JUDGMENT: 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908, is filed by the appellant/defendant, challenging the decree and common Judgment dated 24.02.2014 in O.S. No.187 of 2012 and A.S. No.299 of 2011 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada (for short, ‘trial Court’). 2. The present Appeal is filed questioning the decree and Judgment in O.S. No.187 of 2012. 3. The parties will be referred to as arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments, of the plaint, in O.S. No.187 of 2012 are as under : (a) The plaintiffs initiated the suit seeking eviction and damages amounting to Rs.7,500/-per month from the date of suit till the date of delivery of the schedule property. The plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Kota Lakshmikantha Rao, the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 and 5 to 9 and husband of the 4th plaintiff. He passed away intestate on 14.03.2010 leaving the plaintiffs as his heirs. In the plaint schedule property, the defendant joined as a tenant on 01.07.2003 on a monthly rent of Rs.4,000/-, subsequently, the rent was increased to Rs.4,400/- from 01.07.2008. The defendant paid rent untill December, 2008 but defaulted from 01.01.2009 onwards. Kota Lakshmikantha Rao got issued a quit notice to the defendant on 07.12.2009 directing the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule premises and deliver possession by 31.01.2010 and demanded payment of arrears of rent from 01.01.2009 onwards. In response, the defendant sent a reply notice on 29.12.2009. On 03.01.2010, the defendant sent a Demand Draft for Rs.2,000/- along with a covering letter claiming it to be the rent for December 2009, in reply, Kota Lakshmikantha Rao issued a rejoinder to the defendant stating that the defendant must pay the arrears of rent @ Rs.4,400/-per month from 01.01.2009 to 01.01.2010 totalling Rs.52,800/-. Subsequently, the defendant filed R.C.C.No.13/2010 and deposited rent @ Rs.2,000/-per month into the Court. (b) The plaintiffs along with Kota Lakshmikantha Rao filed a suit in O.S.No.251 of 2010 against the defendant to recover rent arrears. During the suit's pendency, Kota Lakshmikantha Rao died, leaving the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. On 06.11.2010, the plaintiff s issued a quit notice to the defendant. In respondent, the defendant issued a reply reiterating the baseless allegations. (b) The plaintiffs along with Kota Lakshmikantha Rao filed a suit in O.S.No.251 of 2010 against the defendant to recover rent arrears. During the suit's pendency, Kota Lakshmikantha Rao died, leaving the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. On 06.11.2010, the plaintiff s issued a quit notice to the defendant. In respondent, the defendant issued a reply reiterating the baseless allegations. (c) The plaintiffs also asserted that they demanded the defendant to pay Rs.7,500/-per month as damages for the use and occupation of the plaint schedule property from 01.12.2010 onwards, by contending that the defendant’s tenancy was terminated by 30.11.2010, as the defendant became a tenant holding over from 01.12.2010 onwards. Despite numerous demands made by the plaintiffs to vacate the property, the defendant deliberately chose not to comply. 5. The defendant filed a written statement, denying most of the allegations made in the plaint, contending that the schedule shop was in question was taken on oral lease from the father of plaintiff's 1 to 3 & 5 to 9 in 2003 on a monthly rent of Rs.1,500/-, along with an advance payment of Rs.25,000/-. As per the lease agreement, the rent would be increased every five years with mutual consent, and the lease term was set for twenty years. In 2008, the rent was increased from Rs.1,500/- p.m. to Rs.2,000/- p.m., and the defendant consistently paid the rent until 2009. However, while receiving the rent for November 2009, the landlord's son arbitrarily and unlawfully demanded an exorbitant increase of rent from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.5,000/-. As the plaintiffs refused to receive the rent, the defendant was constrained to file R.C.C. No.13 of 2010, and since then, the defendant has been regularly depositing the rent with the Court. Furthermore, the defendant asserts that she is not liable to pay any amount exceeding Rs.2,000/-per month, much less Rs.7,500/- as claimed by the plaintiffs. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues in O.S. No.187 of 2012:- (1) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? (2) Whether the quit notice is true and valid? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction of the defendant from the suit scheduled property and also entitled to the damages @ Rs.7500/- p.m. from the date of filing of the suit till the eviction of the defendant? (4) To what relief? 