raised. 10. Sections 299 and 300 of the Code deal with the definition of ’culpable homicide’ and ’murder’, respectively. In terms of Section 299, ’culpable homicide’ is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it, emphasises on the expression ’intention’ while the latter upon ’knowledge’. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in ’culpable homicide’, that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be ’culpable homicide’. Section 300, however, deals with ’murder’ although there is no clear definition of ’murder’ in Section 300 of the Code. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, ’culpable homicide’ is the genus and ’murder’ is its species and all ’murders’ are ’culpable homicides’ but all ’culpable homicides’ are not ’murders’. 11. Another classification that emerges from this discussion is ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under Section 304 of the Code. There is again a very fine line of distinction between the cases falling under Section 304, Part I and Part II, which we shall shortly discuss. 12. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. : (1976) 4 SCC 382 , this Court while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under: 12. In the scheme of the penal Code, ’culpable homicide’ is genus and ’murder’ its species. All ’murder’ is ’culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. : (1976) 4 SCC 382 , this Court while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under: 12. In the scheme of the penal Code, ’culpable homicide’ is genus and ’murder’ its species. All ’murder’ is ’culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called ’culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ’murder’. The second may be termed as ’culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ’culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 13. Section 300 of the Code proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the Code. ’Culpable homicide’ may or may not amount to ’murder’, in terms of Section 300 of the Code. When a ’culpable homicide is murder’, the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the Code while in other cases, that is, where an offence is ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the Code. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the Code. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail. of course, the principles that have been stated in various judgments like Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v. State of A.P. : (2002) 7 SCC 175 ,Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab : AIR 1958 SC 465 and Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kerala : AIR 1966 SC 1874 are the broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. These are the cases which would provide precepts for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the Code they fall in. 14. v. State of Kerala : AIR 1966 SC 1874 are the broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. These are the cases which would provide precepts for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the Code they fall in. 14. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the Code, i.e., ’culpable homicide’ and ’murder’ respectively. In the case of Phulia Tudu and Anr. v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) : AIR 2007 SC 3215 , the Court noticed that confusion is caused if courts, losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections. The Court provided the following comparative table to help in appreciating the points of discussion between these two offences: Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done - INTENTION (a) with the intention of death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused ; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse or incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 15. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse or incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 15. Section 300 of the Code states what kind of acts, when done with the intention of causing death or bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death or causing bodily injury to any person, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or the person causing injury knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, would amount to ’murder’. It is also ’murder’ when such an act is committed, without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury. The Section also prescribes the exceptions to ’culpable homicide amounting to murder’. The explanations spell out the elements which need to be satisfied for application of such exceptions, like an act done in the heat of passion and without pre-mediation. Where the offender whilst being deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person who has caused the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident, provided such provocation was not at the behest of the offender himself, ’culpable homicide would not amount to murder’. This exception itself has three limitations. All these are questions of facts and would have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a given case. 16. This Court in the case of Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P. : (2007) 14 SCC 660 noticed that academic distinction between ’murder’ and ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ had vividly been brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya : (1976) 4 SCC 382 , where it was observed as under: ... that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of Section 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said sections. that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of Section 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of Section 299 and 300 of the Code and the drawing support from the decisions of the court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab and Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, speaking for the court, Justice RS Sarkaria, neatly brought out the points of distinction between the two offences, which have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the court said that wherever the Court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, on the facts of a case, it would be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be that the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Two, if such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to culpable homicide as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the First or Second part of Section 304, depending respectively, on whether this second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the cases come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first part of Section 304 of the Code. It was, however, clarified that these were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative. 17. Having noticed the distinction between ’murder’ and ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, now we are required to explain the distinction between the application of Section 302 of the Code on the one hand and Section 304 of the Code on the other. 18. 17. Having noticed the distinction between ’murder’ and ’culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, now we are required to explain the distinction between the application of Section 302 of the Code on the one hand and Section 304 of the Code on the other. 18. In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 9 SCC 462 , the Court held that in order to hold whether an offence would fall under Section 302 or Section 304 Part I of the Code, the courts have to be extremely cautious in examining whether the same falls under Section 300 of the Code which states whether a culpable homicide is murder, or would it fall under its five exceptions which lay down when culpable homicide is not murder. In other words, Section 300 states both, what is murder and what is not. First finds place in Section 300 in its four stated categories, while the second finds detailed mention in the stated five exceptions to Section 300. The legislature in its wisdom, thus, covered the entire gamut of culpable homicide that ’amounting to murder’ as well as that ’not amounting to murder’ in a composite manner in Section 300 of the Code. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily the punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either of the offences. 