JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. R.S.Mazundar, the learned Senior counsel along with Mr. Nishant Kumar Roy, the learned assisting counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Rajneesh Vardhan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State and Mr. Mahesh Tewari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 12.08.2016 passed in connection with Complaint Case No.374 of 2016, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi. 3. The entire case is based on not providing the choice number for the vehicle in question after paying a sum of Rs.11,000/- for the same. 4. Mr. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance by order dated 12.08.2016 against these petitioners. By way of referring solemn affirmation he submits that the role of the petitioners played in such transaction has not been disclosed. He further submits that Celerio car was purchased by M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited and the company is not made an accused. He submits that the company has already deposited the amount and the form was duly submitted which was obtained from the office of the D.T.O. under the Right to Information Act contained at page-42 and 43. He submits that no ingredient of cheating from the very beginning is made out against the petitioners who happened to be the Directors of the said company/firm. He submits that when the petitioner came to know about the present case, a sum of Rs.11,000/- was already refunded by Annexure-3 to the main petition. He submits that when the company is not made an accused and if the allegations are made against the company the entire criminal proceeding is vitiated and to buttress his such argument he relied in the case of Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 806 and he refers to paragraph nos.27 and 28 of the said judgment which are quoted below: 27. As held by this Court in the case of India Infoline Limited (supra), in the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction about a prima facie case against the accused who are Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the Directors of the Company and the role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them. Looking to the averments and the allegations in the complaint, there are no specific allegations and/or averments with respect to role played by them in their capacity as Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Director, Deputy General Manager and Planner & Executor. Merely because they are Chairman, Managing Director/Executive Director and/or Deputy General Manager and/or Planner/Supervisor of A1 & A6, without any specific role attributed and the role played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences committed by A1 & A6. 28. From the order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing the process against the respondents herein - accused nos. 1 to 8, there does not appear that the learned Magistrate has recorded his satisfaction about a prima facie case against respondent nos. 2 to 5 and 7 & 8. Merely because respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 & 8 are the Chairman/Managing Director/Executive Director/Deputy General Manager/Planner & Executor, automatically they cannot be held vicariously liable, unless, as observed hereinabove, there are specific allegations and averments against them with respect to their individual role. Under the circumstances, the High Court has rightly dismissed the revision applications and has rightly confirmed the order passed by the learned Sessions Court quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing process against respondent nos. 1 to 8 herein - original accused nos. 1 to 8 for the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC. 5. 1 to 8 herein - original accused nos. 1 to 8 for the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC. 5. He submits that if the corporate criminal liability is there, the liability of directors, controlling authority of the company only arises, there must be specific statutory provision in that regard and vicarious liability in view of that cannot be fastened against the petitioners who happened to be Directors of M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited and to buttress his such argument, he relied in the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 17 SCC 193 and he refers to paragraph nos.19 to 21 of the said judgment, which are quoted below: 19. The liability of the Directors/the controlling authorities of company, in a corporate criminal liability is elaborately considered by this Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal [Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687]. In the aforesaid case, while considering the circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person, this Court has held, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. At the same time it is observed that it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides for. It is further held by this Court, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Further it is also held that an individual can be implicated in those cases where statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 20. Further it is also held that an individual can be implicated in those cases where statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 20. Though there are allegations of negligence on the part of the hotel and its officers who are incharge of day-to-day affairs of the hotel, so far as appellant-Accused 2 Shiv Kumar Jatia is concerned, no allegation is made directly attributing negligence with the criminal intent attracting provisions under Sections 336, 338 read with Section 32 IPC. Taking contents of the final report as it is we are of the view that, there is no reason and justification to proceed against him only on ground that he was the Managing Director of M/s Asian Hotels (North) Ltd., which runs Hotel Hyatt Regency. The mere fact that he was chairing the meetings of the company and taking decisions, by itself cannot directly link the allegation of negligence with the criminal intent, so far as appellant-Accused 2. Applying the judgment in Sunil Bharti Mittal [Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687] we are of the view that the said view expressed by this Court, supports the case of appellant-Accused 2. 21. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal [Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687] it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the accused. Further in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692 this Court has examined the vicarious liability of Directors for the charges levelled against the Company. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that, the Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, when the accused is a company. It is held that vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. It is held that vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. It is further held that statutes indisputably must provide fixing such vicarious liability. It is also held that, even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability. 6. On the aforesaid grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mahesh Tewari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2 submits that in the prayer portion the prayer is made only for the quashing of the order taking cognizance, however, there is no prayer of quashing of summons. He submits that all these petitioners assured and insisted the O.P.No.2 and that is why the O.P.no.2 has paid an additional amount of Rs.11,000/- for the choice number as 0135. By way of referring the paragraph nos.34, 40 and 41 of the counter affidavit, he further submits that the opposite party no.2 has been cheated by the accused petitioners in their personal capacity on the date with the car was purchased the accused petitioners each of them personally approached the O.P.No.2 assuring him that he would be given the choice number and even earlier due to this promise and on the part of the accused petitioners the O.P.No.2 had made his mind for purchase of the said car. He submits that the petitioners have personally attended the O.P.No.2 assuring him that if he purchases the vehicle the accused petitioners undertake that they will provide the choice number from the office of the D.T.O., Ranchi. He further submits that the documents that has been annexed as Form-20 does not disclose the entire facts of the matter rather, it only discloses that the application was made before the District Transport Office, Ranchi. He submits that for ordinary number only Rs.700/- is being deposited, however, for choice number, in view of the notification of Government of Jharkhand a prescribed fee is required to be deposited, however, they have not deposited Rs.11,000/- for the choice number. He submits that this submission is fortified in view of the document annexed as Annexure-‘A’ which is the statement of account with regard to the vehicle in question. He submits that this submission is fortified in view of the document annexed as Annexure-‘A’ which is the statement of account with regard to the vehicle in question. Annexure-‘B’ which is the order dated 22.2.2017 passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court wherein it has been falsely stated that by the RTGS the said amount has been returned and by way of referring Annexure-C to the counter affidavit he submits that this document has been obtained under the Right to Information Act whereas the office of the D.T.O. has informed that the said number has already been allotted to another person and the procedure of providing the choice number is further disclosed therein. He further submits that so far not making party of the company is concerned it is not fatal and the allegations are there and the petitioners in their personal capacity have done so and in view of that, further if there is no allegation of removing the defect with regard to vehicle, the company is not necessary party. He further submits that if the case is made out, the Court is only required to look into the complaint as well as the FIR and the order taking cognizance as well and in view of that, if the case is made out, this Court may restrain itself in quashing the entire criminal proceeding and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 and refers to paragraph no.12 of the said judgment, which is quoted below: 12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few—Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [ (1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [ (1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [ (1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 8. On this ground, he submits that no case of interference is made out and this petition may kindly be dismissed. 9. He further elaborates his argument by way of submitting that the vehicle in question was purchased on 09.11.2015 and application for number was made on 07.12.2015 through an staff of M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited namely Mr. Sanjay. He submits that Form-20 annexed with the main petition dated 23.09.2016. On this ground, he submits that this is not a case of quashing of the entire criminal proceeding. 10. In view of the submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the contents of the complaint petition, the solemn affirmation, the annexures annexed with the petition as well as the counter affidavit and annexures thereon. It is an admitted fact that the O.P.No.2 has purchased Celerio ZXI-CER on 09.11.2015. The application was made for number by one staff of M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited namely Mr. Sanjay. It is an admitted fact that the O.P.No.2 has purchased Celerio ZXI-CER on 09.11.2015. The application was made for number by one staff of M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited namely Mr. Sanjay. The petitioners are said to be the Directors of the said Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited. The learned court has been pleased to take cognizance and summoned the petitioners by order dated 12.8.2016. After the order taking cognizance, the amount in question was refunded by Annexure-3 which has been denied by the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 saying that the said amount has not been allowed to be credited by the O.P.No.2 in the account. The application for registration was already made which has been disclosed in the counter