7. (2) Whether the quit notice is true and valid? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction of the defendant from the suit scheduled property and also entitled to the damages @ Rs.7500/- p.m. from the date of filing of the suit till the eviction of the defendant? (4) To what relief? 7. During the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 and two were examined, and Exs.A.1 to A.12 documents were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined, and Exs.B1 to B3 documents were marked. After the completion of the trial and hearing arguments from both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for, however, by fixing the damages at Rs.4,840/-per month. 8. Sri Manikanteswara Rao Kotha, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant contends that the quit notice dated 16.11.2010 is invalid; the defendant was duly inducted into the plaint schedule property under an oral lease for a duration of 20 years with an initial rent of Rs.1,500/-per month in the year 2003 with an advance amount of Rs.25,000/-. He further emphasized that the defendant had filed RCC.No.13 of 2010, which was subsequently decreed under Ex.B1, as a result, the appellant/defendant has been paying the rent @ Rs.2,000/-per month from December 2009 till the present. He further contends that the defendant’s husband, who was examined D.W.1, denied the alleged signature on Ex.A3; the trial Court failed to consider the authenticity of Ex.A.3; the respondent failed to establish the rent payable for the schedule premises as either Rs.4,000/- or Rs.4,400/-per month; the signatures of D.W.3 being minor, have no validity. 9. Per contra, Sri V. Subrahmanyam, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs would contends that the trial Court correctly appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any modifications. 10. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination : 1. Whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit as on the date of institution of the suit? 2. Whether the quit notice issued under section 106 of the Transport of Property Act is in accordance with the law? 3. Whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit as on the date of institution of the suit? 2. Whether the quit notice issued under section 106 of the Transport of Property Act is in accordance with the law? 3. Whether fixing the quantum of damages at Rs.4,840/-per month would be just and proper? 4. If so, to what relief the parties are entitled? POINTS NO.1 TO 3: 11. The learned Counsel representing the appellant/defendant would submit that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit at all for the reason that the agreed rent per month is Rs.1,500/- and the premises are governed by the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. He also pointed out that in the light of the specific plea taken, the quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (For short, 'the Act') is not in accordance with the law. 12. The learned Counsel representing the respondents/land owners, the plaintiffs in the suit, would contend that quit notice is in accordance with law and even otherwise, in the light of language employed by section 106 of the Act as substituted by Amending Act 3 of 2003, the defence, if any need not be seriously considered. 13. Upon careful examination of the evidence, the following facts emerged as either admitted or undisputed : (a) Pursuant to the orders of the Composite High Court of A.P. in C.R.P. No.587 of 2012, dated 18.05.2012, the suit originally filed as O.S. No.75 of 2011 was transferred from the I Additional Junior Civil Judge Court, Vijayawada to the II Additional District Judge Court, Vijayawada with a direction to consolidate the suit with A.S. No.299 of 2011 which was already pending before the II Additional District Court, Vijayawada. Following the transfer, the suit (O.S. No.75 of 2011) was renumbered as O.S. No.187 of 2012 on the file of II Additional District Court, Vijayawada. (b) A.S.No.299 of 2011 was preferred by the appellant/ defendant, who was aggrieved by the Decree and Judgment in O.S. No.251 of 2010 on the file of III Additional District Court, Vijayawada. O.S. No.251 of 2010 was initiated to recover rents amounting to Rs.60,900/-, equivalent to 13½ months @ Rs.4,400/-. (b) A.S.No.299 of 2011 was preferred by the appellant/ defendant, who was aggrieved by the Decree and Judgment in O.S. No.251 of 2010 on the file of III Additional District Court, Vijayawada. O.S. No.251 of 2010 was initiated to recover rents amounting to Rs.60,900/-, equivalent to 13½ months @ Rs.4,400/-. The plaintiffs 2 to 4 in the said suit are sons of the 1st plaintiff, the owners of the rented premises, while the defendant is the tenant. (c) The plaint