Judgment Mrs. Meenakshi I. Mehta, J. By way of the instant Regular Second Appeal, the plaintiff- appellant (here-in-after to be referred as ‘the plaintiff) has assailed the judgment and decree dated 16.10.1987 passed by learned Sub-Judge 1st Class, Palwal (for short ‘the trial Court’), whereby the Civil Suit bearing No.235 of 1985, filed by her for seeking the decree for declaration to the effect that the decree dated 03.10.1983, passed in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 as well as Mutation No.2448, as sanctioned on the basis thereof, are liable to be set-aside and that the respondent-defendant No.1 is still the owner in possession of the suit land, has been dismissed and she has also laid challenge to the judgment and decree dated 07.04.1989, handed down by learned Additional District Judge, Faridabad (for short ‘the Lower Appellate Court’), dismissing the appeal, as preferred by her against the above-mentioned judgment and decree dated 16.10.1987. 2. Shorn and short of unnecessary details, the facts, culminating in the filing of the present appeal, are that the plaintiff filed the said Civil Suit No.235 against the respondents-defendants (here-in-after to be referred as ‘the defendants’), while averring that defendant No.1, her mother, was the owner in possession of 2/3 share in the land measuring 99 Kanals 03 Marlas (for short ‘the suit land’) as detailed in para No.2 in the plaint and she (defendant No.1) executed a ‘Will’ dated 18.07.1977 in her (plaintiffs) favour in respect of the said land but thereafter, defendants No.2 to 5 filed the said Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 against defendant No.1 and fraudulently obtained the decree dated 03.10.1983 therein, in their favour qua the suit land whereas defendant No.1 had neither thumb-marked the alleged written statement nor the statement, as stated to have been recorded in the Court in the afore-said Suit and in case, the same were found to have been thumb- marked by her, then her thumb-impressions were procured by defendants No.2 to 5 by playing fraud with and mis-representing the facts to her as she was an old illiterate lady and could not have understood the implications of thumb-marking any document. 3. Defendant No.1 filed her written statement controverting the averments of the plaintiff therein, inter-alia, on the grounds of locus-standi, maintainability and cause of action. 3. Defendant No.1 filed her written statement controverting the averments of the plaintiff therein, inter-alia, on the grounds of locus-standi, maintainability and cause of action. On merits, she asserted that after the execution of the said ‘Will’ by her in favour of the plaintiff, she (plaintiff) became greedy and refused to serve her (defendant No.1) in her old age and defendants No.2 to 5 had been serving her since long and therefore, she had suffered the decree dated 03.10.1983 in their favour, out of her own free will and without any influence or pressure. 4. In their joint written statement, defendants No.2 to 5 also contested the claim of the plaintiff, primarily, on the ground of its maintainability. On merits, they pleaded that defendant No.1, being the full-fledged owner of the suit land, had suffered the decree dated 03.10.1983 in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 in their favour as they were the collaterals of her husband and a family settlement had been arrived at between them to rule out the eventuality of any litigation and to restore the peace in the family and the suit land had fallen to their share in pursuance of this settlement and thus, they had become the owners of the said land and were in possession thereof accordingly. 5. The plaintiff filed her replications and then, the parties were put to the trial by framing the issues. After appreciating and evaluating the evidence, as led by the parties on the record and hearing their learned counsel, the trial Court passed the judgment and decree dated 16.10.1987, dismissing Civil Suit No.235 of 1985 filed by the plaintiff and the appeal, as preferred by her against the same, has also been dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 07.04.1989. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff as well as learned counsel for respondents-defendants No.2 to 5 (respondents No.2 & 3 since deceased and represented through their legal representatives) and have also gone through the record carefully. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff as well as learned counsel for respondents-defendants No.2 to 5 (respondents No.2 & 3 since deceased and represented through their legal representatives) and have also gone through the record carefully. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that defendant No.1 had executed the Will dated 18.07.1977 in favour of the plaintiff, her daughter, regarding the suit land but thereafter, defendants No.2 to 5 have fraudulently obtained the decree dated 03.10.1983 in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 in their favour qua the said land whereas defendant No.1 had neither appeared in the Court to make any statement nor she had filed any written statement, admitting their claim in the above-mentioned Civil Suit and he has also raised an alternative contention to the effect that in case, defendant No.1 is found to have thumb-marked the written statement and also the statement as recorded in the Court in connection with the said Civil Suit, then, the defendants had procured her thumb-impressions thereon by way of playing fraud with and mis-representing the facts to her as she was an illiterate and aged lady. 8. However, the afore-raised contentions are devoid of any force/ merit because so far as the contention regarding defendant No.1 having not thumb-marked the written statement etc and having not appeared in the Court for the purposes of Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 is concerned, the trial Court has categorically observed in para No.10 in its judgment dated 16.10.1987 that DW4 Som Nath Aggarwal, the Handwriting and Finger-print Expert, had examined the disputed thumb-impressions of defendant No.1, as appearing on the relevant documents in the file of Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 with her admitted/standard thumb-impressions, available on the ‘Will’ dated 18.07.1977 and had opined that the thumb-impressions appearing on all the said documents and the ‘Will’ were identical. The plaintiff has not led any convincing and trustworthy evidence on the record to prove to the contrary. 