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2023 DIGILAW 1107 (JHR)

Prasanna Narayan v. Jharkhand State Housing Board

2023-09-01

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2023
ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 22nd March 2021 passed in W.P. (C) No. 4880 of 2019 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed. 3. The writ petition was filed by the appellant dismissing the order of the Housing Board cancelling the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) in her name and handing over the same to the respondent no. 5 vide letter no. 537 dated 03rd August 2019 for construction of flats over the same under Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) category. 4. It is not in dispute that the appellant was allotted a LIG house being LRA-51 vide allotment letter no. 186 dated 30th May 1992 pursuant to her application dated 16th March 1985 under the Scheduled Caste category. The said allotment was subsequently cancelled due to the non-execution of the agreement by the appellant. However, the said house was re-allotted in favour of the appellant, and possession of the same was handed over on 3rd June 2018 and a registered lease-deed was also executed. 5. The State of Jharkhand in the exercise of its powers conferred under section 28(3) of the Jharkhand State Housing Board Act, 2000 framed the Jharkhand State Housing Board (Management and Disposal of Housing Estate) Regulation, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation of 2004). Clause 30 of the said Regulation provides for allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) to an adjacent existing allottee who has sought allotment of such type of plot. The appellant filed an application dated 21st March 2009 for allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) measuring an area of 2500 square feet which was situated near her existing house being LRA-51. Thereafter, a report was submitted by the Executive Engineer as required under Clause 30 of the Regulation of 2004 and vide letter no. 295 dated 03rd March 2010 and the said ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was allotted in favour of the appellant on payment of commercial rate but she was restrained from using the said plot for any commercial purpose. The appellant deposited the requisite amount and thereafter a hire purchase agreement dated 12th October 2010 was executed between the appellant and the Housing Board. The appellant deposited the requisite amount and thereafter a hire purchase agreement dated 12th October 2010 was executed between the appellant and the Housing Board. Possession of the said ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was also handed over to the appellant on 21st October 2010 and a registered deed of lease was executed by the Housing Board in favour of the appellant on 27th November 2010. 6. In the year 2015, the Managing Director of the Housing Board issued a show-cause notice to the appellant vide Memo No. 324 dated 10th March 2015 directing the appellant to explain why the restoration of allotment of the house being LRA-51 be not cancelled alleging that re-allocation was made in contravention of Clause 8 (Gh) and 9 (Kh) of the Regulation of 2004. The appellant was also directed vide said show-cause notice to explain why the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) near her house being LRA-51 be not cancelled as the allotment letter no. 295 dated 3rd March 2010 was issued in contravention of Clause 2(xxxi), 8(Gh), 9(Kh), 30(Ga) and 30(Gh) of the Regulation of 2004. The appellant filed a reply to the said show-cause notice on 30th March 2015. The appellant was not served with any order passed by the Housing Board, rather vide letter no. 537 dated 03rd August 2019, the said ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was allotted to respondent no. 5 for the construction of flats under Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) category over it. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, the writ petition was filed for the following reliefs: “(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction for quashing/setting aside the Letter No. 537 dated 3.8.2019 (Annexure-10 of the writ application) wherein respondent-Jharkhand State Housing Board has allotted chitput plot situated near house No. LRA-51 situated at Argora Housing Colony, Ranchi belonging to the Petitioner, to the private Respondent No. 5, for construction of Middle Income Group House/Flats over the said chitput plot being G+3 building. (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including writ of Declaration, declaring that the action of Respondent-authority in allotting said chitput plot having an area of 2500 sq. ft. (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including writ of Declaration, declaring that the action of Respondent-authority in allotting said chitput plot having an area of 2500 sq. ft. situated near House No. LRA-51 of the Petitioner situated in Argora Housing Colony, to Respondent No. 5 for construction of Middle Income Group House/G+3 Flats, is wholly arbitrary and illegal and contrary to the registered lease deed in perpetuity already executed in favour of the Petitioner which has not yet been cancelled by any competent Court of Civil Jurisdiction. (iii) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction, to summon and call for the entire records of the Jharkhand State Housing Board pursuant to show cause notice issued to the Petitioner contained in Memo No. 324 dated 10.3.2015 (Annexure-8 of the writ application) and to consequently quash the order, if any, pertaining to cancellation of the chitput plot of the Petitioner situated near her house being LRA-51, Argora Housing Colony, Ranchi. (iv) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Declaration, declaring that Deed of Lease on perpetuity executed between the Respondent-Jharkhand State Housing Board and the Petitioner dated 27.11.2010 cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Respondent-Jharkhand State Housing Board without seeking proper declaration in that regard from the competent court of civil jurisdiction.” 