schedule property originally belonged to Kota Lakshmikantha Rao, who was the father of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and 5 to 9 as well as the husband of the 4th plaintiff. Following his demise intestate, the plaintiffs have inherited his legal rights. The schedule property comprises of shop rooms with doors Nos.37-44 and 37-45 facing Bandar road. (d) The plaint schedule property in O.S. No.251 of 2010 consisted of two shop rooms, located on Bandar Road, opposite Government Ayurvedic College – cum – Hospital. The defendant/ appellant became a tenant of the schedule property on 01.07.2003 operating business of Ayurvedic medicines. Notably, the schedule property in O.S. No.251 of 2010 is the same as that of in O.S. No.187 of 2012. (e) The appellant/defendant initiated R.C.C. No.13 of 2010 before the Rent Controller, Vijayawada, seeking permission to deposit the rent. The appellant claimed that the rent payable was Rs.2,000/-per month. Whereas, the owners of the schedule property disputed the said contention. The appellant relied on Ex.B.2 which is a certified copy of the order in R.C.C. No.13 of 2010. The Rent Controller passed an order under Ex.B.2, allowing the defendant to deposit the rent @ Rs.2,000/-per month. It is mentioned in Ex.B.2 that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to determine the quantum of rent. The order emphasized that the dispute regarding the quantum of rent should be resolved in the civil suit specifically in O.S. No.251 of 2010, which was filed to recover rent arrears. 14. After carefully considering the evidence on record, the suit in O.S. No.251 of 2010 was decreed, the defendant/appellant is directed to pay the arrears of rent which amounted to Rs.60,900/- with the provision to deduct any amount already deposited by the defendant in R.C.C. No.13 of 2010 for the period from 01.01.2009 to 15.03.2010. 15. 14. After carefully considering the evidence on record, the suit in O.S. No.251 of 2010 was decreed, the defendant/appellant is directed to pay the arrears of rent which amounted to Rs.60,900/- with the provision to deduct any amount already deposited by the defendant in R.C.C. No.13 of 2010 for the period from 01.01.2009 to 15.03.2010. 15. Dissatisfied with the Decree and Judgment in O.S. No.251 of 2010, the defendant/appellant herein preferred Appeal in A.S. No.299 of 2011. In a consolidated Judgment dated 24.02.2014, the II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada, disposed of A.S. No.299 of 2011 and O.S. No.187 of 2012. The Court upheld the contentions of the owners of the schedule property, ordering the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule premises and deliver vacant possession within three months of the decree. Furthermore, the Court confirmed the plaintiffs claim validating the rent for the schedule premises as Rs.4,400/-per month and affirming the defendant’s default in payment of rent as alleged in the suit in O.S. No.251 of 2010. It is worth noting that the appellant has not provided any record to demonstrate preferring the appeal against the orders in A.S. No.299 of 2011. In the absence of such an appeal, the findings rendered in A.S. No.299 of 2011 hold finality as the dispute between the parties primarily concerned the quantum of rent payable by the tenant. 16. In the light of background facts, this Court intends to address the rival contentions raised in this Appeal. In reference to the Judgment in O.S. No.187 of 2012, the trial Court determined the damages for the use and occupation of the schedule premises at Rs.4,840/-per month effective from 01.12.2010. While the trial Court did not accept the plaintiffs’ claim for damages set at Rs.7,500/-, it is crucial to highlight that the plaintiffs did not prefer Appeal or cross-objections against that finding, resulting in its finality. As observed by the trial Court, it is pertinent to determine the rent payable for the schedule premises which directly decides the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. If the rent is indeed Rs.2,000/-per month as contended by the defendant/appellant, then the Rent Controller has jurisdiction over the matter and the plaintiffs should seek eviction through that channel. Conversely, if the rent for the schedule premises is established at Rs.4,400/-per month, then the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to try the suit. If the rent is indeed Rs.2,000/-per month as contended by the defendant/appellant, then the Rent Controller has jurisdiction over the matter and the plaintiffs should seek eviction through that channel. Conversely, if the rent for the schedule premises is established at Rs.4,400/-per month, then the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to try the suit. According to plaintiffs’ claim, the rent was initially set at Rs.4,000/-per month, and subsequently increased to Rs.4,400/-per month from 01.07.2008 onwards. Thus, the primary contention at hand is whether the plaintiffs can substantiate their contention that the rent for the schedule premises is at Rs.4,400/-per month. It is an undisputed fact that the defendant has been in possession of the plaint schedule property as a tenant since 01.07.2003. It is important to note that there is no written tenancy agreement between the parties. 