JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. This Civil Reference has arisen on an order dated 04.07.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in a Special Civil Application No.1664 of 1997 noticing two contrary views in the judgments of the learned Single Judge in the matter of State of Gujarat vs. Mahmad Yusuf Ahmed Nagani (Special Civil Application No.6943 of 1998 decided on 18.01.1999) and in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya vs. State of Gujarat and others – 2005 (2) GLR 1225 , with regard to the jurisdiction of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal to entertain and decide the revision application/appeal preferred against the order of the District Collector under Section 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 (in short referred to as “the Ordinance, 1949”). The matter was initially referred to a Division Bench, which by oral order dated 25.02.2015 has observed that the reference be heard by a Larger Bench of three Judges. By another order dated 18.06.2021, three Judges’ Bench presided over by the then Chief Justice has directed that the reference be placed before a Division Bench after nomination by the Chief Justice. The reference has, thus, been placed before us. The question under reference is formulated as under :- “Whether the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal/revision against the order passed under Section 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, after enforcement of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 with effect from 23.07.1951, whereby the whole of the Chapter-VIII of the Ordinance, 1949 which contained the provision for appeals and revision under Section 65 and 67; respectively, against the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Collector, had been repealed? 2. Shri Ravindra Shah and Ms.Trusha Patel, learned counsels appearing for the respondents would submit that the decision of the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra) does not lay down the correct law. However, with respect to another judgment dated 18.01.1999 in Special Civil Application No.6943 of 1998, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge in the said decision did not address the issue with regard to the maintainability of the revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal against an order passed under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949, inasmuch as, the said issue was not raised before the said Bench. Rather the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay in challenging the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal allowing the review application and setting aside the order passed by the Collector under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949. There is, thus, no question of conflict. 3. Shri Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr.Vinay Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader has rendered assistance on behalf of the State. 4. In order to answer the reference, certain historical events are relevant to be taken note of as under :- (i) By virtue of the Covenant dated 23.01.1948 executed by the erstwhile different rulers, the United States of Kathiawar came into existence which was renamed as United States of Saurashtra on 01.11.1948. (ii) On 08.07.1949, the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, came to be enacted. (iii) Upon enactment of the Saurasthra Land Reforms Act, 1951 (“the Act, 1951”, in short) with effect from 23.07.1951, certain provisions of the Ordinance, 1949, stood repealed. Chapter-VIII as contained in the Ordinance, 1949, in Section 65 provided for appeals against the orders of Mamlatdar and Tribunal to the Collector, in the cases, passed under various provisions of the Ordinance, mentioned therein. Section 58 in Chapter-VII of the Ordinance, 1949, provided for constitution of a tribunal for any area, to be called the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, consisting of three or more members. As per Sub-section (3) of Section 58, for any area for which the Tribunal has not been constituted, the Mamlatdar or any officer authorized in this behalf by the Government shall exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Tribunal. (iv) Saurasthra Revenue Tribunal was constituted under the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal Ordinance, 1949. Section 66 of the Ordinance, 1949, provided for appeal against the award of the Collector under Section 57, to the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal. Remedy of revision under Section 67 of the Ordinance, 1949, was provided before the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal against any order of the Collector on the grounds stated therein. (v) With the promulgation of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 with effect from 23.07.1951, the whole of Chapter-VIII of the Ordinance, 1949 stood repealed by virtue of Section 65 of the Act, 1951. The result is that the remedy of appeal and revision under the provisions contained in Chapter-VII of the Ordinance, 1949, are no more available. (v) With the promulgation of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 with effect from 23.07.1951, the whole of Chapter-VIII of the Ordinance, 1949 stood repealed by virtue of Section 65 of the Act, 1951. The result is that the remedy of appeal and revision under the provisions contained in Chapter-VII of the Ordinance, 1949, are no more available. (vi) On 01.11.1956, under the State Reorganization Act, 1956, the State of Saurashtra merged with the erstwhile State of Bombay. By virtue of the Bombay (Saurashtra Area) Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, the then prevailing statutes of the Bombay State were made applicable to the areas of Saurasthra State. (vii) On 10.04.1958, the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, was enacted. (viii) On 25.04.1960, under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, the State of Gujarat was formed comprising of the territories including the entire area of the then State of Saurashtra. By virtue of the Gujarat Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1960, the provision was made providing that the powers of revision has been conferred upon the statutory Revenue Tribunal, by making amendment in the then Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, wherein Section 76 was amended to provide a non-obstante clause with regard to applicability of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. As per the said provision the revision application challenging the order of the Collector is maintainable before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Section 76 provided that :- “76. Revision:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the 1[Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 (Bom.XXXI 1958)], an application for revision may be made to the 2[Gujarat Revenue Tribunal] constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector 3[except an order under section 32P or an order in appeal against an order under sub-section (4) of section 32G] on the following grounds only :– (a) the order of the Collector was contrary to law, (b) the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law, or (c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act 4[or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence] which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (2) In deciding applications under this section the 5[Gujarat Revenue Tribunal] shall follow the procedures which may be prescribed by rule made under this Act after consultation with the 6[Gujarat Revenue Tribunal]. 1. (2) In deciding applications under this section the 5[Gujarat Revenue Tribunal] shall follow the procedures which may be prescribed by rule made under this Act after consultation with the 6[Gujarat Revenue Tribunal]. 1. These words and figures were substituted for the words and figures "Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939", by the Gujarat Adoption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) (third amendment) Order, 1960. 2. These words were substituted for the words "Bombay Revenue Tribunal", by the Gujarat Adaption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) (third amendment) Order, 1960. 3. These words, figures and letters in brackets were inserted by Guj. 36 of 1965, S. 9.(w.e.f. 01.02.1966). 4. These words were inserted by Guj. 16 of 1960, S.71. 5. These words were substituted for the words "Bombay Revenue Tribunal", by the Gujarat Adaption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) (third amendment) Order, 1960. 