JUDGMENT : (Hemant M. Prachchhak, J.) 1. The order passed below Exhibit 15 in Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2022 dated 30.06.2023 by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surendranagar is challenged under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘the Code’ hereinafter). Factual Matrix: 2. Brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follow: 2.1 The Special Civil Suit No.16 of 2022 filed by the legal heirs of deceased Alibhai Kalubhai with the following prayers. 2.2 That on 14.05.1978, one so-called document in the form of ‘raja chiththi’ was executed by and between the deceased Alibhai Kalubhai and the deceased Shri Valibhai Vithalbhai. Thereafter, on the basis of the said so-called unregistered document, as per the say of the plaintiffs, they were in possession of the suit land and from that date, they are cultivating the said land. It is an admitted fact that from 1978 till the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs had never called upon defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed in their favour nor had they issued any legal notice for initiation of any proceedings against deceased defendant no.1 or his legal heirs, however, there is nothing on record to so that they have ever called upon defendant no.1 or his legal heirs to act upon the said so-called agreement to sell. It is also an admitted fact that on 06.06.1980, deceased defendant no.1 has executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant no.2. That sale deed was registered in the office of the Registrar, Vadhvan (Surendranagar) being registration no.1719/1980. From that day, defendant no.2 was the owner of the said parcel of land. Thereafter, the said land was further transferred to defendants no.3 to 6 by way of executing sale deed bearing registration no.4054/2021 on 22.07.2021 by the defendant no.2. It is the case of the plaintiffs that even upon subsequent transaction also, deceased Alibhai Kalubhai was not aware that the said suit land was sold by defendant no.2 to defendants no.3 to 6. That when the defendants no.3 to 6 came to the suit land and informed the plaintiffs that they have purchased the property from defendant no.2 and, thereafter, the plaintiffs inquired from the office of the Panchayat for getting revenue abstract i.e. 7-12 and Form No.6 on 19.12.2021. That when the defendants no.3 to 6 came to the suit land and informed the plaintiffs that they have purchased the property from defendant no.2 and, thereafter, the plaintiffs inquired from the office of the Panchayat for getting revenue abstract i.e. 7-12 and Form No.6 on 19.12.2021. That the present respondents have lodged the complaint under the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act against the appellants and they received notice from the concerned authority for recording their statement on 29.10.2022. That the appellants came to know that the suit land was owned by defendant no.2, which was subsequently transferred in favour of defendants no.3 to 6 and, therefore, on the basis of the said action, notice issued for recording of the statements. That the appellants approached this Court by way of Special Civil Application No.22635 of 2022 wherein this Court vide order dated 11.11.2022 issued notice and stayed the proceedings. Thereafter, the plaintiffs have obtained the copy of the registered sale deed and they met the legal heirs of defendant no.1 and defendant no.1 had filed affidavit with regard to the ownership of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs. In view of the facts that defendant no.1 had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant no.2 and, thereafter, subsequently, defendant no.2 had had executed a sale deed in favour defendants no.3 to 6, the plaintiffs have filed the suit before the trial Court and the defendants – respondents herein have preferred an application below Exhibit 15 in the suit for quashing and setting aside the suit filed by the plaintiffs, which came to be allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 30.06.2023 and rejected the suit and hence, against the said order, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 3. Prayers sought for in the present appeal are as follow: A. That the Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2023 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surendranagar below Exh. 15 in Special Civil Suit No.16 of 2022 and allow the suit of the Plaintiff; B. For costs; C. For such other and further reliefs as the circumstances of case may require. Oral Submissions: 3. We have heard extensively the learned advocate, Mr. Viral Shah appearing for the appellants. 15 in Special Civil Suit No.16 of 2022 and allow the suit of the Plaintiff; B. For costs; C. For such other and further reliefs as the circumstances of case may require. Oral Submissions: 3. We have heard extensively the learned advocate, Mr. Viral Shah appearing for the appellants. He has submitted that the serious error has been committed by the learned trial Court in not appreciating the law laid down by the Apex Court. He has submitted that the learned trial Court has committed an error of law and facts in rejecting the suit filed under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code and not considering the relevant documents produced along with the plaint showing that the suit is not barred by law of limitation. He has submitted that the appellants herein are in possession of the suit land and they are cultivating the suit land till today and they came to know about the transaction which was taken in the year 2021 and, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs within three years from the date of knowledge and it is not barred by limitation. He has submitted that the learned trial judge has failed to appreciate the provisions of the Code more particularly Order VII Rule 11(d). He has submitted that the learned trial judge has failed to consider the fact that as per Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the. He has submitted that though defendant no.1 has sold the suit land to plaintiff no.1 and handed over the the suit land, accepted the substantial amount of consideration and, therefore, the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land since 1978 and again defendant no.1 fraudulently sold the suit land to defendant no.2 for which the mutation entry to that effect has not been entered in the name of defendant no.2. He has submitted that defendant no.2 sold the suit land to defendants no.3 to 6 in the year 2021 and the plaintiffs came to know said facts in 2021 and they filed the suit in 2022 i.e. within a period of three years from the date of knowledge. He has submitted that the impugned order suffers from infirmities, surmises and conjectures and hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that the impugned order suffers from infirmities, surmises and conjectures and hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3.1 Mr.Shah, learned advocate appearing for the appellants has relied upon the following decisions:- (1) Mohd. Noorul Hoda Vs. Bibi Raifunnisa reported in (1996) 7 SCC 767 ; (2) Ramesh B. Desai and others Vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and others reported in AIR 2006 SC 3672 ; (3) Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik Vs. Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar reported in (2008) 4 SCC 464 ; (4) P. V. Guru Raj Reddy Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy reported in 92015) 8 SCC 331; (5) Urvashiben Vs. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi reported in (2019) 13 SCC 372 ; 4. In the case of Urvashiben (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs no.7, 8, 12 and 13 as under:- “7. In these appeals, it is contended by Sri Desai, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that the alleged Agreement to Sell is dated 13.03.1992 and the suit is filed in the year 2017, i.e., after a period of 25 years C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 and even according to the case of the respondent-plaintiff there is no communication at all in between the period from 1992 to 2017. It is submitted that except stating that he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 on which date he has come to know the said plot is sold to third parties, there is nothing on record to show that the suit is within limitation. Referring to Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is contended by learned counsel that even in absence of prescribing time for executing the Sale Deed, the period of three years is to be computed from the date of refusal. It is submitted that by waiting for a period of 25 years and by merely stating that he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 on which date, the appellants have refused to execute the Sale Deed, such a suit is filed. It is submitted that the suit filed is frivolous, vexatious and ex-facie barred by limitation. It is contended that even in absence of fixing any period for executing the Sale Deed, it is not open to respondent-plaintiff to file the suit after 25 years of alleged Sale Deed / Agreement to Sell. It is submitted that the suit filed is frivolous, vexatious and ex-facie barred by limitation. It is contended that even in absence of fixing any period for executing the Sale Deed, it is not open to respondent-plaintiff to file the suit after 25 years of alleged Sale Deed / Agreement to Sell. It is further stated that the so-called Agreement to Sell is unregistered one, not supported by any payments through cheque. Vaguely C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 stating that entire amount of consideration is paid, by way of cash during the period from 15.01.1990 to 05.09.1991, the said suit is filed. It is contended by learned counsel that a well reasoned order passed by the trial court is set aside by the High Court without recording any justifiable reasons. In support of his case for rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11, learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr. 2015 15 SCC 1 ; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. 1977 4 SCC 467 ; Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. 2007 5 SCC 614 ; Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Dhanraji (Smt.) (Dead) & Ors. 2000 7 SCC 702 ; I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors. 1998 2 SCC 70 ; Raj Narain Sarin (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. V. Laxmi Devi & Ors. 2002 10 SCC 501 ; N.V. Srinivasa Murthy & Ors. v. Mariyamma (Dead) by Proposed LRs. & Ors. 2005 5 SCC 548 ; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal 2017 13 SCC 174 and in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust 2012 8 SCC 706 8. On the other hand Sh. Dushant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the appellant-defendants sought rejection of the plaint under O.VII R.11(d) of the CPC only on the ground that suit is barred by limitation. It is the contention by the learned counsel that undisputedly time was not the essence of the contract, in which event as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act 1963, the period of limitation is three years from the date of refusal. It is the contention by the learned counsel that undisputedly time was not the essence of the contract, in which event as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act 1963, the period of limitation is three years from the date of refusal. It is submitted that the limitation being a mixed question of fact and law, whether the suit is filed within a period of three years from the date of refusal, is a triable issue, which can be adjudicated only after trial but same is no ground for rejection of the plaint at this stage. It is submitted that for the purpose of considering the application under O.VII R.11(d), plain averments in the plaint are to be seen and no other ground can be a ground for rejection of the plaint, under O.VII R.11(d). It is submitted that whether, from the averments in the plaint in a given case, plaint is to be rejected or not under O.VII R.11, is to be considered with reference to facts of each case and from the case on hand, it cannot be said that suit C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 is barred by limitation, only by looking at the averments in the plaint. Learned counsel has contended that all the citations by learned counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand and, in support of his arguments, reliance is placed in the case of Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah & Ors. v. Anton Elis Farel & Ors. 2006 3 SCC 634 ; Rathnavathi & Anr. v. Kavita Ganashamdas 2015 5 SCC 223 ; Madina Begum & Anr. v. Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors. 2016 15 SCC 322 12 and Chhotanben & Anr. v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar & Ors., 2018 6 SCC 422 . 12. From a reading of the aforesaid Article, it is clear that when the date is fixed for performance, limitation is three years from such date. If no such date is fixed, the period of three years is to be computed from the date when the plaintiff, has notice of refusal. When rejection of plaint is sought in an application filed under O.VII R.11, same is to be considered from the facts of each case, looking at the averments made in the plaint, for the purpose of adjudicating such application. When rejection of plaint is sought in an application filed under O.VII R.11, same is to be considered from the facts of each case, looking at the averments made in the plaint, for the purpose of adjudicating such application. As averred in the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiff that even after payment of the entire consideration amount registration of the document was not made and prolonged on some grounds and ultimately when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the same land was sold to third parties and appellants have refused performance of contract. In such event, it is a matter for trial to record correctness or otherwise of such allegation made in the plaint. In the C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 suits for specific performance falling in the second limb of the Article, period of three years is to be counted from the date when it had come to the notice of the plaintiff that performance is refused by the defendants. For the purpose of cause of action and limitation when it is pleaded that when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the sale was made in favour of third parties and the appellants have refused to execute the Sale Deed in which event same is a case for adjudication after trial but not a case for rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(d) of CPC. 13. Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Prabhakar (supra). In the above said case, this Court has held that, even where no limitation period is prescribed by the Statute, courts apply doctrine of delay/laches/ acquiescence and non-suit litigants who approach court belatedly without justifiable explanation. Delay and laches are to be examined with reference to facts of each case and the said judgment is not helpful to support the case of the appellant inasmuch as this matter arises out of an application filed under O.VII R.11(d) of the CPC. The C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 judgment in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) pertains to eviction from tenanted premises which was contested by the tenant. In the said case where rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(d) was considered on the ground that plaint does not disclose cause of action but not a case for rejection of plaint on the ground of limitation. The C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 judgment in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) pertains to eviction from tenanted premises which was contested by the tenant. In the said case where rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(d) was considered on the ground that plaint does not disclose cause of action but not a case for rejection of plaint on the ground of limitation. In the case of Hardesh Ores (supra) it was the case falling in the first limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act 1963 but not a case falling under second limb, where the time is not the essence of the contract. In the judgment in the case of Dilboo (Dead) (supra) this Court has considered relevant principles of applicability of O.VII R.11 of CPC. Equally, the case of I.T.C. Limited (supra) is a case concerning rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(a) but not case of rejection on the ground of limitation. In the case of Raj Narain Sarin (supra) the suit was filed after 40 years after execution of the Sale Deed and as a fact it was found that Sale Deed was to the knowledge of the plaintiff and he had not taken any steps to declare the Sale Deed invalid. In that context, the order passed under O.VII R.11 was confirmed by this Court. In the case of N.V. Srinivasa (supra) the suit is C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062-63/18 for declaration but not for specific performance and in the said suit having regard to the facts of the case this Court has held that suit for declaration filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. In the case of Madanuri Rama (supra) the suit was filed seeking cancellation of Sale Deed on the ground that property in question is a waqf property which cannot be sold to a private party. The aforesaid case is a case not concerning limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act 1963.” 5. The Apex Court in case of Rajpal Singh Vs. Saroj, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 638 has held that for adjudication under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, it is required to be seen by the Court whether the substantial relief and not the consequential relief, is barred by the law of limitation. Once the substantial relief is barred, the consequential relief cannot save the suit. Saroj, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 638 has held that for adjudication under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, it is required to be seen by the Court whether the substantial relief and not the consequential relief, is barred by the law of limitation. Once the substantial relief is barred, the consequential relief cannot save the suit. The substantive relief in the instant case is the cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 14.05.1978 which is barred by limitation. 5.1 It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 wherein the Apex Court held that the Order VII, Rule 11 is mandatory in nature and if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) is made out, the Court is bound to reject the claim. While discussing the law of limitation, the Apex Court held that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected. It was a case of a suit to obtain the declaration and to set aside the instrument or for rescission of contract, it is held that the Court must have determined when right to sue first accrued and the right to sue accrues only when cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when right asserted in suit is infringed or there is a clear and unequivocal threat of infringement. 5.2 Apt would be to refer to the findings and observations of the Apex Court would need to be reproduced. “16.The Trial Court held that the period of limitation for filing the suit was 3 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. The suit was filed on 15.12.2014. The cause of action as per the averments in the plaint had arisen when the Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 had issued ‘false’ or ‘bogus’ cheques to the Plaintiffs in 2009. The suit for cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 could have been filed by 2012, as per Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was however filed on 15.12.2014, which was barred by limitation. 17. The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. The suit was however filed on 15.12.2014, which was barred by limitation. 17. The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. Before purchasing the suit property, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had issued a public notice on 14.08.2012. The Plaintiffs did not raise any objection to the same. 18.The Trial Court, on the basis of the settled position in law, held that the suit of the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, and allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 19. Aggrieved by the Judgment dated 12.08.2016 passed by the Sr. Civil Judge, Surat, the Plaintiffs filed First Appeal No.2324/2016 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. 