17. In support of their case, the plaintiffs relied on Exs.A.1 to A.12 documents. Their main contention is that a practice existed, wherein rent receipts were issued whenever tenants made rent payments. PWs.1 and 2 have explicitly stated that they used to issue rent receipts and retain counterfoils. However, the defendant disputes the practice of issuing rent receipts. In contrast, the plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.3 a certified copy of the rent receipt book which containing counterfoils related to the schedule premises. 18. In support of the defendant's case, the defendant's husband V.V.L.N. Ramakrishna Sharma, is examined as DW.1. The defendant also got examined her son as DW.2. It is undisputed that the original of Ex.A.3, the rent receipt book was filed in O.S. No.251 of 2010. The defendant contends that Ex.A.3 is fabricated and created document. Admittedly, Ex.A.3 receipt book contains counterfoils. As far as the schedule premises, is concerned, the counterfoil starts from Sl. No.17 to 79. The counterfoil for Sl. No.17 dated 01.08.2003 shows that the rent was paid through a cheque with No.28172 drawn on Union Bank of India. DW.1 admits that his wife has an account in the same bank, and account No.28127 belongs to his wife, who operates it through a cheque system. Nevertheless, DW.1 denied the suggestion that they issued a cheque on 01.08.2003 to the K. Lakshmikantha Rao for Rs.4,000/- as rent for July 2003. However, DW.1 failed to produce the passbook of Union Bank relating to the defendant's account for the year 2003. Nevertheless, DW.1 denied the suggestion that they issued a cheque on 01.08.2003 to the K. Lakshmikantha Rao for Rs.4,000/- as rent for July 2003. However, DW.1 failed to produce the passbook of Union Bank relating to the defendant's account for the year 2003. The defendant has not provided any explanation for non-production of the account book. If the defendant contends that the cheque was not issued as rent payment, they could have produced the account book to support their claim. The absence of bank pass book raises doubt about the defendant's case and it is reasonable to draw an adverse inference against the defendant for failing to produce it. 19. It is not DW.1's stand that the cheque was issued for some other purpose than the payment of rent. The defendant has not provided an explanation as to how the plaintiffs obtained the cheque related to DW.1's wife. This document supports the plaintiffs' claim regarding the rent payable for the scheduled premises. The counterfoil dated 01.08.2003 at Sl. No.17 includes the details of the cheque and the account number. It indicates that rent payments were made in the name of Renuka Agencies for the shop rooms with door numbers 37-44 and 37-45. As the tenancy began in July 2003, the trial court rightly observed that the plaintiffs could not have fabricated a counterfoil for the first month of the tenancy. Additionally, it is not explained how the plaintiffs were aware of the defendant's account number at the start of the tenancy. The trial court disregarded the defendant's claim of counterfoil fabrication after providing reasons. 20. The defendant raised an argument regarding the payment of an advance amount of Rs.25,000/- at the start of the tenancy. However, no receipt or acknowledgement has been filed to substantiate this claim. Without supporting documents, it is difficult to accept this contention. On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue that they did not receive any advance amount due to the proposed demolition of a portion of the building for road widening. 21. Although DW.3 provided evidence supporting the defendant's argument regarding the rent payable for the scheduled property, this Court does not consider the oral testimony of DW.3 to carry significant weight, as the counterfoils from Ex.A.3 establish that the rent payable for the schedule property was initially Rs.4,000/-per month and later increased to Rs.4,400/-per month. 22. 21. Although DW.3 provided evidence supporting the defendant's argument regarding the rent payable for the scheduled property, this Court does not consider the oral testimony of DW.3 to carry significant weight, as the counterfoils from Ex.A.3 establish that the rent payable for the schedule property was initially Rs.4,000/-per month and later increased to Rs.4,400/-per month. 22. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.12, a certified copy of DW.1's deposition in O.S. No.251 of 2010. It is worth noting that DW.1, who is the defendant's husband, was also examined as DW.1 in that case, and his deposition is marked as Ex.A.12. In Ex.A.12, DW.1 admitted that they started a business in the scheduled premises as a branch of their business establishment at S.N.Puram. He further mentioned that they paid rent of Rs.2,000/-per month for a shop at S.N.Puram after closing their business there in 2008. Based on this evidence, the trial court observed that Bandar Road, where the scheduled premises are located, is a busy commercial area, whereas S.N.Puram is far away from Bandar Road. It is difficult to believe that when the defendant was paying rent of Rs.2,000/-per month in the year 2000 at S.N.Puram, they would have taken the scheduled premises on rent for Rs.1,500/-per month. There is no evidence on record to suggest that the trial court's finding is incorrect. 23. It is admitted that the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 issued Ex.A4, a quit notice demanding the defendant to vacate the scheduled premises and deliver possession to the plaintiffs by 31.01.2000. Ex.A.5 is a certified copy of the reply sent by the defendant, while Ex.A.8 is a certified copy of the rejoinder to that reply notice. The defendant then issued another reply, the original of which is Ex.A.9, and the plaintiffs responded with Ex.A.10. Ex.A.11 is the reply issued by the defendant. There is no significant dispute between the parties regarding the exchange of these notices. These notices reflect the positions taken by both parties in the suit. After the demise of the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3, the plaintiffs issued Ex.A.1, a quit notice dated 06.11.2010, demanding that the defendant vacate the premises by 30.11.2010 and pay damages at the rate of Rs.7,500/-per month from 01.12.2010 onwards. Ex.A.2 acknowledges the receipt of Ex.A.1 quit notice. After the demise of the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3, the plaintiffs issued Ex.A.1, a quit notice dated 06.11.2010, demanding that the defendant vacate the premises by 30.11.2010 and pay damages at the rate of Rs.7,500/-per month from 01.12.2010 onwards. Ex.A.2 acknowledges the receipt of Ex.A.1 quit notice. In Ex.A.1 quit notice, it is stated that the tenancy is on a month-to-month basis, commencing from the 1st of every month, and the rent payable is Rs.4,400/-per month for the two shop room portions. The tenancy of the defendant is stated to be terminated by 30th November 2010, and the defendant is directed to vacate the schedule property. Failure to do so would result in the defendant being liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs.7,500/-per month from 01.12.2010 onwards. The defendant does not argue that there is any variance in the terms and conditions of the lease as stated in Ex.A.1 and Ex.A.4. Although Ex.A.1 does not explicitly reference Section 106 of the Act, it still functions as a notice for the determination of the lease. The reasons for terminating the lease mentioned in Ex.A.1, with a date aligned with the end of the month in which the notice was issued, clearly indicate that it is a quit notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Act. 24. Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act 1882, deals with the duration of certain leases in absence of a written contract or local usage, which reads as hereunder : (1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice. A lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in subsection (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of the notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in subsection (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of the notice. (3) A notice under subsection (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section. (4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. 25. The observations of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Bhagabandas V. Bhagawandas, A.I.R. 1977 SC 1120, make the point clear in this regard. In that case, also, it was mentioned in the quit notice that the tenant shall vacate the house and deliver possession to the landlord within the specified period. The specific terminology of terminating the tenancy was not used in that particular case also. In those circumstances, it is observed by their Lordships in Para-3 of the Judgment : “Now it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed res magis valent quam pereat, “The validity of a notice to quit”, as pointed out by Lord Justic L indley, L.J. in Sidebotham Vs. Holland (1895) 1 QB 378, “ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw”. It must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way”. 