6. These words were substituted for the words "Bombay Revenue Tribunal", by the Gujarat Adaption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) (third amendment) Order, 1960. 7. Section 76A was inserted by Bom. 38 of 1957, S.25” 5. Placing the above turn of events, and the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, it was argued by the learned counsels for the respondents that the said statute is in operation in the State of Gujarat, and with the amendment of Section 76, the jurisdiction is conferred upon the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal against orders of the Collector. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, provided for constitution and functioning of the then Bombay Revenue Tribunal, which is now termed as Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, which exercises the appellate and revisional powers under Sections 204 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. It was contended that since the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was already established, there was no need for making any provision for constitution of the revenue tribunal while enacting the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Upon merger of the State of Saurashtra on 01.11.1956 with the then State of Bombay, the Bombay Revenue Tribunal continued to exercise its powers of appellate and revisional jurisdiction under Section 75 and 76 of the Tenancy Act, 1948, which continued until 01.05.1960 when the new State of Gujarat came to be formed by virtue of the Gujarat Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1960, whereby appropriate amendment was made in the Tenancy Act, 1948. With the non-obstante clause of non-applicability of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 as per Section 76, the revision application challenging the order of Collector is maintainable before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. It was further submitted that in an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court dated 17.11.1952 rendered in Ratanchand Onkardas Meher alias Oswal Marwadi and another vs. Hari Jayaram Khadke Leva Patidar and others, being Special Civil Application No.1651 of 1952, it was noted while comparing the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, that no tribunal was set up which was empowered to revise a decision of the Collector. In that respect, the scheme of the old Act and the present Act was different. Meaning thereby that the constitution and functioning of the statutory Bombay Revenue Tribunal was made in the Act, 1948, whereas no such constitution was provided in the Act, 1939. The said Division Bench has also taken note of the provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 which empowered the provincial Government to have and exercise the same authority and control over the Collector and Mamlatdar as they have over them in the exercise of the power in the general and revenue administration. It is argued before us that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court taking note of the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, Sections 13(4) and Section 28 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and Section 3 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939 which provided for constitution of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, has decided that the Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Act, 1948 will have power of revision against the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and the Collector under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 6. In the written submissions filed by Mr.Ravindra Shah, learned counsel for the respondents, it is stated that, in case, the present Division Bench comes to a different conclusion from the opinion of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court drawn in the aforesaid decision, the present Civil Reference will have to be referred to a Larger Bench of three or more Judges. 7. 7. Coming to the oral arguments made by the counsels for the respondents, we may note that the contention of the learned counsels for the respondents is that with the repeal of the whole of Chapter-VII, the respondents have been rendered remediless in case the argument of the State is accepted that the revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal is not maintainable even after the repeal. Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 provided for summary eviction of any person, allegedly in unauthorized occupation or wrongful possession of any land, under the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 75. Section 76 prohibits the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matters require to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the Collector under the Ordinance. Section 77 confers general power of administration upon the State Government of authority and control over the Mamlatdars and Collectors acting under the Ordinance, 1949, as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration. The contention is that the said power cannot be treated as a power of revision with the State Government against the order passed by the Mamlatdar or Collector under the Ordinance, 1949. 8. The provisions of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 have been placed before us to assert that the provision for appeal and revision against the order of the Mamlatdar and the Collector has been provided therein. Section 51 of the Act, 1951, provides a remedy of appeal to the Collector against any order of the Mamlatdar. Whereas Section 52 confers power of revision to the Tribunal against any order of the Collector on the grounds mentioned therein. The same enactment namely Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 also contains provision in Section 63 of providing general power of control and revision to the State Government over Mamlatdar and Collector acting under the said Act, as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration. It is, thus, argued that the Saurasthra Land Reforms Act, 1951, provides three remedies of appeal, revision and the power with the State Government of administration over the Mamlatdar and Collector. 9. It is, thus, argued that the Saurasthra Land Reforms Act, 1951, provides three remedies of appeal, revision and the power with the State Government of administration over the Mamlatdar and Collector. 9. A comparative reading of Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 and Section 63 of the Act, 1951 makes it clear that both the provisions speak of only the administrative powers of the State Government, of authority and control over the Mamlatdars and the Collectors, acting under the said provision, as it have and exercise in the general and revenue administration. The power under Section 77 conferred upon the State Government cannot be treated as a quasi-judicial power of revision to deal with the validity of the orders passed by the Mamlatdar or the Collector. It was argued that Section 67 as contained in Chapter-VIII, in the original Ordinance, 1949 pertained to the judicial/quasi-judicial power of the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal Ordinance, 1949, in the nature of revision. The administrative powers conferred upon the State under Section 77 cannot be compared with the judicial/quasi-judicial power under Section 67 of the then Ordinance, 1949. 10. Even otherwise, the then Ordinance, 1949 itself contained both the powers of revision under Section 67 and administrative power of the State Government under Section 77. Once the Legislature at the relevant point of time, while enacting the Ordinance, 1949, in its wisdom had thought it fit to provide for both the above-noted provisions, if at a subsequent point of time, one of the provisions i.e. Section 67 stood repealed, it cannot be inferred that the State Government can resort to Section 77, to exercise revisional power to examine the legality and validity of the order passed by the Mamaltdar or the Collector. It was vehemently argued that both the aforesaid provisions were provided in the statute-book for altogether different purposes. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.S.Ramamurthy Reddiar vs. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry and another - AIR 1963 SC 1464 and Karnataka High Court decision in Mallappa Murigeppa Sajjan and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others - AIR 1980 Karnataka 53, to argue that at the time of framing of the statute, had it not been the intention of the Legislature to simultaneously incorporate both the aforesaid provisions for different purposes, it would not have provided for the same. Any different interpretation regardless of the said intention leads to absurdity. The power of revision exercised by the then tribunal under Section 67 being in the nature of judicial/quasi-judicial power cannot be exercised by the State Government in its power of general and revenue administration conferred under Section 77. 11. With these submissions, it was argued that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra), does not lay down the correct law. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 has to be held to have jurisdiction to exercise power of revision over the decision of the Mamlatdar or the Collector under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949, or else the respondents would be rendered remediless. 12. Having noted the above submissions, the facts of the case in brief, in Special Civil Application No.1664 of 1997 out of which the instant reference has arisen, are also relevant to be noted. By the order dated 10.06.1993, the Deputy Collector in Gharkhed Ordinance Case No.20/91-92 passed an order holding that the sale was in breach of Section 54 of the Ordinance, 1949 and hence, the transaction effected by registered Sale Deed executed by the petitioner in favour of respondent No.1 in respect of lands in question being Survey No.553 admeasuring 26-Acres 30-Gunthas and Survey No.96 admeasuring 5-Acres 0-Gunthas of Lakhtar Taluka of Dhrangadhra Sub Division, was held illegal and void in view of the same being in favour of a non-agriculturist. The Collector in Gharkhed Ordinance/Appeal No.4/92-93 by order dated 19.02.1994 dismissed the appeal holding that the sale was barred under Section 54 of the Ordinance and hence, confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector. The revision was instituted before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which had allowed the same vide order dated 18.10.1996, quashing the orders passed by the Deputy Collector and the Collector, on the ground that the notice dated 08.09.1993 under Section 75 of the Ordinance sought to unsettle the sale transaction dated 01.07.1963 after thirty one years, which was impermissible and that no reasons were given for such an abnormal delay. The aforesaid Special Civil Application was filed by the petitioners against the order dated 13.02.1997 on the ground that without their knowledge, their names from the revenue records pertaining to the land in question came to be deleted and the order came to be passed against them without impleading them as parties. 13. Now we may note the arguments of Mr.Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General assisted by the learned Assistant Government Pleaders appearing on behalf of the respondent State. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that the covenant dated 23.01.1948 which was signed by and between the erstwhile rulers of certain States of Kathiawar for formation of the United States of Kathiawar and the Government of India contained in paragraph (3) of Article IX inter-alia as under :- “Article IX (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) Until Constitution so framed comes into operation, the legislative authority of the United State shall vest in ‘Raj Pramukh’, who may make and promulgate ordinance for the peace and good government of the State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Legislature of the State.” 14. The Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, came to be promulgated by the Raj Pramukh in exercise of the powers conferred by the above-noted paragraph (3) of Article IX of the Covenant, on 08.07.1949, with a view to settle dispute pertaining to Gharkhed land in respect of various issues such as rent and eviction, enhancement of economic and social conditions of peasants, complete and efficient use of agriculture land etc. It was argued that the Ordinance, 1949 was promulgated prior in time of the enforcement of the Constitution of India on 26.01.1950. Pre-constitutional law has the force of law as an Act passed by the legislature. Mere fact that it is termed as Ordinance, it cannot be said to be covered under Article 213 of the Constitution of India and, as such, there arises no question of compliance with the requisites under the said Article. The Ordinance, 1949 is a valid piece of legislation, which continues to operate with various amendments made to the same. Mere fact that it is termed as Ordinance, it cannot be said to be covered under Article 213 of the Constitution of India and, as such, there arises no question of compliance with the requisites under the said Article. The Ordinance, 1949 is a valid piece of legislation, which continues to operate with various amendments made to the same. It was argued that Section 77 of the Ordinance, which is pari materia to Section 28 of the erstwhile Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 confers power on the State to modify, annul or reverse orders of the Mamlatdar passed under Section 24 of the Tenancy Act, 1939. 15. It is further submitted that the judgment and order dated 17.11.1952 relied by the learned counsel for the respondents has been held to be per incuriam by a subsequent judgment in the case of Bai Rukhi and others vs. Vrajlal Jechand and others, decided on 29.07.1958 reported in AIR 1960 Bom. 212 . It is held therein that the State Government had power to revise an order passed by the Mamlatdar under Section 24(2) or under Section 24(3) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. It is held therein that the jurisdiction which was conferred upon the State Government under Section 28 was the jurisdiction of revisional character and not a mere administrative or executive jurisdiction. It was further noted therein that previous decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Parvatibai Utamlal vs. Rupa Keshav - AIR 1948 Bom. 118, in holding that the order made by the Collector under Section 24 of the Act, 1939 is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the provincial Government, had not been brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Ratanchand Onkardas Meher alias Oswal Marwadi and another vs. Hari Jayaram Khadke Leva Patidar and others, being Special Civil Application No.1651 of 1952, the decision is relied by the learned counsel for the respondents. The relevant paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Bai Rukhi and others (supra) are relevant to be extracted hereinunder :- “6. It is true that in Special Civil Applications Nos. The relevant paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Bai Rukhi and others (supra) are relevant to be extracted hereinunder :- “6. It is true that in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1651 of 1952 and 274 of 1951 the view taken by this Court was that the decision of the Collector in appeal under sub-s. (3) of S. 24 of the Act of 1939 was a judicial order and it could not be interfered with administratively or by an executive fiat by Government under S. 28 of the Act. With very great respect, it may be stated that the provisions of S. 24(4) of the Tenancy Act of 1939 do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Court in those Special Civil Applications. It is sub-s. (4) of S. 24 which makes the Mamlatdar's orders and the Collector's orders, passed under sub-ss. (2) and (3) respectively of that section, subject to the provisions of S. 28. Sub-section (4) of S. 24 does not confer absolute finality upon those orders. The finality of these orders depends upon what Government might do in the exercise of the power conferred upon them under S. 28. This aspect of the case, with great respect, does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Court when Special Civil Applns. Nos. 1651 of 1952 and 274 of 1951 came up for decision. 7. At this stage it might be pointed out that in the case of Parvatibai Utamlal v. Rupa Keshav 49 Bom LR 658 at p. 664 : (AIR 1948 Bom 118 at p. 122), also it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court : 'Taking now the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act relevant to the question referred to us, the provision in section 28 that "in all matters connected with the Act, the Provincial Government shall have and exercise the same authority and control over the Collectors and Mamlatdars as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration" clearly indicates, in my opinion, that an order made by the Collector under S. 24 of the said Act is subject to the revisional jurisdiction not of this Court, but of the Provincial Government.' These observations also do not appear to have been brought to the notice of this Court in Special Civil Applns Nos. 1651 of 1952 and 274 of 1951. 