20.The Division Bench of the High Court took note of the fact that the Plaintiffs did not deny having executed the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent No.1. In the said Sale Deed, it was specifically admitted and acknowledged by the Plaintiffs that they had received the full sale consideration. The Sale Deed contained the complete particulars with respect to the payment of sale consideration by Respondent No. 1 through 36 cheques, the particulars of which were recorded therein. Since the execution of the Sale Deed was not disputed, and the conveyance was duly registered in the presence of the Plaintiffs before the Sub- Registrar, the Sale Deed could not be declared to be void, illegal, or ineffective. The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 vide registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 for a sale consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. 21.The present suit for cancellation of the Sale Deed was filed by the Plaintiffs after a period of over 5 years after the execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and 1 year after the execution of the Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 by Respondent No.1. It was noted that prior to the institution of the suit on 15.12.2014, at no point of time did the Plaintiffs raise any grievance whatsoever, of not having received the full sale consideration mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. It was for the first time that such an allegation was made after over 5 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. It was for the first time that such an allegation was made after over 5 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. Since the suit in respect of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 was held to be barred by law of limitation, the High Court was of the view that the suit could not be permitted to be continued even with respect to the subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. The Plaintiffs had not raised any allegation against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and there was no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The High Court rightly affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, and held that the suit was barred by limitation, since it was filed beyond the period of limitation of three years. 22.Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2016 passed by the High Court, the original Plaintiff No.1 has filed the present Civil Appeal. 23.We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the plaint and documents filed therewith, as also the written submissions filed on behalf of the parties. 23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. 23.We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the plaint and documents filed therewith, as also the written submissions filed on behalf of the parties. 23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:– (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied) 23.2 The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3 The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. 23.3 The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words: “12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5 The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint2, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under : “Order 7 Rule 14: Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2)Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3)A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” 23.8 Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9 In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 23.11 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., which reads as : “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” 23.12 In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. 23.13 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 23.14 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra). 23.15 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24.“Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24.“Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 24.1 In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam this Court held : “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded”. 24.2 In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr.9 this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words : - “5. …The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …” 24.3 Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal,10 this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. 24.4 If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. 25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. 26.Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under : “Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 58.To obtain any other declaration. Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 59.To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.” The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.,12 this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.,12 this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.” 5.3 Yet another decision of Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 601 speaks of the rejection of the plaint on an application moved under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code. The Apex Court reiterated that the principles to be followed in considering such applications by holding that if on entire and meaningful reading of averments of plaint, it is found to be not disclosing a cause of action and clear right to sue or is found to be barred by law of limitation, the suit is to be held vexatious and meritless. What is contended by the defendant in the written statement or in other record and document is immaterial. What is contended by the defendant in the written statement or in other record and document is immaterial. From the averment as a whole, if a suit is found to be barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1959, plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent the provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances by which the suit is barred by limitation. 5.4 In the matter before the Apex Court the respondent-plaintiff was the father of the appellant-defendant with his brother who had jointly executed a registered gift deed on 06.03.1981 gifting the suit land in favour of the appellant and putting him in possession of the land. The suit was instituted in the year 2000 against his brothers and others for partition of the joint family properties. The plaintiff was also joined as defendant in that suit. The summons along with the copy of the plaint of the partition suit was allegedly served upon the respondent-plaintiff on 21.12.2001 and after death of the plaintiff’s brother in the year 2012, the respondent-plaintiff alone filed the suit against the appellant for a declaration that the deed of gift dated 06.03.1981 executed in favour of the appellant is a showy and sham transaction and no title and possession with respect to the gifted properties ever passed to the appellant-original defendant and hence, the same was not binding upon him. The appellant filed the written statement and filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 read with Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as the gift deed was of 06.03.1981 and the suit in view of the Article 59 of the Limitation Act ought to have been filed within three years of the deed of execution of the gift deed, whereas the same has been filed after 22 years of the execution and also under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act as well as Section 47 of the Registration Act it was urged that the same was not maintainable. 