19. An analysis of these two Sections must be done having regard to what is common to the offences and what is special to each one of them. The offence of culpable homicide is thus an offence which may or may not be murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed in Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases not covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into two distinct classes, that is (a) those in which the death is intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case the sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the maximum sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In the latter case, imprisonment is only optional, and the maximum sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10 years. In the former case the sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the maximum sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In the latter case, imprisonment is only optional, and the maximum sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10 years. The first clause of this section includes only those cases in which offence is really ’murder’, but mitigated by the presence of circumstances recognized in the exceptions to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only with the cases in which the accused has no intention of injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Fatta v. Emperor, 1151. C. 476 20. Thus, where the act committed is done with the clear intention to kill the other person, it will be a murder within the meaning of Section 300 of the Code and punishable under Section 302 of the Code but where the act is done on grave and sudden provocation which is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender himself, the offence would fall under the exceptions to Section 300 of the Code and is punishable under Section 304 of the Code. Another fine tool which would help in determining such matters is the extent of brutality or cruelty with which such an offence is committed. 21. An important corollary to this discussion is the marked distinction between the provisions of Section 304 Part I and Part II of the Code. Linguistic distinction between the two Parts of Section 304 is evident from the very language of this Section. There are two apparent distinctions, one in relation to the punishment while other is founded on the intention of causing that act, without any intention but with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. It is neither advisable nor possible to state any straightjacket formula that would be universally applicable to all cases for such determination. Every case essentially must be decided on its own merits. The Court has to perform the very delicate function of applying the provisions of the Code to the facts of the case with a clear demarcation as to under what category of cases, the case at hand falls and accordingly punish the accused." 18. Recently, in Mohd. Every case essentially must be decided on its own merits. The Court has to perform the very delicate function of applying the provisions of the Code to the facts of the case with a clear demarcation as to under what category of cases, the case at hand falls and accordingly punish the accused." 18. Recently, in Mohd. Rafiq vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 706 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after noticing the earlier judgments on the point, has held as under :- "11 . The question of whether in a given case, a homicide is murder, punishable Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, or culpable homicide, of either description, punishable Under Section 304 Indian Penal Code has engaged the attention of courts in this country for over one and a half century, since the enactment of the Indian Penal Code; a welter of case law, on this aspect exists, including perhaps several hundred rulings by this Court. The use of the term "likely" in several places in respect of culpable homicide, highlights the element of uncertainty that the act of the Accused may or may not have killed the person. Section 300 Indian Penal Code which defines murder, however refrains from the use of the term likely, which reveals absence of ambiguity left on behalf of the Accused. The Accused is for sure that his act will definitely cause death. It is often difficult to distinguish between culpable homicide and murder as both involve death. Yet, there is a subtle distinction of intention and knowledge involved in both the crimes. This difference lies in the degree of the act. There is a very wide variance of degree of intention and knowledge among both the crimes. 12. The decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. notes the important distinction between the two provisions, and their differing, but subtle distinction. The court pertinently pointed out that: 12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide" is genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice- versa. Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 13. The academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. 13. The considerations that should weigh with courts, in discerning whether an act is punishable as murder, or culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, were outlined in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. This Court observed that: 29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls Under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the Accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable Under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable Under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder are treated as murder punishable Under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances; (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the Accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;(viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the Accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstance is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention." 19. As discussed earlier, the incident took place on the day of Holi when the appellant was consuming liquor along with his relative in his courtyard and it is alleged that he was hurling abuses and using foul language, which the deceased’s family took as offensive and tried to stop him. It is alleged that, when the appellant did not stop to hurl the abuses despite warnings, deceased Jagsir Singh reached the courtyard of the appellant, where the scuffle took place between them. It is alleged that, when the appellant did not stop to hurl the abuses despite warnings, deceased Jagsir Singh reached the courtyard of the appellant, where the scuffle took place between them. It is noticed that the appellant was arrested immediately after the incident and as per the arrest memo, the shirt of the appellant was found torn. From the above, it can be gathered that the scuffle took place between the deceased and the appellant. 20. The further allegation against the appellant is that he brought a gun from his house and fired a gunshot on the chest of the deceased. The eye-witnesses, namely, P.W.-3 Najar Singh, P.W.-6 Sukhdev Kaur, P.W.-7 Bhagwanti and P.W.-12 Balvinder Singh, in their statements, have alleged that the appellant had fired gunshot from a distance, but the post-mortem report suggests that the gunshot wound caused on the chest of the deceased was spread in few inches, which suggests that the gunshot was fired from very short distance. It is true that the appellant had the knowledge that due to gunshot injury, complainant’s son could be died, but it cannot be gathered that he had intention to kill the deceased, particularly when no previous animosity is established between the parties, and the appellant had no motive to kill the deceased. It is also to be noticed that though in his police statement and in the written complaint, P.W.-3 Najar Singh has alleged that the convict-appellant was hurling abuses and using foul language and despite warning, when he did not stop, deceased Jagsir Singh went to his house along with one Balvinder Singh to stop him, but in his court statement, he has stated that the appellant and his guest were quarreling and deceased went to his house to stop them from doing so and, as such, the complainant has stated a different reason, for which, the deceased had approached the house of the appellant. 21. From the above discussion, we are of the view that the present case falls under the exception contained in Section 300 IPC and is a simpliciter case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, for which, maximum punishment prescribed in Section 304 Part-II IPC is ten years. 22. Hence, this appeal is allowed in part. 21. From the above discussion, we are of the view that the present case falls under the exception contained in Section 300 IPC and is a simpliciter case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, for which, maximum punishment prescribed in Section 304 Part-II IPC is ten years. 22. Hence, this appeal is allowed in part. The conviction awarded to the appellant under Section 302 IPC is converted into the conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant is reduced to eight years, however, the appellant shall pay the fine of Rs.2,000/- imposed by the trial court, in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo three months’ rigorous imprisonment. 23. The judgment of the trial court is modified accordingly.