9. The plaintiff has not led any convincing and trustworthy evidence on the record to prove to the contrary. 9. As regards the contention qua defendants No.2 to 5 having played fraud with or mis-represented the facts to defendant No.1 to procure the decree dated 03.10.1983 in their favour, the same also does not hold any water because in the above-alleged eventuality, defendant No.1 herself would have been the best person to challenge the said decree on the afore- discussed grounds but concededly, she did not prefer to do so despite the fact that she was alive till the filing of Civil Suit No.235 of 1985 by the plaintiff and rather, she had filed her written statement in the said Suit, categorically denying therein the averments/allegations as made/levelled by the plaintiff in her plaint, as discussed earlier. To add to it, the plea of fraud or mis-representation of the facts has to be specifically pleaded and proved even in the Civil Suit and a perusal of the plaint reveals that throughout in the same, the plaintiff has not even come forward with any fair, candid and specific details/version as to how, when and under what circumstances, defendants No.2 to 5 had allegedly committed the fraud with or had mis-represented the facts to defendant No.1 to secure the decree dated 03.10.1983 in their favour in respect of the suit land nor she has adduced any cogent evidence on the record to substantiate these pleas/allegations. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has, further, contended that after the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act of 1956’) vide the Amending Act of 2005, the plaintiff, being the daughter of defendant No.1, has acquired the rights in the suit land as a coparcener and therefore, the decree dated 03.10.1983, as passed in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 in favour of defendants No.2 to 5 regarding this land, is liable to be set-aside on this score alone. He has placed reliance upon the observations made in Vineeta Sharma Versus Rakesh Sharma and others, 2020(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 473 (SC); Shri Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari and others Versus Ompraskash Shankar Bhandari, 2014(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 620 (Bombay) (FB) and Sher Singh Versus Mahabir Singh, 2002(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 32 (P&H) (SB), in support of his contention. 11. He has placed reliance upon the observations made in Vineeta Sharma Versus Rakesh Sharma and others, 2020(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 473 (SC); Shri Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari and others Versus Ompraskash Shankar Bhandari, 2014(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 620 (Bombay) (FB) and Sher Singh Versus Mahabir Singh, 2002(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 32 (P&H) (SB), in support of his contention. 11. Again, I do not find the above-discussed contention to be tenable at all because undisputedly, the scope of the Joint Hindu Family was wider than that of the Hindu Coparcenary because besides all the persons lineally descended from a common ancestor, it also included their wives and unmarried daughters whereas, prior to the amendment of 2005 in the Act of 1956, the ambit of the Hindu Coparcenary was confined to the propositus and his three male lineal descendants only but by virtue of the said amendment, this scope has been enlarged as the daughters have also been conferred the coparcenary rights, exactly similar to ones which the sons used to acquire in the coparcenary property by birth. However, the fact remains that to claim the afore-said right in any property, the daughter would be required to establish that the same is coparcenary property and it is pertinent to mention here that the plaintiff has nowhere averted in her plaint that the suit land was a coparcenary property in the hands of her mother, i.e defendant No.1 nor she has adduced any evidence on the file to substantiate this fact. 12. The observations as made in Vineeta Sharma (supra), Shri Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari & others (supra) and Sher Singh (supra), are of no avail to the plaintiff because in Vineeta Sharma (supra), the Apex Court, while answering a reference, has made the following observations:- “63. x x x x The daughter would step into the coparcenary as that of a son by taking birth before or after the Act. However, the daughter born before can claim these rights only with effect from the date of the amendment, i.e. 09.09.2005 with the saving of past transactions as provided in the proviso to Section 6(1) read with Section 6(5)”. 