ORDER : Order dated 10/02/2023 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Surendrnagar in Civil Misc. Application No.57 of 2022 condoning the delay of 194 days caused in preferring the appeal before the learned first appellate Court against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is sought to be challenged in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Necessary facts for deciding this petition are that petitioner has filed RCS No.51 of 2013 before learned Civil Judge, Muli which was decreed in favour of the petitioner on 20/03/2020 wherein petitioner has prayed for removal of encroachment from the land of the petitioner. The petitioner has also preferred execution being Regular Execution No.1 of 2021 before the learned Court below and during the proceeding of the execution, respondent has filed Civil Misc. Application No.57 of 2022 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 196 days caused in preferring the appeal which came to be allowed by the learned first appellate Court after hearing both the sides and said delay was condoned on the ground of payment of costs of Rs.500/- with the DLSA, Surendranagar. The said order has been challenged in this petition. 3. Heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. 4. Drawing the attention of this Court to page nos.26 and 29 learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that respondent have participated in the Darkhast proceeding. Firstly, they have taken date on 01/03/2021 and then on 07/10/2022; meaning thereby, the respondent had full knowledge about the passing of the judgment and decree against them, yet the respondent had waited upto 11th hours for filing the appeal. He would further submit that normally objection to the delay condonation are not raised; but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case whereby the learned trial Court has not noticed the aspect that respondent has participated in the execution proceeding which indicates that respondent has knowledge about passing of the judgment and decree against him and yet within the time period or within reasonable time period, the appeal is not preferred. He would further submit that learned first appellate court seriously erred in not discussing the said reasons and passed the order contrary to the facts on record of the case. This submission has been canvased to allow this petition. 5. He would further submit that learned first appellate court seriously erred in not discussing the said reasons and passed the order contrary to the facts on record of the case. This submission has been canvased to allow this petition. 5. Learned Advocate Mr.Harsh Vyas for the respondent on the other hand would submit that objection raised by the petitioner for condoning the delay had been raised by him even before the learned first appellate Court and by referring to Annexure-C of the petition, he would submit that all the objections which are raised herein by the petitioner was also raised before the learned first appellate Court. He would further submit that learned first appellate court after having considered the objections on record was pleased to exercise the discretion and condoned the delay. He would further submit that allowing the respondent to file the first appeal, the first appellate Court is not granting any extraordinary relief; but permitted the respondent to espouse his cause to be decided on the merits. He would further submit that since the first appellate Court has decided to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondent and further believed to adopt the liberal approach, the first appellate Court has not committed any error much less any error on facts and in understanding the provisions of law. By making such submissions, he would submit to dismiss the petition. 6. Having heard learned Advocates for the respective parties, at the outset, let refer to the findings of the learned first appellate court rendered in paragraph 7 to 9 which reads thus: “7. For condonation of delay, the applicants are required to prove that there is sufficient cause. It is well settled that the words “Sufficient Cause” has to be liberally construed but it cannot be crystallized in to rigid rules nor can it be encased in any straight jacket formula. In each individual case, the surrounding circumstances of the case are required to be looked into. It is also well settled that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and causes of justice being defeated. As against this, if the delay is condoned at the most that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the necessary parties. It is also well settled that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and causes of justice being defeated. As against this, if the delay is condoned at the most that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the necessary parties. However, it is not necessary to explain each and every day delay but the doctrine requires to be applied in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner. The delay should not be deliberate or malafile or on account of negligence. It is also well settled when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, substantial justice requires to be preferred. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties but they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. It is also well settled that while deciding a delay condonation application, merits of the case are also not required to be considered and previous conduct for parties in the matter is required to be overlooked while considering the delay condonation application. 