ORDER : 1. Captioned petition is filed by the claimants, who are respondents in the proceedings initiated by the respondents herein by filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short “the Act”). 2. The present petitioners filed an application in I.A. No. 4 under section 151 of CPC requesting the Court to dismiss the application on the ground that it is not filed within the time stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Act. The said application is rejected by the Court below by holding that the application under Section 34 of the Act filed by respondent-authority is well within the stipulated period of 90 days. 3. Heard the counsel for petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for respondents. Perused the records. 4. The petitioner is relying on the date of communication of award by the arbitrator addressed to the advocate appearing for respondent-authority. This fact is not disputed by the respondents. The award passed by the Arbitrator is not communicated to Highway Authorities, but is communicated to the counsel appearing for Highway Authorities on 15.09.2022. Section 31(5) of the Act regarding delivery of signed copy of arbitral award to each party should be construed strictly. The expression used ‘he shall’ even if it is construed in its ordinary literal meaning the mandate is that it is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with. 5. The Apex Court in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited, SLP (Civil) No. 23860/2010 has dealt with the question as to whether an award served on a party’s counsel/advocate would amount to good service within the meaning of Section 31(5) of the Act. The Apex Court examining the meaning of expression ‘party’ as it appears in Section 34 (3)(2)(1)(h) and Section 31(5) of the Act took note of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239 . The Apex Court examining the meaning of expression ‘party’ as it appears in Section 34 (3)(2)(1)(h) and Section 31(5) of the Act took note of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239 . The Apex Court in the above said judgment held that meaning of “party to an arbitration agreement” as provided in Section 2(1)(h) and 34 (3) of the Act would mean “in the large organizations like Railways ‘party’ as referred in Section 2(h) read with Section 34(3) of the Act “ has to be construed to be a person directly connected with and involved in the proceedings and who is in control of the proceedings before the Arbitrator.” The Apex Court took note of the findings recorded in the case of Tecco Trechy (supra) wherein it has held that delivery of an award to a party was a substantive right and not a mere formality since it set in motion several limitation periods. 6. The Apex Court in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee and Others (supra) held that it is one thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an advocate to act as the party himself. The Apex Court held that the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act clearly indicates a person who is a party to the arbitration agreement. 7. On reading the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the above cited judgments the definition of a ‘party’ as indicated in Section 2(h) of the Act does not in any way include an agent or a counsel of a party to the agreement. Any reference made therefore in Section 31(5) of the Act can only mean the party himself and not his or her agent or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. Any liberal view and an inclusive approach in this regard would have a cascading effect as challenge to the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act prescribes limitation and an application beyond the stipulated period of limitation cannot be entertained by the Court. National Highway authorities is either found to be litigating or facing large number of litigations. Any liberal view and an inclusive approach in this regard would have a cascading effect as challenge to the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act prescribes limitation and an application beyond the stipulated period of limitation cannot be entertained by the Court. National Highway authorities is either found to be litigating or facing large number of litigations. Bearing in mind the amount of litigations that the National Highway authorities is facing, service of arbitral award on the counsel does not adhere to the mandate contemplated under Section 31(5) of the Act. 8. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party making an application for setting aside under Section 34(1) of the Act. Therefore, two factors highlighted are that the award needs to be signed by the learned Arbitrator and the certified copy thereof has to be delivered to the party to the arbitral proceedings, who propose to make an application to challenge it under Section 34(1) of the Act. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(1) of the Act would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party. 9. The legal position is that if law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched or sent to the party to the arbitral proceedings in a particular way and if the provisions of the Act also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation only commence from the date on which the copy of the order/award is received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by law. 10. In the present case on hand, the arbitral award is delivered on the counsel on record and not the party. If a copy of arbitral award is not communicated to the party, the limitation will not commence from the date of service of copy of arbitral award on the counsel. The Court below has taken cognizance of these significant details. The Court below having found that respondent-authority has applied for copy of the award on 02.12.2022 and the same being received on 13.12.2022 has come to the conclusion that application filed under Section 34 is well within the time. 11. The Court below has taken cognizance of these significant details. The Court below having found that respondent-authority has applied for copy of the award on 02.12.2022 and the same being received on 13.12.2022 has come to the conclusion that application filed under Section 34 is well within the time. 11. If these significant details are looked into, I am not inclined to interfere with the order under challenge. The writ petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. 12. In view of disposal of the petition, pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and are disposed of accordingly.