5.5 The trial Court rejected the appellant’s application on the ground that for determining the question of limitation, oral evidence is required. High Court dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the order of the trial Court. 5.5 The trial Court rejected the appellant’s application on the ground that for determining the question of limitation, oral evidence is required. High Court dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the order of the trial Court. When challenged before the Apex Court, it held that the suit is clearly barred by the law of limitation and clearly barred by the law of limitation and the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of the powers under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code by reiterating the well laid down law emphatically in this fashion: “6.3 While considering the scope and ambit of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, few decisions of this Court on Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC are required to be referred to and considered. 6.4 In the case of T. Arivandandam (supra), while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and the decree of the trial Court in considering such application, this Court in para 5 has observed and held as under: “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits.....” 6.5 In the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, this Court in paras 13 has observed and held as under: “13. While scrutinizing the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. While scrutinizing the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. The cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the Plaintiff the right to relief against the Defendant. Every fact which is necessary for the Plaintiff to prove to enable him to get a decree should be set out in clear terms. It is worthwhile to find out the meaning of the words "cause of action". A cause of action must include some act done by the Defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue.” 6.6 In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem, this Court explained the meaning of “cause of action” as follows: “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” 6.7 In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Charity Commissioner in paras 11 and 12, this Court has observed as under: “11. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” 6.7 In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Charity Commissioner in paras 11 and 12, this Court has observed as under: “11. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ (1998) 2 SCC 70 ] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code.” 6.8 In the case of Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal this Court has observed and held as under: “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 6.9 In the case of Ram Singh vs. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan this Court has observed and held that when the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation. 7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC to the facts of the case in hand and the averments in the plaint, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. It is required to be noted that it is not in dispute that the gift deed was executed by the original plaintiff himself along with his brother. The deed of gift was a registered gift deed. It is required to be noted that it is not in dispute that the gift deed was executed by the original plaintiff himself along with his brother. The deed of gift was a registered gift deed. The execution of the gift deed is not disputed by the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. However, it is required to be noted that for approximately 22 years, neither the plaintiff nor his brother (who died on 15.12.2002) claimed at any point of time that the gift deed was showy deed of gift. One of the executants of the gift deed – brother of the plaintiff during his lifetime never claimed that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift. It was the appellant herein original defendant who filed the suit in the year 2001 for partition and the said suit was filed against his brothers to which the plaintiff was joined as defendant No. 10. It appears that the summon of the suit filed by the defendant being T.S. (Partition) Suit No. 203 of 2001 was served upon the defendant No.10 plaintiff herein in the year 2001 itself. Despite the same, he instituted the present suit in the year 2003. Even from the averments in the plaint, it appears that during these 22 years i.e. the period from 1981 till 2001/2003, the suit property was mortgaged by the appellant hereinoriginal defendant and the mortgage deed was executed by the defendant. Therefore, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 8. At this stage, it is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff has never prayed for any declaration to set aside the gift deed. We are of the opinion that such a prayer is not asked cleverly. 8. At this stage, it is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff has never prayed for any declaration to set aside the gift deed. We are of the opinion that such a prayer is not asked cleverly. If such a prayer would have been asked, in that case, the suit can be said to be clearly barred by limitation considering Article 59 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, only a declaration is sought to get out of the provisions of the Limitation Act, more particularly, Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid aspect has also not been considered by the High Court as well as the learned trial Court.” 5.6 The Apex Court in case of Rajpal Singh Vs. Saroj reported in (2022) SCC Online SC 638 held that the subsequent suit by the plaintiff in the Civil Suit is barred by the law of limitation seeking the cancellation of sale deed was required to be filed within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of the sale deed. Therefore, when the names of the original defendant was mutated in the revenue records in the year 1996 on the basis of the registered Sale Deed which took place on 19.04.1996 and when the person was found to be in possession and cultivating the land since then, the original plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within a period of three years from 1996. The submission of the original plaintiff that the prayer in the suit was also for recovery of the possession and therefore, the suit was filed within the period of twelve years and within the period of limitation was not found acceptable. The Apex Court held that relief for possession is a consequential prayer and the substantive prayer was of cancellation of the Sale Deed and therefore, the limitation period is required to be considered with respect to the substantive relief claimed and not the consequential relief. Law on the Subject: 6. On thus hearing the learned advocate of the appellants, firstly the law on the subject under consideration deserves reference. 