8. The findings of the learned writ Court are as under: “9. In the case of ITC Limited (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “30. A lease governed exclusively by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the TP Act” for short) could be cancelled only by filing a civil suit for its cancellation or for a declaration that it is illegal, null and void and for the consequential relief of delivery back of possession. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law. But where the grant of lease is governed by a statute or statutory regulations, and if such statute expressly reserves the power of cancellation or revocation to the lessor, it will be permissible for an authority, as the lessor, to cancel a duly executed and registered lease deed, even if possession has been delivered, on the specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute.” 10. It may thus be construed that there is a distinction between a private lease and a government lease. It has been held that a private lease is governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the cancellation of which cannot be done unilaterally and a party intending cancellation must seek such remedy before a competent court of civil jurisdiction. However, the position would be different in a case where any lease is governed by a statute or statutory regulation as also if such statute expressly reserves the power of cancellation or revocation to the lessor. In such cases, the authority as a lessor may cancel a duly executed and registered lease deed on the specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute. The said cancellation of lease deed may be done even if the possession has been delivered to a lessee. 11. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Zahoor Ahmad and Another, (1973) 2 SCC 547 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: ........................... 12. In the case of Union of India and Others vs. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 204 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: ........................... 13. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 has held that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not applicable to any Government grants including lease of land and the same will be governed entirely by the terms of the grant. 13. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 has held that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not applicable to any Government grants including lease of land and the same will be governed entirely by the terms of the grant. The Government has a discretion under Section 3 to impose any condition, limitation or restriction in its grants and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant itself even if the said terms may be inconsistent with the provisions of any statute or common law. 14. In the present case, the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ is governed by the Regulation, 2004. Clause 2(xxxi) defines ‘chhitput plot’ as a plot which is left un-allotted after development/allotment of the residential premises and which is not fit for allotment independently. However, the said chhitput plot shall not be capable of allotment if the same is the part of a projected road or park or through which sewer line, water disposal and water pipe line are passing or upon which Housing Board has proposed some other project. Further, Clause 30 of the said regulation contains the procedure for allotment of ‘chhitput plot’. Clause 30(Ga) provides that a ‘chhitput plot’ will be allotted to only those persons in whose name there is a plot allotted beside/in front of or in back side of the said ‘chhitput plot’. Clause 36 further provides that the allotment of a residential unit/flat to an allottee will be on “Perpetual Lease Hold” basis as per the terms and conditions framed by the JSHB. 15. On bare perusal of the lease deed of the said ‘chhitput plot’ it would appear that in paragraph 12 of the same certain conditions have been mentioned under which the Board has the right to cancel the lease. The said paragraph of the lease deed is quoted hereunder for ready reference: “12. 15. On bare perusal of the lease deed of the said ‘chhitput plot’ it would appear that in paragraph 12 of the same certain conditions have been mentioned under which the Board has the right to cancel the lease. The said paragraph of the lease deed is quoted hereunder for ready reference: “12. That the without prejudice to the Board right under any other law rules and regulation and besides recovering the amount if found due to the Board along with interest penalty and damage even after execution of these present the Board shall in addition the right to cancel the allotment/settlement made in favour of the LESSEE and to evict him from premises allotted to the LESSEE and resume possession therefore in the event of any one of the or more of the following: (a) Non-compliance of any terms and condition of the Indenture or of the terms and condition of the Hire Purchase Agreement executed on 13.10.2010. (b) Violation of the term and condition prescribed in the rules and regulation of the Board in this regard. (c) Default in payment of any amount remaining due for payment to the Board even after execution of the presence for the period of more than 12 months from the date such demand by the Board. (d) If it is found that the LESSEE was Frazidar and took settlement on behalf of any other person or persons. (e) If it is found that the allotment/settlement was taken by furnishing false information or affidavit or concealing any material facts.” 