JUDGMENT : The Second Appeal has been filed assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 01.10.2007, passed in A.S.No.18 of 2006 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty. The learned District Judge, while allowing the appeal filed by the plaintiff, had set aside the decree and Judgment dated 03.07.2006 of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty passed in O.S.No.43 of 2001. 2. This Revision Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is preferred against the order, dated 05.09.2018, in E.A.No.53 of 2018 in E.P.No.24 of 2013 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, which is filed under Section 151 of C.P.C seeking relief to consider the changes occurred in the boundaries of the E.P schedule property and direct the Court Amin to deliver the property to the Decree Holder. 3. Since the issue involved in Second Appeal and C.R.P is one and the same, the same are heard and are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 4. The parties will herein after be referred to as they are arrayed in the Original Suit for the sake of convenience. 5. The plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No. 43 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty against the defendants for eviction and delivery of possession of the suit schedule property and to direct the defendants to pay arrears of rent of Rs. 11,700/- up to the end of January, 2001 and future rent from the date of suit till delivery of the suit schedule property with costs. The averments in the plaint, in brief are as under:- The plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from the 1st defendant under a Registered Sale Deed dated 16.09.1998 and constructed a Zinc Sheet shed therein. He let out the same to the 1st defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/- under a lease agreement, that the defendants 1 to 3 have started hotel business and started paid rents up to April-2000, later failed to pay the rents since may, 2000 onwards. Hence the suit. 6. Per contra, the defendants filed Written Statement by denying all material averments made in the plaint and contended that the 1st defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 60,000/- and executed a Sale Deed dated 16.09.1998 in favour of the plaintiff. Hence the suit. 6. Per contra, the defendants filed Written Statement by denying all material averments made in the plaint and contended that the 1st defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 60,000/- and executed a Sale Deed dated 16.09.1998 in favour of the plaintiff. The 1st defendant raised temporary zinc sheet shed in the suit schedule property for the purpose of running hotel therein. Further it was agreed to reconvey the said property after discharge of the amount borrowed by the 1st defendant and later he paid an amount of Rs. 50,000/- on 29.06.2000. Further the defendant never executed lease agreement dated 15.09.1999 and did not pay any rent to the plaintiff. The alleged lease agreement dated 15.09.1999 is created and fabricated document. Therefore the suit is liable to be dismissed. 7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court eventually framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant possession of the suit property? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled arrears of the rent of Rs. 11,700/- upto January 2001 and also future rent from February-2001 till the date of delivery of the suit? 3. To what relief? 8. During the course of trial PWs-1 to 6 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked and on behalf of the defendants, DWs-1 and 4 were examined and marked Ex.B1 to B13. 9. After full-fledged trial, the trial could held that the plaintiff failed to establish the relationship of the land-lord and tenant and also quantum of rent and service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore he is not entitled for eviction and delivery of possession of the suit schedule property and dismissed the suit with costs. 10. Assailing the said judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 18 of 2006. The first appellate court has framed the following points for consideration in the Appeal: 1. Whether plaintiff purchased the suit property from the defendant No.1 through a registered sale deed dated 16.09.98? 2. Whether there is a landlord and tenant relationship in between the plaintiff and 1st defendant? 3. Whether the notice under Section 160 of Transfer of Property Act is mandatory in the present suit? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for arrears of rent? 5. 2. Whether there is a landlord and tenant relationship in between the plaintiff and 1st defendant? 3. Whether the notice under Section 160 of Transfer of Property Act is mandatory in the present suit? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for arrears of rent? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the suit property? 6. Whether the decree and judgment by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, are liable to be set aside? 11. The First Appellate Court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case allowed the appeal on merits on 01.10.2007 by setting aside the decree and judgment in O.S.No.43 of 2001, dated 03.07.200 Consequently the suit of the plaintiff for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent was decreed with costs and the defendants were directed to vacate and deliver possession of the suit property within one month from the date of decree, failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to execute the decree and further directed the defendants to pay Rs. 11,700/- towards arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff. 12. Assailing the Judgment of the First Appellate Court, the appellants herein, who are respondents/defendants 1 and 2, before the court below filed this Second Appeal, seeking to set aside the First Appellate Court’s decree and Judgment. 13. This court while admitting the Second Appeal has framed the following substantial question of law, which are as under:- 1. Whether the document which was rejected by the trial court on the ground that it is not valid, the appellate court can accept the same and decide the matter on the basis of the document? 2. Whether the Court has right to compare the signature and decide the matter on the basis of the hand-writing in the absence of sending the same to the hand-writing expert? 