JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.Y. KOGJE) 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed for following relief:- “(B) To issue a writ of habeas corpus and/or any other writ, order or direction, quashing the order of detention bearing no.D.C./POL/PASA/ D.T.N./ SR NO.09/2023 dated 28.07.2023 passed by respondent no.2-District Magistrate, Sabarkantha -Himmatnagar and to set the petitioner at liberty (Annex-A); 2. Essentially, the challenge is to the order of detention dated 28.07.2023 passed by the District Magistrate, Sabarkantha-Himmatnagar, respondent No.2 herein, by which the petitioner has been detained as a “bootlegger” as defined under section 2(b) of the Act based on four offences registered against him, details of which are as under:- Sr. No Name of Police Station CR No. and date Sections 1 Vijaynagar Police Station, Sabarkantha PART-C-11209055220569 of 2022 dated 04.11.2022 65(A)(E), 81 of the Prohibition Act 2 Himmatnagar Rural Police Station, PART-C-11209017220947 of 2022 dated 16.11.2022 65(A)(E), 81 and 83 of the Prohibition Act 3 Jadar Police Station, Sabarkantha PART-C-11209024220713 of 2022 dated 29.09.2022 65(A)(E) of the Prohibition Act 4 Himmatnagar Rural Police Station, PART-C-11209017220472 of 2022 dated 06.05.2022 65(A)(E), 116B, 81, 83 and 98(2) of the Prohibition Act 3. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of the offences under Sections 65(A)(E), 98(2), 81, 83 and 116B of the Prohibition Act by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(b) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Learned Advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder. 4. Learned AGP for the respondent State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined under section 2(b) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court. The State has chosen not to file counter affidavit/reply so as to justify the action invoking provisions of the PASA Act. 5. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused documents on record, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any bearing on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act. Except general statements, there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner, which is dangerous to the public order. 6. In recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen Vs. State of Telanga & Ors. rendered in Criminal Appeal No.908 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.4260 of 2022 dated 22.06.2022, the Supreme Court has made following observations in para-17:- “17. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenue is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Moreover, the Court also finds that the order of detention does not refer to the bail granted to the petitioner. 8. The Court also finds that there is delay in passing the order of detention as the petitioner was enlarged on regular bail in last offence on 16.06.2023 and the order of detention came to be passed on 28.07.2023. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik Vs. State of Tripura, reported in AIR 2022 SC 4715 has observed as under:- “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the "live and proximate link" between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention & failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION 12. DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: "Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the "live & proximate link" between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. 16. In Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 395 , this Court while examining the necessity of securing the arrest of the detenu immediately after the order of detention has held thus: "It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude in securing the arrest of the petitioner immediately after the making of the order of detention, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities. Of course when we say this we must not be understood to mean that whenever there is delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the delay and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine." Having held as above, Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) pointed out that if there is any delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention which is prima-facie unreasonable, the State must give reasons explaining the delay. 17. 17. A similar contention was raised in Suresh Mahato v. The District Magistrate, Burdwan, and Ors., (1975) 3 SCC 554 , on the basis of the dictum laid down in two decisions of this Court, namely, SK. Serajul v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 78 , and Sk. Nizamuddin (supra) contending that the delay of the arrest of the detenu in that case showed that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detention of the detenu for otherwise he would have tried to secure the arrest of the detenu promptly and not left him free to carry on his nefarious activities. Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) while dealing with this submission, made the following observation: "Now, there can be no doubt-and the law on this point must be regarded as well settled by these two decisions-that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest of the detenu, such delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and it would be a legitimate inference to draw that the District Magistrate was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the petitioner." 18. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench in Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1979) 1 SCC 465 , has explained as follow: "It is further true that there must be a "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is "snapped" if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the "link" not snapped but strengthened." (Emphasis supplied) 19. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the "link" not snapped but strengthened." (Emphasis supplied) 19. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Meerut and Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 556 , having regard to the fact that there was a delay of two and a half months in detaining the petitioner (detenu) therein, pursuant to the order of detention has concluded that "there was undue delay, delay not commensurate with the facts situation in that case and the conduct of the respondent authorities betrayed that there was no real and genuine apprehension that the detenu was likely to act in any manner prejudicial to public order. The order, therefore is bad and must go". However, the learned Judge observed that "whether the delay was unreasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner & though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” 10. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 11. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 05.04.2023 passed by the respondent–detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 12. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.