ORDER 1. This Criminal Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner, being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.03.2017 in C.C.No.27012/2015 on the file of the Court of XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City and its confirmation judgment and order dated 20.07.2019 in Crl.A.No.538/2017 on the file of the Court of LX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-61) has filed this revision petition seeking to set aside the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, wherein the petitioner / accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'N.I Act'). 2. The petitioner is the accused before the Trial Court and the appellant before the Appellate Court. Brief facts of the case are as under: 3. It is the case of the complainant that, the petitioner and the respondent were friends. The respondent along with one Sri.Kempegowda, Sri.Jaikar entered into an agreement of sale dated 01.03.2013 with one Sri.G.Srinivasa in respect of property Sy.No.9/2, Machohalli Village, Dasanapura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk (as per Ex.P6). It is further stated that the petitioner being one of the purchasers was short of funds, therefore, it is stated that the respondent stated to have funded an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- at the time of agreement of sale. It was agreed that the said amount would be repaid after the development and sale of the said property. The accused / petitioner stated to have issued a post-dated cheque dated 25.08.2015 to the complainant. It is stated that the said cheque was presented on 09.10.2015 for encashment, however, it was dishonoured for the reason 'funds insufficient'. After the issuance of the notice, a complaint came to be filed before the Magistrate having jurisdiction. 4. To prove the case of the complainant, the complainant examined himself as PW.1 and marked 26 documents as Exhibits P1 to P26 and also examined the other three witnesses as PWs.2 to 4. On the other hand, the petitioner examined himself as DW.1 and got marked 7 documents as Exs.D1 to D7. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record convicted the petitioner for the offence stated supra. On the other hand, the petitioner examined himself as DW.1 and got marked 7 documents as Exs.D1 to D7. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record convicted the petitioner for the offence stated supra. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal in part by confirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Trial Court, however, the Appellate Court modified the order of sentence and sentenced the accused to pay a fine of Rs.15,05,000/-. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition seeking to set aside the concurrent findings. 5. Heard Shri Prasanna D P, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Shri N Shivakumar, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the Courts below failed to consider the contradiction and omission and passed the impugned judgments, which are opposed to the facts and evidence on record, hence the same is liable to be set aside. 7. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the petitioner used to purchase cement and other items from one Sri.Prakash who was running a shop namely S.L.N.Traders situated at Srirampuram, Bengaluru -560 021. It is further stated that, after the petitioner came to know that, the said cheque was misused by the respondent, he immediately, sent a legal notice to said Prakash asking him to return the said cheque. 8. It is further contended that the petitioner has substantiated that, he has not borrowed a loan from the respondent as stated in the cheque and also the respondent has not proved that there is a legally enforceable debt or liability. In spite of not proving the case by the respondent, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court grossly erred in holding that, the petitioner found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is erroneous and illegal and the same is liable to be set aside. Making such a submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays to allow the petition. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent justifying the concurrent findings of conviction and submits that the cheque belongs to the petitioner and the petitioner admitted his signature, however, he has denied the transaction. Making such a submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays to allow the petition. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent justifying the concurrent findings of conviction and submits that the cheque belongs to the petitioner and the petitioner admitted his signature, however, he has denied the transaction. Mere denial of the transaction would not enure the benefit of rebuttable presumption to the petitioner in any way. To rebut the presumption, the petitioner has to raise a probable defence that is believable and acceptable. 10. It is further submitted that the petitioner even though denied acquaintance with the respondent, in the cross-examination, has admitted that the respondent and other two partners including the petitioner entered into an agreement of sale to purchase the property of Sri.G.Srinivasa. After the formation of the layout, they have sold the sites to the prospective purchasers. 11. It is further submitted that, even though the petitioner contended that, the cheque was issued to one Sri.Prakash, has not established how the said cheque was given to the respondent by said Sri.Prakash. The petitioner neither examined Sri.Prakash nor produced any document to show that, the cheque had been issued to some other person other than the respondent. Therefore, the Trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record opined that the petitioner was found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. The findings recorded by the Courts below appear to be appropriate and correct, interference with the well-reasoned order may not be warranted. Having submitted thus, the learned counsel for the respondent prays to dismiss the petition. 12. Having heard the rival contentions urged by the learned counsels for the respective parties and also perused the documents available on record, the findings of the Courts below in recording the conviction, the points which arise for my consideration are: i) Whether the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below in convicting the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act are sustainable? ii) Whether the petitioner has made grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below for conviction? 13. ii) Whether the petitioner has made grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below for conviction? 13. This Court being a Revisional Court, having regard to the scope and ambit envisaged to appreciate the facts and law, it is necessary to have a cursory look upon the evidence and also the law, to ascertain as to whether any illegality or perversity or error committed by the Courts below in recording the conviction. 14. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is relevant to refer to the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BIR SINGH v. MUKESH KUMAR, (2019) 4 SCC 197 paragraphs No.18 to 24 read thus: '18. In passing the impugned judgment and order dated 21-11-2017, the High Court misconstrued Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which mandates that unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is a rebuttable presumption. However, the onus of proving that the cheque was not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused drawer of the cheque. 19. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, this Court held that both Sections 138 and 139 require that the court shall presume the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn. Following the judgment of this Court in State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, this Court held that it was obligatory on the court to raise this presumption. 20. Section 139 introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof and shifts the onus on the accused. The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from presumption of facts. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, which requires the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from presumption of facts. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, which requires the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law and presumptions of fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the nonexistence of the presumed fact as held in Hiten P. Dalal. 21. Presumption of innocence is undoubtedly a human right as contended on behalf of the respondent-accused, relying on the judgments of this Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI. However the guilt may be established by recourse to presumptions in law and presumptions in facts, as observed above. 22. In Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, this Court reiterated that in view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque was issued in discharge of a debt or other liability but the presumption could be rebutted by adducing evidence. The burden of proof was however on the person who wanted to rebut the presumption. This Court held 'however, this presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act'. 23. In Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, this Court reiterated that there is a presumption that every negotiable instrument duly executed, is for discharge of a debt or liability, but the presumption is rebuttable by proving the contrary. In the facts and circumstances of the case it was found that the cheque in question was towards advance for purchase of carpets, which were in fact not sold by the payee of the cheque to the drawer, as proved from the deposition of an official of the Sales Tax Department, who stated that the payee had admitted that he had not sold the carpets. 24. In K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, this Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 118 thereof, the Court had to presume that the cheque had been issued for discharging a debt or liability. 24. In K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, this Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 118 thereof, the Court had to presume that the cheque had been issued for discharging a debt or liability. The said presumption was rebuttable and could be rebutted by the accused by proving the contrary. But mere denial or rebuttal by the accused was not enough. The accused had to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. This Court clearly held that the High Court had erroneously set aside the conviction, by proceeding on the basis that denials/averments in the reply of the accused were sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the complainant to prove that the cheque had been issued for discharge of a debt or a liability. This was an entirely erroneous approach. The accused had to prove in the trial by leading cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability.' 15. On careful reading of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it makes it clear that Section 139 of the N.I Act mandates presumption unless the contrary is proved. It is to be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. However, the said presumption is rebuttable in nature. It is needless to say that Section 139 of the NI Act introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof and shifts the onus on the accused to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. Mere denial or rebuttable by the accused was not enough. 16. Now it is relevant to refer the defence of the accused by considering the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The accused in the cross-examination of PW.1 contended that he had not received the amount as stated by PW.1. When a specific question was put to PW.1 in the cross-examination regarding the mode of payment of the amount as stated in the cheque, PW.1 asserted that on 01.03.2013 he paid Rs.15.00 lakhs at once. However, further PW.1 stated that Rs.10.00 lakhs was paid by way of cash and Rs.5.00 lakhs was paid through cheque. When a specific question was put to PW.1 in the cross-examination regarding the mode of payment of the amount as stated in the cheque, PW.1 asserted that on 01.03.2013 he paid Rs.15.00 lakhs at once. However, further PW.1 stated that Rs.10.00 lakhs was paid by way of cash and Rs.5.00 lakhs was paid through cheque. In order to substantiate the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs paid to the accused, PW.1 produced Ex.P7 which is his bank statement. PW.1 says that as per Ex.P7(b) he had issued a cheque to the accused. When a specific question was put to PW.1 that it was not credited to the account of the accused, he replied that he did not know. However, the amount which PW.1 stated to have issued through cheque to the accused, was credited to the account of Sri.Srinivas who was the vendor of the property wherein the complainant, the accused and two others have purchased the immovable property for the purpose of forming the layout. 17. PW.1 examined the other three witnesses PWs.2 to 4, and they did not support regarding payment of the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs to the accused. As far as the evidence of accused/DW.1 is concerned, the accused contended that on receipt of summons from the Court, he is stated to have issued notice to Sri.Prakash who was running a shop namely Sri S.L.N Traders, situated behind Devaiah Park, Bengaluru where DW.1 used to purchase cement and other items. In the said notice, DW.1 asked Sri.Prakash to return the cheque which was given as security. However, the said notice was not received by Sri.Prakash. 18. On careful reading of the evidence of DW.1, it appears that he has rebutted the presumption by adducing the cogent evidence that notice was issued to Sri.Prakash regarding the return of the cheque after receipt of summons from the Court. It is noted here that, the notice issued to DW.1 regarding the dishonour of the cheque was returned to PW.1 as 'addressee refused'. When DW.1 cross-examined PWs.2, 3 and 4 and elicited that the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs was not paid to DW.1, the burden would be shifted to PW.1 to prove that he had lent the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs to DW.1. When DW.1 cross-examined PWs.2, 3 and 4 and elicited that the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs was not paid to DW.1, the burden would be shifted to PW.1 to prove that he had lent the amount of Rs.15.00 lakhs to DW.1. In the present case, PW.1 even though stated that amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs was paid by way of cash and Rs.5.00 lakhs was paid through cheque, PW.1 failed to prove the said transaction despite he examined three witnesses on his behalf. PW.1 has not produced any bank statements or any other documents to show that the amount of Rs.5.00 lakhs was credited to the account of DW.1. Therefore, PW.1 failed to prove that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability. However, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the said aspect in this manner and recorded the conviction which is erroneous and illegal. Even though the Revisional Court not opted to appreciate the evidence, however, when there is patent error is noticed, in recording the conviction, the Revisional Court can interfere with the facts and also the law in order to secure the ends of justice. 19. In the light of the observations made above, the points that arose for my consideration are answered as under:- Point No.(i) - 'Negative' Point No.(ii) - 'Affirmative' 20. Hence, I proceed to pass the following:- ORDER (i) The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. (ii) The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.03.2017 passed in C.C.NO.27012/2015 by the Court of XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City and the judgment and order dated 20.07.2019 passed in Crl.A.No.538/2017 by the Court of LX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-61), are set aside. (iii) The petitioner is acquitted for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I Act. (iv) Bail bonds executed, if any, stand cancelled.