affidavit filed by the O.P.no.2 in paragraph no.11 by one of the staff of the said company on 07.12.2015. It is an admitted case that a sum of Rs.11,000/-for choice number was also deposited by the O.P.No.2 with M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited contained in Annexure-A of the counter affidavit. Annexure-C is the document of D.T.O suggesting the procedure of allowing the choice number and it was disclosed that the said number was already allowed earlier to another person. The petitioners have already returned the said amount, however, it has been disputed by the learned counsel for the O.P.no.2 about the credit of that amount in his account as the O.P.No.2 has directed the bank not to allow the credit in the said account. It is further an admitted case that the learned Sessions Judge has been pleased to allow the anticipatory bail petition by order dated 17.11.2016 and considering that the amount has already been returned. The Court further finds that there is no dispute that these petitioners who happened to be the Directors of the said company. Admittedly the said amount of Rs.11000/- was deposited in with the M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited and one of the staff as has been discussed in paragraph no.11 of the counter affidavit has deposited the amount for registration of the vehicle in question. However, it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the O.P.no.2 that only Rs.700/- was deposited and which is the fee for general number. However, it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the O.P.no.2 that only Rs.700/- was deposited and which is the fee for general number. Thus, it is crystal clear that the said amount was deposited with the said company and one of the staff has already acted upon and has deposited the amount, the question remains as to whether in such circumstance, the case of cheating under section 415 of the IPC is made out or not. Further for making the case of cheating, the intention from the very beginning is required to be there which is lacking in the case in hand. Looking to the complaint petition the Court finds that in paragraph no.5 of the said complaint petition, the complainant has also admitted that all correspondences were made with M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited, thus, it cannot be said that three of the Directors of M/s Sudha Business Enterprises Private Limited have involved themselves for cheating a sum of Rs.11,000/- and if such situation is there, the case of the petitioners is fully covered in view of the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of ‘Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Others’ and ‘Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 17 SCC 193 ’ (supra). The judgment relied by Mr. Tewari, the learned counsel for the O.P.no.2 with regard to Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others( supra), it is not in dispute. It is well settled that the Court if the criminality is made out, the civil and criminal proceeding can go simultaneously. However, if the criminality is not made out, the criminal case cannot be allowed to proceed which amounts to abuse of the process of law. In the case relied by Mr. Tewari, the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 in paragraph nos.13 and 14 of the judgment in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the consequences of criminal proceeding has been dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is quoted hereinbelow: “13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8) “It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.” 11. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.” 11. At best this can be said that it is a case of deficiency in service and if the deficiency in service is detected post-purchase, offence of an avenue for the aggrieved consumer to seek relief before the consumer forum, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R Enterprise, (2023) 3 SCC 195 , paragraph no.16 of the said judgment is quoted below: 16. We have failed to comprehend as to what NCDRC meant when it observed that the appellants “ought to have known what they were purchasing.” More often than not, the jurisdiction of the consumer For a under the CP Act is invoked post-purchase. If complaints were to be spurned on the specious ground that the consumers knew what they were purchasing, the object and purpose of the enactment would be defeated. Any deficiency detected post purchase opens up an avenue for the aggrieved consumer to seek relief before the Consumer Fora. The reasoning of NCDRC is, thus, indefensible. Indeed, the appellants had purchased their respective flats on payment of consideration amounts as per market rate and there was due execution and registration of the deeds of conveyance preceded by agreements for sale and these instruments did indicate, inter alia, what formed part of the common facilities/amenities; however, the matter obviously could not have ended there. Whether the appellants had been provided what the respondents had promised did survive for consideration, which does not get reflected in the impugned order. 12. Although the case has been registered under section 120B, 406 and 420 of the IPC, however, the learned court has only taken cognizance under section 420 of the IPC and for taking such cognizance, the ingredient of section 415 is required to be fulfilled which is lacking in the case in hand. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 12.08.2016 which is composite order and thus, word summon not disclosed in prayer has got no consequence. 13. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 12.08.2016 which is composite order and thus, word summon not disclosed in prayer has got no consequence. 13. In view of the above reasons and analysis, entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 12.08.2016 passed in connection with Complaint Case No.374 of 2016, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi is quashed. 14. This petition is allowed and disposed of. 15. It is made clear that if any civil proceeding with regard to said deficiency is there, that can be decided on its one merit without being prejudiced of this order. 16. This petition is allowed and disposed of.