3. Whether the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary when the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the landlord and tenant relationship exists? 4. Whether the Court can order eviction on the basis of a collateral document? 14. During pendency of the suit, 1st defendant died leaving behind him the defendants 2 and 3, who are appellants herein stepped into the shoes of deceased 1st defendant being his legal heirs. 1st respondent is the appellant/plaintiff before the court below. 15. 4. Whether the Court can order eviction on the basis of a collateral document? 14. During pendency of the suit, 1st defendant died leaving behind him the defendants 2 and 3, who are appellants herein stepped into the shoes of deceased 1st defendant being his legal heirs. 1st respondent is the appellant/plaintiff before the court below. 15. Heard Mr.P. Sree Ramulu Naidu, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. S. Dilip Jayaram, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 16. During hearing learned counsel for the appellants i.e respondents 1 and 2 before the first appellate court/defendants 2 and 3 before the trial court would contend that the first appellate court ought to have seen that PW-1 admitted in the cross examination, the fact that he purchased the schedule property under Ex.A1 and constructed a shed therein, without permission from the Grampanchayat. Therefore when the plaintiff has not taken any permission, there is no question of constructing the shed in the open land and in support of his contention no documentary evidence is placed on record. It is further contended that the first appellate court ought to have seen that the plaintiff has not taken any electricity connection for running the hotel in the suit schedule property. When the defendants are running a hotel in the said premises with power connection, that itself shows that the defendants have taken power connection after constructing the shed. It is further contended that the lease deed Ex.A1 is not a registered one, it is not admissible in evidence and it cannot be used even for collateral purpose and that in a suit for eviction, lease deed is the basic document, but it cannot be marked as exhibit as the same is unregistered document and the trial court also rejected to mark the same. The plaintiff has not filed any document to establish that the defendants paid the rent till January-2001. Therefore the findings of the first appellate court are based on mere surmises and the same is liable to be set aside. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant is the owner of the suit property, he in turn sold the same to the plaintiff under Ex.A1 Registered Sale Deed and that the property was delivered possession to the plaintiff on the date of document itself. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant is the owner of the suit property, he in turn sold the same to the plaintiff under Ex.A1 Registered Sale Deed and that the property was delivered possession to the plaintiff on the date of document itself. Further Ex.A4 is a Sale Deed executed by the 1st defendant in respect of the property covered in the suit schedule survey number, which was executed by DW-1 subsequent to Ex.A1. Therefore the plaintiff purchased the suit property under Ex.A1. Further the lease deed dated 15.09.1999 marked as Ex.A5 in the first Appeal, which is executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff and the same is also rightly observed by the first appellate court in its Judgment itself. Under the said circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to claim the relief as prayed for in the suit. With regard to substantial question of law on the point that: 1. Whether the document which was rejected by the trial court on the ground that it is not valid, the appellate court can accept the same and decide the matter on the basis of the document? Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff vehemently contended that the unregistered lease deed dated 15.09.1999 is marked as Ex.A5 as per orders in I.A.No.432 of 2007 in the Appeal in A.S.No.18 of 2006, which was not marked in the trial court. Further it is contended that earlier the trial court dismissed the application to receive the unregistered lease deed dated 15.09.1999. As against the same, no appeal was preferred. Subsequently the suit was dismissed with costs, against which the plaintiff preferred an Appeal in A.S.No.18 of 2006, wherein I.A.No.432 of 2007 filed to receive the lease deed dated 15.09.1999 and the same was allowed and marked as Ex.A5, which is highly illegal and arbitrary. Since no appeal preferred against the order passed by the trial court in rejecting the application on merits to receive the lease deed by the trial court and once again the very same document is brought into existence in the Appeal and marked the same is not in accordance with law. 19. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the Judgment in “Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand”, (2022) 7 SCC 247 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “6. 19. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the Judgment in “Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand”, (2022) 7 SCC 247 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “6. However, the High Court while considering the application for additional evidence has not appreciated the fact that the documents which were sought to be produced as additional evidence might have a bearing on determination of the fair market value of the acquired land. It is to be noted that except the sale deed dated 29.12.1987, which was rejected by the courts below, no further evidence was on record to determine the fair market value of the acquired land. It was a case of awarding of fair compensation to the landowner whose land has been acquired for public purpose. It cannot be disputed that the claimant whose land is acquired is entitled to the fair market value of his land. 7. It is true that the general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. It may also be true that the appellate court may permit additional evidence if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. However, at the same time, where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed……” 20. In “Parsotim Thakur Vs. Lal Mohar Thakur”, The Indian Law Reports Page 654 (Vol.X) 26.03.1931 (Patna Series) it was held as follows: “In their Lordships’ opinion this additional evidence ought not to have been admitted. If the respondents desired to give evidence as to the thumb impression, they had ample opportunity to do so in the trial Court. In “Parsotim Thakur Vs. Lal Mohar Thakur”, The Indian Law Reports Page 654 (Vol.X) 26.03.1931 (Patna Series) it was held as follows: “In their Lordships’ opinion this additional evidence ought not to have been admitted. If the respondents desired to give evidence as to the thumb impression, they had ample opportunity to do so in the trial Court. The provisions of section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code as elucidated by Order XLXI, r.27 are clearly not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the Court of Appeal.” 