JUDGMENT : The defendants in the suit, O.S.No.447/2022, of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam, are the petitioners herein. The suit is essentially one for declaration that a settlement deed executed by the husband of the 1st plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant is void, non-est and invalid. Recovery of possession of Schedule B to F properties, upon declaring the plaintiffs title, is also sought for. 2. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs preferred I.A. No.1/2022 seeking an injunction restraining the 1st defendant from alienating plaint C to F schedule properties; from effecting further construction in plaint D schedule property; from obstructing plaint J schedule road; and from causing any obstruction to the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint A schedule property. As per Ext.P11 order, the learned Munsiff allowed I.A.No.1/2022 in part, restraining alienation of C to F schedule properties and obstructing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint A schedule property by the plaintiffs. However, the injunction sought for from effecting further construction in plaint D schedule property was rejected. Both plaintiffs and the defendants carried Civil Miscellaneous Appeals from Ext.P11 order. By Ext.P14 common order, the Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendants (petitioners herein) and allowed that of the plaintiffs (respondents herein), thus granting injunction from effecting any further construction in D schedule property as well. Ext.P14 common order is under challenge in this Original Petition. 3. Heard Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned senior counsel, instructed by Sri.P.B.Krishnan, on behalf of the petitioners and Sri.C.S.Manilal, learned counsel for the respondents. 4. The solitary dispute before this Court is with respect to the grant of injunction from proceeding with the construction in plaint D schedule property, which was refused by the learned Munsiff, but allowed by the learned District Judge. The essential facts, insofar as it pertains to the short issue before this Court, are recorded thus: Plaintiffs are the wife and children of late Udaya Kumar and defendants 1 and 2 are his brother and mother respectively. The 3rd defendant is the son of the 1st defendant. The said Udaya Kumar passed away due to chronic kidney disease on 16.11.2022. Two months before the death, precisely on 16.09.2022, the said Udaya Kumar executed Ext.P4 settlement deed in favour of his brother/1st defendant, as per which, his rights over schedule C to F properties were settled on the 1st defendant. The said Udaya Kumar passed away due to chronic kidney disease on 16.11.2022. Two months before the death, precisely on 16.09.2022, the said Udaya Kumar executed Ext.P4 settlement deed in favour of his brother/1st defendant, as per which, his rights over schedule C to F properties were settled on the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs contend that Ext.P4 document was executed, at a time when, the said Udayakumar was in the 5th stage of chronic kidney disease and was undergoing frequent dialysis, thus suffering from cognitive dysfunction. He was not in a sound disposing state of mind and hence incapable of instructing the scribe for registration of any instrument and that Ext.P4 document was got executed by the 1st defendant in his favour by taking advantage of the impaired cognitive features of deceased Udaya Kumar, wherefore, Ext.P4 is a fraudulent document, liable to be adjudged void and non-est. 5. According to the defendants, the infirmity sought to be attached to Ext.P4 is without any bonafides; that the mental health of late Udaya Kumar, as also, his capacity to understand things, were never affected, though he was suffering from kidney disease at the time of execution of Ext.P4 document; that the relationship between the said Udaya Kumar and his wife/1st plaintiff was completely estranged; that the 1st plaintiff filed Ext.P3 suit before the Family Court concerned on 31.08.2022 against the said Udayakumar, in which proceeding, he appeared before the court for mediation on 15.11.2022, the day immediately preceding his death; and therefore, the execution of Ext.P4 document, two months prior to his death, cannot be assailed as infirm or invalid for reason of the alleged impaired disposing state of mind. 6. The contentions are broadly recorded only to understand the basic case pleaded by the parties. 7. Now, coming to the issue before this Court, which pertains to the construction of a commercial building in plaint D schedule property, it is admitted in Ext.P5 plaint, as also, in Ext.P7 application for injunction that the 1st floor of the building was constructed by late Udaya Kumar himself, after obtaining permit and license in his name. 7. Now, coming to the issue before this Court, which pertains to the construction of a commercial building in plaint D schedule property, it is admitted in Ext.P5 plaint, as also, in Ext.P7 application for injunction that the 1st floor of the building was constructed by late Udaya Kumar himself, after obtaining permit and license in his name. The suit was moved on 17.12.2022 and the status of the building has been noted in Ext.P9 commission report dated 19.01.2023, wherein it is recorded that the construction of the ground floor of the western block has been completed and the work in respect of the 1st floor was going on. As regards the eastern block of the building, no construction was started, except erecting five