26. The defendant issued a reply notice as evidenced by Ex.A.11. The trial Court correctly noted that since the tenancy is month to month basis, provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be applicable. Although the defendant contends that quit notice is illegal and not valid under the law, no supporting reasons were provided to substantiate the contentions. 27. The trial Court correctly noted that since the tenancy is month to month basis, provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be applicable. Although the defendant contends that quit notice is illegal and not valid under the law, no supporting reasons were provided to substantiate the contentions. 27. Upon careful examination of the content of Ex.A.1 quit notice and the reasoning provided by the trial Court, it is evident that the quit notice issued under Ex.A.1 is in full compliance with sub-section (1) of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The trial Court after providing its detailed reasons, rightly observed that quit notice issued by the plaintiffs 1 to 3 after the death of K. Lakshmikantha Rao, cannot be considered a waiver of notice to quit. 28. It is born out from the record after the issuing of notice by the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3; he died, and subsequently, the plaintiffs got issued Ex.A.1 notice. Section 111 (h) of the Act provides how the lease is to be determined in the case a notice is issued for termination of tenancy. It reads as follows : “(h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other”. 29. Section 106 of the Act does not insist that the consequential suit must be filed within a time. The plaintiffs could not pursue the legal action consequent to the notice issued by K. Lakshmikantha Rao; this Court views that it does not bar the plaintiffs from issuing fresh notice and initiating legal action based on the said notice. In the facts of the case, the trial Court's finding “the giving of quit notice by the plaintiffs 1 to 3 after the death of their father cannot be considered as a waiver of notice to quit” cannot be found fault with. As rightly observed by the trial Court, the defendant did not plead that there was a waiver of quit notice. 30. In the light of the clear evidence available on record and in the light of the amended provision, which had watered down the rigour of section 106 of the Act as it originally stood before the amendment Act, the submissions regarding the validity of quit notice are not sustainable. 30. In the light of the clear evidence available on record and in the light of the amended provision, which had watered down the rigour of section 106 of the Act as it originally stood before the amendment Act, the submissions regarding the validity of quit notice are not sustainable. Given all these circumstances, the trial Court rightly held that Ex.A.1 is a valid notice to quit satisfying all the requirements of section 106 of the Act. Therefore, the respondents are entitled to seek eviction of the appellant from the premises. 31. The trial Court after considering the location of the building and enhancement of rent from Rs.4,000/- to Rs.4,400/- after the lapse of five years, the damages be ascertained for the scheduled premises at Rs.4,840/- by increasing the rent by 10% over the existing rent which was last enhanced in 2008. The trial Court has given reasons to fix the damages at Rs.4,840/-per month from 01.12.2010. As such, the said finding cannot be interfered with. 32. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the view that the findings and observations of the trial court are in accordance with the evidence on record. I find that there is no valid ground made out by the appellant/defendant to interfere with the Judgment of the trial Court, and hence the Judgment is hereby affirmed. This Appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. The impugned Judgment passed by the trial court is upheld. Accordingly, the points are answered. POINT NO.4: 33. As a result, the Appeal fails, and it is hereby dismissed with costs by confirming the Decree and Judgment in O.S. No.187 of 2012, dated 24.02.2014. The appellant/defendant is granted three months to vacate the premises subject to the following conditions : 1. The appellant/defendant shall file an undertaking before the trial Court within one month from today that she would vacate the premises on or before the expiry of three months from today. 2. If such undertaking is not filed within one month from today, the decree shall be executable forthwith without any further reference to this Court. 34. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.