16. The learned counsel for the respondent-JSHB has submitted that the lease of the ‘chhitput plot’ granted to the petitioner was subsequently found to be in gross contravention of the Regulation, 2004 and at the time of grant of lease, petitioner’s husband was the Managing Director of the Board who, with a well-designed plan, in association with the Executive Engineer, Ranchi Division and other officials got the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ made in favour of the petitioner. The JSHB having found the illegality in grant of said allotment to the petitioner has subsequently cancelled it. 17. The JSHB having found the illegality in grant of said allotment to the petitioner has subsequently cancelled it. 17. On perusal of paragraph 12(b) of the lease deed, it appears that while executing the lease deed of the ‘chhitput plot’ the Board had reserved its right to cancel the lease in the event of violation of the terms and conditions prescribed in the rules and regulations of the JSHB in this regard. On perusal of the map of the ‘chhitput plot’ appended with the lease deed dated 27th November, 2010, it appears that the same was not situated beside/in front of/behind plot no. LRA-51 which was earlier allotted to the petitioner and thus there was clear violation of the Regulation, 2004 while allotting the said ‘chhitput plot’ to the petitioner. It further appears from the map that after plot no. LRA-51, there was plot no. LRA-52 and thereafter a 20 feet wide road and then a drain of 6 feet and lastly the said chhitput plot was situated. Apart from that, the petitioner’s own statement is that the area of the said ‘chhitput plot’ was 2500 square feet which in view of the statement of the respondent-Board was capable of being allotted as a HIG plot and thus the same could not be said to be coming under the definition of ‘chhitput plot’. 18. In view of the aforesaid fact, I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the JSHB was not justified in cancelling the lease deed. Since, the power of cancelling the lease deed was conferred in the lease deed itself on certain conditions and the petitioner had signed the lease deed with her open eyes, the Board having found that there was violation of the provisions of Regulation, 2004 rightly cancelled the lease of the said ‘chhitput plot’ executed in favour of the petitioner. I am of the view that in the cases where allotment/transfer of any land is made by the state instrumentalities in favour of any private person in violation of law, they should be given some latitude to cancel the same under a given situation. I am of the view that in the cases where allotment/transfer of any land is made by the state instrumentalities in favour of any private person in violation of law, they should be given some latitude to cancel the same under a given situation. The purpose behind it is that the matters of illegal and fraudulent transfer of land should not be relegated to civil adjudication in a routine manner which is a time consuming process giving undue benefit to the transferee whose transfer was in contravention of law. This also adversely affects other persons seeking allotment of land as per law. 19. I have also perused the other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the petitioner’s claim. 20. In the case of Sukh Sagar Medical College (Supra). 21. In the case of Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Supra). 22. The fact and issue involved in the aforesaid judgments are altogether different from the fact of the present case and as such the ratio laid down in the said cases is not applicable in the present case. Here, the lease deed of the petitioner itself contained conditions under which the lease of the petitioner could be unilaterally cancelled by the JSHB and since the same has been cancelled after having found the allotment in gross violation of the regulation, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said decision of the JSHB. 23. One of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 24. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 4 SCC 54 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: ........................... 25. Thus, the compliance of the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. If under certain circumstances, it is found that any prejudice has been caused to the aggrieved, the principles of natural justice must be followed in its strict sense. However, if the court finds that even after compliance of the principles of natural justice, the result would be the same, the court may waive the compliance of principles of natural justice considering it as a futile exercise. However, if the court finds that even after compliance of the principles of natural justice, the result would be the same, the court may waive the compliance of principles of natural justice considering it as a futile exercise. Moreover, it is evident from the record that the petitioner was issued a show cause notice on 10th March, 2015 which was replied by her and only thereafter, the impugned order has been passed. As such, the JSHB had given ample opportunity to the petitioner to controvert the allegation levelled against her before taking the impugned action. 26. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.” Arguments of the appellant 9. The learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the judgment passed by the learned writ Court has submitted that once the registration of any plot was done the same could not be unilaterally cancelled merely by alleging violation of one or the other clause of the aforesaid Regulation of 2004. It is submitted that a registered document could be cancelled only through a competent Court of civil jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the order of cancellation of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was annexed along with the counter-affidavit which is contained in letter no. 710 dated 15th April 2015 and such cancellation was not in accordance with law and her show-cause reply was not considered. Arguments of the respondent Housing Board 10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Housing Board has submitted that the Housing Board has cancelled only the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) and the Board has not disturbed the allotment of the House No. LRA-51. It is submitted that it is not in dispute that the allocation of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was in violation of the aforesaid Regulation of 2004 and consequently the learned writ Court has rightly observed that the principles of natural justice would not have served any purpose. The learned counsel for the Housing Board submits that the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has also referred to the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895. The learned counsel for the Housing Board submits that the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has also referred to the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895. He submits that the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was to be strictly in accordance with the Regulation of 2004 and therefore the argument of the appellant that the ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) could not have been cancelled without process of the civil Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He has submitted that the issue is squarely covered by the judgments which have been referred to by the learned writ Court and there is no illegality in the impugned order. The learned counsel has reiterated the arguments advanced before the learned writ Court and submits that serious allegations have been made against the appellant in connection with the manner in which the ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was allotted to her during the period when her husband was the Managing Director of the Housing Board and the plot was neither adjoining to her already allotted vide House No. LRA-51 and the plot could be termed as ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) considering the location and dimensions of the plot and was capable of independent allotment as an ordinary plot of land. The plot was allotted in complete violation of the Regulation of 2004. Findings of this Court 11. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the appellant was allocated a house property being LRA-51 by the Housing Board and subsequently she was also allocated another piece of land stating it to be a ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) on the ground that it was adjacent to her plot. The allocation of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) is governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Regulation of 2004. During the course of the argument, it is not in dispute that the area allocated to the appellant by way of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was to the extent of 2500 square feet and the same was not adjacent to House No. LRA-51 was earlier allotted to her and the location and the dimensions of the plot were such that it was capable of allotment as an independent plot and not as ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot). It is also not in dispute that the required approval of the Housing Board was also not taken prior to the allotment of such a plot of land to the appellant and all this happened while the husband of the appellant was the Managing Director of the Housing Board. There has been a flagrant violation of the provisions of the law including violation of Regulation of 2004 in the matter of allotment of 2500 square feet of land by treating the same to be ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) and showing it to be adjoining to the House No. LRA-51 of the appellant and all this happened not only in contravention of the provision of the Regulation of 2004 but without the required approval of the Board during the period when the husband of the appellant was the Managing Director of the Housing Board. The learned writ Court has elaborately dealt with the facts of the case and has recorded its findings in paragraph nos. 13 to 17 and has rightly refused to interfere with the order of cancellation of the ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) by citing reasons in paragraph no. 18 of the impugned judgment. 12. The foundational facts which led to the cancellation of allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) to the appellant are not in dispute and such facts strike at the very basis of allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) to the appellant and violation of the aforesaid Regulation of 2004 is not in dispute, therefore, the learned writ Court has rightly observed that the compliance of principles of natural justice would be of mere formality and such principle cannot be placed under a strait jacket formula and such exercise would be a futile exercise. In such circumstances, the learned writ Court has refused to interfere with the order of the cancellation of the ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) in favour of the appellant. This Court finds no illegality or perversity in the aforesaid findings recorded by the learned writ Court. 13. In such circumstances, the learned writ Court has refused to interfere with the order of the cancellation of the ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) in favour of the appellant. This Court finds no illegality or perversity in the aforesaid findings recorded by the learned writ Court. 