pillars. This explains the reason why, the plaintiffs sought for an injunction restraining the defendants from “proceeding with further constructions” in D schedule property. As a matter of fact, the building has been separately described as Schedule-I to the plaint. Since there was no injunction restraining further construction until Ext.P14 order was passed, the construction has proceeded with and the 1st floor has also been completed. The present status of the building constructed in plaint D schedule property could be seen from Ext.P10 photograph produced in this Original Petition. That apart, the fact that the construction of the structure is almost complete has been taken note of by the learned District Judge in paragraph no.48 of the impugned Ext.P14 order. In such state of affairs, the question is, whether completion of the construction should be prevented by way of an injunction, as has been done by the learned District Judge in Ext.P14 order. 8. Both the learned Munsiff and the learned District Judge found a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs (respondents herein). While the learned Munsiff found prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs in the matter of restraining alienation of plaint C to F schedule properties and found that the construction going on in the property need not be stalled, the learned District Judge found the balance of convenience in this regard as well in favour of the plaintiffs and prevented further construction. The findings as regards the prima facie case and the balance of convenience were seriously assailed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The findings as regards the prima facie case and the balance of convenience were seriously assailed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. In respect of the prima facie case, learned Senior Counsel would submit that, merely because a challenge is raised against the validity of a registered document, the owner of the property cannot be deprived of the rights and incidents of ownership. It cannot be presumed or inferred that the cognitive features -and thereby the sound disposing state of mind -of late Udaya Kumar were affected, only for reason of his kidney disease and due to the fact that he was undergoing dialysis. Learned Senior Counsel would emphasise that the document in question is a registered one, that the said Udaya Kumar had appeared for mediation before the Family Court even on the day immediately preceding his death, and that the relationship between the said Udaya Kumar and his wife/1st plaintiff was seriously estranged, to contend that the legality and validity of Ext.P4 document, which was executed two months prior to the date of death of the said Udayakumar, is prima facie vouchsafed. Disinheriting the natural heirs cannot be taken as a circumstance suspicious to doubt the veracity of a registered sale deed evidencing transfer inter vivos. These submissions were seriously refuted by the learned counsel for the respondents, who toed in line with the findings of the learned Munsiff and the District Judge, insofar as prima facie case and balance of convenience is concerned. Learned counsel emphasised that further construction, if permitted, would result in irreversible injury to the respondents/plaintiff. 9. It may not be proper for this Court to express any opinion at this stage of the suit as regards the validity of Ext.P4 document, as the same may prejudice one of the parties to the lis in the trial. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the challenge posed to Ext.P4 sale deed is only on the premise that the cognitive features of late Udaya Kumar was impaired, thus affecting his sound disposing state of mind. On the one hand, we have a registered sale deed evidencing a transaction; and on the other, we have a few treatment records showing that the said Udaya Kumar was suffering from serious kidney disease, which ultimately led to his death on 16.11.2022. On the one hand, we have a registered sale deed evidencing a transaction; and on the other, we have a few treatment records showing that the said Udaya Kumar was suffering from serious kidney disease, which ultimately led to his death on 16.11.2022. There exists no material, as of now, to show that the mental capacity and the disposing state of mind of the said Udaya Kumar was impaired as on the date of execution of Ext.P4 document, that is, 16.09.2022, which is two months before this date of death. As found by both the courts, the same is a matter for evidence, before which, it would be too premature to arrive at an opinion, though prima facie, as regards the infirmity/invalidity sought to be attached in Ext.P4. 10. Confining to the issue before this Court, which pertains to completion of construction, the question as to who stands to gain by stalling the construction should necessarily be addressed. As already indicated, the construction of the structure is almost complete, as evidenced from Ext.P10 photograph. If such a building is to remain as such until the culmination of the suit and possibly, the appeals therefrom, it goes without saying that, neither the plaintiffs, nor the defendants would stand to gain. The expenditure claimed to have been made by the defendants would become a dead investment, especially in view of their contention that substantial loans were availed for the purpose of construction. The situation would have been completely different, had the subject matter of the lis is a landed property, pure and simple, unburdened by any building thereof. Here is a