21. In “K. Venkataramaiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy and Others”, AIR 1963 SC 1526 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “13. It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl.(2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence. We are not prepared however, to accept the contention of the appellant that the omission to record the reasons vitiates the admission of the evidence. Clearly the object of the provision is to keep a clear record of what weighed with the appellate court in allowing the additional evidence to be produced- whether this was done on the ground (i) that the court appealed from had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or (ii) it allowed it because it required it to enable it to pronounce judgment in the appeal or (iii) it allowed this for any other substantial cause. Where a further appeal lies from the decision of the appellate court such recording of the reasons is necessary and useful also to the court of further appeal for deciding whether the discretion under the rule has been judicially exercised by the court below. The omission to record the reason must therefore be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory….” 22. Therefore, admissibility of additional evidence in appellate court not adduced in the court of original jurisdiction under order 41, rule 27 C.P.C does not depend upon the relevancy of the issue on hand. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory….” 22. Therefore, admissibility of additional evidence in appellate court not adduced in the court of original jurisdiction under order 41, rule 27 C.P.C does not depend upon the relevancy of the issue on hand. In the instant case, except unregistered lease deed i.e Ex.A5, which was rejected by the trial court, no further evidence was on record to determine the authenticity and relevancy of the document with regard to issue involved in the suit, how the document is relied upon is not vitiated in the eye of law. Therefore it is very clear that the first appellate court went in wrong notion and marked Ex.A5 document. 23. With regard to substantial question of law 2 to 4 concerned, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “A.Andisamy Chettiar Vs. A. Subburaj Chettiar”, (2015) 17 SCC 713 wherein it was held as follows: “11. Under the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) Whether oral or documentary, it is the trial court before whom parties are required to adduce their evidence. But in three exceptional circumstances additional evidence can be adduced before the appellate court, as provided under Section 107(1)(d) read with Rule 270 of Order 41 of the Code. Rule 27 of Order 41 reads as under: “27. Production of additional evidence in appellate court- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if- (a) The court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) The appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. Therefore, as per sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 cited supra, it is made clear that the parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary in the appellate court, but for the three situations referred supra. Further the parties are not allowed to fill up the lacunae at the stage of appeal. In the instant case, no appeal was preferred against the order passed in the document petition, which was dismissed by the trial court. 24. Further learned counsel for the respondent draws the attention of this Court, the findings given by this Court in “J.N.Eranna Rao Vs. Vitta Dodda Hanumanthappa Subbayya Setty and Co. Bellary and Adoni by Partner Vitta Anjaneya”, AIR 1960 AP 331 wherein it was held as follows: “22. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the lower appellate court should have drawn a hostile presumption on account of the failure on the part of the defendant to produce the relevant documents which were in his possession. It is said that the defendant should have produced the gate pass –book for the month of July 1951 as well as the stock-book for the month of July 1951 as well as the stock-book and the day-book and ledger for July. As regards the gate passbook the defendant did produce it in the trial court, though at a late stage. The plaintiff objected to its reception and the trial court shut it out. It is urged nevertheless that a presumption should be drawn against the defendant that had the gate passbook been produced, it would have gone against him. This is a most untenable proposition. As pointed out by Varadachariar J. in Sevugan v. Raghunatha, AIR 1940 Mad 273 at P.275 when repealing a similar contention: “It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the defendants could not seriously rely upon their alleged enjoyment because they had not produced their accounts showing the receipt of income by the temple from these lands. We are unable to appreciate this argument. Some of these accounts were filed before the First Survey Officer and marked as Exhibits O and P series. They were for some reason not produced before the Subordinate-Judge’s Court in time; when an attempt was made to produce them they were rejected by the learned Judge as having been produced too late. We are unable to appreciate this argument. Some of these accounts were filed before the First Survey Officer and marked as Exhibits O and P series. They were for some reason not produced before the Subordinate-Judge’s Court in time; when an attempt was made to produce them they were rejected by the learned Judge as having been produced too late. We do not wish to say anything against the learned Judge’s exercise of discretion in dealing with this attempt of the defendants to produce their documents. But the penalty for this conduct is in our opinion only to deprive the defendants of the benefit of the evidence afforded thereby. It does not, however, lie in the mouth of the plaintiff who, as the learned Judge says, strongly opposed their production, to contend that an adverse interference ought to be drawn against the defendants from the non-production of these documents”. It is therefore clear that no adverse inference can be drawn from the fact that the gate pass-book for the month of July 1951 was not produced by the defendant in time. Here in the instant case, the first appellate court without any witness, the court itself marked the said document as Ex.A5 and the judgment in main suit also delivered/pronounced, which established that the appellate court has not followed any procedural law established under Order 41, Rule 27 to 29 C.P.C. 25. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that when the respondent herein failed to establish landlord and tenant relationship, without any basis or any document he could not claim the suit property. The trial court rightly dismissed the suit observing the fact that there was no lease agreement and no document is filed to prove the landlord and tenant relationship and the plaintiff failed to prove his claim. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that if any document is received in evidence by the appellate court the appellate court remands the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration, but the first appellate court straight away marked the document, which is unregistered one, which is bad in law. The docket order of the trial court dated 19.09.2002 has become final. The docket order of the trial court dated 19.09.2002 has become final. Without taking steps on the said order, filing the same document in the appellate court to receive as additional evidence is beyond the scope of Order 41, Rule 27 of C.P.C. No ingredients of the said order is applicable. The first appellate court completely ignored the provision of order 41 rule 27 of C.P.C while allowing the I.A.No.432 of 2007 and that too on the date of pronouncement of judgment is also highly illegal and arbitrary. 27. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in AIR 1957 SC 912 , wherein it was held as follows: “3…… “It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the nonproduction of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (vide: State of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M.Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 28. So also, he relied on a decision “State of U.P Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava”, AIR 1957 SC 912 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme categorically discussed admissibility of the provision under Order 45, Rule 5 of C.P.C, at Para 3, which reads as follows: “It is well-settled that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lecunane in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps. Of course, the position is different where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties”. 29. Further in “B.S.Goutham Vs. Rama Murthy and Another”, (2021) 5 SCC 241 wherein, it was held as follows: “37. Of course, the position is different where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties”. 29. Further in “B.S.Goutham Vs. Rama Murthy and Another”, (2021) 5 SCC 241 wherein, it was held as follows: “37. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per the provisions of Order 41, the appellate court may permit additional evidence to be produced whether oral or documentary, if the conditions mentioned in Order 41 Rule 27 are satisfied after the additional evidence is permitted to be produced in exercise of powers under Order 41, Rule 27. Thereafter, the procedure under Order 41, Rules 28 and 29 is required to be followed. Therefore, unless and until the procedure under Order 41, Rules 27, 28 and 29 is followed, the parties to the appeal cannot be permitted to lead additional evidence and/or the appellate court is not justified to direct the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred or any other subordinate court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the appellate court. From the material produced on record, it appears that the said procedure has not been followed by the High Court while calling for the report from the learned Principal City Civil Judge”. He further relied on a decision in “Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India and Others”, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “5. The matter was carried in appeal. A Division Bench of the High Court examined the matter once over again and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Division Bench also noticed that at the end of the arguments the appellant made a submission that as they have not produced some of the important documents, the matter may be remanded to the trial court in order to enable them to produce the said documents and with a direction to the trial court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. The High Court did not allow the plea raised by the appellant that there are documents in question which will go to the root of the matter or which would be necessary in terms of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to permit them to adduce further evidence and on that basis rejected that claim. The High Court did not allow the plea raised by the appellant that there are documents in question which will go to the root of the matter or which would be necessary in terms of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to permit them to adduce further evidence and on that basis rejected that claim. The High Court affirmed the various findings given by the trial court. 