8. Again with great respect, the scheme of the Tenancy Act of 1939 does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Court in those Special Civil Applications. There are several sections in the Act of 1939 which lead us to the conclusion that the jurisdiction, which was conferred by the Legislature upon the Government under S. 28, was jurisdiction of a revisional character and not a mere administrative or executive jurisdiction. Section 2A (2) provides that where an application under sub-s. (1) of that section has been made and the Mamlatdar refuses to make a declaration which is prayed for and where the Mamlatdar's decision is not set aside by the Collector in appeal under sub-s. (3) of S. 13 or by the Provincial Government under S. 28, the person concerned shall be deemed to be a tenant for the purposes of the Act. When the Legislature enacted Sec. 2A, it clearly intended that the Mamlatdar's decision under sub-s. (1) of that section could be judicially revised either by the Collector in appeal under Sec. 13(3) or by the Provincial Government under Sec. 28. Then again, Sec. 3A (2) provides that where an application under sub-s. (1) of that section has been made by the person concerned and where the Mamlatdar refuses to make a declaration sought by him and where the Mamlatdar's decision is not set aside by the Collector in appeal under sub-s. (3) of S. 13 or by the Provincial Government under S. 28, the said person shall be deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of the Act and his rights as such protected tenant shall be recorded in the Record of Rights. Here again, the language used by the Legislature in sub-s. (2) of S. 3A would show that the decision of a Mamlatdar under sub-s. (1) of that section, which decision has undoubtedly a judicial character about it, could be revised either by the Collector in appeal under S. 13(3) or by the Provincial Government under S. 28. Here again, the language used by the Legislature in sub-s. (2) of S. 3A would show that the decision of a Mamlatdar under sub-s. (1) of that section, which decision has undoubtedly a judicial character about it, could be revised either by the Collector in appeal under S. 13(3) or by the Provincial Government under S. 28. Sub-section (2) of S. 3A deals with an important question of the rights of a protected tenant and it is clear that the Legislature intended by this sub-section that in pursuance of the power conferred by the Legislature upon Government under S. 28 the Government could interfere with the decision of the Mamlatdar even upon such an important point as the point affecting the tenancy rights. Then again, there is sub-s. (4) of S. 13 which provides that the order of the Mamlatdar made under sub-s. (2) of that section shall, subject to an appeal to the Collector under sub-s. (3) of the same section and the provisions of S. 28, be final. The order of the Collector also shall, subject to the provisions of S. 28 be final. It is not disputed, and indeed it cannot be disputed, that the order made by the Mamlatdar under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 and the order made by the Collector Bom215 under sub-s. (3) of S. 13 possess judicial character and, therefore, when the Legislature provided by sub-s. (4) of S. 13 that these orders could be interfered with by the Government under S. 28, it is clear that the Legislature intended to confer upon the Government powers of judicial revision of the orders of the Mamlatdar and the Collector. It is no doubt true that in Special Civil Appln. No. 1651 of 1952 a reference to S. 13 (4) of the Act of 1939 was made. But the attention of the Court does not appear to have been invited to the effect of S. 28 upon the subject of the finality of the orders of the Mamlatdar and Collector. It is no doubt true that in Special Civil Appln. No. 1651 of 1952 a reference to S. 13 (4) of the Act of 1939 was made. But the attention of the Court does not appear to have been invited to the effect of S. 28 upon the subject of the finality of the orders of the Mamlatdar and Collector. The relevant observation which was made by this Court in that case was this : 'When we turn to the old Tenancy Act, 1939, an appeal was provided by sub-s. (3) of S. 13 to the Collector from a decision of the Mamlatdar and that decision became final under sub-s. (4).' It is true that sub-s. (4) conferred finality upon the Collector"s decision, but the Court's attention does not seem to have been invited to the fact that the said finality was subject to the provisions of S. 28.” 16. It was further argued that the erstwhile Section 67 of the Ordinance provided for filing of revision application before the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal, but the same has been repealed with effect from 23.07.1951. As regards the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, it provided for jurisdiction of the Tribunal known as Gujarat Revenue Tribunal to entertain and decide appeals and revise decisions and orders of the officers (of the category provided therein), in respect of cases arising out of the enactments specified in the first schedule thereto, which does not include the Ordinance, 1949. The only remedy available to the persons aggrieved by the orders passed under the Ordinance, 1949 is under Section 77 of the said Ordinance. 17. The submission, thus, is that the decision of the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra) correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 77 to hold that the language used therein “general and revenue administration” is to be given a liberal interpretation giving wide power to the State Government which would include examining the legality and validity of the actions taken or orders passed by the Mamlatdars or the Collectors under the Ordinance. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that there is no reason to restrict such power of the State Government which are essentially for controlling the actions taken by the Mamlatdars or Collectors under the Ordinance, which would include the orders passed by them. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that there is no reason to restrict such power of the State Government which are essentially for controlling the actions taken by the Mamlatdars or Collectors under the Ordinance, which would include the orders passed by them. The submission, thus, is that the said decision is more plausible as compared to the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18.01.1999 rendered in Special Civil Application No.6943 of 1998, where the issue pertaining to jurisdiction has not been adjudicated. 18. The Government Circular bearing No.S-30/2503/2798/Z dated 29.10.2005 has been placed before us to submit that in order to streamline the issue, to provide remedy to persons aggrieved under Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949, the power of revision which was with the State Government has been conferred upon the Collectors of all districts, to hear appeal/revision/applications under the Ordinance, 1949. By another notification of the Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat dated 13.06.2013, issued by the State Government, in pursuance of Instructions 4(1) contained in the instructions issued under Rule 15 of the Gujarat Government Rules of Business, 1990, the cases relating to the subjects specified in the Schedule-III appended thereto have been directed to be disposed of at such levels as are indicated in the said Schedule. Schedule-III at Item No.6 is relevant to be extracted hereinunder :- “Schedule-III Unless the Minister in charge himself takes up any of the following cases and decides the same, the following cases in appeal or revision as the case may be disposed off by the Additional Chief/Principal Secretary/Secretary (Appeals) or such other officer or officers not below the rank of the joint/Deputy Secretary as the Additional Chief/Principal Secretary/Secretary/Additional Secretary (Appeals) may direct Sr. No. Name of the Act or Rules Section Subject matter 1 to 5 xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 6 The Saurasthra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Ordinance, 1949 Section 54 and 75 Sections 55(2)(D)(1) Appellate powersq 7 xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 19. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record, to deal with the above-noted facts emerging from the record, we may note the relevant provisions of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, which was promulgated by the Raj Pramukh in exercise of powers conferred under paragraph (3), Article IX of the Covenant, extracted above. There is no dispute about the fact that the Ordinance, 1949 is still in operation being a valid piece of legislation, dealing with the settlement of disputes between land holders and their tenants and other matters, relating to Gharkhed land, falling in the jurisdiction of the then State of Saurashtra. Gharkhed is defined in Section 2(h) of the Ordinance, 1949 as under :- “2(h) “Gharkhed” means land reserved by a landholder for cultivating personally : Provided that the land shall continue to be Gharkhed land even if a landholder allows the same to be cultivated by the tenant cultivating the land on the 1st January, 1948.” 20. Sections 54, 75 and 77 which are still existing on the statute-book are also relevant to be noted hereinunder :- “54. Sections 54, 75 and 77 which are still existing on the statute-book are also relevant to be noted hereinunder :- “54. (1) Save as provided in this Ordinance :- (a) no sale (including sales in execution of a decree of a civil court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue), gift, exchange or lease of any land 1[where lease is by law allowed] or interest therein, or (b) no mortgage of any land or interest (herein in which the possession of the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee, shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist ; 2[or] 3[(c) no agreement made by an instrument in writing for the sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage of any land or interest therein]: Provided that the Collector or an officer authorised by the Government may grant permission for such sale, gift, exchange, lease, 4[where lease is by law allowed], or mortgage, 5[or for such agreement] on such conditions as may be prescribed: 6[Provided further that no such permission shall be granted, where land is being sold to a person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose, if the annual income of such person from other sources exceeds five thousand rupees.] 7[(1A) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt from the provisions of sub-section (1), for the transfer of any agricultural land to any public trust established for the charitable purpose and which is non-profitable in nature, for the use of such land in the field of health and education, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein.] (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the sale, gift, exchange or lease of a dwelling house or the site thereof or any land appurtenant to it in favour of an agricultural labourer or an artisan. 75. 75. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land, (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Ordinance, (b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provisions, or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such persons, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. 77. In all matters connected with this Ordinance, the Government shall have the same authority and control over the mamlatdars’ and the Collectors acting under this Ordinance as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration.” 21. Section 67 of the then Ordinance, 1949, prior to the repeal, reads as under :- “67. Revision:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal Ordinance, 1949, an application for revision may be made to the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Ordinance against any order of the Collector on the following grounds only :– (a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; (b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; or (c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Ordinance, which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (2) In deciding applications under this section, the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal shall follow the procedure which may be prescribed by rules made under this Ordinance after consultation with the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Court Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870) as adapted and applied to the State, every application or appeal made under this Ordinance to the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal shall have a court-fee stamp of such value as may be prescribed.” 22. The Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 which came to be enacted on 23.07.1951, by virtue of Section 65, had repealed the majority of the provisions of the Ordinance, 1949 including Section 67 contained in Chapter-VIII. Section 65 of 1951 Act reads as under :- “65. The Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 which came to be enacted on 23.07.1951, by virtue of Section 65, had repealed the majority of the provisions of the Ordinance, 1949 including Section 67 contained in Chapter-VIII. Section 65 of 1951 Act reads as under :- “65. (1) The following Chapters and sections of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance No. XLI of 1949) as amended from time to time, are hereby repealed, namely:- (a) the whole of Chapter II, the whole of Chapter III except sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 19 and the whole of Chapters IV, V, VIII and IX; and (b) sections 55, 56 and 57 of Chapter VII : Provided that such repeal shall not, save as expressly provided in this Act, affect or be deemed to affect ;- (i) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act, or (ii) any legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, title, interest, obligation or liability or anything done or suffered to be done before the commencement of this Act, and any such proceedings shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed : 55[Provided further that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law or usage, agreement, settlement, grant, sanad or any decree or order of any court, Tribunal or other authority, all orders passed regarding giving, reserving or alloting any land for Gharkhed but not executed by giving possession before 20th May, 1950 under the provisions hereby repealed shall be treated as void and no such order shall be executed; the application for the giving, reserving or alloting land for Gharkhed on which any such orders may have been passed shall be treated as applications presented for the allotment of land for personal cultivation under the provisions of this Act and shall be disposed of accordingly: Provided further that such applications shall be deemed to have been presented within the period prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 19 for presenting such application.] (2) Any appointment, notification, notice, order, rule or form made or issued under the provisions of the Ordinance so repealed shall continue to be in force and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions of this Act, in so far as such appointment, notification, notice, order, rule or form is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, or rules made thereunder and shall continue to be in force unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, notice, order, rule or form made or issued under this Act.” 23. The provisions of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 in Section 9 are also relevant to be noted :- “9. Jurisdiction of Tribunal. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and decide appeals from and revise decisions and orders of officers, not below the rank of a Collector or Deputy Commissioner, in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the First Schedule. (2) Save as expressly provided in any enactment for the time being in force, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction to entertain and decide appeals from, and receive decisions and orders of, such persons, officers and authorities in such other cases as the State Government may determine; and for that purpose the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, add to, amend or omit, any of the entries in the First Schedule, and thereupon the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in such matter and the jurisdiction of any other persons, officer or authority therein shall cease. (3) The State Government may, at any time, in like manner, cancel such notification or omit any entry from the First Schedule and resume to itself such jurisdiction: Provided that nothing herein shall prevent the State Government after such resumption of jurisdiction from conferring any such jurisdiction on any other person, officer or authority. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, when the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain and decide appeals from and revise decisions and orders of any person, officer or authority in any matter aforesaid, no other person, officer or authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain and decide appeals from and revise decisions or orders of such person, officer or authority in that matter.” 24. As noted above the first schedule of the Tribunal Act, 1957 does not include the Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. 25. As noted above the first schedule of the Tribunal Act, 1957 does not include the Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. 25. The learned counsels for the respondents have also referred to Sections 65, 67, 77, 86 and 211 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, to submit that Section 211 of the Code, 1879 confers power upon the State Government and any revenue officer mentioned therein, to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceeding conducted by any subordinate revenue officer for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings conducted by such officer. The contention, thus, is that Section 211 which confers revisional power upon the State under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, is clear and specific. The Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 also deals with the land laws and also extends to the Saurashtra area of the State of Bombay. There is a remarkable difference in the language of Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 which only speaks of exercise of power of general and revenue administration. On comparison of the language of two provisions namely Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 and Section 211 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, it cannot be inferred that the State Government is empowered to exercise power to examine legality or validity of an order passed in exercise of quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar or the Collector/revenue authorities. Section 211 of the Revenue Code, 1879, is also relevant to be noted hereinunder :- “211. Power of [State] Government and of certain revenue officers to call for and examine reords and proceedings of subordinate officers:- The [[State] Government] and any revenue officer, not inferior in rank to [an Assistant or Deputy Collector] or a Superintendent of Survey, in their respective departments, may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for the purpose of satisfying [itself or himself, as the case may be,] as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. The following officer may in the same manner call for and examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held, namely, [* * *] a Mamlatdar, a Mahalkari, [an] Assistant Superintendent of Survey and an Assistant Settlement Officer. And to pass orders thereupon. If in any case, it shall appear to the [[State] Government], or to such officer aforesaid, that any decision or order or procedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, [it or he] may pass such order thereon as [it or he] deems fit. [Provided that an Assistant or Deputy Collector shall not himself pass such order in any matter in which a formal inquiry has been held, but shall submit the record with his opinion to the Collector, who shall pass such order thereon as he may deem fit]” 26. Having gone through the above relevant statutory provisions, we may again note the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra), the correctness of which has been challenged before us. A perusal of the said decision indicates that the learned Single Judge having noted the provisions of the Ordinance, 1949, namely Section 54 and 75, noted in paragraph 7 as under :- “7. The impugned orders have been passed by the competent authority under Section 75 of the Ordinance. It may be recorded that earlier against the decision of the authority under the Ordinance for declaration that the transaction is invalid the revision was competent before the Saurashtra Land Revenue Tribunal as per the provisions of Section 67 of the Ordinance and after formation of the Gujarat State before the Gujarat Land Revenue Tribunal. However, Section 67 of the Ordinance is repealed by the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as per the provisions of Section 65 of the Act. In view of Section 65 of the Act which is subsequent to Ordinance of 1949 Section 67 of the Ordinance since repealed, the tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain the revision against the order passed by the competent authority under the Ordinance unless the action is taken during the period when Section 67 of the Ordinance was on the statute book and unless such proceedings are saved by the provisions of General Insurance Clause. In none of the petitions, the action has been taken by the authorities under the Ordinance during the period when the Section 67 of the Ordinance was on the Statute book. Such actions are taken after repealing of Section 67 of the Ordinance and therefore it appears that the Gujarat Land Revenue Tribunal which is substituted in place of Saurashtra Land Revenue Tribunal after formation of Gujarat State will not continue to have jurisdiction for entertaining the revision in a matter where the action is taken under the Ordinance after repealing of Section 67 of the Ordinance as per the provisions of Section 65 of the Act.” 27. It was further noted in paragraph 9 that :- “9. As such, even after repealing of Section 67 of the Ordinance, the provisions of Section 77 of the Ordinance have continued to be on the Statute book and there is no repeal of that provision. Section 77 of the Ordinance reads as under: "77. Control:-- In all matters connected with ordinance the Govt. shall have the same authority and control over the Mamlatdars and the Collectors acting under this Ordinance as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration." As per the said Ordinance the State Govt. is having the same authority and control over Mamalatdars and Collectors acting under the Ordinance as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration. As such, the expression used under Section 77 of the Ordinance can be said as a conferring power upon the State Govt. to examine the legality and validity of the powers exercised by the Mamalatdar and the Collector under the Ordinance and to exercise the same power as that of Mamaltdar or the Collector under the Ordinance. Such power if not construed at par with the appellate power, it can be said at par with the power of revisional authority. In the absence of any express provision available for appeal or revision the orders passed by the competent authority under the Ordinance can be examined by the State Govt. It appears that only the controlling power of the State Govt. can be read as power akin to the revisional jurisdiction with a view to control and supervise any action taken or the order passed by the authority under the Ordinance.” 28. It appears that only the controlling power of the State Govt. can be read as power akin to the revisional jurisdiction with a view to control and supervise any action taken or the order passed by the authority under the Ordinance.” 28. While dealing with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner therein with regard to the language used in Section 77 of ‘general and revenue administration’, it was held in paragraph 10 as under:- “10. Mr. Patel, Ld. counsel appearing in one of the petitions made an attempt to submit that the language used is "general and revenue administration" and therefore it may not be interpreted as having power to modify or annul the order which would rather be available with the revisional authority. In my view, merely because the language used is 'general and revenue administration', the powers of the State Govt. which are otherwise equated to control over the powers exercised and exercisable by the Mamalatdars and Collectors should not be restricted. The liberal interpretation would give wider power to the Govt. which would include examining the legality and validity of the actions taken or orders passed by the Mamaltdars or Collectors under the Ordinance. There is no reason to restrict such powers of the State Govt. which are essentially for controlling the actions taken or the orders passed by the Mamalatdars or Collectors under the Ordinance.” 