situation, where there exists a building, the construction of which is substantially complete. To keep it as such, may not subserve the interest of any of the parties. Per contra, if the commercial building is permitted to be completed and put to use commercially, the same will enable generation of income/profit. Now, the question is, who should reap the benefit of the profit. As things stand now, the 1st defendant is the registered owner of the property under Ext.P4 sale deed and the plaintiffs pose a challenge to the same only on legal grounds envisaged under Sections 11, 12 or 19 of the Indian Contract Act. 11. In this regard, this Court will notice one decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Mandali Rangana and Ors. v. T.Ramachandra and Ors. 11. In this regard, this Court will notice one decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Mandali Rangana and Ors. v. T.Ramachandra and Ors. [ (2008) 11 SCC 1 ], which specifically address the issue, as to whether the constructions made shall be permitted to be completed pending litigation, especially when huge amounts have been spent. Paragraph nos.23 and 24 of the said judgment are extracted here below: “23. Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up. They cannot be directed to be demolished, at least at this stage. Respondent No.7 is said to have spent three crores of rupees. If that be so, in our opinion, it would not be proper to stop further constructions. 24. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if while allowing the respondents to carry out constructions of the buildings, the same is made subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. The Trial Court is requested to hear out and dispose of the suit as early as possible. If any third party interest is created upon completion of the constructions, the deeds in question shall clearly stipulate that the matter is subjudice and all sales shall be subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. All parties must cooperate in the early hearing and disposal of the suit. Respondents must also furnish sufficient security before the learned Trial Judge within four weeks from the date which, for the time being, is assessed at Rupees One Crore.” 12. One decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass [2004 (8) SCC 199]. That was a case, where the suit was one for possession of the schedule property, wherein the plaintiff sought for an injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property and from putting up any construction thereof. The Honourable Supreme Court held that no extraordinary ground is made out to permit the defendant to put up construction and alienate the schedule property. In this decision, this Court notice that the property was not encumbered with any building as on the date of institution of the suit, in which situation, there cannot be any quarrel that the status quo obtaining as on the date of the suit has to be maintained, so as to preserve the subject matter of the suit. In this decision, this Court notice that the property was not encumbered with any building as on the date of institution of the suit, in which situation, there cannot be any quarrel that the status quo obtaining as on the date of the suit has to be maintained, so as to preserve the subject matter of the suit. But, a situation, where the construction of the ground floor has already been completed, as on the date of institution of the suit, by expending substantial amounts, is one which can be more appropriately dealt with in accord with the dictum laid down in Mandali Rangana (supra). 13. This Court also takes into account the classical requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. One distinguishing feature, which this Court notice in the given facts, is the existence of multiple interlocutory reliefs of injunction, that is to say, to restrain the defendants from alienating the property, from effecting any further construction therein, from obstructing the passage through plaint J schedule property and to restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint A schedule property by the plaintiff etc. In such cases, contours and parameters of balance of convenience and irreparable injury in respect of each interim relief may vary and will have to be appropriately and independently assessed. In other words, the balance of convenience, as also, irreparable injury for the purpose of grant of an interim relief restraining alienation of property, may not be the same for grant of an interim relief preventing further construction. So also, the parameters for balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the context of obstruction of the pathway through plaint J schedule may also be different and independent. It is necessary to bear in mind the above aspects, when multiple interim reliefs are sought for in the same petition. However, to ascertain the prima facie case, the same has to be assessed vis-a-vis the main relief sought for in the suit, except in circumstances where a separate prima facie case needs to be addressed in the context of the interim relief sought for. 14. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that, subject to a direction for accounting the profit/income reaped from the building, the petitioners can be permitted to complete the constructions and put the building for profitable use. 14. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that, subject to a direction for accounting the profit/income reaped from the building, the petitioners can be permitted to complete the constructions and put the building for profitable use. Necessary directions for accounting, coupled with appropriate intervention by the Munsiff Court concerned as regards the correctness of accounts, would safeguard the interest of the respondents herein (plaintiffs in the suit), so that, if the suit is ultimately decreed, the respondents can claim such profit derived from the building. If the other course of preventing completion of construction is adopted, certainly the respondents/plaintiffs do not stand to gain anything out of it. Thus, in order to prevent idling of a substantially constructed building and also to prevent the money spent by the registered owner becoming a dead investment, this Court is of the opinion that the completion of construction can be permitted. 15. The remaining question to be addressed is with respect to the cost of improvements made in plaint D schedule property, which weighed with the learned District Judge in extending the injunction to prevent further construction as well. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would concede that the petitioners/defendants would not claim any cost of improvement in respect of any further construction to be made in the building. The construction thus far made is sought to be justified on the premise that there was no prohibitory order of injunction restraining the petitioners from doing so, at the time when such constructions were effected. The correctness of the said contention canvassed by the learned senior counsel is, again, a matter to be decided in the suit, especially when a substantial portion of the construction, with respect to the 1st floor was done after the institution of the suit, that is to say pendente lite. The question as to whether such constructions effected pending litigation, though in the absence of a prohibitory order of injunction, is liable to be deemed at the risk and cost of the petitioners/defendants is a larger issue to be decided in the suit. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the said issue can be relegated for consideration by the learned Munsiff, after trial based on evidence and pleadings. 16. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the said issue can be relegated for consideration by the learned Munsiff, after trial based on evidence and pleadings. 16. In the circumstances, Ext.P14 order is set aside and the restraint on petitioners is confined to the matters contemplated in Ext.P11 order of the learned Munsiff, subject to the following conditions: i) Learned Munsiff will appoint a Commissioner to have an overall supervision of the remaining constructions to be effected and also for recording the cost involved for the same. ii) Upon completion of construction, the Commissioner shall take note and report before the court, as to the terms and conditions under which the building is let out or put to use, especially with respect to the financial component involved. iii) Any renewal of lease or other business arrangement shall be promptly notified to the court by the petitioners, with notice to the Commissioner as well, who shall verify the correctness thereof and ascertain the financial involvement, so as to report to the Court. iv) The petitioners shall furnish accounts to the court, the authenticity of which will be cross checked by the Commissioner. v) The Commissioner will be at liberty to file interim reports as and when circumstance demands. 17. The whole idea behind the above directions is to ensure that there is proper accounting of the benefits/profits to be reaped from the building in question pendente lite, so as to enable the learned Munsiff to take a final call in the matter, if the suit is found liable to be allowed ultimately. 18. Before leaving the judgment, one more contention of the respondents requires to be referred to. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the plaintiff had deviated from the approved permit and plan, since he had given up his idea to effect constructions on the eastern block and that in the absence of a revised plan, he cannot continue with a construction. This Court is not inclined to address the same in this Original Petition, since such a case is not seen pleaded in the plaint, or for that matter, in the injunction application. If the respondents have any grievance in this regard, it is for them to seek appropriate remedy in this regard. This Court is not inclined to address the same in this Original Petition, since such a case is not seen pleaded in the plaint, or for that matter, in the injunction application. If the respondents have any grievance in this regard, it is for them to seek appropriate remedy in this regard. This Court may also clarify that the contention with respect to the plaintiff's right claimed through plaint J schedule pathway is also not addressed in this Original Petition, though argued by both sides, for the reason that the same does not form the subject matter of this Original Petition. This Court notice that in Ext.P7 injunction application, one among the reliefs sought for, was to restrain the respondents therein from obstructing the user of J schedule, which runs through plaint D schedule property. In this regard, no relief is seen granted by the learned Munsiff in Ext.P11 order; nor such relief is seen granted by the learned Additional District Judge in Ext.P14 order. The same is not the subject matter of this Original Petition and hence not addressed herewith. With the above observations and directions, this Original Petition will stand disposed of.