6.1 At the outset, the provision of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and Section 59 of the Limitation Act would be necessary to be reproduced. Law on the Subject: 6. On thus hearing the learned advocate of the appellants, firstly the law on the subject under consideration deserves reference. 6.1 At the outset, the provision of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and Section 59 of the Limitation Act would be necessary to be reproduced. “Order VII Rule 11: The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9. Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him. 7. Some of the decisions which are on the very issue but sought to be relied upon by the appellant would require reference now as there law is the same but, noticing peculiar facts and particularly fraud having been proved, Apex Court chose to hold in favour of the appellant. 7. Some of the decisions which are on the very issue but sought to be relied upon by the appellant would require reference now as there law is the same but, noticing peculiar facts and particularly fraud having been proved, Apex Court chose to hold in favour of the appellant. 7.1 Thus, what is required is meaningful reading of the plaint in its entirety and while so doing the defence raised is not to be looked into. 8. The decision of the T.Aravindan vs. V.Satyapal and anr., reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 is the base decision, which insists on a meaningful reading of the plaint and when it is manifestly found to be vexatious and meritless, not disclosing a clear right to sue or where it is ex-facie time barred, the Court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. No amount of clever drafting should create an illusion of the cause of action as the Court is expected to nip in bud the vexatious litigation. 9. Suffice to note that the law which has been made abundantly clear from the base decision of T. Arvindam (supra) has also been reiterated in case of Rajpal Singh (supra) and other decisions. The question is only of application of the law to the facts in the instant case. 9.1 We are of the opinion that the trial Court has committed no error in rejecting the plaint in the instant case. Being conscious of the decisions which has been sought to be relied upon by the appellants herein who are the original plaintiffs, we notice that the challenge is made to the execution of the sale deeds 06.06.1980 and 23.07.2021 and for questioning the registered sale deeds, the Civil Suit has been preferred. 10. The Division Bench of this Court has dealt with identical issue of limitation considering the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code rendered in the case of Jyotsnaben d/o. Govindbhai Patel w/o. Rajendrabhai Patel and others Vs. L.H. of late Ashokbhai Govindbhai Patel and others in First Appeal No.3386 of 2017 dated 13.07.2022. 11. We are conscious also that only on meaningful reading of the plaint, any trial Court needs to decide the aspect of limitation and particularly the incident of knowledge of such transfer. 12. L.H. of late Ashokbhai Govindbhai Patel and others in First Appeal No.3386 of 2017 dated 13.07.2022. 11. We are conscious also that only on meaningful reading of the plaint, any trial Court needs to decide the aspect of limitation and particularly the incident of knowledge of such transfer. 12. In one of the decisions of the Apex Court even while discussing the law of limitation which will presume the knowledge from the date of registration of the date, the Court from the plaint could notice the fraud perpetrated upon the parties before it where the essential challenge was to the thumb impression which had been found on the registered sale deed. The trial Court while dealing with an application under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code had also simultaneously dealt with the application questioning the thumb impressions and had directed such thumb impressions to be taken and sent to the Hand Writing Expert for examination, demanding a report within a very short period and in this background when the application was moved under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code where the trial Court chose not to entertain the same with robust and glaring facts of deceit. This when was entertained by the High Court, the Apex Court quashed and set aside the order of the High Court and had upheld the order passed by the trial Court on an application under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code. 12.1 Barring this decision, the law is quite clear that the knowledge of a person shall need to be presumed from the date of the registration and in the instant case it is 14.05.1978. Therefore, the suit ought to have been filed within three years of the said period. It is the averment in the plaint which had led the trial Court to hold that the suit is outrightly vexatious and we completely agree with such findings. The challenge has been mainly made to the agreement to sell after 44 years where practically no cause of action is noticed in the plaint. 12.2 As the Apex Court has held that the consequential prayers are not important and what is required to be kept in mind is the substantial prayer under challenge which undoubtedly in the instant case is the challenge to the sale deeds dated 06.06.1980 and 23.07.2021. 12.2 As the Apex Court has held that the consequential prayers are not important and what is required to be kept in mind is the substantial prayer under challenge which undoubtedly in the instant case is the challenge to the sale deeds dated 06.06.1980 and 23.07.2021. The consequential prayer of ownership of the suit land as well as other reliefs therefore would be of no significance much less necessary to be emphasised or to be addressed at this stage. The suit which is otherwise required to be preferred within three years as per Article 59 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act has been preferred after 44 years, the relief of ownership of the suit land also otherwise was required within 10 years from the agreement to sell executed which if is considered the suit is after 44 years of such transaction and therefore also the trial Court was right in rejecting the plaint by holding the same to have been done for being barred by law of limitation deserves no interference. 13. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the averments made in the appeal, it appears that the agreement to sell was executed on 14.05.1978 between deceased Alibhai Kalubhai and deceased Vajabhai Vithalbhai Pagi and Alibhai died on 14.05.1989 after a period of eleven years and Vajabhai Vithalbhai died on 22.01.2008 and, therefore, the original plaintiff no.1 and the defendant no.1 both have died. It appears that for the said agreement to sell no any suit came to be filed or notice was issued to each other and in these circumstances, the suit ought to have filed within a period of three years from 14.05.1978. It reveals that Vajabhai Vithalbhai Pagi had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant no.2 on 06.06.1980 and after execution of the sale deed, no any such suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for cancellation of the same till the death of Vajabhai Vithalbhai. Considering the material placed on record, it reveals that as per the say of the plaintiffs, defendant no.1 executed an agreement to sell to the father of the plaintiffs for consideration of Rs.30,000/-, out of which Rs.27,000/- was paid on 14.05.1978 to defendant no.1, but as per Section 17(b) of the Registration Act, the agreement to sell is required to be registered, but the same has not been done. Considering the evidence on record, it appears that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by law of limitation and, therefore, the trial judge has rightly rejected the suit and allowed the application below Exhibit 15. 13.1 The cause of action of the suit again states that the plaintiff no.1 has purchased the suit land from defendant no.1 by way of agreement to sell and defendant no.1 sold the suit land to defendant no.2 by way of registered sale deed and defendant no.2 also sold the suit land to defendants no.3 to 6 by way of registered sale deed. When the appellants were precluded from entering the property and when they asked for sale deed and the defendants denied the same, the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction. This is absolutely vague, unclear and is reflective of the fact that there is an artificial manner in which the attempt is made to bring the suit by creating the cause of action where in fact, there exists none. The reading of the plaint itself makes it abundantly clear that the appellants in connivance with the respondents, have chosen to approach this Court with the vague and ambiguous pleadings with regard to their gaining of the knowledge and if the trial Court has chosen to therefore not find it palatable and has rejected the plaint, this Court finds absolutely no palatable legal reason to interfere. The appeal also being devoid of any merits deserves firm rejection. 14. It appears that the learned trial Court, while relying upon the certain decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, has observed that plaintiffs have cleverly drafting the suit and the suit was filed in the year 2022 i.e. after a period of 44 years and, therefore, considering the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, rejected the suit and allowed application at Exhibit 15. Considering the material placed on record and submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the appellants and the decisions cited at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of this Court has decided similarly identical issue under the provision of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code in the case of Jyotsnaben d/o. Govindbhai Patel w/o. Rajendrabhai Patel (supra) and, therefore, the present appeal deserves to be rejected. 15. 15. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatesh Construction Company Vs. Karnataka Vidyuth Karkhane Limited reported in (2016) 4 SCC 119 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraph no.20 as under:- “20. The Appellate Court may not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the finding recorded by the trial court is erroneous or the trial court ignored the evidence on record. The High Court reversed the decree passed by the trial court without discussing oral and documentary evidence and several grounds raised before the trial court. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which in our view, was not warranted. Without considering the oral and documentary evidence, the High Court erred in interfering with the factual findings recorded by the trial court and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.” 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Prabhakara Vs. Basavaraj K. and another reported in (2022) 1 SCC 115 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs no.22 to 24 as under:- “22. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanor of the witness. Therefore, it has got its own advantage in assessing the statement of the witnesses which may not be available to the appellate court. In exercising such a power, the appellate court has to keep in mind the views of the trial court. If it finds that the trial court is wrong, its decision should be on the reasoning given. A mere substitution of views, without discussing the findings of the trial court, by the appellate court is not permissible. If two views are possible, it would only be appropriate to go with the view expressed by the trial court. While adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone. 23. If two views are possible, it would only be appropriate to go with the view expressed by the trial court. While adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone. 23. The aforesaid views expressed by us are nothing but a reiteration of the settled principle of law as could be seen through the following paragraphs of the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 : “27. It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a re-hearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, re-appreciate and review the entire evidence – oral as well as documentary and can come to its own conclusion. 28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanor of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to wellestablished principles of law or unreasonable. 29. Before more than a century, in Coghlan v. Cumberland [(1898) 1 Ch 704 (CA)] Lindley, M.R. pronounced the principle thus; "Even where the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court of Appeal has to bear in mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the materials before the Judge with such other materials as it may have decided to admit. The Court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from, but carefully weighing and considering it; and not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration the Court comes to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong. When, as often happens, much turns on the relative credibility of witnesses who have been examined and cross-examined before the Judge, the Court is sensible of the great advantage he has had in seeing and hearing them. It is often very difficult to estimate correctly the relative credibility of witnesses from written depositions and when the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another; and that question turns on manner and demeanour, the Court of Appeal always is, and must be, guided by the impression made on the Judge who saw the witnesses. But there may obviously be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanour, which may shew whether a statement is credible or not; and these circumstances may warrant the Court in differing from the Judge, even on a question of fact turning on the credibility of witnesses whom the Court has not seen." (See also observations of Lord Thankerton in Watt v. Thomas, [1947 AC 484]) 30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [ AIR 1949 PC 32 ] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated : "…but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given." 31. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given." 31. This Court also, before more than half a century in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari, Pratap Narain Singh [ AIR 1951 SC 120 ] stated: (SCC p. 717, para 8) "8. The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact.” 32. Referring to several cases on the point, the Court concluded: (Sarju Pershad case, SCC p. 720, para 18): "18. …The duty of the appellate court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, outweighs such finding." (emphasis supplied) 33. After about a decade, in Radha Prasad v. Gajadhar Singh, this Court reiterated: (AIR p. 118, para 14) "14. After about a decade, in Radha Prasad v. Gajadhar Singh, this Court reiterated: (AIR p. 118, para 14) "14. The position in law, in our opinion, is that when an appeal lies on facts it is the right and the duty of the appeal court to consider what its decision on the question of facts should be; but in coming to its own decision it should bear in mind that it is looking at the printed record and has not the opportunity of seeing the witnesses and that it should not lightly reject the trial Judge's conclusion that the evidence of a particular witness should be believed or should not be believed particularly when such conclusion is based on the observation of the demeanor of the witness in court. But this does not mean that merely because an appeal court has not heard or seen the witness it will in no case reverse the findings of a trial Judge even on the question of credibility, if such question depends on a fair consideration of matters on record. When it appears to the appeal court that important considerations bearing on the question of credibility have not been taken into account or properly weighed by the trial Judge and such considerations including the question of probability of the story given by the witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the trial Judge is wrong, the appeal court should have no hesitation in reversing the findings of the trial Judge on such questions. Where the question is not of credibility based entirely on the demeanor of witnesses observed in court but a question of inference of one fact from proved primary facts the court of appeal is in as good a position as the trial Judge and is free to reverse the findings if it thinks that the inference made by the trial Judge is not justified.” 34. In T.D. Gopalan v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, this Court said: (SCC p. 333, para 9): "9. The High Court next proceeded to reproduce a summary of the statement of each of the witnesses produced by the defendants. In T.D. Gopalan v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, this Court said: (SCC p. 333, para 9): "9. The High Court next proceeded to reproduce a summary of the statement of each of the witnesses produced by the defendants. No attempt whatsoever was made to discuss the reasons which the learned District Judge had given for not accepting their evidence except for a general observation here and there that nothing had been suggested in the crossexamination of a particular witness as to why he should have made a false statement. We apprehend that the uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness the appellate court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial court. We are, therefore, not in a position to know on what grounds the High Court disagreed with the reasons which prevailed with the learned District Judge for not relying on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the defendants.” 35. Yet in another decision in Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai [ (1983) 1 SCC 35 ], this Court said: (SCC pp. 39-40, para 8): "8. …At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that, in an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. …The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. …The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. There is, of course, no doubt that as a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact.” 36. Three requisites should normally be present before an appellate court reverses a finding of the trial court: (i) it applies its mind to reasons given by the trial court; (ii) it has no advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses; and (iii) it records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial court. 37. If the above principles are kept in mind, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court falls short of the grounds which would allow the first appellate court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial court. As already adverted earlier, the High Court has 'virtually' reached a conclusion without recording reasons in support of such conclusion. When the court of original jurisdiction has considered oral evidence and recorded findings after seeing the demeanour of witnesses and having applied its mind, the appellate court is enjoined to keep that fact in mind. It has to deal with the reasons recorded and conclusions arrived at by the trial court. Thereafter, it is certainly open to the appellate court to come to its own conclusion if it finds that the reasons which weighed with the trial court or conclusions arrived at were not in consonance with law.” (emphasis in original) 24. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that though the first appellate court is the final court of fact and law, it has to fall in line with the scope and ambit of Section 96 of the Code. 17. Considering the scope of the first appeal, the Court cannot ignore and overlook the documents which are part and parcel of the trial Court and considering all these aspects, it appears that the suit filed by the appellants herein is hit by the provisions of law and, therefore, the trial Court has not committed any error while rejecting the suit. Considering the scope of the first appeal, the Court cannot ignore and overlook the documents which are part and parcel of the trial Court and considering all these aspects, it appears that the suit filed by the appellants herein is hit by the provisions of law and, therefore, the trial Court has not committed any error while rejecting the suit. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case, materials on record, the submissions canvassed by the learned advocate for the appellants and the order passed by the trial Court, we are of the opinion that the trial Court has not committed any error in passing the order and, therefore, no interference is required to be called for. Hence, the appeal deserves to be rejected and the same is, accordingly, rejected. Pending civil application/s, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.