64. The effect of the amendment is that a daughter is made coparcener, with effect from the date of amendment and she can claim partition also, which is a necessary concomitant of the coparcenary. Section 6(1) recognises a joint family governed by Mitakshara law. 64. The effect of the amendment is that a daughter is made coparcener, with effect from the date of amendment and she can claim partition also, which is a necessary concomitant of the coparcenary. Section 6(1) recognises a joint family governed by Mitakshara law. The coparcenary must exist on 09.09.2005 to enable the daughter of a coparcener to enjoy rights conferred on her..... 65. x x x x Section 6, as substituted, presupposes the existence of coparcenary.” Sections 6(1) and 6(5) of the Act of 1956, after the amendment of 2005, provide as under:- “6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. - (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitalahara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, - (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that ofa son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, “partition” means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court.” Thus, a juxtaposed reading of the afore-quoted observations as well as the provisions makes it crystal clear that the transactions affected in respect of the coparcenary property before the above-stipulated date, would remain preserved/saved even after the afore-said amendment. In the present case also, the judgment and decree, as challenged by the plaintiff, had been passed on 03.10.1983 in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983, i.e much prior to the above-referred date and the plaintiff has assailed the same on the grounds of fraud and mis-representation of facts and as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, she has neither been able to prove the said grounds nor the fact that the suit land was coparcenary property. 13. Then, in Shri Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari and others (supra), all that had been observed was that the provisions of the amended Section 6 of the Act of 1956 are retroactive in operation but again, these observations pertain to the coparcenary property but in the instant case, as mentioned above, the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor has led the evidence to prove that the suit land was a coparcenary property qua her. Further, in Sher Singh (supra) also, the plaintiff, being one of the sons of the owner of the suit property, had challenged the decrees suffered by his father in favour of his brothers, without joining him as a party in the family settlement whereas in this case, the plaintiff was, concededly, the married daughter of defendant No.1 and it being so, she could not be considered to be a member of the Joint Hindu Family at the time of the family settlement that had taken place in 1982, i.e prior to the amendment of 2005 and had led to the passing of the said decree in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983. 14. Lastly, learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that the value of the suit land being more than Rs.100/-, the decree passed in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 was compulsorily registrable but it has not been so registered and therefore, the same cannot pass a valid and lawful title to defendants No.2 to 5 in respect of this land. To buttress his contention, he has placed reliance upon Bhoop Singh Versus Ravi Singh Major and others, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 196(I) and Ranbir Singh Versus Shri Chand, 1984 PLJ 562 (P&M). 15. To buttress his contention, he has placed reliance upon Bhoop Singh Versus Ravi Singh Major and others, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 196(I) and Ranbir Singh Versus Shri Chand, 1984 PLJ 562 (P&M). 15. However, I am afraid to agree with this contention also because a bare reading of the copy of the plaint in Civil Suit No.571 of 1983 shows that the plaintiffs, i.e present defendants No.2 to 5, had categorically averted therein that they and defendant Inchha, i.e defendant No.1, were the members of the same family as the said defendant was the wife of their paternal-uncle and her husband had died long ago and her son Attar Singh had also expired as a bachelor and they had entered into a family settlement regarding the suit land in the year 1982 and the said land had fallen to their share in accordance thereof. PW4 Rajbir, who is the son of the plaintiff and her attorney as well, has specifically deposed during his cross-examination that defendants No.2 to 5 were the collaterals of the husband of defendant No.1 and that their ‘Khewat’ was a joint one. 16. The verdicts, as rendered in Bhoop Singh (supra) and Ranbir Singh (supra) also, do not further the cause of the plaintiff because all that has been held in Bhoop Singh (supra), is that a decree creating the rights in favour of a party in any immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards, would require the registration but in the present case, it is quite explicit that defendants No.2 to 5 were not the strangers to defendant No.1 and rather, they were the members of the same joint family and it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment as handed down in Som Dev and others Versus Rati Ram and another, 2006(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 303 that “where the title is acquired in the property by way of family arrangement and the decree of the Civil Court is based on such arrangement, such decree does not require registration” and these observations are fully applicable to the instant case. The verdict rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench in Ranbir Singh (supra), is also of no help to the plaintiff in view of the above-quoted observations made by the Apex Court. 17. The verdict rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench in Ranbir Singh (supra), is also of no help to the plaintiff in view of the above-quoted observations made by the Apex Court. 17. As a sequel to the fore-going discussion, it follows that the impugned judgments and decrees, passed by both the Courts below, do not suffer from any illegality, infirmity, irregularity or perversity so as to call for any interference by this Court. Resultantly, the same are hereby upheld and the appeal in hand, being sans any merit, stands dismissed.