8. In this matter, considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and on perusing the record and keeping in mind the settled proposition of law, it transpires that the impugned judgment and decree has been passed against the present applicant/original defendant by the learned trial court on 20/03/2020 and after that due to Covid 19 pandemic, lockdown was declared by the Government. Not only this, as per the guideline of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, the court had remained close for a pretty long period and when the applicant came to know regarding passing of the impugned and decree , he applied for the certified copies of the judgment and decree before the learned trial court and after getting the same, the applicant has preferred the present delay condone application to prefer the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. 9. Hence, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no malafide or negligency or dilatory tactics on the part of the applicant. It is also evident that the judgment and decree of matter in question is passed against the present applicant. 9. Hence, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no malafide or negligency or dilatory tactics on the part of the applicant. It is also evident that the judgment and decree of matter in question is passed against the present applicant. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the issues involved in the matter in question and the order passed on factual aspects are to be dealt with in accordance with law and the right for preferring the appeal against the order in question is a valuable right of the applicants which must be protected. Furthermore, as per the settled law it is quite justifiable to deal with the real issue of the matter in appeal against the impugned order instead of disposing the matter on such technical ground of delay. Moreover, if the delay condonation application is allowed, the other side is not going to suffer any damage.” 7. Learned Advocate for the petitioner is correct in submitting that the respondent was aware about the passing of the judgment and decree; but to overcome this aspect the respondent has pleaded that they were engaged in the treatment of his father who died on 05/08/2021. The submission is also made that respondent came to know about the judgment and decree only on 20/05/2022; however the said submissions is not correct in view of the two application referred to at page No.26 and 29 of the petition. But, what is weighed to the learned first appellate Court for condoning the delay is to adopt the liberal approach and permit the respondent to espouse the cause on merit. It is settled law that the litigant should not be jettisoned on the technical ground. It is true that applicant is to explain the delay; but it cannot insist that delay should be explained in such a manner which inspires the confidence of other litigant party. If the delay is explained and conscience of the Court is appealed, it could be construed that party seeking condonation of delay has satisfactorily explained the delay. There cannot be any iron casted formula for explanation of delay. Delay aspect is always weighed with the facts of each case; but in all, principle of substantial justice prevails. 8. This Court can have worthy assistance of the decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. Vs. Msr. Katji and Ors. There cannot be any iron casted formula for explanation of delay. Delay aspect is always weighed with the facts of each case; but in all, principle of substantial justice prevails. 8. This Court can have worthy assistance of the decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. Vs. Msr. Katji and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 9. Assistance can also be availed from the decision in the case of State (NCT Of Delhi) Versus Ahmed Jaan [ 2008 (4) SCC 582 ]; where in paragraph 10 to 15 held as under: “10. In State of Kerala V/s. E. K. Kuriyipe, 1981 Supp SCC 72, it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi V/s. Dina Nath, 1982 3 SCC 366 , it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. In Milavi Devi V/s. Dina Nath, 1982 3 SCC 366 , it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Art. 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits. 11. In O. P. Kathpalia V/s. Lakhmir Singh, 1984 4 SCC 66 , a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition V/s. Katiji, 1987 2 SCC 107 , a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Sec. 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a Licenced to : Honble Mr.Justice Jitendra Champaklal Doshi Page 5 of 6 rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 12. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non- grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha V/s. Ram Parkash Kalra, 1987 Supp SCC 339, this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 13. In G. Ramegowda, Major V/s. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 1988 2 SCC 142 , it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 13. In G. Ramegowda, Major V/s. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 1988 2 SCC 142 , it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Sec. 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. 14. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 15. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 15. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana V/s. Chandra Mani and Ors., 1996 3 SCC 132 ; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala V/s. K.V. Ayisumma, 1996 10 SCC 634 and State of Nagaland V/s. Lipok AO and Ors., 2005 3 SCC 752 . It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal” 9. In view of the above settled legal position as well as principle, this Court finds no patent illegality in the impugned order which has been passed in accordance with law. The Court has permitted the respondent to espouse the cause on merit. To be noted that the first appeal is a statutory right. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed. However, considering the cause which is litigated between the parties, it is expected from the learned first appellate Court to hear and decide RCA No.7 of 2023 as early as possible; preferably within 12 months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this order.