13. So far as another point raised by the appellant regarding cancellation of the plot having been registered through a competent Court of civil jurisdiction is concerned, this Court finds that the learned writ Court has referred to various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including in Union of India and Others vs. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 204 and has rejected the arguments of the appellant in the light of the aforesaid judgment in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the impugned order which is already quoted above. 14. In this appeal also, the main argument of the appellant is that the transfer involved in the present case would attract the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and if the Housing Board intended to cancel the registered lease-deed already executed in favour of the appellant, it was required under law to approach the competent Court of civil jurisdiction for seeking a declaration that the lease-deed is void ab-initio and/or cancelled and in absence of such a declaration, the Housing Board was not justified in interfering with the peaceful possession of the property by the appellant. The appellant has referred to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ITC Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2011) 7 SCC 493 . The appellant has submitted that under the provisions of the Jharkhand State Housing Board Act, 2000, and the Regulation of 2004, there is no enabling power given to the authorities of the Housing Board to unilaterally cancel the registered deed executed by it in favour of an allottee including the present appellant. The appellant has relied upon paragraph no. 30 of the aforesaid judgment which was also relied upon before the learned writ Court and quoted in paragraph no. 9 of the impugned judgment. 15. It is important to note that as per the registered lease-deed itself, the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was made to the appellant vide letter no. The appellant has relied upon paragraph no. 30 of the aforesaid judgment which was also relied upon before the learned writ Court and quoted in paragraph no. 9 of the impugned judgment. 15. It is important to note that as per the registered lease-deed itself, the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was made to the appellant vide letter no. 295 dated 3rd March 2010, thereafter a hire purchase agreement was executed on 13th October 2010 which was followed by execution of lease-deed dated 27th November 2010. The allotment letter no. 295 dated 3rd March 2010 has not been placed on record. However, Clause 12 of the lease-deed executed on 27th November 2010 as quoted in paragraph no. 15 of the impugned order is the same as that of Clause 25 of the hire purchase agreement placed on record and it is apparent that the Housing Board has reserved its rights to cancel the lease and cease possession if it is found that the allotment/settlement was taken by furnishing false information or affidavit or concealing any material facts. 16. The judgment in the case of “ITC Limited” (Supra) has been considered and distinguished by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2022) 5 SCC 591 . In “New Okhla Industrial Development Authority” (Supra) it was an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted a property who had sworn a false affidavit that neither she nor her spouse owned any other plot in Noida and such allotment of property on the basis of false affidavit struck as the root of the allotment which led to the cancellation of allotment. The allotment was subject to the terms and conditions which clearly provided that the person himself or in case of spouse or dependent children owning a plot within Municipal Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi or Noida Complex will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in Noida. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recorded that the terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff had a specific clause that if the allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation, misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken by the authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recorded that the terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff had a specific clause that if the allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation, misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken by the authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that cancellation of allotment of the plot obtained by filing a false affidavit was a legitimate ground for cancellation of the lease and held that fraud vitiates all actions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further rejected the contention that the lease was required to be determined by the Chief Executive Officer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the determination of the lease by the Chief Executive Officer would arise if in case there was any violation of the terms of the lease. If the condition precedent for the grant of the lease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of the lease was not required to be preceded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that the fact that the 2nd plot allotted to the plaintiff was allotted against the express terms of allotment, therefore, there was neither any equity nor any law in favour of the plaintiff. It was held that a person who misleads the authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has distinguished the case of “ITC Limited” (Supra) in paragraph no. 25 of the judgment by holding that the judgment of “ITC Limited” (Supra) was on altogether different facts. In that case, the allotment made in favour of ITC Limited was the subject matter of challenge in Public Interest Litigation and the issue was in respect of cancellation of the lease on account of violation of terms not based upon fraud in obtaining the lease. The paragraphs relevant for the purposes of the present case of the judgment in “New Okhla Industrial Development Authority” (Supra) are quoted as under: 22. The terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff on 1-12-1988 have a specific clause that if allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation or misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken by the Authority. The terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff on 1-12-1988 have a specific clause that if allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation or misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken by the Authority. Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after filing false affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease. 23. Fraud vitiates all actions as laid down by this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath wherein it was held as under: (SCC p. 5, Para 5) “5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that ‘there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence’. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax evaders, bank loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 24. The argument that the lease was required to be determined by the Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. The determination of lease by the Chief Executive Officer would arise if in case there was any violation of the terms of lease. If the condition precedent for grant of lease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of lease was not required to be preceded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further, the Chief Executive Officer has granted permission on 13-9-1998, though the cancellation order was passed on 18-10-1996. If the condition precedent for grant of lease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of lease was not required to be preceded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further, the Chief Executive Officer has granted permission on 13-9-1998, though the cancellation order was passed on 18-10-1996. Thus, it is a case of irregularity at best which stands removed with the permission of the Chief Executive Officer. The argument that if the statute prescribes a power to do a certain thing in a certain way, such thing must be done in that way and other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden is not applicable in the present case. Firstly, for the reason that admittedly, false affidavits were filed by the plaintiff as well as by his wife. The filing of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable relief. Secondly, any irregularity in the process of cancellation stands cured with Chief Executive Officer granting permission on 13-9-1998. 25. The judgment in ITC as relied upon by the respondent is on altogether different facts. In that case, the allotment made in favour of ITC Limited was subject-matter of challenge in public interest litigation in writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. The issue was in respect of cancellation of lease on account of violation of the terms, not based upon fraud in obtaining the lease. 26. The judgments of this Court in Teri Oat Estates and Hari Om Enterprises are also on different facts wherein the doctrine of proportionality was applied. 27. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiff had been allotted against the express terms of allotment. Therefore, there is neither equity nor any law in favour of the plaintiff. A person who misleads the Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief. 28. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the suit is thus dismissed.” 17. In the present case also the cancellation of the allotment is based on the established fact that the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was itself in violation of the Regulation of 2004 and was made in complete violation of the law. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the suit is thus dismissed.” 17. In the present case also the cancellation of the allotment is based on the established fact that the allotment of ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) was itself in violation of the Regulation of 2004 and was made in complete violation of the law. A plot was allotted to the appellant by treating it as a ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) which was neither capable of being treated as a ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot) in terms of the Regulation of 2004 nor the same could have been allotted to the appellant by showing it adjoining to her house being LRA-51, which was a condition precedent for such an allotment, though admittedly it was not adjoining to her house being LRA-51. The allotment itself was obtained by misrepresentation and by putting incorrect/misleading facts on record. Accordingly, the cancellation of allotment was fully justified and the learned writ Court has rightly relied upon Clause 12 of the lease-deed. 18. This Court finds that the learned writ Court has given sound reasons for rejecting the aforesaid plea of the appellant. The allotment itself being in violation of Regulation of 2004 the Housing Board was within its right to cancel the allotment of the land to the appellant termed as ‘chhitput plot’ (cut plot). Such cancellation will have its own effect and all consequences shall follow. 19. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings and in the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court does not find any merits in this Letters Patent Appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed. 20. Pending I.A. if any, is closed.