29. Having gone through the statutory provisions and the arguments of learned counsels for the respondents and the State, exhaustively, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the opinion drawn by the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra), as noted hereinabove. The fact remains that the Ordinance, 1949 is a valid piece of legislation, and is still available on the statute-book providing for the settlement of disputes relating to quantum of Gharkhed land, rent and eviction, between the land holders and their tenants, to provide for the full and efficient use of any agricultural land and for certain other matters mentioned therein. With the repeal of its provisions mentioned in clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 65 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, the remedy of revision before the then Saurasthra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal Ordinance, 1949, is not available. With the repeal of its provisions mentioned in clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 65 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, the remedy of revision before the then Saurasthra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Saurashtra Revenue Tribunal Ordinance, 1949, is not available. As noted above, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under Section 3 of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 has a limited jurisdiction mentioned in Section 9, pertaining to the provisions of the enactment specified in the first schedule, which does not include the Ordinance, 1949, as noted above. The jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal being a statutory tribunal established under the Act, 1957, restricted in respect of the cases mentioned therein, cannot be extended to the cases pertaining to the Ordinance, 1949. 30. The only provision which can be construed as a remedy to examine the legality or validity of the orders passed under the Ordinance, 1949 is Section 77 which confers supervisory powers upon the State Government. A careful reading of Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 indicates that the State Government in its power of Eminent Domain, has authority and control over the Mamlatdars and the Collectors acting under the Ordinance, 1949, in all matters connected with the Ordinance. A deeper reading and understanding of Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 makes it clear that in its general power of superintendence, in the matter of revenue administration, the State can exercise its authority to see the legality and propriety of the orders passed by the Mamlatdars and the Collectors while acting under the Ordinance, 1949, in all matters connected with the Ordinance. The reading of Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949, in this manner, as has been interpreted by the learned Single Judge in Vallubhai Kukabhai Boliya (supra), will provide a purposive construction to the provision, which is in sync with the intention of the legislature while repealing Chapter-VIII of the Ordinance, 1949 by virtue of Section 65 of the Saurasthra Land Reforms Act, 1951. Section 77 which has been retained in the statute-book has to be given a purposive meaning and reading of the said provision in the above manner brings the provision within the umbrella of power of Eminent Domain of the State Government. Section 77 which has been retained in the statute-book has to be given a purposive meaning and reading of the said provision in the above manner brings the provision within the umbrella of power of Eminent Domain of the State Government. Any other interpretation to Section 77 of the Ordinance, 1949 would not only leave this provision otiose, but also render the aggrieved persons arising out of the matters under the Ordinance, 1949 remediless. 31. It is settled rule of statutory interpretation that a construction which reduces the Statute to a futility has to be avoided. The Statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it applicable and operative on the principles expressed in the maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’, i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See: Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edition) page 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edition) page 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edition) page 221.]. 32. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Hindustan Bulk Carriers – (2003) 3 SCC 57, has laid down the above-noted principles and stated that a statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. Relevant paragraphs 14 to 20 of the said decision are to be noted hereinunder :- “14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. (See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edition), page 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edition) page 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edition) page 221.) 15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edition), page 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edition) page 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edition) page 221.) 15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1926) AC 37 p.52 referred to in Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja Singh ( AIR 1959 SC 352 ), Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 1062 ). 16. The Courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627 p.634 (PC), Curtis v. Stovin (1889) 22 CBD 513) referred to in S. Teja Singh's case (Supra). 17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1940) 3 All E.R. 549 (CL) referred to in Pye vs. Minister for Lands for NSW (1954) 3 All ER 514 (PC). The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India ( AIR 1992 SC 1 ) 18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 19. The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. [See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and Anr. ( AIR 1992 SC 81 )]. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. [See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and Anr. ( AIR 1992 SC 81 )]. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the Court to avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same Act. [See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain ( AIR 1997 SC 1006 )] 20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.” 33. The same principles were noted by the Apex Court in previous decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs. S. Teja Singh - 1958 SCC Online SC 30 as under:- “9. We must now refer to an aspect of the question, which strongly reinforces the conclusion stated above. On the construction contended for by the respondent, s. 18-A(9) (b) would become wholly nugatory, as ss. 22(1) and 22(2) can have no application to advance estimates to be furnished under s. 18-A(3), and if we accede to this contention, we must hold that though the legislature enacted s. 18-A(9)(b) with the very object of bringing the failure to send estimates under s. 18-A(3) within the operation of s. 28, it signally failed to achieve its object. A construction which leads to such a result must, if that is possible, be avoided,, on the principle expressed in the maxim, "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". Vide Curtis v. Stovin (1) and in particular the following observations of Fry, L. J., at page 519 : "The only alternative construction offered to us would lead to this result, that the plain intention of the legislature has entirely failed by reason of a slight inexactitude in the language of the section. If we were to adopt this construction, we should be construing the Act in order to defeat its object rather than with a view to carry its object into effect". Vide also Craies on Statute Law, p. 90 and Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edn., pp. 236-237. If we were to adopt this construction, we should be construing the Act in order to defeat its object rather than with a view to carry its object into effect". Vide also Craies on Statute Law, p. 90 and Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edn., pp. 236-237. "A statute is designed", observed Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2), "to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable". 