6. In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the claim made before the High Court that they should be permitted to adduce further evidence before the Court to substantiate their claim but when the matters were pending before the trial court and the High Court they had ample opportunity to do so. If they had to produce appropriate documents, they could have done so and also it is not clear as to the nature of the documents which they seek to produce which will tilt the matter one way or the other. The scope of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is very clear to the effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, unless they have shown that in spite of due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents are required to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. In this view of the matter, we do not think there is any justification for us to interfere with the orders of the High Court. However, in view of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, we have also gone into various aspects of the matter and have given another look at the matter and out aspect needs to be noticed. The High Court need not have stated that the first respondent is entitled to the relief even on the basis of adverse possession. We propose to examine this aspect”. 30. In the above decision, the Hon’ble Division Bench also noticed that at the end of the arguments the appellant made a submission that as they have not produced some of the important documents, the matter may be remanded to the trial court in order to enable them to produce the said documents and with a direction to the trial court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. The High Court did not allow the said plea that there are documents in question which will go to the root of the matter or which would be necessary in terms of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to permit them to adduce further evidence and on that basis rejected that claim. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the above ruling, the appellant is entitled to set aside the decree and judgment dated 01.10.2007 in A.S.No. 18 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rayachody. 31. Perused the record. 32. The claim of the defendants is that the 1st defendant borrowed Rs. 60,000/- and executed Ex.A1 and that it was agreed to re-convey the property after discharge of the said amount, which fact is not recorded before the trial court, as pointed by the learned first appellate court. Further the first appellate court held that the first defendant executed Ex.A5 lease deed, which was executed subsequent to Ex.A1 sale deed. Therefore it was held that there is landlord and tenant relationship in between plaintiff and 1st defendant and plaintiff let out the suit property to the 1st defendant, which is wrong notion. 33. After close scrutiny of the findings of the both trial court as well as first appellate court, this Court opines that the first appellate has not taken into consideration the material aspects and failed to appreciate the findings of the trial court. The trial court has given valid reasons and the first appellate court has not dealt the issue in a right perspective. Further the decisions cited supra by the respondent/plaintiff are supporting the case of the appellants herein. Under these circumstances the Judgment of the first appellate court requires interference of this Court. Therefore, the Second Appeal is liable to be allowed. 34. As far as C.R.P is concerned, after issuance of delivery warrant, the said delivery warrant was returned without execution on the ground that boundaries of the suit schedule property was not tallied. The 1st petitioner/1st appellant would contend that after filing of the suit, original J.Dr by name Ramesh Naidu sold away the property situated in both western and northern side of petition schedule property to his brother by name Venugopal Naidu. Eastern side property purchased by sons of Shaik Ibrahim under a Registered Sale Deed dated 03.03.2001. The 1st petitioner/1st appellant would contend that after filing of the suit, original J.Dr by name Ramesh Naidu sold away the property situated in both western and northern side of petition schedule property to his brother by name Venugopal Naidu. Eastern side property purchased by sons of Shaik Ibrahim under a Registered Sale Deed dated 03.03.2001. According to her, after purchasing three sites property by purchasers, they made constructions in the property purchased by them. In view of the same, she filed the petition to issue delivery warrant by considering the changes made in the boundaries of the petition schedule property. The defendant did not file any counter. 35. After considering the factual aspects and submissions of learned counsel, the trial court held that the plaintiff obtained decree in the year 2007 and delivery warrant also issued, which was returned on the ground that the boundaries of the petition schedule property were not tallied with suit schedule property in the decree; it is admitted fact that there is no stay and appeal was dismissed. Further it was held that changes made in boundaries of suit schedule property have no bearing on the right of the D.Hr over the petition schedule property and the trial court is duty bound to implement the decree. Therefore the trial court allowed the application on 05.09.2018 in E.A.No.53 of 2018 in E.P.No.24 of 2013 in O.S.No.43 of 2001. Assailing the same, the present revision came to be filed. 36. Since this Court by this Common Judgment allowed the Second Appeal and consequently dismissed the suit, the continuation of the execution proceedings would not arise. Hence the order impugned in the C.R.P is also set aside. 37. Upon perusal of the material on record, the trial court has given proper reasons by taking into consideration the facts on record properly. The first appellate court has not dealt the issue in a right perspective and hence the judgment and order impugned requires interference of this Court. Therefore the Second Appeal and C.R.P are liable to be allowed. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has made clear observation that earlier the trial court dismissed the application to receive the unregistered lease deed dated 15.09.1999. Therefore the Second Appeal and C.R.P are liable to be allowed. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has made clear observation that earlier the trial court dismissed the application to receive the unregistered lease deed dated 15.09.1999. As against the same, no appeal was carried out and subsequently the very same document brought into existence in the first appellate court and got marked as Ex.A5 as per orders in I.A.No.432 of 2007 is highly illegal and unjust. Therefore the Judgment of the first appellate court is liable to be set aside. 39. Accordingly, the Second Appeal and C.R.P are allowed by a Common Judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand closed.