34. In the case of M. Pentiah and others vs. Muddala Veeramallappa and others - 1960 SCC Online SC 37, the Apex Court has held that :- “6. Before we consider this argument in some detail, it will be convenient at this stage to notice some of the well established rules of Construction which would help us to steer clear of the complications created by the Act. Maxwell " On the Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edn., says at p. 7 thus: ".............. if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." It is said in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., at p. 82- “Manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly to be avoided.” Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. provides another useful guide of correct perspective to such a problem in the following words: "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and the other clauses of the Act, so as, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter." 35. In the case of Corporation of Calcutta and another vs. Liberty Cinema - 1964 SCC Online SC 65, it is stated that :- “9. In the case of Corporation of Calcutta and another vs. Liberty Cinema - 1964 SCC Online SC 65, it is stated that :- “9. It may also be stated that a statute has to be read so as to make it valid and, if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided; it has to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat : see Broom's Legal Maxims (10 ed.) p. 361, Craies on Statutes (6th ed.) p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th ed.) p. 221. Therefore again, the word "fee" in s. 548 should be read as meaning a tax, for as we shall show later, it made no provision for services to be rendered; any other reading would make the section invalid. A construction producing that result has to be avoided. We do not also think that by reading the word as referring to a tax we would be doing any violence to the language used.” 36. The observations in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of Assam and others - 1989 (3) SCC 709 are relevant to be noted as under :- “118. The Courts strongly lean against any "construction which tends to reduce a Statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "ut res majis valeat quam periat". It is, no doubt, true that if a Statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the Statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial-review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a Court of construction, dealing with the language of a Statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the Statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., Farwell J. Said: (pp 360-61) "Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty." . 119. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., Farwell J. Said: (pp 360-61) "Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty." . 119. In Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham Coun- try Council, [1960] 3 All ER 503 Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. Said: (All ER p.516) "But when a Statute has some meaning, even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the Courts have to say what meaning the Statute to bear rather than reject it as a nullity." 120. It is, therefore, the Court's duty to make what it can of the Statute, knowing that the Statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to declare a Statute unworkable. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, Lord Dunedin said: (AC p.52) "A Statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable." 37. Lastly, coming to the decision relied by the learned counsels for the respondents in Dipak Babaria vs. State of Gujarat – 2014 (3) SCC 502 , the dispute therein was pertaining to the permission granted by the Collector, Bhuj, to sell certain parcels of agricultural land situated in District Kutch, which was purchased by the respondent therein for industrial purpose. The contention was that it was impermissible under the provisions of the Gujarat (earlier “Bombay” prior to the amendment in its application in the State of Gujarat) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Areas) Act, 1958. The submission of the appellant before the Apex Court was that under Section 89-A of the Tenancy Act, 1958, agricultural land can be permitted to be sold by an agriculturist to another person for industrial purpose provided the proposed user is bona fide. The issue with respect to the underlying policy and purpose behind the relevant provision of the Tenancy Act, 1958 fell for consideration before the Apex Court. It was noted therein that the land in question had not been deal in the manner as provided in the Statute. The issue with respect to the underlying policy and purpose behind the relevant provision of the Tenancy Act, 1958 fell for consideration before the Apex Court. It was noted therein that the land in question had not been deal in the manner as provided in the Statute. It was further noted that the State Government being an appellate authority under Sub-section (3) of Section 89-A could not have given direction to the Collector who was supposed to take the decision independently under his own authority. The power to deal with the land, i.e. to grant permission was with the Collector and the State could have exercised the appellate power, if occasion arose. It was not permissible for the State Government to issue direction to the Collector in the guise of the power of overall control of the State under Section 126 of the Tenancy Act, which could be utilized for giving general guidelines, but not for giving directions in individual cases. The Apex Court had taken exception to the action of the State Government in usurping the power of the statutory authority prescribed under the Statute. 38. Having noted the above, we may record that the decision in Dipak Babaria (supra) is of no help to the respondents, inasmuch as, it was a case where the power exercised by the State Government was dehors the provisions of the statute, which provided for a specific mechanism to be followed by the Collector, therein. The observation with regard to the power of the State in its overall control under Section 126 of the Tenancy Act, 1958 therein was made in the aforesaid perspective. 39. Another decision in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda vs. State of Gujarat – 2016 (2) GLR 1021 , pertains to the powers of the Collector/State in the matter of summary eviction by the Collector under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949. It cannot throw light on the issue for consideration before us. 39. Another decision in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda vs. State of Gujarat – 2016 (2) GLR 1021 , pertains to the powers of the Collector/State in the matter of summary eviction by the Collector under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949. It cannot throw light on the issue for consideration before us. Other decisions relied by the learned counsel for the respondents as noted in (i) judgment dated 23.12.1981 in Punja Chindu and another vs. State of Maharashtra and other – 1981 LawSuit (Bom) 358, (ii) Order dated 16.10.2015 passed by the Apex Court in Vipul Khodidas Pobaru vs. State of Gujarat, being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.29190 of 2015, (iii) Thakkar Shantilal Mohanlal vs. State of Gujarat – AIR 2004 Gujarat 272, (iv) State of Gujarat vs. Amrutlal Hansrajbhai and others – 2008 (5) GLR 4006 and (v) Ravichand Manekchand Sheth vs. State of Gujarat – 2006 (2) GLR 1567 , are distinguishable on the facts of those cases and are of no help as they do not pertain to the issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal to deal with the matters pertaining to or arising out of the orders passed under the Ordinance, 1949. 40. Moreover, in view of Section 9 of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, the statutory tribunal which has been established under Section 3 of the said Act, cannot be conferred jurisdiction beyond the scope of the said Act and any such act of this Court would amount to entering into the legislative arena, which is impermissible. 41. We, therefore, reach at an irresistible conclusion that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, has no jurisdiction to entertain an application/appeal/revision against an order passed by the Mamlatdar or the Collector under Section 75 of Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949. The reference is answered, accordingly. The Special Civil Application No.1664 of 1997, out of which the instant reference has arisen, be placed before the appropriate Single Bench. FURTHER ORDER The oral request made by Mr.Ravindra Shah, learned counsel for the respondents to grant leave to file appeal before the Supreme Court as well as the prayer for grant of interim stay to the operation of this judgment are hereby rejected.